

I think it is inappropriate to come in at this late hour and try to change the site without any provision for money to buy the site. The bill merely provides for a site in the vicinity of the Pennsylvania Avenue development program. It seems to me this is quite realistic. If it had been provided for originally and we had been able to get a site, it would be another matter, but a great amount of time, money, and effort have been expended on the development of the site.

Aside from that fact, I think it comes too late to try to change it now. It would destroy the present concept altogether.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I am very glad that the Senator from Arkansas has commented on the pending Cultural Center site. As a member of the District of Columbia Committee, let me say that in view of the developments, I believe it is an excellent choice. It would be a great mistake to try to disrupt the program now by getting into controversy over location of the center. The program is coming along nicely.

As the Senator from Arkansas knows, it is expected that a substantial drive will be conducted to obtain private funds and contributions. Our citizens have been led to believe that the site has been agreed upon.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Some \$15 million has been raised privately.

Mr. MORSE. Yes, the Senator is correct, but not only that, as we look at the situation in retrospect, and when we take into account the plans which are now in the blueprint stage for other developments in the District of Columbia, I believe that it is an excellent site.

This may be a sentimental argument on my part, but I believe it is a most appropriate site in view of the fact that President Kennedy's burial place is just across the river, with its everlasting torch aflame. Thus, this center will be among other shrines in the area, such as the Lincoln Memorial, the Jefferson Memorial, and other memorials. The Cultural Center is, after all, being built as a great memorial to our great President Kennedy, and is most appropriately located at the site which has been selected.

Accordingly, I sincerely hope that plans for completing the Center will proceed without any controversy being raised at this date over its location.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thank the Senator from Oregon for his comments. They are entirely appropriate.

REMARKS OF SENATOR THOMAS J. DODD CONCERNING A CHRONOLOGY PUBLISHED BY THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS ON THE SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the senior Senator from Connecticut (Mr. Dodd) has today issued a press release entitled "Senator Dodd Charges Foreign Relations Publication on Dominican Crisis Slanted Against Administration."

The allegation is that the chronology quoted exclusively from press sources

critical of administration policy in the Dominican Republic. The remarks of the senior Senator from Connecticut included complaints that the chronology did not bear statements favorable to the position of the administration.

The facts are as follows:

First. The document to which the senior Senator refers was issued in early July for use of the committee in connection with its effort to learn in detail of developments in the Dominican Republic. It was compiled, as noted in the preface, from material "collected with the assistance of the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, the Department of State, and the staff of the Committee on Foreign Relations." Because of shortage of time, the staff of the committee in compiling the chronology made extensive use of a research instrument to which it subscribes entitled "Deadline Data."

Second. The statement of the senior Senator from Connecticut leaves the impression that the administration views were not adequately presented in the chronology. Members should note, however, that the chronology and the accompanying printed material includes not only a number of documents issued by the Organization of American States, but six statements by President Johnson, and a number of statements by the Department of State and one by Ambassador Stevenson.

Third. I do wish to express my regret that it has not been possible for the senior Senator from Connecticut (Mr. Dodd) to attend meetings of the Foreign Relations Committee on this subject. Much of the material to which he referred has been considered by the committee.

Fourth. Finally, I wish the Record to show that all of the witnesses which the committee heard at the sessions not attended by the Senator from Connecticut were administration witnesses, save one. We heard the testimony of Secretary of State Rusk, Under Secretary of State Mann, Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance, Ambassador Bennett, Admiral Raborn, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Assistant Secretary of State for American Republics Affairs Vaughn. The only non-Government witness called before the committee was the former Governor of Puerto Rico, the Honorable Luis Muñoz-Marin.

Investigations of acts of the executive department by their very nature, as the Senator well knows, put the burden on the administration to prove that its actions were correct. I believe that a fair criticism of the committee might be that it put too much time and effort into the examination of Government witnesses, and not enough into examination of Government critics.

The committee has met on 13 different occasions, compiling some 700 pages of testimony. Most of the meetings have been 2 or 3 hours in length. The senior Senator from Connecticut attended one of those meetings, and a search of the committee records indicates that he has not seen fit to consult the transcripts of those hearings.

FURTHER AMENDMENT OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1951—CONFERENCE REPORT

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I submit a report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 7750) to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1951, as amended, and for other purposes. I ask unanimous consent for the present consideration of the report.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The report will be read for the information of the Senate.

The legislative clerk read the report. (For conference report, see House proceedings of Aug. 18, 1965, pp. 30183-30185, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.)

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the report?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the report.

VIETNAM

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, today, there came to my attention a document entitled "Why Vietnam," which includes some historical documents—letters written by President Kennedy and President Eisenhower, and statements made by President Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk. It is a most informative document and will be helpful to citizens who wish to study step by step the nature and extent of our involvement in Vietnam.

I ask unanimous consent to have this document printed in the Record for the information of all Senators.

There being no objection, the document was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

WHY VIETNAM FOREWORD

MY FELLOW AMERICANS: Once again, in man's age-old struggle for a better life and a world of peace, the wisdom, courage, and compassion of the American people are being put to the test. This is the meaning of the tragic conflict in Vietnam.

In meeting the present challenge, it is essential that our people seek understanding, and that our leaders speak with candor.

I have therefore directed that this report to the American people be compiled and widely distributed. In its pages you will find statements on Vietnam by three leaders of your Government—by your President, your Secretary of State, and your Secretary of Defense.

These statements were prepared for different audiences, and they reflect the differing responsibilities of each speaker. The congressional testimony has been edited to avoid undue repetition and to incorporate the sense of the discussions that ensued.

Together, they construct a clear definition of America's role in the Vietnam conflict: the dangers and hopes that Vietnam holds for all free men, the failures and truths of our national objectives, in a war we did not seek, the constant effort on our part to bring this war we do not desire to a quick and honorable end.

August 20, 1965.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

THE ROOTS OF CONSPIRACY
In the historic documents that follow, two American Presidents define and explain

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TABLE 2.—Percent of total R. & D. performance funds and total federally financed research and development accounted for by the 4, 8, and 20 companies with the largest dollar volume of R. & D. performance, by industry, 1962—Continued

Industry	Percent of R. & D. performance					Percent of federally financed R. & D. performance				
	1st 4 companies		1st 8 companies		1st 20 companies	1st 4 companies		1st 8 companies		1st 20 companies
	1962	1963	1962	1963		1962	1963	1962	1963	
Fabricated metal products.....	39	48	53	65	64	(1)	62	80	89	84
Machinery.....	52	48	62	58	74	64	64	77	79	90
Electrical equipment and communication.....	60	63	74	77	84	61	64	79	81	91
Communication equipment and electronic components.....	60	63	74	77	84	61	64	79	81	91
Other electrical equipment.....	78	89	82	91	83	83	83	81	88	94
Motor vehicles and other transportation equipment.....	89	90	93	94	97	91	93	96	98	98
Aircraft and missiles.....	52	60	71	71	94	52	51	72	71	95
Professional and scientific instruments.....	58	62	68	70	83	60	71	79	81	88
Scientific and mechanical measuring instruments.....	72	75	77	83	86	(1)	92	89	95	95
Optical, surgical, photographic, and other instruments.....	61	64	77	79	94	(1)	63	75	81	91
Other manufacturing industries.....	43	60	53	66	67	(1)	75	(1)	66	(1)
Nonmanufacturing industries.....	32	33	44	40	60	38	69	50	73	68

(1) Not separately available.

As those interested in this field know, there are enough forces in the economy militating against growth of small and medium-sized business without adding sledge-hammer blows from the disproportionate administration of Federal research and development funds in favor of the giants in each industry.

LOW PERCENTAGE OF FEDERAL R. & D. FUNDS AWARDED TO SMALL BUSINESS

Yet, we have the spectacle of about 85 percent of all Federal research and development funds being awarded, under the system of classification used by the National Science Foundation, to large companies of more than 5,000 employees. Medium-sized companies of from 1,000 to 5,000 employees receive about 9 percent, with small businesses having less than 1,000 employees receiving only about 6 percent of these enormous sums. (Most recent figures from National Science Foundation, 1962.)

Of course, the agency which has the greatest effect upon these figures and trends is the Department of Defense, which spent more than 70 percent of all Federal R. & D. money in 1961 and still spends more than half. It is also pertinent to note that NASA, which now spends close to 30 percent has increasingly adopted the Department of Defense position.

CONCENTRATION RAISES ISSUE OF CIVIL-MILITARY BALANCE

To illustrate the seriousness of the concentration issue, particularly in the Defense Department, may I quote the testimony of Dr. Robert L. Lanzillotti, chairman of the Economics Department of Michigan State University, before the Senate Small Business Committee in 1963, as follows:

"The Government R. & D. contracts appear to be highly concentrated among the very large firms. While small business averages around 16 to 17 percent of Department of Defense procurement, when it comes to research and development small business accounts for some 2 to 3.5 percent. In fiscal year 1961, 20 corporations accounted for nearly 75 percent (of total military R. & D.).

"Is it not inconsistent—not to say dangerous—for the Federal Government to nurture such concentration in the technologically most advanced fields which can be pre-empted by the particular firms selected by military officials?" ("Economic Aspects of Patent Policies," hearings, Mar. 8, 1963, p. 121.)

The seriousness of this matter of selection is indicated by the fact that in fiscal year 1962, 97 percent of DOD research awards were made on a nonprice, noncompetitive basis. (Hearings, testimony of Dr. R. J. Barber, Southern Methodist University Law School, p. 52.)

It should be further noted that for the same year, 10 firms received 56 percent of DOD's total research money; and for NASA,

the top 10 companies received 54 percent. Furthermore, five of these contractors are on both lists. (Hearings, loc. cit., Mar. 7, 1963, p. 56-7.)

CONCENTRATION OF PATENT ACQUISITIONS

Specifically as to patent acquisitions, a Department of Justice study for the 5-year period ending in 1966 found that, among defense contractors, the top 15 companies accounted for 3,559 patents out of 8,788 assigned, for a total of 52 percent. (Hearings, loc. cit., p. 122.) I would urge that the subcommittee obtain the updated figures, and make a judgment as to the degree of correlation between R. & D. contract administration and patent acquisition.

Mr. Chairman, I have recited these figures in considerable detail because they are relevant to the question of who would receive the benefits of a policy of granting exclusive commercial rights to contractors. At a minimum Federal R. & D. policy, in the administration of contracts, as well as in the allocation of patent rights, should attempt to counteract trends toward monopoly and concentration, rather than reinforce them as these policies appear to have been doing.

POSITION OF SMALL BUSINESSES SHOULD BE PROTECTED

With the formulation of a general patent bill, this committee has a golden opportunity to do something about it in a practical way. Yet, what do we find?

As you know, S. 1809 has no such small business provision. The President's Science Adviser admits at page 26 of the transcript that patent questions are "especially important" to small businesses. He admits at page 27 that the patent right problems of subcontractors are unresolved. Mr. Chairman, in the name of the 90 percent of American firms which are small business, and the 300,000 manufacturers which are small business, we ought to give small business an even break in any patent bill.

I am not asking for preferential treatment for small business. But when, year after year, the 2 or 3 dozen largest companies in the country receive one-half or two-thirds of the research money, and take out a half or two-thirds of the patents, there is little question that this policy is preferential to big business.

In the name of all we value—independence of business enterprise, of finances, of mind, and of spirit—the Congress ought to take the time and trouble to provide equitably for small business in any patent legislation.

S. 1809, which is the principal bill before this subcommittee, is based very heavily upon the language and philosophy of the Patent Advisory Panel Progress Report of June 1964.

On page 3 of this report, we find the essence of this philosophy. You will recall the following language:

"Where a Government contractor is expected to build upon existing knowledge in a

field of technology directly related to an area in which the contractor has an established technical competence and a non-governmental commercial position, the Policy Statement stipulates that the principal or exclusive rights to resulting inventions should normally remain in the contractor * * * this situation is perhaps best illustrated by the typical Department of Defense contract which is intended to build upon a contractor's established technical competence.

The statistical material above indicates what has been happening to the structure of our economy under a Government patent policy dominantly influenced by the Department of Defense. These trends threaten further concentration in the economy if this philosophy is projected into the future.

This would mean disadvantage for not only small business and medium-sized business, but all business in this country except the favored few corporate giants.

Enactment of such a policy by the Congress at this time of rapid technological change and scientific discovery would cast a pall on our system of free enterprise for generations to come.

It would assure that the top companies get bigger and more powerful, while smaller rivals would be under increasing pressure to merge, sell, or be driven out of business. It also means that many men of initiative would be denied the rights of going into business, or seeing their own businesses grow and flourish. The philosophy of this proposal thus strikes at the heart of our free enterprise system.

Accordingly, Mr. Chairman, I recommend that there be a mechanism by which small businesses can gain access to public research and development patents done by the giant corporations with public funds. Retention of title and a flexible system of licensing according to the equities involved seems to me an avenue that should be explored.

In S. 2160, a copy of which is attached as appendix VI, one system of this kind is available for the subcommittee's inspection.

DOES S. 1809 PROTECT THE POSITION OF THE TAXPAYER?

Now, at last, we come down to the individual taxpayer. How can we demonstrate how his monetary interests are affected?

In the course of the "great debate," the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. Long] has raised the case of a test developed to detect PKU, a cause of infant mental retardation. While title was in the Government, commercial manufacturers were producing this test for 1½ to 2 cents per baby, and making a profit. When a private firm claimed a patent on this test, it was priced at 52 cents per baby.

On August 12, 1965, two Senators introduced a bill (S. 2402) that would appropriate "such sums as may be necessary" to buy a test for every newborn baby in the country. A little arithmetic demonstrates that

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the sums necessary would be more than \$2 million higher under a license policy than under a title policy. Since the original appropriations for developing the PKU test are estimated to be about \$1 million, it can be seen that a failure to take title would result in the taxpayers' being charged \$2½ million every year for something they had already bought for \$1 million.

The details of this story are more fully set forth in appendix VII, attached, as I believe they are especially pertinent in view of the members of the Judiciary Committee who have taken an interest in this particular matter.

I realize that S. 1809 contains a special exception for "fields which directly concern the public health, welfare, and safety." But this is a limited field, where less than 5 percent of R & D funds are spent.

If it makes sense to safeguard the taxpayers' investment in this area, where the Government puts up an estimated 15 percent of the research money, does not it make even more sense in scientific instruments, where the taxpayer furnishes 57 percent, or electronics and communications equipment, where the taxpayers' share is 67 percent, or aircraft, where the share is 89 percent. (See Federal Bar News, November 1963, p. 357). What about education? What about housing?

How many tax cuts could be paid for by the sale or reservation of royalties on some of this extremely valuable patent property areas? Far from assisting the taxpayer in this respect, S. 1809 would prevent agencies now sharing royalties to continue to do so. (Letter to the chairman of the Judiciary Committee by Federal Aviation Agency, June 5, 1965 (p. 2)).

From the foregoing, it does not appear that S. 1809 gives the taxpayer an even break. I, therefore, urge the Subcommittee to seek testimony from qualified fiscal experts the effects of a general sale or royalty system.

CONTENT OF GENERAL PATENT LEGISLATION

Now, Mr. Chairman, let me comment further as to the specifics of the legislation now before the committee. I have noted that the Departments of Justice and Health, Education, and Welfare, have both expressed the opinion that further experience should be accumulated under the President's patent policy of 1963 before it is embedded permanently in the form of statutory law, and the Atomic Energy Commission opposes enactment of S. 1809. If the subcommittee does report a bill, I believe that these reservations and this lack of experience and empirical data should be recognized by making the legislation quite general and providing for collection of the needed information. I believe that a bill on the subject at this time should be governed by the following six principles:

1. A clear policy statement that Federal research and development property is a natural resource belonging to the people of the United States, and must, therefore, be safeguarded accordingly.

2. Plain and certain penalties for the giveaway or unauthorized disposition of Federal R. & D. property.

3. Provision for preserving the many congressional patent protections that have been ordered into law over the past three decades.

4. Practical means for discouraging monopoly and concentration, and thus protecting the interests of small business and an open economic system."

5. Clear and unambiguous standards separating and providing for private interests and the public interest in the commercial development of the property.

6. A system whereby Federal R. & D. property sought by private companies for commercial development could be sold or licensed to them for an amount equivalent to fair market value, and the same property sought

by other public institutions for dedication to public purposes could be sold or licensed for half of the fair-market value, wherever practicable.

The language of the policy declaration as you are aware is taken from the October 10, 1933, memorandum. In my judgment, it is consistent with settled law and sound public policy. A summary of the applicable law is attached as appendix V. The absence of such a declaration or the adoption by expression or implication of a contrary policy, would be, I believe, an historic failure by the Congress.

PROCEDURAL SECTIONS ARE AS IMPORTANT AS POLICY

Several of these provisions, pertain to matters of procedure and standards. These are the vehicles by which any policy would be carried into effect, and are fully as important as the policy sections.

S. 789 is a fine example for a procedural trip. As stated by the Department of HEW, "the entire thrust of the bill is thus to impede the Governments taking and retaining of ownership in inventions derived from federally financed research, by making this a long arduous and exceedingly difficult and in many cases impossible task." As Dr. Horning stated: "In short, I think it leaves too few rights to the Government."

As to an appropriate standard for waiver, I would recommend the one put forward by the 1947 Justice Department report, that there might be waiver under "emergency conditions" where the head of the agency certified this was so. I believe that this standard would cover the equities for all contractors adequately, but I would be willing to change my view in the face of enough concrete evidence that it would not.

There are several standards set forth in S. 1809, under which contractors would be able to acquire exclusive rights. The principal one of these is "exceptional circumstances."

The use of this phrase in connection with patent administration by a Federal agency has been specifically considered by a Member of this body, the Senator from Connecticut, Senator RORER, when he was Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. He warned of the dangerous ambiguities in the use of this standard in the following terms:

"The phrase in 'exceptional circumstances' is relatively vague and indefinite and in the absence of any indicated criteria in the policy itself would appear to leave considerable latitude to each agency head to determine what constitutes such circumstances. While this does have the advantage of flexibility, it does have the disadvantages of exposing agency heads to the pressures of those contractors who would urge that each circumstance of hardship, however slight, represents an exceptional circumstances calling for more generous allocation of invention rights."

The phrase "special circumstances" in section 4(c) of the bill is open to the same criticism which I consider to be wholly persuasive.

As a matter of fact, the report of the Patent Advisory Panel upon which S. 1809 and S. 789 are based, admits, and I quote:

"The working experience of the subcommittee has revealed that various agencies have placed different interpretations on certain key phrases found throughout the policy statement. It is believed that unless additional guidance is given, this problem of proper interpretation would only become exaggerated if left to the unguided judgment of the hundreds of contracting officers throughout the Government. The following are examples: * * * 3. The phrase 'exceptional circumstances.'"

Mr. Chairman, I believe this confession is the best evidence the subcommittee can have to establish two propositions:

1. That the disposition of these billions

of dollars worth of patent properties should be placed by Congress, once and for all beyond the power and discretion of "hundreds of contracting officers throughout the Government"; and

2. That the phrase "exceptional circumstances" is not an appropriate standard to be used in this legislation.

It is my strong feeling that the power of disposition should be given into the ultimate responsibility of the head of any agency who is responsible to the President of the United States. Every effort should be made to preserve the actuality of responsibility for the disposition of Federal patent property, rather than perpetrating a misleading appearance of responsibility.

In S. 2160, I have suggested additional provisions for public licenses and royalties, and procedures which would result in written findings by the head of an agency as to both public versus private interests and value of patent interests. These proposals might be helpful to the subcommittee in formulating the necessary standards, and I commend them to the subcommittee's consideration.

If I can further assist the subcommittee during its deliberations, I would be glad to do so.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

PUBLIC WORKS APPROPRIATIONS, 1966

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have Calendar No. 615, H.R. 9220 laid before the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R. 9220) making appropriations for certain civil functions administered by the Department of Defense, the Panama Canal, certain agencies of the Department of the Interior, the Atomic Energy Commission, the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the Delaware River Basin Commission, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Hawaii?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill, which had been reported from the Committee on Appropriations, with amendments.

THE STORY OF THE DOMINICAN UPRISING AND THE DIVISION IN THE AMERICAN PRESS

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, 3 months after the outbreak of the Dominican uprising, a debate still rages over the wisdom of President Johnson's decision in sending in the U.S. Marines.

This debate has found a reflection in the hearings that have recently been conducted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In advance of these hearings, the Foreign Relations Committee published a brochure entitled "Background Information Relating to the Dominican Republic," which was described as "a compilation of material deemed useful in any discussion dealing with the present situation in the Dominican Republic." In addition to official documents and statements dealing with the Dominican crisis

Transcript, p. 37.

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and the background to this crisis, the publication contained an extensive chronology of events.

Unfortunately, the chronology quoted exclusively from press sources that were critical of administration policy—the New York Times, the New York Herald Tribune, the Washington Post, Le Monde of Paris, the London Observer, the London Times, the London Economist. All told, there were over 100 quotes from these sources. The chronology completely ignored the hundreds of newspaper articles by veteran correspondents by columnists of national reputation which, in general, substantiated the administration's statement that it intervened only because law and order had broken down completely and because the Communists were on the verge of taking over.

The chronological summary also ignored the statements issued by the AFL-CIO and by Conatrol, the major Dominican labor federation, as well as by the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers.

Even more serious is that fact that, in the documentation which it reproduced, the committee's compilation of "Background Information Relating to the Dominican Republic" completely ignored the minutes of the 4th plenary session of the 10th meeting of consultation of the OAS, at which the Special Committee on the Dominican Crisis submitted its report.

This was a document of the greatest importance, because it makes it abundantly clear, in the words of the five Latin American diplomats who made up the Special Committee, that they shared the administration's evaluation of the degree of Communist control in the rebel movement, and that, in general, they felt that the administration had taken the only possible course of action.

Since this publication was put out in the first instance for the information of Congress, I consider it most unfortunate that the references in the chronological summary of events should have been so completely one-sided.

In a sense, however, this one-sidedness is simply another manifestation of the widespread impression, especially in the Eastern part of our country, that the American press corps in Santo Domingo was almost unanimously critical of President Johnson's decision and skeptical of the reports put out by the American Embassy in Santo Domingo and by the Department of State.

This impression stemmed more than anything else from the bitterly critical attitude of the correspondents assigned to cover the Dominican uprising by the three major metropolitan newspapers of the Eastern area—the New York Times, the New York Herald Tribune, and the Washington Post.

Among our European allies the impression was almost unanimous that the administration had been completely repudiated by our own press corps in the Dominican Republic—and this for the simple reason that the Times and Tribune and Post are commonly regarded as the most authoritative newspapers in our country and are more frequently read

and more frequently quoted by Europeans than the rest of the American press put together.

The purpose of my remarks today is not to denigrate the Times and Tribune and Post. I believe that these great newspapers richly merit the international recognition which they today enjoy. Not only are they the first three newspapers I read every day, but I honestly believe that no Member of Congress or community leader can pretend to be adequately informed about events in our country and around the world unless he includes the Times and Tribune and Post in his daily reading material.

However, the Times and Tribune and Post, are not by themselves the press of America. Nor, despite the great reputations they enjoy, are their correspondents any more experienced, any more competent, any more deserving of credibility, than are the correspondents of our wire services and our news magazines and of the many other great American newspapers, large and small.

In a complex situation like the Dominican Republic revolt, it was easy enough for the man who reads only one newspaper to have a firm opinion because the one-newspaper reader, by and large, is disposed to accept the information printed in his daily paper as something akin to gospel.

If a reader was somewhat more assiduous and included the Times and Tribune and Post in his daily newspaper fare, it was also easy to have a firm opinion on events in the Dominican Republic, because, except for minor points of difference, the accounts appearing in the Times and Tribune and Post agreed with each other and supported each other.

But those who try to follow the world's events by reading, as broadly as possible in the national press and in their news magazines would have found it very difficult, indeed, to determine what was really going on in the Dominican Republic, because the version of events put out by the correspondents of the Times and Tribune and Post was flatly contradicted by the accounts cabled by an important and distinguished group of correspondents writing for other media, and by authoritative Dominican and Latin American sources—as well as by the State Department and the administration.

The quality of this second group of correspondents may be gaged from the fact that it included two former Pulitzer Prize winners—Marguerite Higgins and Hal Hendrix—as well as the winners of other journalistic awards, and that several members of this group had 10 to 20 years' experience in Latin American affairs.

Among this group were: Paul Bethel, Mutual Network; Jules DuBois, Chicago Tribune Syndicate; Howard Handelman, U.S. News & World Report; Daniel James, Newhouse Papers; Jeremiah O'Leary, Washington Star; Virginia Prewett, syndicated columnist, editor, Latin American Times; John T. Skelly, Latin American Times; the Latin American desk at Time magazine; Eric Sevareid, syndicated columnist; Rowland

Evans and Robert Novak, syndicated columnists; and Dickey Chapelle, the National Observer.

While some of these correspondents and observers were more sympathetic to the junta, some less sympathetic, and while there were other differences between them, they were all essentially agreed on one basic fact: That the Communists had seized complete control of the revolt at the point where President Johnson decided to intervene, and that, had the President delayed or attempted to handle the situation otherwise, the result would have been another Castro regime in the Americas.

In the remarks that follow, I intend to say a few words by way of establishing the credentials of the more prominent of these correspondents, and quote briefly from their writing on the Dominican Republic crisis.

In doing so I shall quote first from the writings of the two Pulitzer Prize winners, Miss Marguerite Higgins, and Mr. Hal Hendrix.

MISS MARGUERITE HIGGINS

Miss Higgins, now a correspondent for Newsday Syndicate, served as a Herald Tribune foreign correspondent for more than 20 years. She covered World War II, the Korean war, and the war in Vietnam, and she served as Herald Tribune bureau chief in Tokyo, Berlin, and Moscow.

Among other things, Miss Higgins wrote that:

The Bosch-Caamano argument (which belittled the Communist role) is in total contrast in both its parts to the portrait brought back by the OAS Special Committee to Santo Domingo.

According to Ambassador Ilmar Penna Marinho, of Brazil, "The whole Committee (the OAS Special Committee) agreed that the Caamano movement could be rapidly converted to a Communist insurrection that was susceptible of gaining the support of the Marxist-Lenin powers."

As to conditions in Santo Domingo in May, "It was a no man's land," said the Brazilian Ambassador. "There had been a complete collapse of public authority. The Dominican Republic had disappeared as a legal and political entity—arms had been given to a disoriented nation of fanatics and adolescents who were in a frenzied state egged on by subversive broadcasts—anarchy reigned—any organized group that made a landing in the Dominican Republic could have dominated the situation."

Miss Higgins quoted the Ambassador of Colombia as stating at the OAS special committee:

What were we to do when blood was running in the streets—what happens when a state in this condition is so close to Cuba? Are we to sit silently on balconies and watch the end of the tragedy as if we were watching some sort of bullfight?

Miss Higgins said:

It is important that these judgments on Communist penetration and chaos were made by Latins, because Latins are traditionally the most apprehensive about Yankee intervention.

HAL HENDRIX

Mr. Hendrix, of the Miami News, won the Pulitzer Prize for his coverage of the Cuban missile crisis. He serves as Latin American editor of the Miami News as well as correspondent for Scripps-

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Howard. This is what Mr. Hendrix wrote from Santo Domingo:

The Communists and pro-Castro June 14 movement leaders began to crawl out from the woodwork and by Sunday night, April 25, they had the rebellion going their way.

After Reid's Sunday overthrow the real scramble for power began.

By Tuesday it was over. The extremists had gained control behind the scenes, using Col. Francisco Caamano Dengo as rebel chieftain and new cover. Caamano was installed as "constitutional President."

The Communist design was to create chaos and anarchy. Now using Caamano's "constitutionalist" movement as a shield, they engineered distribution of weapons to thousands of civilians—probably as many as 16,000 were armed in 1 day.

Communist and June 14 movement leaders here continue to remain out of the limelight. But no one, including the special OAS peace-seeking mission sent here to help end the war, doubts that they still are active inside the rebel-held section of the capital.

In addition to these two Pulitzer Prize winners, the groups of correspondents whose dispatches from Santo Domingo supported the administration's versions of events included many other seasoned correspondents with long experience in the area.

PAUL BETHEL

Mr. Bethel is a veteran of 20 years in the American Foreign Service including a period as press attaché in the U.S. Embassy in Havana at the time of the Castro takeover. He is the author of two books on Latin America, and he covered the Dominican situation for the Mutual Broadcasting network and for the United Features Syndicate.

In a serialized account syndicated by United Features, Mr. Bethel wrote:

Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett told a group of us on April 29 that the PRD (Bosch's party) and the Communists had been collaborating. He said: "The Communists worked with Bosch's PRD for months and were prepared well in advance for Reid's (civilian junta chief) overthrow."

That was the significance of the March 16 Communist manifesto. It was the blueprint for the events that took place on April 24 and thereafter.

I also learned from an unimpeachable source that Bosch met with two members of the Castro-Communist "14th of June Movement" in San Juan in early March. The two—Victoriano Felix and Rafael Taveras—got Bosch's agreement to cooperate. Taveras is a member of the central committee of the party.

I wish to add here that Mr. Bethel's account has since been confirmed by the State Department.

JULES DU BOIS

Mr. Du Bois, correspondent for the Chicago Tribune Syndicate, has been a recognized authority and prize-winning correspondent on Latin America for over two decades, and is one of the best known officers of the Inter-American Press Association.

Writing from Santo Domingo, Mr. Du Bois reported that rebel leader Col. Francisco Caamano was taking orders from the Communists from the day of the outbreak of violence. In an interview with the former commander of Ozama Fortress, he quoted the commander as saying:

I know that on the night of April 24-25, Caamano was with Dr. Daniel Ozuna-Her-

nandez, a known international Communist. They were driving through the streets of downtown Santo Domingo where eight policemen stationed at various points in the city . . . reported to me that Ozuna had a nap on his lap and they could hear him as the car was halted at street corners tell Caamano where to emplace a .50 and .30 caliber machinegun and where barricades should be erected.

Mr. DuBois also reported that on March 16, just 5 weeks before the April 24 revolt, the Dominican Communist Party (PSP-D) issued a manifesto calling for the "return of Prof. Juan Bosch to legitimate control of the government." The manifesto incited the people to violence to restore Bosch in these words:

The entire population must fight in the streets, in the squares, in the factories, in the fields, for the return of Juan Bosch as the head of the constitutional government.

HOWLAND EVANS AND ROBERT NOVAK

Howland Evans and Robert Novak, the distinguished columnists for the Herald Tribune syndicate, were among the many who did not arrive at the same conclusions as Bernard Collier, the Herald Tribune correspondent in Santo Domingo; Tad Szulc, the New York Times correspondent; and Dan Kurzman of the Washington Post.

In one of their reports, Evans and Novak warned:

Adventurers are running the rebel command, but they maintain only tenuous control over all their forces. Rebel strong-points, particularly in the southeast section of Santo Domingo, are manned by Communists with only token allegiance to Caamano.

HOWARD HANDELMAN

Mr. Handelman of U.S. News & World Report, has covered Cuban and Caribbean news since 1960. After weeks of careful investigation under the direction of Mr. Handelman, U.S. News & World Report had this to say about the role of Cuba in the Dominican revolt.

Cuba, it is clear, was a major staging area for supplying men and weapons for the uprising.

The article said that Cuba assembled a quarter of a ton of small arms and about 300,000 rounds of ammunition to support Cuban-trained Dominican guerrillas. Those guerrillas reinfiltred their homeland in late 1964 as Dominican agents for Cuba's General Directorate of Intelligence. Thus, they were poised to strike for power when the revolt broke out in late April.

DANIEL JAMES

Daniel James, who covered the Dominican crisis for the Newhouse papers, has written five books on Latin America over the past 12 years, and has also contributed articles dealing with Latin-American problems to Reader's Digest, Fortune, Saturday Evening Post, and many other periodicals. He wrote many articles directed against the Trujillo regime, including an investigation of the assassination and kidnapping of the anti-Trujillo scholar, Dr. Jesus De Galindez.

Writing from Santo Domingo on June 1, Mr. James said:

A majority of the persons this reporter has talked with agree that the Communists had begun surfacing within 24 hours after the revolt had started on April 24, and that within 72 hours were acquiring control over it.

As of mid-May, Caamano was still in contact with the Dominican Reds, according to reliable informants. Hard evidence that prominent Communists continued to play a leading role in the rebel military command up until the third week in May, is the fact that four of them were killed at that time in the heavy fighting around the national palace.

How many Communists there were, or still are in Caamano ranks, is relatively unimportant. A "numbers game," unfortunately started by the State Department when it issued a hastily prepared list of 58 Reds conspicuous in the revolt's early days, is being played by ignorant or dubious writers who are thus obscuring the real significance of the Communist role.

First of all, many of the leading Communist participants have been trained in Cuba and/or Russia. The State Department named 18. Sources here put the total at nearer 50. That is more than enough to seize the leadership of a surging mass with little or no military experience and no knowledge whatsoever of the strategy and tactics of revolutions.

JEREMIAH A. O'LEARY

Mr. O'Leary, of the Washington Star, won the first prize of the Washington News Guild for his report on President Kennedy's assassination. After his return from Santo Domingo, Mr. O'Leary wrote the following:

There are no Communists in the rebel high command, officials believe, nor is Caamano himself a Communist.

As one official put it: "What is the use of being minister of Interior or foreign minister in a government that only controls a few acres of a poorer section of Santo Domingo? Those with the real power are the Communists who control the armed civilians, the roughly disciplined youths who owe allegiance to the three main Communist groups. "These groups are the PSPD, or orthodox Moscow line party; the MPD, which adheres to the philosophy of Peking, and the Havana-line APCJ or June 14 movement."

MISS VIRGINIA PREWETT

Miss Prewett has for many years been an expert on Latin American affairs. She is a syndicated columnist, the editorial director of the Latin American Times, and the author of several standard works on Latin America. Among other things Miss Prewett's coverage of Latin American affairs have been cited for excellence by the Overseas Press Club, and she has several times served as the Press Club's chairman for inter-American affairs.

Miss Prewett wrote:

If Mr. Johnson had taken the consultation gamble and lost it, the American people would never have forgotten that Americans were massacred and the Caribbean fell to communism while their President talked to the OAS over the phone.

JOHN T. SKELLY

Mr. Skelly is associate editor of the Latin American Times. He reported for UPI in Havana until January of 1959. He knew Castro as a boy, and because of his strong anti-Batista convictions, served without pay as press coordinator for the so-called revolutionary government of Cuba, set up by Castro in January-February of 1959.

In a recent article published by the Latin American Times, Mr. Skelly wrote from Santo Domingo that Colonel Caamano's so-called constitutional government now has an indoctrination section—the G-5. Courses are given every

night at rebel command posts; and the substance of those courses are Marxist. Mr. Skelly writes:

One of the principal courses offered to the youths is the history of Marxism and the ways of communism * * * collaboration between deposed President Bosch's PRD Party and Communist elements, discovered at the outset of the revolt, continues. Consider for a moment that the indoctrination section of Colonel Caamano's rebels is comprised of the PRD, representatives from the military, and the Marxist-Leninist-Fidelista faction.

TIME MAGAZINE

This is what the Latin-American team at Time magazine had to say about the Dominican revolution:

What had happened, in its baldest terms, was an attempt by highly trained Castro-Communist agitators and their followers to turn an abortive comeback by a deposed Dominican President into a "war of national liberation."

ERIC SEVAREID

Mr. Severeid is internationally recognized as one of our most distinguished columnists and commentators. Indeed, I think it is no exaggeration to say that there are very few commentators who command such broad respect in all sectors of the political community.

This is what Mr. Severeid wrote:

For me it is impossible to believe that the Communist threat was a myth, impossible to believe that a democratic and stable government could have been formed by the impassioned people, a vast number of them youngsters. It is hard for me to believe that we could not have prevented the tragic fighting in the northern part of the city, easy to believe that we did prevent an even more awful bloodletting in the congested downtown region.

DICKEY CHAPELLE

Miss Dickey Chapelle has for many years now been a frequent contributor to Reader's Digest, the National Geographic magazine, and other leading American periodicals. She has covered virtually every important conflict since World War II—the Korean war, the landing of the marines in Lebanon, the Hungarian Revolution, the Castro takeover in Cuba, the war in Laos, the Chinese invasion of India, the Vietnam war, and more recently the Dominican uprising, which she covered for the weekly newspaper, the National Observer.

Miss Chapelle is a front line correspondent rather than a rear echelon correspondent. Because she believes in seeing things with her own eyes, she has made frequent parachute jumps with the Vietnamese and Laotian forces, and she has been exposed to fire countless times.

In one of her articles, Miss Chapelle told a very revealing story. She had heard that an old-time Castro stalwart, Ramon Pichirilo Mejia, a man whom she had met in Cuba during the Castro takeover, was active in the Dominican revolt. She decided that she would try to find him. Entering the rebel quarter, she received permission to live with the rebels for a period of several days. And it turned out that the rebel commandante in her district was the very man she was looking for. Let me quote from Miss Chapelle's account of her encounter with the commandante:

For the first time in the brightening morning light, I looked squarely into his face.

Was it truly familiar, or was my judgment suspect after the night's misadventures? Standing amid the rubble slum, I drew a deep breath.

"Were you in Cuba then? I mean, were you Castro's boatman?"

The eyes narrowed and the answer came by reflex—proudly.

"I was the commander of Fidel's Gramma and later, in the mountains, where you were, Americana, a leader of a battalion for him."

"Are you Pichirilo?"

"My name is Ramon Pichirilo Mejia."

"Did you remember who I was?"

He looked pitifully at me, "Si si, Americana," he grinned and spoke slowly as if the words tasted good.

"Are you then well after what happened to you in Cuba?"

"Well enough to have led people against their oppressors in Bolivia and Colombia and Venezuela and Costa Rica and Guatemala since last I saw you," he nodded.

He posed. I shot fast. He raised his hand. "Now do not say I am a Communist, Americana. If I were truly a Red, I could have a good life staying in Cuba. But you see I am here instead, where I was born."

Because I have endeavored to limit myself to the best known correspondents I have quoted from only a partial list of those who reported in a manner which, despite minor differences, generally authenticated and endorsed the basic decision to intervene in the Dominican crisis.

THE ATTITUDE OF THE AFL-CIO AND OF LATIN AMERICAN UNIONISTS

Finally, I wish to point out that the statements of the AFL-CIO Executive Council which was missing from the chronological summary, welcomed "the prompt and energetic measures taken by the President to prevent the Communist attempt to seize control of the Dominican democratic revolutionary movement and to foist a Castro-type dictatorship on Santo Domingo."

The Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers—ORIT—an organization which embraces most of the important labor unions in the hemisphere, adopted a resolution, couched in similar terms, supporting American intervention:

We must point out that the unilateral action of the U.S. Armed Forces in this grave Dominican conflict has, on the one hand, served to save thousands of lives and, at the same time, under the guidance of the OAS Commission, has been able to contribute toward making the horrors of civil war less cruel.

THE REPORT OF THE OAS SPECIAL COMMITTEE

I have already referred to the report of the OAS Special Committee. The minutes of the meeting at which the Special Committee reported to the fourth plenary session is a document of such importance that I hope all of my colleagues will find the time to read the complete text. Let me quote two statements that were made at this meeting.

Ambassador Carrizosa, the special delegate of Colombia, told the meeting:

With regard to the sector led by Colonel Francisco Caamano, many diplomats accredited in the Dominican Republic, and I can include my country's diplomatic representative, feel that, if not Colonel Francisco Caamano, whom I do not know to be personally a Communist, there are indeed numerous persons on his side that, if they are not members of the Communist Party, are actively in favor of Fidel Castro's system of government or political purposes. There

is such a tendency in the opinion of many diplomats I spoke to, and I do not mention other countries in order not to commit countries represented here. They are firmly convinced that on that side there are many persons, I do not say members registered in an officially organized Communist party, but persons who do have leanings toward a well-known trend which is prevalent in Cuba.

Mr. Carrizosa's remarks were corroborated by the other members of the Special Committee. Summarizing the views of the Committee, Ambassador Yodice of Paraguay made this statement:

The Government of Paraguay, as I stated clearly when approval was given to the establishment of the collective inter-American force, believed from the beginning that continental security was at stake. The replies by the Ambassadors composing the Committee reporting today on certain questions regarding these delicate aspects of the Dominican situation have been categorical. My government was right. Continental security is threatened. The danger existed, and still exists, that chaos and anarchy will permit international communism to transform the Dominican Republic into another Cuba. With his customary clarity, courage, and energy, the Ambassador of Colombia, Mr. Alfredo Vazquez Carrizosa, has categorically mentioned the highly political nature of the problem we are facing. In reply to a question of the Ambassador of Uruguay, he has rightly said that the peace of America is threatened, that the security of the hemisphere is threatened, and that there is a possibility that another Cuba, another Communist government in the hemisphere will arise out of the chaos and anarchy in the Dominican Republic.

OTHER LATIN AMERICAN VIEWS

There were also many other Latin Americans of stature who made comments supporting the action taken by the administration. For example, the Baltimore Sun on June 9 carried a statement by Dr. Rupo Lopez-Frescat, first secretary of the treasury in the revolutionary regime set up by Castro after he came to power. Let me quote from the interview with Dr. Lopez:

The Organization of American States has stated that communism is incompatible with the democratic principles of Latin America. The United States has a right to intervene against the Communists—the enemy.

Dr. Lopez believes that Communists were involved in the Dominican disorders.

"They are everywhere," he says, "and they are trained to infiltrate popular movements." "Their number is immaterial," he says, "for 53 trained Communists working with an armed civilian militia would be plenty under the chaotic conditions that prevailed early in the revolt."

In the light of all these statements, Mr. President, I think it is clear beyond challenge that the American press was not unanimously critical of the administration's policy in the Dominican Republic, that the President's decision was, in fact, supported by a very substantial section of the press corps as well as by independent authorities, both Latin and American.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert into the RECORD some of the writings of the American correspondents to whom I have referred, in the order in which I have mentioned them.

I think it is also clear beyond challenge that the administration's decision enjoyed the endorsement of responsible

Latin American diplomats who were on the spot or who made an on-the-spot investigation, as well as of other Latin Americans of liberal reputation whose personal background qualified them to speak with some authority on the problem of Communist subversion.

In this connection I ask unanimous consent to insert into the RECORD the minutes of the 4th plenary session of the 10th meeting of consultation of the OAS; the interview with Dr. Rupo Lopez-Frescat in the Baltimore Sun for September 9; and the full text of the statement of the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers.

Mr. President, one of the great advantages of a free press is that in any controversial situation it will generally come up with reports, scattered through various newspapers, that reflect all sides of the controversy.

In attempting to make up our minds in any such situation, Members of Congress are confronted with the problem of weighing conflicting press accounts against each other, of assessing each account in the light of their own experience or knowledge, of supplementing these reports wherever possible from their own sources of information, and of then making their own decision.

The fact that a majority of the American correspondents in any given situation sponsor a version of events which is contradicted by a minority, is no clue at all to the real truth—because in more than one situation it has been demonstrated that the majority of the press corps can be wrong and the minority can be right in their evaluation.

In the case of the Dominican situation, it was unquestionably true that an arithmetical majority of the 160-man American press corps were critical of administration policy. But, by the nature of things, I think there would be no difficulty in establishing that most of these 160 American reporters had had no major experience in Latin American affairs, that the great majority of them were not seasoned foreign correspondents or correspondents of national reputation for the simple reason that there are not enough of these to go around, that few of them spoke Spanish, and that a number of them were relative cubs on their first or second foreign assignment.

I feel that it is of the greatest importance and significance that the group of correspondents and columnists I have quoted were all people of national reputation and that most of them had specialized for years in Latin American affairs and either spoke Spanish fluently or had a working knowledge of it. Even though they may have constituted a minority, I believe that the exceptional quality of this group of correspondents makes it necessary to accord a very high specific gravity to their version of the events in the Dominican Republic.

The remarkable conflict within the American press corps in Santo Domingo was the subject of an article in the press section of Time magazine for May 28, 1965, which I also asked unanimous consent to insert into the RECORD.

Mr. President, the insertions I have made here are extensive, but I consider

it of the greatest importance that they be brought together in one place for the information of Members of Congress who might conceivably have been misled by the unfortunately one-sided presentation in the study published by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the month of July.

I earnestly hope that the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee will be instructed, in preparing such future studies, to bring together all pertinent documents and not merely selected documents, and to select their press quotations in a manner that presents both viewpoints, or all viewpoints, rather than just one viewpoint.

It is also my hope that some of those correspondents who assured us that Caamano and his immediate entourage are not Communists and that all the talk about Communist infiltration was therefore vastly exaggerated, will find the time to take a hard look at the situation today in the rebel controlled area of Santo Domingo.

All the accounts that I have read in recent weeks indicate that the Communists and pro-Communists are not merely in complete control of the rebel quarter, but that they are controlling it more or less openly.

It has been reported that the only visible political activity in the rebel quarter is that carried on by the three Communist parties. They are responsible for most of the literature published in the area. They set the tenor of radio broadcasts. They flaunt their pro-Castro and anti-American slogans openly. But even more serious is the fact that they are using their hold on the business and banking heart of the Dominican Republic to strangle the economic life of the nation, while they place one obstacle after another in the way of a peaceful settlement.

It is almost as though the Communists were permitted to seize control of Wall Street and then hold it for 4 months or longer while we sought to negotiate a political settlement with them.

Writing about this situation from Santo Domingo on August 17, Scripps-Howard Correspondent Hal Hendrix said:

Communist and other extreme leftists in the rebel movement are blocking adoption of an OAS peace formula. Informed sources here are convinced the front office rebel leaders, headed by Colonel Caamano are captives of the extremists in their camp . . . sources here believe that extremist elements weeks ago concluded that each day that passes without a settlement is another day of victory for them. The delay affords them additional time for brainwashing efforts and nowishes the seeds of anti-Americanism they have planted.

It is high time that the OAS moved to put an end to this intolerable situation.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DODD. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I shall read the speech of the Senator and the material which he had printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD with the greatest of interest.

I believe that in the struggle over Vietnam, the problem we have in the Dominican Republic has tended to become over-

looked. I am convinced through my own work that our hemispheric problems rate equal attention with the problems involved in south and southeast Asia.

I welcome contributions by our colleagues upon these problems. I hope to make one of my own soon.

I am pleased that the Senator from Connecticut, who has a reputation in the Senate for thoroughness and courage, should have analyzed the matter in this way. I shall read everything the Senator has to say on the problem with the greatest of interest.

Mr. DODD. I thank the Senator from New York.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Newsday, May 12, 1965]

MARGUERITE HIGGINS "ON THE SPOT"

(By Marguerite Higgins)

WASHINGTON.—There is a dramatic and ominous contrast in what Dominican rebel leader Col. Francisco Caamano has been telling the world press about Communist infiltration of his movement and what he confided to the special five man ambassadorial committee of the Organization of American States.

This was brought out in question and answer sessions of the five Latin American Ambassadors held privately with their colleagues of the OAS after their return to Washington last weekend. Since the five Latin American Ambassadors went to Santo Domingo with a skeptical, show-me attitude, their vivid eyewitness account of the Dominican tragedy has special significance. For one thing, what one Latin American tells another is likely to have more impact on the OAS as a whole than any number of State Department releases.

In reply to a question from the Mexican Ambassador on the Communist role in the fighting, Argentine Ambassador Ricardo M. Colombo gave this illuminating account of conversations at headquarters of the rebels who started the revolution in the name of the return to constitutionalism and support for former President Juan Bosch.

"We spoke to a variety of persons in the Caamano group," said the Argentine Ambassador. "They recognized the possibility of control being taken over by the Communists . . . this was one of their problems. In fact Colonel Caamano confirmed this personally to me. Colonel Caamano labeled many of the snipers as belonging to a group that did not want a Dominican solution."

This account of what the rebel colonel told the Argentine Ambassador is of particular significance since both Caamano in Santo Domingo and Bosch in Puerto Rico have belittled the whole Communist aspect of the revolution, and indeed have been quoted as believing that presence of American troops was not even necessary to restore order and save lives. This line of course is being echoed by a wide range of opponents to the Johnson doctrine ranging from President de Gaulle of France to Fidel Castro to Mao Tse-tung.

The Bosch-Caamano argument is in total contrast in both its parts to the portrait brought back by the OAS Special Committee to Santo Domingo.

According to Ambassador Ilmar Penna Marinho of Brazil, "The whole committee agreed that the Caamano movement could be rapidly converted to a Communist insurrection that was susceptible of gaining the support of the Marxist-Leninist powers."

As to conditions in Santo Domingo on May 2, "It was a no man's land," said the Brazilian Ambassador. "There had been a complete collapse of public authority. The Dominican Republic had disappeared as a

legal and political entity. Arms had been given to a disoriented nation of fanatics and adolescents who were in a frenzied state egged on by subversive broadcasts. Anarchy reigned. Any organized group that made a landing in the Dominican Republic could have dominated the situation."

In an even more impassioned outburst of oratory, the Ambassador of Colombia said in defending the American intervention: "What were we to do when blood was running in the streets? What happens when a state in this condition (anarchy) is so close to Cuba? Are we simply to sit silently on balconies and watch the end of the tragedy as if we were watching some sort of bull fight?"

Nobody in the OAS Mission to Santo Domingo judged that rebel Colonel Caamano himself was a Communist but there was deep concern that his flirtations with the Communists still might mean even now that the entire cease-fire might at any time blow up and the Reds choose the moment to surface in full strength.

It is important that these judgments on Communist penetration and chaos were made by Latins because Latins are traditionally (and with reason) the most apprehensive about Yankee intervention.

The OAS Mission to Santo Domingo concluded, in effect, that the American intervention was not gunboat diplomacy but preventive diplomacy. As Colombian Ambassador Alfred Vazquez Carriosa said: "It is clear now that the world of communism is no longer separated from this hemisphere by the great oceans. Communism is a clear and frightening presence."

And if Latin Americans grasp the merit of preventive diplomacy, shouldn't it be possible to get the point across also to American intellectuals?

[From Newsday, May 13, 1965]

MARGUERITE HIGGINS "ON THE SPOT"

(By Marguerite Higgins)

SANTO DOMINGO.—Minutes before junta planes silenced his hate-spewing Santo Domingo radio, Rebel Colonel Francisco Caamano in an exclusive interview defiantly rejected all compromise by way of a meeting or a coalition with the rival junta regime.

Such a compromise had been urged all the previous day by anxious delegates of the Organization of American States as a way of preventing more bloodshed.

"How can one compromise with murderers?" asked Caamano speaking of the ruling junta. This comment came as a blow to the OAS which had thought for a few bright minutes that Caamano would at least talk to General Imbert. It appears Caamano did agree for a few moments but then his more militant advisers vetoed the idea. But in the Dominican Republic nothing is ever final. And the OAS is still attempting to start a palaver between the opposing side whose stand-off hostility has left the city divided and paralyzed with the U.S. forces in between.

At his Rebel headquarters filled with rifle-toting civilians, Caamano was in a cocky mood. He was so cocky that he even ruled out any official place in his future government for Juan Bosch, the former Dominican President in exile, in whose name the rebellion was started. The U.S. claims that the Caamano rebellion has become heavily Communist infiltrated but the rebels pooh-pooh the charge.

In speaking of Bosch, Colonel Caamano said he was "a close spiritual adviser but he cannot be assigned any formal position in my government." Prior to the plane attack on his radio, Colonel Caamano exuded confidence that his rebels would win the entire country.

Propaganda over the silenced rebel radio has called everyone from President Johnson to Ambassador Bennett liars and has alleged

that the United States was backing General Imbert's junta regime.

The claim to fame of this newest junta leader is that he helped to assassinate Dictator Trujillo. General Imbert (the title is honorary) is at least a dedicated anti-Communist and this is one comfort to the United States which feels awkward about having to depend on a one-time assassin as its best hope for leading this country back out of this wild anarchy.

In urging a bridge between Caamano and Imbert, the United States hopes that somehow in the process the rebel colonel can be separated from his more militant advisers. This remains a very iffy question. On our interview today it seemed to me that Colonel Caamano was as interested in impressing his aid, the militant Hector Aristy, with his defiance as he was in conveying this to me. Aristy who has the title of minister of government was the rebel leader who allegedly prevented Caamano from even meeting with the rival General Imbert. It is the conclusion therefore of most Latin American diplomats that Caamano is the prisoner of the militants around him.

"There is no question of meeting with General Imbert," said Colonel Caamano. "He is an imposter." Asked if he was asking the junta government to surrender to his rebel authority, Colonel Caamano claimed that "General Imbert represents nobody."

"If the United States would leave," Caamano said, "the troops now with Imbert would flood over to our side. We would not avenge ourselves on those who have been loyal to the junta. We would only try the criminals such as General Wessin."

General Wessin, one of the few incorruptible generals of the Dominican Republic is credited with having intervened against the Caamano led rebellion when it became evident that Communist elements were close to taking over control. The United States intervened on April 28 when law and order disintegrated. Its purposes at the time were to save lives and prevent another Cuba. Its purpose now is to prevent a new blood bath and find some kind of formula that will restore order and get this country on the path to some kind of democratic solution. The cease fire has been a mockery from the start. This correspondent has been caught in three successive fire fights in 3 successive days, and the side that started shooting was the rebels—not our Marines or our 82d Airborne. Today, the junta planes attacked and silenced (at least temporarily) the Santo Domingo rebel radio station and thus ruptured the cease fire in their turn.

The fact that American Ambassador Bennett hit the deck and crawled under his desk during the junta air attack would appear to bear out the claim that it came as something of a surprise to the Embassy. It was a surprise to our troops who shot at the attacking planes—and missed.

The mystery of whether Colonel Caamano is a free agent was not pierced by his answer to my questions as to why his wife and two children had taken asylum in the Argentine Embassy in the zone controlled by the rival junta.

"Our house burned down," said Colonel Caamano.

"But that was 3 weeks ago," I interposed.

"Why doesn't she join you now?"

"There may be bloodshed," said Colonel Caamano. "I do not want to think about my wife and children. I want to think about my country."

In this volatile land, rebel intransigence may well fade in the wake of the display of determination in the form of aerial strafing of the rebel radio which had had a great role in inciting citizens to shoot at American troops and otherwise harass us. But at the moment the feeling is that things are going to get worse before they get better.

[From Newsday, May 13, 1965]

MARGUERITE HIGGINS "ON THE SPOT"

(By Marguerite Higgins)

SANTO DOMINGO.—The authoritative rattle of automatic weapons was mixed with the occasional ping of a light rifle and the rebels kept firing on the U.S. marine company for a stubborn hour and 20 minutes. The firing came from a block away and the rebel snipers stretched about two-thirds of a mile along the demarcation line between their zone and the international area held by U.S. forces. The marines kept their heads down—behind sandbags, stone walls, fences, cars—and returned fire on the infrequent occasions when they could get a decent look at their ragtag enemies. Finally, the firing stopped, as inexplicably as it had started and the long lines of cars started moving through the marine checkpoints at the intersections, apparently unconcerned that the road they were travelling had been a no man's land a few minutes before.

And that's how it is with the crazy cease fire that is supposed to be prevailing around here.

But there is one good thing about it according to U.S. Marine Capt. Charles Barstow, of Dunellen, N.J.

"Those rebels fire high and wild," said Captain Barstow, grinning reassuringly as another round pinged in somewhere down the block.

And in this case, he was right. For Barstow's marine company has not sustained any injuries despite what the marine captain—a practitioner of the art of understatement—describes laconically as rather intense fire.

So the fracas would not even have been reported on the incident sheet and his marine company's luck—and remarkable restraint in the face of provocation—would have gone unsung if this reporter and Howard Handleman of U.S. News & World Report had not happened to stumble into the tail end of the fire fight while trying to make our way to rebel headquarters in the sniper zone.

Was there any pattern or purpose in these rebel sniper attacks? I asked Captain Barstow.

"Militarily there is no sense to it," said the young captain. "They never try to rush us. They hide up there on the roofs or sometimes dart in the middle of an intersection to fire and run. What I think they are really doing is trying to get some martyrs. And we are doing our best not to give them any martyrs. We only fire back when a sniper is getting awfully close to target and awfully aggressive."

We were standing in the front yard of a home which had a stone wall in front. The wall gave good cover against incoming fire and so several marines had their pup tents in it. A couple more were on the porch of the house itself which was heavily sandbagged.

Catching my glance, the marine said ruefully: "Of course we are a nuisance to those people. But so help me we try to make it up to them by courtesy and gifts of coffee and such. It's bothersome to be in a fire fight. But it is a whole lot more bothersome to have tommygun-toting rebels setting fire to your house and looting as was happening around here when we came. And these people have been absolutely wonderful to us. I heard that some of the press say they hate us. If so, these are some of the best actors I have ever seen."

Later, over in the rebel zone, we could see closeup the scary results of the indiscriminate distribution of guns after they had been looted from police and military armories by the rebelling mobs. It seemed for several blocks as if no man was without a rifle or automatic weapons slung over his shoulder. Few were in uniform. A great many simply had on open white shirts and slacks.

Was it youngsters like this, I wondered, who had been firing on Captain Barstow's company? Were they under any orders? Could the sniping be turned off?

Over in front of rebel headquarters we found the so-called commander of the rebel forces, Col. Monte Arrache. He was in a camouflage uniform sitting in a jeep with an aide talking to some of the gun-toting rebels.

"Colonel," I asked, "do you have control of the people firing from your zone?"

"Of course I do," said the rebel colonel.

"They why don't you turn off the firing?" I asked.

"But it is not the rebels who are firing," said the colonel. "It is really soldiers who represent the junta (the new provisional government of General Imbert) who disguise themselves as rebels. They sneak into our zone and fire at the American troops to try and provoke an American attack on our headquarters."

It was all nonsense, of course, but that is the way this off-again-on-again cease fire is.

And in this crazy mixed-up situation anything can still happen—including a blood bath.

[From Newsday, May 17, 1965]

MARGUERITE HIGGINS "ON THE SPOT"
(By Marguerite Higgins)

SANTO DOMINGO.—The role being played in the Santo Domingo crisis by John Bartlow Martin, writer, diplomat, and a darling of the liberals, is so extraordinary as to defy all the known rules in the practice of foreign policy anywhere, anytime—ever.

In effect, the United States has two Ambassadors here. But wait, this is not cause for any wringing of hands. For they work well in tandem, have a complete meeting of minds on the nightmarish realities of the situation, and have no reason to compete for the favors of Lyndon Baines Johnson. They are already both tops in his favor.

John Bartlow Martin was Ambassador here during the epoch of the former President of the Dominican Republic, Juan Bosch. The progressive idealism of Bosch was betrayed by his poet's dreams and his inability to see that the Communists in his government were determined, by definition and ideological compulsion, to work for his undoing in order to advance their own chances of seizing power. So Bosch was overthrown by anti-Communist generals who were alarmed at his permissive attitude to the militant leftists.

Nonetheless, both during his presidency and beyond, Martin was close philosophically and personally to the democratically-elected Bosch and members of his government.

So it has been former Ambassador Martin's task to seek to persuade the moderate pro-Bosch elements to turn their backs on the Communist militants who sought to take over the current rebel revolt and cooperate in some sort of government of national union that can guide this nation back to constitutionality and whatever measure of democracy is possible in a nation that is largely illiterate and still in political swaddling clothes.

Ambassador Martin has been the Embassy's principal link with rebel Col. Francisco Caamano, the head of the rump constitutional regime. And contrary to press reports, these links have been kept very much alive—when the militant rebels would condescend to cooperate.

Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, the Ambassador No. 1 so to speak, is in overall command of the situation and recognizes that John Bartlow Martin fills an invaluable gap. For the rebels have made Ambassador Bennett their enemy No. 1. It would be unfitting and demeaning certainly for Ambassador Bennett to seek to deal with a group whose radio (until it was silenced) described him as a liar, murderer and such.

The priority task for Ambassador Bennett has been to work with the broadened coalition government of junta leader Gen. Antonio Imbert Barreras to bring about whatever concessions possible in the American-inspired attempt to build a bridge between the junta and the pro-Bosch rump regime of Colonel Caamano.

The irony of the rebel abuse heaped on Bennett is that the U.S. Marines would not be in Santo Domingo today if it were not for the judgments of John Bartlow Martin as made when he was whisked down here in the early days of chaos.

When L.B.J. telephoned John Bartlow Martin at Wesleyan College to ask him to go to Santo Domingo, the former Ambassador told the President: "The United States is backing the wrong side. We should back the Bosch (constitutionalist) movement."

Once on the scene in Santo Domingo, John Bartlow Martin quickly changed his mind.

Intercepting him for an instant the other day as he reported in briefly to the Embassy in between his 18 to 20 hours a day of "be reasonable" conference with Dominican politicians, Ambassador Martin explained: "The revolution did not start out as Communist but quickly developed in that direction."

Once a bloodbath begins, all the factions guilty of it are in it together so what used to be differences are wiped out. When you go to extremes, the old niceties of philosophic and ideological differences disappear. By extremes, I mean beheading, sending people "to the wall," killing of children, torture. In this bloodlust, all factions (pro-Castro, pro-Mao, pro-Soviet, and those pro-Bosch who participated in the bloodlust) tend to be melted together.

It was John Bartlow Martin's warnings that convinced President Johnson that there was a possible Cuba in the making in the Dominican Republic. If even an ardent liberal had come to this conclusion, L.B.J. reasoned, then he could not afford to take the political chance of inaction, let alone permit thousands of lives to be lost as the United States stood idly by.

The atmosphere around here even today is a kind of wild west magnified a thousand times and with a severe shortage of good guys to pit against the bad guys. So there is no doubt in this observer's mind that an orgy of killing was in the cards—and still might be.

The frail, ulcer-ridden Martin, with his gaunt cheeks and chain smoking habits, reports directly to President Johnson on a situation that despite his gargantuan efforts—and those of Bennett and others—seems strangled by hate and feuds.

But he is still trying, sometimes in Santo Domingo, sometimes in long futile efforts to persuade exiled Juan Bosch in Puerto Rico, to cease giving killers and fanatics political respectability.

Black as it looks, Martin keeps going because in the Dominican Republic, black can often be an optical illusion and things are seldom what they seem.

AMMUNITION DUMP EXPLOSION (By Hal Hendrix)

SANTO DOMINGO, May 12.—A tremendous ammunition dump explosion here in June 1964 was the initial stage of a Communist-backed military plot to dump the triumvirate regime of Donald Reid Cabral, a highly placed diplomatic source disclosed here today.

Reconstruction of events leading to last month's eruption helps explain President Johnson's decision to land U.S. forces here quickly to safeguard Americans and prevent a power grab by Communist strategists allied with Castro's Cuba.

This is an authoritative account of how the current disaster took shape here during the past year:

After having a relatively free run of the range during the government of leftist President Juan Bosch, toppled by a bloodless military coup in September 1963, Communists and Castroites here were forced to carry on clandestinely.

Quietly and carefully they sought a vehicle on which they could move in, piggy-back fashion. When Reid began to crack down on corrupt high-ranking military officers, including a clique known here as the San Cristobal group, early last year the extremists found their vehicle.

The dissident San Cristobal officers, at this stage believed to be unaware of their silent Red allies, made a deal with representatives of Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) on overthrowing the Reid government.

The officers had only in mind establishing a military junta, with them in charge. They didn't want to bring Bosch back to run the show.

One major stumbling block for the plotters was the huge 27th of February arsenal and ammunition dump across the Ozama River from downtown Santo Domingo.

With this key installation on the eastern side of the river and within control of Brig. Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin's headquarters at the San Isidro Air Base, the conspirators feared they were highly vulnerable. So it was decided that the ammunition base had to be eliminated and its replacement put on the west side of the river.

On the night of last June 11, a series of mysterious blasts destroyed four of five ammo dumps at the camp, along with tons of military hardware. The blasts, which rocked Santo Domingo, killed 14, injured about 140 and caused \$80 million damage.

The Reid government announced the explosions were caused by sabotage. Suspects were arrested and questioned, but there was never a complete explanation.

Six weeks later a special Organization of American States (OAS) investigative commission reported it had found indications of Communist infiltration in the Dominican armed forces and that the explosion was a result of this penetration.

The report and its implied warning went generally unheeded here and elsewhere in the hemisphere.

As the military plotters here had hoped, the replacement base was constructed on the west side of the Ozama River. It was built northwest of downtown Santo Domingo, and called the 16th of August camp—an important base in events of last month.

The plotting continued between the dissident officers and PRD representatives here and in San Juan, where Bosch is living and agitating in exile.

The PRD knew of the Red infiltration in their scheme, but figured it could control the Communists when the time came.

Reid learned of the plot against him early in April. The military conspirators found out that he knew of their plans and decided to advance their timetable. They still were thinking in terms of setting up only a military junta to rule the country.

The plot unfolded April 24. The PRD quickly moved to proclaim it a movement to restore Bosch to the Presidency. The chief military plotters began to see their plans getting out of control.

The Communists and pro-Castro June 14 movement leaders began to crawl out from the woodwork and by Sunday night, April 25, they had the rebellion going their way.

After Reid's Sunday overthrow the real scramble for power began.

By Tuesday it was over. The extremists had gained control behind the scenes, using Col. Francisco Caamano Dengo as rebel chieftain and new cover. Caamano was installed as "Constitutionalist President."

The Communist design was to create chaos and anarchy. Now using Caamano's "con-

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stitutionalist" movement as a shield, they engineered distribution of weapons to thousands of civilians—probably as many as 16,000 were armed in 1 day.

Most of the weapons came from the 16th of August arsenal and ammunition dump that the original military plotters figured would be in their control.

When ragtag rebels began appearing on television brandishing their newly acquired weapons, the San Cristobal clique knew they had been duped.

Some of these officers scurried back to San Isidro base to join in what they considered to be an anti-Communist fight. Others sought sanctuary in embassies here.

To diplomats and other observers the arming of civilians, under an admitted block-by-block plan, clearly reveals the insurgent movement for what it is now.

Caamano, who is not believed to share Communist sympathies but now is considered a captive of the extremists, and his chief adviser, Hector Aristy, readily admit the weapons were distributed according to plan.

But both heatedly deny that the Communist elements control the constitutionalist movement.

Communist and June 14 movement leaders here continue to remain out of the limelight. But no one, including the special OAS peacekeeping mission sent here to help end the war, doubts that they still are active inside the rebel-held section of the capital.

As for the original military plotters who dreamed of establishing a military junta, all were separated from the Dominican armed forces last Sunday by decree of Gen. Antonio Imbert Barrera, president of the U.S.-backed civilian-military junta.

DOMINICAN MILITARY LEADERS REJECT U.S. PROPOSAL (By Hal Hendrix)

SANTO DOMINGO, May 19.—Top Dominican military leaders supporting the civilian-military junta government created by the United States only 10 days ago have turned down flat a U.S. proposal to replace it with another provisional government.

The White House and State Department officials sent here Sunday bypassed Gen. Antonio Imbert Barrera, the junta president, and his four associates to meet with the military leaders.

Some of these members of the military hierarchy were the very same officers who 20 months ago overthrew the leftist government of President Juan Bosch after concluding he was "soft" on communism in the Dominican Republic and was an incompetent administrator—an opinion then shared by Washington.

Yet yesterday the U.S. diplomats asked the Dominican Army, Navy and Air Force brass to withdraw support from the stanchly anti-Communist Imbert-led junta and align themselves with a Washington-suggested pro-Bosch provisional coalition government.

The military hierarchy refused to buckle under the pressure and countered with a proposal that consideration be given to formation of a government of "national harmony," composed of all democratic parties in the country and including the Imbert junta.

The Dominican officers rejected as totally unacceptable the Washington-drafted scheme for a government to be headed by Antonio Guzman, who was flown by the U.S. Air Force to Washington for secret conferences last Friday and apparently was approved by the White House.

State Department spokesman Richard I. Phillips confirmed that Guzman, a close friend of Bosch and minister of agriculture in his cabinet, had been flown to Washington. But he declined to say with whom Guzman met.

Imbert and the Dominican military leaders, noting that Guzman was acceptable

quickly to the rebel forces, expressed bitterness that the United States had flown Guzman secretly to Washington for consultation.

"What kind of business is this the North American government is doing?" asked Imbert, sitting with his junta and military chiefs.

"This still is a free and sovereign country, so why does a Dominican citizen have to be taken to Washington for approval before being named President of the Dominican Republic?"

The military also put the U.S. representatives on the spot by declaring:

"If you want to turn this country over to communism you will have to guarantee safe evacuation of all the anti-Communist Dominican armed forces and their families and also all democratic Dominican citizens who hold anti-Communist beliefs."

Commodore Francisco J. Rivera Caminero, Armed Forces Secretary, said after the meeting the military establishment solidly supports the Imbert junta. He said he wasn't certain of the names of the American officials at the conference.

The Washington task force includes George Bundy, Special Assistant to President Johnson on National Security Affairs, Under Secretary of State Thomas C. Mann, Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance, and Jack Hood Vaughn, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. Mann flew back to Washington yesterday.

"I don't understand why the Americans came to talk with us about this instead of discussing it with the President of the National Reconstruction Government," Rivera Caminero commented. "We do have a President now, you know, General Imbert."

Imbert and his junta associates said their government rejects any attempt by the United States to pressure acceptance of "persons of Communist affiliation or sympathizers." He said he supported the idea of a national harmony government composed of "all capable and honest Dominicans regardless of their political affiliation—except for the Communists, of course."

The military leaders and Imbert also suggested to the American representatives that it would be helpful for the Organization of American States to maintain a peacekeeping force here for at least 2 months after hostilities end and supervise a referendum so Dominicans can decide by ballots whether they want to live under the 1963 or 1962 constitution.

The rebel or constitutionalist forces led by Col. Francisco Caamano Dene have been clamoring for return to the 1963 constitution, prepared by the Bosch government.

In opposing Guzman as a provisional president, Imbert and the military refer to him as a puppet of Bosch. "When the National Reconstruction Government was being formed," Imbert said, "we called Guzman and asked him to be a member. He declined, saying he was in ill health and added that since he was a close friend of Professor Bosch he would have to consult with him."

Other members of the U.S. proposed coalition government are reported to be Milton Messina, currently an economist for the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington and a former ambassador to Canada during the Trujillo dictatorship, Hector Garcia Godoy, Bosch's foreign minister, Dr. Alejandro Gruillon, a bank president, and Marcos Cabral, a Santiago businessman.

Guzman, Garcia Godoy, and Cabral are said to be members of Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party.

VANCE DENIES U.S. TROOPS ASSISTING DOMINICANS (By Hal Hendrix)

SANTO DOMINGO, May 21.—U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Cyrus R. Vance has categorically denied allegations that American

troops are assisting either of the two battling forces in the bitter Dominican civil war.

He said such allegations are "not correct."

"President Johnson's instructions are for the U.S. forces here to observe strict impartiality and these instructions are being carried out," he said at a news conference here.

In reply to a question about reports that troops of the civilian-military junta government of national reconstruction are preparing to strike at the heart of the Communist-infiltrated rebel resistance in downtown Santo Domingo, Vance said:

"What happens in the future will be governed by events and circumstances at the time."

Presumably, if such an attack is launched by the loyalist forces they would either have to cross the U.S.-controlled east-west security corridor across the city or land fighting units from the sea.

Presently, as emphasized by Vance, the policy of the American troops is to prohibit crossing of the corridor by any armed Dominican forces, rebel or loyalist. Also, U.S. naval vessels are patrolling the Santo Domingo area from close offshore.

Earlier, Gen. Antonio Imbert Barreras, junta president, said the loyalist forces will "very soon" launch a cleanup offensive against the downtown rebel stronghold.

Vance said some armed members of the Dominican police force, loyal to the Imbert government, have been permitted in the corridor to help maintain law and order.

Some of the police wear army uniforms since men in police uniforms were targets of the rioting rebel extremists early in the conflict here. Vance said the police now are changing back to the regular attire.

He also denied published reports that the U.S. forces were supplying arms to the junta troops.

Vance acknowledged that two small U.S. military radio units had been with the troops in the northside battle and at the national palace to help prevent the loyalist gunners from firing into American installations inside the corridor when shooting at the rebel forces.

He also said the United States provided no helicopter assistance to the junta forces, although two U.S. helicopters were used to transport some civil officials of the junta or a survey trip outside the Santo Domingo area.

Vance said published reports of American troops firing without provocation from the corridor into the rebel zones are not true. "American troops have returned fire when fired upon," he said.

Asked why U.S. forces referred to the rebels as "unfriendly," Vance replied:

"Well, there have been 426 violations (rebel fire into the U.S. corridor or safe zone) of the cease-fire agreement since it was made and to the best of my knowledge the (junta) forces have not fired into the U.S. line of communication."

Vance could have added that rebel snipers have killed 19 American soldiers and Marines and wounded more than 100.

He added that "U.S. trucks are interposed in front of the (junta) air force planes at San Isidro (air force base about 20 miles east of the capital) and they are not taking off."

The trucks were placed near the plane after five of them last week strafed Radio Santo Domingo, then held by the rebels. The station now is occupied by loyalist troops.

Gen. Bruce Palmer, commander of the U.S. military forces here, said all necessary steps would be taken to prevent any bombardment by air or sea of downtown Santo Domingo.

Imbert and Armed Forces Secretary Commodore Francisco J. Rivera Caminero said they expected to finish the battle against rebel forces north of the U.S. corridor by this week end.

Imbert said a permanent cease-fire, as called for by the Organization of American States and the United Nations Security Council, is now out of the question.

"The fight against communism here is being won by our troops and we will continue the fight until the Communists surrender or are completely defeated," he said. Meanwhile, both sides in the bloody war agreed to a 24-hour truce, starting at noon today, to enable the Red Cross to remove dead and wounded from the battle zone. The truce was worked out by the International Red Cross and the U.N. representative.

U.S.-PROPOSED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WOULD CAUSE "ABANDONMENT," DOMINICAN OFFICIAL SAYS

(By Scripps-Howard Newspapers)

SANTO DOMINGO, May 25.—Rather than accept a U.S.-proposed political settlement of the Dominican Republic crisis, the Dominican military establishment "would be forced to abandon the country," Commodore Francisco J. Rivera Caminero, armed forces secretary of the military-civilian junta government said today.

"The Americans will have to evacuate the military and their families—about 25,000 Dominicans," he said. "This is not just the Dominican officers, it's the whole establishment down through the troop lines."

"If the United States wants to help deliver our country to communism, it has the force to do it. But we will not surrender to a Communist formula."

"We will fight communism, but not the United States. We would be forced to abandon the country . . ."

This adamant military posture is believed to be a major cause of the stalemate in negotiations between President Johnson's Special Assistant, McGeorge Bundy and Antonio Guzman, a cabinet member in the deposed leftist government of ex-President Juan Bosch, for creation of a coalition government headed by Guzman.

Officials of the junta government, created earlier by American diplomats and headed by Gen. Antonio Imbert Barrera, have not been consulted by Bundy about the coalition government. But U.S. officials now are taking a second look at a proposal from the loyalist forces.

Loyalist leaders have suggested a referendum to determine whether Dominican citizens wish to be governed by Bosch's 1963 constitution or the 1962 version.

The Bundy formula would have the Guzman coalition govern under the Bosch constitution, discarded when Bosch was toppled by a military coup in September 1963.

"The only proper formula is for the Dominican people themselves to decide what kind of government and constitution they want through referendum or election," says Rivera Caminero.

Yesterday, General Imbert summoned American Ambassador William Tapley Bennett, Deputy Defense Secretary Cyrus Vance and Dr. Jose A. Mora, Secretary General of the Organization of American States, to his residence to inquire what the United States was doing in its secret negotiations.

It was learned that Bennett assured Imbert the United States is not trying to impose a government upon the Dominican Republic, emphasizing that "this is matter for Dominicans themselves to resolve."

Nonetheless, sources in the rebel government headed by Col. Francisco Caamano Deno, hinted strongly to newsmen that a "complete agreement with the United States" on a coalition headed by Guzman was imminent.

American Embassy spokesmen insisted there is nothing to substantiate the claim, noting that there is a stalemate now, and saying only that talks are continuing.

According to rebel informants, the Guzman coalition would include these Dominicans in a cabinet:

Dr. Ramon Ledesma, minister of presidency, member of Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD); Hector Garcia Godoy, foreign minister, a strong supporter of former Trujillo-puppet President Joaquin Godoy; Silvestre Alvarez Moya (PRD), minister of interior and police; Col. Jose Antonio Deleon, armed forces secretary, apolitical; Dr. Marcelino Velez Santana, minister of health, Dominican Socialist Party (PSD); Senora Mineta Roque, minister of education, an aunt of a top Dominican Communist, Fidelia Despradel, and described as a far-leftist; Virgilio Mainardi Reyna, minister of labor, member of the splinter National Dominican Revolutionary Party and campaign opponent of Bosch in the 1962 elections; Miguel Angel Brito (PRD), attorney general; Milton Messina, minister of finance, an economist working for the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington and considered apolitical; Cesar Brache, minister of industry and commerce; Tomas Pastoriza, minister of agriculture, apolitical; Ramon Vila Piola, minister of public properties, a PRD member and minister of finance in the Bosch government; Julio Postigo, minister without portfolio, apolitical, member of the present Imbert government; Col. Juan Lora Fernandez, army chief of staff; Col. Nelson Gonzalez Pomare, chief of the air force; and Emilio Almonte (PRD), minister of public works.

A big question among traditionally anti-Communist and pro-American Dominicans now is why the U.S. attempts to ram Guzman into the provisional Presidency when it was obvious in advance he would be unacceptable to the anti-Bosch and anti-Communist elements, but pleasing to the rebels.

It is argued by American manipulators that Bosch won the Presidency with about 60 percent of the vote in 1962. But how much of this was vote against his opponent is not discussed by the Americans. At least 40 percent of the Dominican voters still are stringently anti-Bosch.

There is doubt here that Bundy and others involved in settlement negotiations have been made fully aware of the backgrounds of some of the "Constitutionalists" and PRD figures they are dealing with.

Washington officials, including Bundy, contend they are distressed by the lack of capable politicians on the Dominican scene.

Some have not even been approached by U.S. officials.

There are such capable Dominicans as Dr. Eduardo Read Barreras, former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and now Ambassador to Rome. And former President Emilio de los Santos. Both have unsullied reputations and are not vulnerable to attack from either side.

It is also puzzling to many observers why the United States is using such emissaries as Dr. Jaime Benitez, Chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico, who is well known in the area for his anti-Americanism. He is here now at Bundy's request.

Disturbing, too, is the manner in which U.S. diplomats persuaded General Imbert and his four associates in the junta to accept the temporary government role, and then attempted to dump them—in an apparent concession to the rebels and the PRD leaders in Puerto Rico.

"GUERRILLA SCHOOL" OPENS IN SANTO DOMINGO

(By Hal Hendrix)

SANTO DOMINGO, July 22.—A school to produce "instant guerrillas" has opened in the rebel zone of this battle-fatigued Dominican capital.

The setting is Parque Infantil, a block-square children's park studded with swings, tee-er-toters and big, red-blossomed trees.

For the time being, Dominican children who play in the park must dodge small

groups of young men receiving basic guerrilla training.

The school is in a pocket of the rebel zone controlled by the pro-Castro June Fourteen Movement, which is allied with the "Constitutionalists" of Col. Francisco Caamano Deno.

A school director, who identified himself as a June Fourteen member but asked to remain anonymous, said there are 600 youths in training now, most of them supporters of the June Fourteen group.

Most instructors also belong though some are members of the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), whose titular head is ex-President Juan Bosch.

"Most of the people under arms now are members of the June Fourteen Movement," the director commented. "So it is reasonable that the majority force be teaching others how to carry on the struggle."

The director said there are about 12,000 armed persons in the rebel sector. He did not speculate how many were followers of his organization.

"We are teaching the people how to fight urban guerrilla warfare, how to maintain the fight in the city," the director said.

As he explained the school's purpose, he indicated training would continue regardless of the outcome of negotiations by the Organization of American States (OAS) for settlement of the 3-month Dominican hostilities.

U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, chief OAS mediator, said later he was unaware of the school, but would be interested in looking into its operations.

The trainees use wooden sticks to simulate rifles in drills. The director said they would learn to use every type of rifle and automatic weapon available in the country before the course is completed.

Instruction is given also in the art of concocting Molotov cocktails—bottles filled with gasoline.

As a teenage girl drill sergeant, in muddy blouse and bluejeans, gave combat instructions, the director said tactics being taught are the result of experience in the recent fighting here.

"Dominican armed forces often shoot from a kneeling position," he said. "So the recruits are learning to shoot on their stomachs and fire at the right level."

Another group crawled back and forth across a muddy patch. "They are learning how to sneak up for an attack on a barracks," said another June 14 member.

A series of obstacle courses has been built for the trainees.

One has lots of barbed wire less than a foot off the ground. The object is to teach the youngsters how to crawl at curb level in city street fighting.

The school day extends from 5:30 a.m. to 6 p.m. with a noon lunch break. Classes are held 7 days a week.

There also is classroom instruction. The director said students are taught morality, proper use of free time and the basic reason for "the Dominican struggle," which includes sovereignty, human rights and intervention by foreign troops.

It was apparent the school has the potential of creating the nucleus for a Dominican FALN, initials of the Castro-model Armed Forces of National Liberation in Venezuela.

For older boys—and some girls—a more sophisticated school is opening across the street under direction of Col. Manuel R. Montes Arache, secretary of the armed forces in the Caamano regime.

Montes Arache, a frogman in the Dominican Navy, is offering courses in sabotage, espionage, demolition, communications and guerrilla warfare.

Among other things, his students will learn how to pick off a sentry with a crossbow and arrow.

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COMMUNISTS TOOK LEAD ROLE IN REBELLION FROM START, SAYS WRITER WHO WAS THERE—ARTICLE 1

(By Paul D. Bethel)

How did the Dominican Republic revolt start on April 24? Who were the prime movers? Who are the "good guys" and who are the "bad guys?" Was U.S. action justified? What is U.S. policy today?

There is impressive evidence that the Communists were in on the rebellion from the very beginning. They did not snatch the revolt from the hands of deposed President Juan Bosch's party, the PRD, as has been widely supposed.

On March 16, just 5 weeks before the April 24 revolt, the central committee of the PSP-D (Communist Party) issued a manifesto. It called for "the return of Prof. Juan Bosch to legitimate control of the government."

The manifesto said: "The working people will achieve total liberation if it unites and fights to conquer—to eliminate the economic domination by North American imperialism and to establish Socialist democracy which puts the wealth in the hands of the people."

The manifesto thus endorsed Juan Bosch as the surest means of establishing its Socialist democracy. It incited the people to violence to restore Bosch to the presidency in these words:

"The entire population must fight in the streets, in the squares, in the factories, in the fields, for the return of Juan Bosch as the head of the constitutional government."

The Communist Party knew that Donald Reid Cabral, president of the civilian junta, was unpopular and that his overthrow was imminent. The party had tested his strength in seven labor strikes over the period of a year. The strikes weakened the national economy, struggling under Reid's austerity program. Rational as his policies were, they made no friends for Reid among the Nation's business and labor leaders.

Then there was the military.

Under U.S. guidance, Reid cracked down hard on graft and corruption in the armed forces—the first Dominican leader with the courage to do so. Bosch never challenged the authority of the generals nor made any effective moves to curb corruption.

Under Bosch, the three big shots in the contraband racket were the National Police Chief, Peguero Guerra; Air Force Gen. Atila Luna and Army Gen. Vinas Roman. They ran everything, from nylons to dope, and put millions of dollars into their own pockets.

Reid dumped all three generals early this year in a cleanup of the government. He removed Luna and Roman from their commands and fired Peguero.

Reid had thus alienated the three pillars needed for support—the military, labor, business. Bosch's PRD and the Communists organized and waited for Reid's ouster.

Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett told a group of us on April 29 that the PRD and the Communists had been collaborating. He said: "The Communists worked with Bosch's PRD for months and were prepared well in advance of Reid's overthrow."

This was the importance of the March 16 Communist manifesto. It was the blueprint for the events which took place on April 24 and thereafter.

I also learned from an unimpeachable source that Bosch met with two members of the Castro-Communist "14th of June movement" in San Juan in early March. The two—Victoriano Felix and Rafael Taveras—got Bosch's agreement to cooperate.

Taveras is a member of the central committee of the party. He arranged to tape a question-and-answer session with Bosch. The tape was taken by them to Santo Domingo and turned over to Jose Brea, secretary of finance of Bosch's PRD. He also owns the radio station, Cristal.

Prevented from airing the tape by a Reid law, a transcript was made and read over the air April 9 on the program "Here is Santo Domingo." The program was sponsored by the 14th of June movement.

Bosch's message was anti-American, rabble-rousing and pro-Communist. The facts of the story have since been confirmed by official Washington sources.

Another fact cementing the United States case that the revolt was Communist is presented by Jose Rafael Molina Urena, Bosch's provisional president during the first 4 days of the rebellion. He called on our U.S. Ambassador Tuesday night, April 27, and was, in the Ambassador's words, "a thoroughly defeated and dejected man who admitted to me that the rebel movement was in the hands of the Communists." Molina took asylum in the Colombian Embassy that same night.

There can be little question that the Communists, Bosch and Bosch's PRD collaborated from the very beginning. Timing was the key element. The pocket-sized rebellion of a few military officers on April 24 provided the opening. The collaborators took it. Here is what happened:

At 1:30 p.m. on that fateful Saturday, rumors began to fly in the slum areas of Santo Domingo that the Reid Cabral junta had been overthrown. People began to pour into the streets as the rumors multiplied and spread.

Only a few hours earlier, Reid had dispatched Army Chief of Staff Gen. Marco Rivera Cuesta to the 27th of February Barracks to sack two officers for graft and disloyalty. Instead, Rivera Cuesta was surrounded and taken prisoner. Immediately, the 16th of August Barracks threw in with the rebels, and the revolt was on. The barracks are named after famous dates in Dominican history.

Why the revolt?

Officers of rank lower than general applauded Reid's moves against Roman, Peguero, and Luna. It gave them a chance to move up. But when Reid reached down, as he did that Saturday, to fire officers of relatively junior rank, those same officers rebelled. They saw in his move—perhaps accurately—a plan to crush the power of the military.

It is important to note at this moment, however, that the military insurgents had no intention of expanding their pocket-sized rebellion into a civil war. They merely wanted to get rid of Reid and the threat he posed to their privileged position.

Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin stepped in and tried to mediate the dispute.

A career military officer, untainted by graft or corruption, Wessin y Wessin was feared by the Communists and respected by his colleagues. He has other power. He commands the military training center (CEFA) and, through it, the San Isidro Air Base with its Dominican armored force, paratroopers, and counterinsurgency teams.

The Air Force is privileged. Not only does it have all the planes, but virtually everything else.

The rebels refused to surrender to Wessin y Wessin, and gambled that he would not push them too hard. They were right. The general had also begun to look upon Reid's moves against the military with some concern, since he felt that a weakening of the military establishment could only play into the hands of the Communists. He talked the situation over with the rebels and came up with a formula. That formula was to set up a joint military junta—rebel and loyalist—and call for elections within 90 days.

Wessin y Wessin defends his actions. He had backed Reid for nearly 2 years. But he said he knew that Reid could never pull through the April crisis. He urged Reid to

resign "rather than see the country plunged into chaos."

Reid had a few things to say. In an interview on May 3, while in hiding in Santo Domingo, he said: "The Communists used the resentment of the military toward me and were able to undermine civilian control."

Nevertheless, the doughty Scotch-Dominican made a stab at staying in power, overriding the advice of General Wessin y Wessin. That Saturday night he broadcast an ultimatum to the rebels. They were to surrender by 5 a.m. the next day, he said, or they would be attacked by loyalist forces. But there were no loyalist forces.

Wessin y Wessin refused to back him any longer. Reid Cabral was through.

Taken in the context of Latin-American politics, Reid's critics had a point. True, they say, he was cleaning up corruption. True, they also say, he tried to develop rational economic policies. Not true, they say, that he intended to hold elections as promised in September of this year—unless he was sure of winning.

He made himself Secretary of War. He brought the 10,000-man national police force under his control. He tried to unite smaller political parties behind him.

However, Reid's views or alleged views about elections also had a point.

In that same May 3 interview, he stressed the need to prepare for elections. Illiteracy in the Dominican Republic runs around 70 percent. The people were under the suffocating dictatorship of Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo Molina for 32 years.

Commencing only with the assassination of Trujillo on May 30, 1961, political parties have little real strength and no tradition. The Communists have that. Reid seemed to feel that early elections, without several years' preparation, would play into the hands of the Communists and demagogues.

No rational budgetary procedures had been followed under Bosch. "The first freely elected President in 32 years," and he made a mess of things. Military-contracting officers made all kinds of import deals—when they could get a rake-off of between 10 and 20 percent. Importers vied with each other in offering higher rake-offs. So the military signed deals that committed the budget for 5 or 10 years ahead.

Reid established a budget commission and headed it himself. No purchases were permitted unless this commission stamped the contract to show that the Government had the money to pay. All purchasers had to deposit 40 percent in advance against the purchase of foreign goods. But by the time Reid was in a position to enforce economic control, the debt was already sky high.

One effect was to close the door after the horses had escaped. The other was to lay him open to charges of wanting to become a dictator. It did not seem to matter that Reid Cabral had few trusted aides to turn to.

The facts suggest that civilian junta President Donald Reid Cabral came on the scene too late. Badly needed in 1962 and 1963, his policies in 1964 and 1965 satisfied nobody and alienated sources of support needed to keep him in power and carry out those policies.

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DOMINICAN DILEMMA—KNOWN REDS AMONG REBELS HARANGUED POPULACE TO INDICATE REBELLION HAD POPULAR SUPPORT—ARTICLE 2

(By Paul D. Bethel)

On Sunday, April 25, the second day of the Dominican Republic revolt, Gen. Wessin y Wessin sent a personal representative to meet with the rebels of the 16th of August Barracks. They were jointly to set up a

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caretaker junta composed of rebels and loyalists until elections were called.

The general's emissary was met by banners carrying the slogan of Communist manifesto issued the month before: "We are for the return of President Bosch at the head of the constitutional government." This was a dramatic switch from the agreed-upon elections. The PRD-Communist combine had gotten to them.

The emissary also found that a large number of the Army rebels had slipped into the center of the city from the two Army encampments. It was there that the real political and military decisions were being made. The PRD-Communist combine was at work.

The day before, mobs seized Radio Santo Domingo. Known Communist leaders—among them Castro-Cuban Luis Acosta—harangued the populace with: "We are for the return of President Bosch at the head of the constitutional government."

This was early—2:30 p.m. on Saturday. People were paraded across the TV screens dragging rifles, armed to the teeth. Some of the demonstrators were from the Army, some from the Navy, others were imposters wearing uniforms, still others were civilians.

One purpose was to give the impression that everyone was supporting the rebellion. Another was to throw the loyalist armed forces into confusion. Both purposes were achieved.

Control of radio and television by the Communists nearly delivered the country into their hands. The confusion in the ranks of the loyalists was enormous. Skillful radio and television propaganda made it appear that the country was in the hands of the rebels.

As late as 10 p.m. Sunday night, loyalist Commodore Rivero Camlenero was unable to give a definite answer as to where the Dominican Navy stood. He told a junior commander: "I am with the people but against communism." Broadcasts that the navy had thrown in with the rebels were apparently interpreted by the commodore to mean that the joint rebel-loyalist military junta had been established. There were no clear instructions from the San Isidro base on the politics of the moment, simply because Gen. Wessin y Wessin was trying to sort out the confusion.

Adding to the confusion, on Sunday the National Police set prisoners free—criminals and political prisoners. They were rushed to the TV station by the rebels. The police, they said, had gone over to the side of the people's movement. Powerful propaganda. Tremendous confusion.

But it was organized confusion. Four truckloads of arms roared into Independence Park in the rebel-held portion of Santo Domingo. As one Western diplomat stated: "I saw Peiping Communists, Castro Communists, and Moscow Communists passing out arms to criminals and to the street gangs." These, then, were the armed civilians referred to in news accounts by overly objective observers.

Two precious days had been gained for the rebels. During that period they were able to secure and to hold the central part of the city. Saturday night and early Sunday morning Gen. Wessin y Wessin's tanks moved across the Duarte Bridge over the Ozama River to curb the mobs.

But Gen. Wessin y Wessin did not know at the time that he had been doublecrossed. He expected the Army rebels to join him in cleaning out the city. Instead, his troops were faced by those same rebels now working together with the organizers and the mobs. The blow to loyalist morale was nearly fatal.

Communist and leftwing parties openly endorsed the revolt and called for the return of Bosch—the MPD (Popular Democratic movement), the Communist Popular Socialist Party, the 14th of June movement, among others. All are pro-Castro organizations. The PRD provided the all-important front.

Radio and television pounded home these messages:

"We are the PDR."

"We are for the constitution."

"We are not Communists."

"We want President Bosch."

"Come to the old airport and pick up your weapons."

The musclemen for the rebels are the turbas. Turbas are street gangs, roughly comparable to those who terrorize subway riders in New York City. But they also do the dirty work for whoever happens to hold power in the Dominican Republic.

During Trujillo's time, street gangs were used by the police to keep the populace in line. They were given missions to beat up or intimidate Trujillo foes. And they were paid for those missions.

During the April revolt, the turbas were used by Communist organizers. Their mission—to loot, kill, steal, create chaos, intimidate the populace, exterminate those not in sympathy with rebel aims.

The horrors committed by the turbas is told by Ina French, a Negro domestic servant:

"I saw them kill a Chinese merchant who lived above his store. He heard the turbas coming Saturday night, ran down to close his shutters and was shot through the stomach, and he died right there."

"The turbas," she continued, "attacked homes, killed people, and broke down the steel doors of a department store. When they were finished with the store, you couldn't find one pin left. * * * Bodies of people assassinated by the turbas were all over the streets."

"Some of the bodies had stomachs which were higher than their faces. They had been lying there for 3 whole days in the sun. The people started scratching dirt over the bodies. They began to bury them where they could, and put little sticks together as crosses. We knew when we saw the sticks that a body was there."

A similar story was told by a Puerto Rican, Maria de los Santos. Her home was broken into, her car stolen, and her family beaten. Another eyewitness was Hector de Vries, a Dutch West Indies migrant worker.

A Scottish news photographer went into the city on April 28 and came back eeked at the wanton murder. He counted 90 bodies in one block. The Scotsman was also arrested for a period, accused of being a Yankee spy. Hate and murder stalked rebel-held streets.

Most foreign reporters arrived in Santo Domingo well over a week following the initial outbreak of the revolt. By that time most of the bodies had been removed. A nurse reported 19 bodies stacked up in a corner of the hospital. But since there were no bodies in abundance, as reported by U.S. Embassy sources, overly hostile reporters scoffed at those reports.

Yet, even the Peace Corps volunteers said that hoes and shovels given to the people for backyard gardening were used to bury the dead and more were requested. Those same volunteers, from their vantage point of working out in the barrios (neighborhoods) with the people, also reported that leaflets had been passed around by Communist organizers several weeks before the revolt, with instructions on how to make Molotov cocktails out of Coca-Cola bottles and gasoline.

A woman in the rebel-held section of Santo Domingo was raped 12 times by street toughs. She was known to be anti-Communist. Other groups of toughs known as Tigers, assaulted police stations of precinct size, slaughtered the inmates, and seized the arsenals.

Three eyewitnesses reported independently that the warden of a prison was beheaded. His head was stuck atop a pole and paraded around the city by mobs. U.S. Embassy officials corroborated the stories.

There are other evidences of Communist

domination of the rebel movement. Much of it comes from Havana.

For example, on May 11 I found that Rafael Mejia (alias Pichirilo) was in Santo Domingo with the rebels. Mejia was helmsman for the yacht *Gramma* which took Fidel Castro and 82 men from Mexico to Cuba, where they landed on December 2, 1956, and took up the guerrilla fight against Gen. Fulgencio Batista.

I got Mejia's telephone number and called. His wife answered. I told her that I was a reporter and that I'd met Mejia before in Cuba and would like to talk with him. He was asleep. Could I speak with Pichirilo when he woke up? His wife said that I should call back in an hour. I did. His sister-in-law answered. I again used the nickname Pichirilo and was told that he was still asleep. I called back that night. He had gone. Further a man answered the phone. He cut me off, say that I shouldn't bother to call again.

Although Mejia is a Dominican by birth, he holds Cuban citizenship, as well. He does so by virtue of being commissioned a captain in Castro's rebel army. He is a graduate of guerrilla training and political agitation schools in Cuba. He worked for a year in Maj. Ernesto "Che" Guevara's Ministry of Industries. Guevara is chief of Cuba's external guerrilla warfare operations and his ministry is the front for those operations.

The extent of Castro Communist influence in the rebel camp is fully documented in reports of John Bartlow Martin, President Johnson's special envoy. He has named names and given positions of several hardcore Communists. Their activities range from introducing large sums of money into the Dominican Republic to running "a school for Communist indoctrination." All were trained in Cuba, and some had received training in Russia and China, as well.

A five-man factfinding Commission of the Organization of American States gave a devastating report on Communist and Castro-Communist rebel activities. Several Senators among them, Alaska's ERNEST GRUENING and Connecticut's THOMAS DODD, are critical of our press for not reporting those findings.

In speaking of that oversight, Dodd attributed it bluntly to the fact that, as he put it, "there has been a tendency on the part of some writers to oversimplify the situation in the Dominican Republic and overidealize the rebel movement. Their articles suggest that what is involved in the Dominican Republic is a conflict between a dictatorship (new junta chief Imbert Barreras) and a constitutional democracy (Caamano Deno)."

In fact, Gen. Antonio Imbert Barreras is not really a general. He was given the honorary rank by Juan Bosch himself for his part in killing Rafael Trujillo. Imbert's colleagues jokingly say that he "couldn't direct a squad on an assault on a Coca-Cola machine, if each member had a dime in his hand."

MANY CIVILIANS DIED WHEN REBELS USED THEM AS A SHIELD AGAINST STRAFING BY AIR FORCE—ARTICLE 3

(By Paul D. Bethel)

At about noon on Sunday, April 25, the rebel-held radio in Santo Domingo announced that Juan Bosch had designated Jose Rafael Molina Urena as "provisional constitutional President." He was installed in the presidential palace by rebel armed units, members of Bosch's PRD, and a large number of Communists and leftists.

Molina Urena signed several decrees designed to establish his authority and give the impression that the loyalist cause was lost.

Dominican Air Force planes bombed and strafed rebel positions in the city Sunday, the day after the revolt started. One objective was psychological. Air Force Lt. Col. Mario Palanco told me that the attacks were also

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intended to show the people that the air force had not gone over to the rebels, as the rebel radio was claiming. However, rebel announcers deftly countered by saying that the planes were flown by Cuban exile "mercenaries." Several thousand Cubans were living in Santo Domingo.

When that fiction no longer held up, the turbas (street gang musclemen) were called into action. They rounded up the relatives of pilots who were living in this city and took them to the television station. There, they were forced to plead with the pilots to stop the strafing. In some cases, rifles aimed at them were clearly visible to the viewers.

When the televised appearances did not stop the air force, families of the pilots were herded into military targets to be among the first to die. The planes came anyway.

"Everyone ran," said Colonel Palanco, "pilots' wives, children, fathers, and their turba guards who counted on the presence of the hostages as a shield for themselves."

Crude leaflets were dropped on the city by the Air Force warning the public to get out of certain areas marked for bombing. The rebel radio countered by urging the people to rush to those areas in cold-blooded use of civilians to protect rebel positions.

How many were killed is not known, but by April 29 the U.S. Embassy estimated that there had been 1,800 casualties in the city from all causes—among them around 600 dead. It turned out later that this was a conservative figure.

By Sunday night, outwardly it appeared that the rebels had the upper hand. But at the same time, many leaders were taking asylum in Latin American embassies—among them a relatively obscure lieutenant colonel by the name of Francisco Caamano Deno. Up to this point, he had played no significant role in the revolt.

The tide began to turn slightly in favor of the loyalists, and at 7 a.m. Tuesday the main base of San Isidro got a radio station operating. It told the people in target areas to get out and go to the Quisqueya baseball stadium, the El Embajador Hotel, and the Perla Antillana Hippodrome where they could seek refuge and get food and water. The rebel-held Santo Domingo radio demanded that the people stay where they were, and in some instances they enforced their demand for nearly a week.

With San Isidro on the air, the scattered elements of the Dominican armed forces began to pull themselves together. The first target to be knocked out was the rebel radio. The radio was the only one which reached the entire country, and it carried accounts of a complete rebel victory.

In retrospect, it seems miraculous that the whole country did not throw in with the rebels during those first few days. It serves as a commentary on rebel claims that theirs was a social, popular revolution. The country remained quiet and under loyalist control.

At 9:45 a.m. on Tuesday, Dominican Air Force vampire jets hit the rebel station. The Dominican Navy cruised slowly offshore lobbing shells at the rebel-held palace and the rebel radio. At 11:50 a.m. the radio abruptly left the air.

Provisional President Jose Molina Urena fled from the Palace. Military personnel, disillusioned by the obvious Communist takeover, began to defect. By Tuesday night, April 27, the PRD-Communist strike for power had bogged down in a tiny enclave in the center of Santo Domingo.

Rebel claims that U.S. forces withheld them from certain victory by encircling their enclave are overstated. Only 536 Marines had landed up to April 29, and they were used only to protect the U.S. Embassy from sniper fire and to secure the El Embajador Hotel, which was headquarters for the evacuation of civilians.

And it was not until 3 days later that marine units and the 82d Airborne Division

forged a corridor through the outskirts of the city as an evacuation route. This corridor hemmed in the rebels, but it also prevented loyalist forces from attacking rebel positions in the city.

In fact, on April 30 in the first interview held with the rebel command's political adviser, Hector Aristy, I was told that the rebels intended to hold the center of the city. They planned to enter into negotiations with the peace commission of the Organization of American States which was to arrive the following day. The tactics were to gain at the conference table what they had been unable to win by force of arms.

Aristy said that the rebel zone was well-stocked with arms and food. "We can hold out indefinitely here," he said. "In fact, I expect to get fat on all of the good food we have."

By this time, Lt. Col. Francisco Caamano Deno was the nominal leader of the rebels. With PRD-man Joss Molina Urena in asylum, the leaderless rebels needed a new front. Again, Juan Bosch made the selection—or agreed to it. Caamano came out of asylum in the Argentine Embassy on Tuesday, April 27, and took over.

The rebels moved fast to prepare for the peace commission of the OAS. They stalled on the cease-fire until they could round up some members of the old Bosch congress. Caamano was voted in as constitutional President on May 4, and the name of the rebel movement changed to the constitutional government. The cease-fire was formally ratified by them in that name. The loyalists signed merely as "the Governing Military Junta."

Any thinking person can see which title carries the greatest propaganda appeal. Thus the rebels got the OAS to deal with them on a level generally reserved for governments of legally recognized authority. They had gotten the rebel radio functioning again, and were winning the propaganda battle.

Caamano's pretensions were given a dose of Johnsonian diplomacy. Highly placed U.S. officials pointed out that under the constitution a military man may not be president. But the damage had already been done. The signing of the OAS document had extended to the rebels a certain dignity and status.

Highly placed U.S. officials threw another dash of cold water on rebel enthusiasm. They said that the night before Caamano's investiture, he had met with four top Communists. He could be top man the next day on two conditions, he was told. One, that if he should win out in negotiations and come to power, he must give important positions to the Communists. Two, in those negotiations, he must get concrete assurances of safe conduct for Communists out of the country, should he lose. U.S. officials say that he agreed to both demands.

The three-man military junta had given way, under the patient prodding of President Johnson's civilian envoy, John Barlow Martin, to a five-man Government of national reconstruction, headed by Antonio Imbert Barreras. By May 17, a combination of forces from the Navy, Army, the tank corps, and the police began to mop up the northeastern part of the city—north of the armed U.S. corridor and the international zone.

The goal of the mop-up was to flush out snipers, capture caches of arms, and thus return the greater part of the city to a semblance of normalcy.

I went along with the lead tanks for several blocks, at times under heavy fire. The troops maintained good discipline. They searched each house over a vast area. Suspected snipers had their shoulders examined for bruises from rifle and automatic weapons recoil. Their pants were rolled up above their knees for signs of extended kneeling in sniper nests. Teletype evidence sent suspects to the rear for further interrogation. Others were

let go. Houses were carefully searched and arms caches sent to the rear in trucks and armored vehicles.

One vignette of the war:

A group of 11 rebels, firing a .50-caliber machinegun sandbagged atop a British-made Land Rover, were cut down as they raced into loyalist lines. An army ambulance arrived almost immediately and took away the bodies.

People in houses around the vehicle began to emerge as the loyalists moved up the street. They talked. One said: "When the tanks are in the next block, we can dismantle it." They meant the vehicle.

I had to leave to make a broadcast for Mutual News. I came back in an hour. The car was completely stripped—its headlights, steering wheel, tires, most of the engine, even the brake drums. I asked why they did it. One turned to me and replied: "Chico, we have to live, don't we?"

I talked to people in the houses. Almost as soon as the loyalist troops had passed, housewives began to sluice down their sidewalks with water and clean the streets.

I noticed that they referred to loyalist troops as our troops. I asked how come? Only a few hours before this section had housed rebel snipers, hadn't it? They shrugged and said they had no means to get them out. And besides, it now looked like the loyalists were going to win.

Friday noon was the deadline for a 12-hour Red Cross truce. It was agreed upon by both sides so that bodies could be removed. However, there was the feeling that this wedge-opener would be used to extend the truce. (It was.) This meant that loyalist forces had to complete their mop-up by noon. They did so.

By exactly 12 noon on Friday, May 21, loyalist forces had driven across the northern part of the city and stood on the banks of the upper Ozama River. They had the rebels completely surrounded, with U.S. forces interposed between rebels and loyalists.

There is an importance to this story.

When it became clear that the U.S. forces were preventing the loyalists from attacking the last rebel stronghold, questions were asked. The answer, from one official source, is that the "Dominican Army couldn't fight its way out of a paper bag." Another opined that the rebels, entrenched in the city, would clobber them. Still another source was bitter about Wessin y Wessin's failure to move into the city on Sunday, the day after the revolt had broken out.

However, there were no U.S. Marine Army men with Dominican troops as they cleaned up the northern part of the city. There is an apparent failure on the part of our officials to recognize the power of Communist propaganda—powerful enough to virtually immobilize Dominican forces for 3 days.

REPORTER TELLS HOW REBELS USED PROPAGANDA AGAINST YANKEES TO GET CIVILIAN SUPPORT—ARTICLE 4

(By Paul D. Bethel)

On Saturday, May 22, photographer Andrew St. George and I saw something of the rebel propaganda organization in the Dominican Republic rebellion—on the firing line.

We had interviewed the entire Dominican general staff. The cease-fire was to end in an hour. Dominican troops were loading into trucks at the headquarters of Army chief of staff, Brig. Gen. Jacinto Martinez Arana. They were headed for the firing line, ready to enter the rebel-held part of the city.

Suddenly sirens sounded and a trumpet blared. Four staff cars rolled into the courtyard. The Secretary of War, Rivera Caminero, had arrived. With him were the chiefs of the air force and the navy and other staff officers. They invited Howard Handleman, an American adventurer by the name of

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Mitchell WerBell, Andy St. George, and me into Gen. Martinez Arana's office.

There, the combined chiefs of staff told us of their plans and frustrations less than an hour before they would be free to fight again.

General Caminero said:

First, junta forces will not shoot unless Communist rebels shoot first. He expected them to shoot. He seemed to hope that they would.

Second, junta forces will not try to fight their way through American lines which had cut them off from the rebel stronghold.

Third, although junta forces are cut off, they have every intention of cleaning out the Communists from their tiny downtown enclave.

There are ways, said Gen. Martinez Arana, to move into the rebel positions without crossing U.S. lines: by boat down the Ozama River, and by sea.

Junta chiefs, he said, were debating whether the U.S. Navy would be ordered to turn against the original American mission—"to prevent Communists from taking over this country"—and physically restrain loyalist troops from cleaning out the city.

Up to May 22, he pointed out, rebels killed 19 U.S. soldiers, wounded another 111, and killed untold numbers in the city's center. By contrast, junta forces had not fired one single round at Americans.

Caminero's last point was to stick with Andy and me. Following the interview, we went to the only restaurant open in Santo Domingo—the Italla. It is situated just inside U.S.-controlled territory.

We ordered a cold beer. Suddenly we heard the sound of machinegun fire and the heavy clatter of mortar shells impacting nearby. We looked longingly at the unfinished beer, and ran out to my car.

The firing was coming from the vicinity of the presidential palace, a loyalist stronghold surrounded by the rebels. We drove through the marine checkpoint, ever so slowly, and approached the palace. The streets were a shambles of tree branches and electric lines severed by shells and bullets.

We entered the palace grounds, across an exposed expanse of street. Loyalist troops waved us back, but we went in anyway.

Two tanks had their guns trained on rebel strongpoints. Infantry units were lying prone, sighting over their rifles and automatic weapons. We talked for a moment with squad and platoon commanders, and they told us to talk with the colonel in charge of the unit.

I drove through more gates and arrived at the command post. The colonel looked at us in astonishment.

The colonel's aide was suspicious. He asked for identification. We gave it. He asked for more. We gave that, too. Still suspicious, the aide reluctantly permitted us to talk with the colonel. He said that the rebels might launch another attack on the palace.

Andy suggested that we drive down into the rebel lines to see what was going on. We did. I drove about eight blocks, lateral to the line of fire, and parked the car. We got out and walked another several blocks into the rebel zone.

Suddenly bullets started zipping around us. We flattened ourselves against the walls as heads bobbed out of houses and motioned us to make small targets of ourselves. On the street corner opposite, two men motioned us to cross. When the firing had died down, we did so.

One of them said that Wessin y Wessin's troops were firing on Marine positions. I looked around and saw American uniform several blocks away. They marked the armed corridor to the airport, forged by the 82d Airborne and the Marines 2 weeks earlier.

Speaking halting English, the Dominican insisted that Wessin y Wessin's troops were

shooting at U.S. Marines, not the rebels. He pointed down into deep rebel-held Santo Domingo: "There are two bodies of Wessin y Wessin soldiers there." Andy and I looked at one another. I replied in Spanish that we were not idiots, and turned to leave.

"No," he said, in Spanish. "Don't go." Another 10 toughs appeared, making a cordon. All insisted that the Wessin y Wessin troops were trying to get rebels and U.S. soldiers fighting each other. They kept repeating that the two bodies of the Wessin y Wessin troops were there. "How do you know that they are troops of Wessin y Wessin?" I asked.

"Because they wear the insignia," the leader replied.

They did not know that Andy and I had just come from the palace. They did not know that we knew where the lines were. And they kept insisting, to the point of where the leader said the bodies of the alleged Wessin y Wessin soldiers "had been there for 3 days."

Andy looked at the organizer and mumbled to me: "And just why, Paul, do you think they should be left there for 3 days, eh?"

The answer was phony evidence to be shown to unsuspecting people—OAS and reporters. With the battle going on at this moment, we couldn't go to the bodies. I again told the leader that we weren't idiots, that insignia could be planted. He thought for a moment, and said nothing. Suddenly, his face lighted up. "I want you to see the houses blown down by Yankee fire."

Andy saw the opportunity for some good photos, so we moved out of our sanctuary and edged our way along the line of intermittent fire.

We almost didn't make it. A mortar shell exploded in an alleyway about 50 yards away. All of us, the turbas included, dived for safety. We looked up to see smoke and dust billowing out of the alley. We also saw a woman dash out of a house nearby, holding her bleeding head in a towel.

The cry went up from the turbas: "Yankees are killing Dominicans. Yankees are killing Dominicans. Each street corner came alive with well-organized groups of between 6 and 10 persons, all shouting: Yankees are killing Dominicans. Out with the Yankee dogs." One variation was: "Out with the white Yankee dogs." It was a ticklish situation.

The organizer of the group we were with yelled to the woman to cross over. He saw the opportunity for Andy to take shots of the bleeding creature. I said nothing. Both Andy and I knew from the trajectory that the mortar shell had come from loyalists at the palace. We knew that the turbas knew it.

The woman, now helped by a man, was afraid to cross over the street in the line of fire. The two of them ran down another alleyway, lateral to the sniper fire hammering at U.S. positions. We met them on the next corner—also in the line of fire. The woman was bleeding but was able to run like hell. A Red Cross ambulance, a Volkswagen station wagon, roared up. The mobs on the corner shouted: "Yankees are killing Dominicans." She collapsed gracefully into the arms of the crowd. They put her into the ambulance. Andy took shots, furiously.

As the ambulance rounded the corner, I saw her sitting between two men in the back, chattering away excitedly.

The crowds on the corners shouted "Yankees are killing Dominicans." Then a Swedish car, a Saab, came roaring at us from the rebel lines. It was crowded with rebels, in riotous dress, carrying submachine guns and rifles.

They glowered at us fiercely, and pointed their guns at us menacingly. Then one of the mob shouted: "You're in the line of marine fire."

Four expressions turned to slack-jawed panic. The driver slammed the car into

gear, roared around the corner, and out of sight. Andy and I took a deep breath. I looked at the leader and said: "Wessin y Wessin's troops, eh?" He shrugged and laughed.

The only way we could get out of the zone and back to my car was to walk about a hundred yards with our backs to rebel snipers. Thus far, there had been more noise than actual fighting. But just then, rebel snipers winged a burst into the wall just over our heads, and we heard the screeching sound of the ricochet.

"That was for us," Andy said. "Let's get out of here."

We walked the hundred yards slowly and nonchalantly, our spines tingling. After an eternity we rounded the corner and gave a sigh of relief.

We walked along the relatively safe area next to U.S. troops. We talked to the people in the houses. They were tired of having their houses turned into snipers' nests. They were afraid of the turbas and the law of the streets. They were leaving the rebel zones in droves.

Two civilians of pleasant mien attached themselves to us. Andy is Hungarian, with the accent. Our two companions asked who we were. Andy replied in Spanish that we were Brazilian. "Good," they said, and urged Andy to tell the story of how Yankees were killing Dominicans.

The next day around noon, Andy rushed into my rooms. "This is Havana, 1959," he exclaimed. "There are bearded guys, and the whole smell of the place is exactly like it was in 1959 in Cuba."

Andy had gone into the center of the city. He had an appointment with rebel leader Francisco Caamano and photographed him. "But guess what," Andy said to me, "Remember the two fellows from yesterday? Well, I was walking into the Caamano headquarters, and someone said: 'Hello Brazilian.' I asked him how he knew I was Brazilian and it turns out that he was one of the two we saw yesterday. The two of them in Caamano's headquarters, armed and guarding the place."

I later learned from the loyalist G-2 that arms were cached in strong points in the rebel-held part of the city. Actually, strong points were few. No one was permitted to take arms from one strong point to another, even though personnel were rotated frequently for intelligence-gathering purposes. Unarmed, and on the street, the rebels were just ordinary citizens.

Mobs were organized and controlled in the classic manner. What was going on in rebel territory was a carbon copy of Cuba's mobs of neighborhood informers—vigilance committees—controlled and directed by Communists and Communist-trade cadres.

JOHNSON AIDS CALL FOR A CONSENSUS REGIME DASHED HOPES OF GETTING ANTI-RED GOVERNMENT—ARTICLE 5

(By Paul D. Bethel)

As the first handful of correspondents entered the El Embajador Hotel in Santo Domingo on April 29, a fleshy, confident-looking man left. Driven to the helicopter port set up by Marines near the hotel in a U.S. Embassy station wagon, Antonio Imbert Barreras left for San Isidro Air Base to set up a new junta.

Imbert Barreras is tough and purposeful. He had to be. He and four colleagues killed the hated dictator Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo Molina on May 30, 1961. By doing so, Imbert Barreras became a sort of national hero. A sort of national hero because his background is not unblemished. But few backgrounds in the Dominican Republic are.

However, Imbert Barreras is a staunch Catholic. More, he is a graduate of the strong anti-Communist Catholic cursillo. Other graduates—Gen. Elías Wessin y Wessin, chief of staff to Army General Jacinto

Martinez Arana. The three are dedicated anti-Communists. They are welded together in sense of purpose.

The Imbert junta is not a military junta. Discounting Imbert's status as a general, there is only one military man represented—Air Force Colonel Pedro Bartolome Benoit. The others are a lawyer, a businessman, and a quasi-intellectual. Imbert's junta does, however, enjoy the confidence of the Dominican armed forces.

Installed by us on May 12, the GNR was having the rug pulled from under it by the United States on May 18. The rug-pulling act was done by Presidential Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy and Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance. Apparently alarmed at press reporting from Santo Domingo that the GNR was militarist and rightwing, Bundy and Vance sought to replace it with what was described in Bundyses as a consensus government.

Pressures put upon the junta to resign are related by an indignant chief of staff, Gen. Jacinto Martinez Arana.

The general is short and stocky, energetic. He has had 38 years of military service. He doesn't drink. He told me on May 19 that he could be retired but wouldn't sit idly by and watch the country taken over by communism.

The general was enraged at the antics of the Washington mission composed of Under Secretary Thomas Mann, Bundy, and Vance. Led by Bundy, the mission was there to create a consensus government.

"What the hell does that mean?" Martinez Arana asked rhetorically, pounding the desk with his open palm. He answered: "It means turning the country over to the Communists."

Little by little the story poured out.

"On Sunday, May 15, Mr. Mann met with us at junta headquarters. All of the military chiefs were there. Mr. Mann said that we should accept Antonio Guzman as president, and later, in a few months, hold elections under the 1963 constitution." The general paused, rolled his eyes, spread his hands. "Well," he continued, "Mr. Guzman is a nice man. He is intelligent. But he is not a person of firm purpose." Mr. Martinez Arana again spread his hands, leaned over his desk and punched it with his index finger in rhythm with "And he is a friend, a close friend, of Juan Bosch." Guzman served in Bosch's cabinet and has been charged with inefficiency and corruption in that position.

Gen. Martinez Arana continued: "He could never handle the Communists. And the 1963 constitution." He uttered an oath. "It is made for a dictator."

He had a point there. A Bosch constitution, rammed through by an incompetent and largely illiterate group of Congressmen swept in with Bosch in elections in late 1962, it is a blank check. Its provisions are so vague that a President can do anything he wants under it. The 1963 constitution is deliberately and dangerously vague. It is a resentful document, the product of resentful men.

In section 4, on property, there are provisions like these:

"Expropriation may take place in the general interest." Article 28 says that: "It is declared that only Dominican nationals have the right to acquire land. But Congress may authorize the acquisition of land in urban areas by foreigners, when this is in the national interest."

Excessive holding of land is outlawed. But the Constitution does not say what is excessive and leaves it up to Congress to determine. All subsoil wealth, oil, and minerals is declared (as in Cuba) to be the property of the state. Other provisions of the 1963 Constitution are of deep concern to Dominican businessmen. Nor is there any mention of God, causing religious people to

question the motives of the originators of the Bosch constitution.

Convinced of the Communist makeup of the rebels, the Imbert junta rejected Mann's proposal. They liked Mann, however, describing him as a sensitive and intelligent diplomat.

They did not like Cyrus Vance.

"Monday," said the Army Chief of Staff, "Mr. Cyrus Vance came to see us. He acted like a Hitler, a real dictator. He took out a notebook and briskly ticked off the points to which we would have to agree." The general uttered a mildly dirty word. "He said we would have to agree to the Guzman government and to the 1963 Constitution."

"We consulted and said we would accept Guzman but not the 1963 Constitution. We wanted the 1962 Constitution, which is explicit and understandable. Well, this Mr. Vance said that we couldn't have it. We asked why. And he said because the rebels demanded the 1963 Constitution. Of course they demanded the 1963 Constitution. It is an open door for the Communists to walk in."

"We blew up," Gen. Martinez Arana continued. "Just who are the rebels, anyway? They control only a part—and only a tiny part—of the city of Santo Domingo. Everywhere else in the nation people are working. Stores are open. There are no disturbances. What the hell does this man want, this Mr. Vance?"

The general paused, then continued: "So we ask him, just who are the rebels? Why are they so important to you when they are your enemies, and American Marines are being shot by them everyday?"

"Then do you know what he said? He said we could take it or leave it. And he also said that if we leave it, the United States would be forced to make a deal with the rebels. Then he left. Day before yesterday we met with another American official. I won't tell you who it was (it probably was McGeorge Bundy), but he was important. We told him that if the United States insisted on Guzman and the 1963 Constitution, we would accept on certain conditions. The United States must transport out of this country all of our fighting men and their families. The Communists would slaughter them. The United States must also transport out of the country all Dominican families who want to leave. There would be nobody left."

Saturday, May 22, Bundy held an unattributed background press conference for a select few journalists "personally known to him," as a spokesman later revealed. He told them that he was rather optimistic that a "solution" would be found to install a "consensus government."

He implied that Caamano had agreed to step down in favor of Guzman and rather believed that Imbert would do the same. Later, a high U.S. official in Santo Domingo said that the United States was prepared to exert economic pressures against Imbert to force him out.

The story of the Bundy conference leaked out. Reporters who had not been invited were not bound to the no-attribution rule. Newspapers reported that Imbert was on his way out.

Imbert was furious. The next day, Sunday, he blasted "malintentioned" reports (meaning certain reporters whom he felt were representing him and his junta as a rightist threat). He said that the people of the Dominican Republic knew that he was no dictator. They knew he had risked his life to rid the country of the Trujillo dictatorship.

Imbert Barreras and his staff were also incensed at efforts by reporters of three influential U.S. dailies to prove that no Communist menace existed in the country. He said privately that these reports apparently

had influenced President Johnson's staff. He referred to McGeorge Bundy.

Asked why the United States was pressuring the junta to step down, an official from Washington said that Imbert had "failed to capture the imagination of the people quickly enough." The official continued: "We were gambling—hoping that Imbert could form a government that could win public approval quickly."

When queried regarding that statement, a junta member angrily replied: "You seem to want instant democracy. How can a junta which was installed by you 10 days ago expect in that period of time to win a wave of popular support?"

He went on: "Don't your negotiators from Washington know that there are no newspapers being published, no mass media communications we can resort to, to explain our position and develop public understanding of the issues?"

My Washington source also said that even if Imbert managed to defy the United States and remain in power, the result would be civil war. Arms would be cached, plots hatched, and the revolt would spread.

An officer of the Dominican counterinsurgency force said that Cuban arms had been cached over a period of several years. He also said that in the sweep by Imbert forces across the northern part of the city, "tons of cached arms had been found." He continued: "If our forces had not made the sweep, those arms would never have been found." The counterinsurgency officer was trained in the United States.

Regarding the lack of real support for Imbert, I asked my Washington source: "What about the fact that the 130,000-member National Confederation of Free Workers (CONTRAL) is supporting Imbert?" Here he got a little vague, and fell back on his earlier statement that Imbert did not win popularity fast enough.

The inescapable conclusion is that President Johnson's advisers are sensitively attuned to "world opinion." They were influenced by initial press reports which doggedly refused to recognize the Communist menace and tended to romanticize rebel leader Lt. Col. Francisco Caamano Deno. Thus influenced, Johnson's advisers went looking for compromise rather than solution.

As of this writing, the rebels still control the center of Santo Domingo and have launched a potent propaganda campaign from their festering pocket of resistance.

What started out as a vigorous and just action by President Johnson has bogged down in a mire of international and national bureaucrats. It could end in a diplomatic defeat as disastrous as our failure to follow through at the Bay of Pigs 4 years ago. For the lesson of the Dominican Republic to Latin American Communists and leftists is this: seize territory, no matter how much, and force the United States and the OAS to negotiate.

[From the Chicago (Ill.) Tribune, Apr. 30, 1965]

SEVENTEEN HUNDRED MARINES IN DOMINGO—2,500 PARATROOPERS ALSO FLOWN IN—INSURGENTS ATTACK U.S. EMBASSY—5 DIE—5-DAY REVOLT BY LEFTISTS TAKES 400 LIVES

(By Jules Dubois)

SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, April 29.—A band of rebels dressed in civilian clothes fired on the U.S. Embassy today. American marines fired back and repelled the attackers in a 30-minute fight.

At least two of the attackers and possibly four were killed by the marines. There were no casualties on the U.S. side. Three other attackers were killed by Dominican Army troops as the leftists fled marine gunfire.

Later, other leftist bands that have been roaming the city fired sporadically at the Embassy but the attacks ended as night fell.

August 23, 1965

TROOPS ROLL IN

An Embassy spokesman said afterward that the 100 marines stationed at the Embassy will be reinforced.

Marine reinforcements, as expected, were landed tonight, from the Wood County, a landing ship. A tank company of the 10th Marines rolled ashore on the beach west of the Hotel Embajador. They were followed by I company of the 6th Marines. The reinforcements joined 556 marines landed last night.

In Washington, the State Department said that the El Salvador Embassy in Santo Domingo had also been attacked but that it had no further details.

The incident at the U.S. Embassy was the first exchange of fire involving American marines who were landed to protect and help Americans caught in the Dominican civil war.

TAKES 400 LIVES

The 5-day-old leftist revolution has taken 400 lives and resulted in injuries to 1,200 persons. Hospitals are filled with casualties.

Mopping up operations ordered by the military junta failed to dislodge leftists from positions in the center of the city. There were air strikes and some heavy ground fighting this morning and sporadic fighting throughout the night.

There was an afternoon lull but then the Dominican army resumed action. There was considerable firing in the city and mortars apparently were being used.

The leftists hold 15 buildings in what they call the free territory of Santo Domingo. The major street, which is the Communist stronghold, is called the 20th of October to commemorate a Communist demonstration several years ago.

AIR ATTACKS FAIL

The strafing attack by the air force failed to dislodge the rebels, many of whom are dressed in olive drab uniforms similar to those used by Cuban Premier Fidel Castro's rebel army. Others are in civilian clothes.

Helicopters which had brought in the marines evacuated 650 more Americans and other nationals to the aircraft carrier Boxer.

Among the evacuees were 18 Christian Brothers who had been expelled from Cuba by Castro. The brothers said the revolt here followed the same pattern that had been during the Communist takeover in Cuba.

The Christian Brothers left because leftist militia, which had seized a police station, later captured a Roman Catholic school and were using it as a position for snipers.

[France announced it had ordered two warships, at Fort de France, Martinique, to sail for the Dominican Republic to evacuate French nationals if necessary. Britain said it had asked the United States to evacuate any of the 120 Britons there if they requested it. Canada asked the marines to protect its citizens.]

The diplomatic corps met with Msgr. Emanuele Clarizio, the apostolic delegate to seek ways to halt the war which is raging only in the capital. American Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett attended the meeting.

CALLS IT SAD

After the meeting Monsignor Clarizio flew to the San Isidro air base where he broadcast another appeal to both sides to halt the fighting.

I interviewed Monsignor Clarizio and he said the situation in the city was "very sad."

Col. Pedro Benoit, president of the junta, spoke over the radio for the first time since he took power. He announced that the United States had urged an end to the fighting and had offered to send in medicines and food. American naval planes and helicopters landed at the airbase with medical supplies today.

Benoit said that free elections would be held as soon as possible, "with all political parties participating."

War conditions continue in the capital. There is still no electric power. Many telephone lines are out. There is no water in the Hotel Ambassador except in the swimming pool where I took my bath today, without soap. To provide drinking water the hotel earlier took water out of the swimming pool and poured the water into clean trash cans. It is hoped that water will be back before it is used.

The hotel faces the loss of \$45,000 worth of frozen foods, because it has been unable to obtain gasoline for an auxiliary generator. This has not only blacked out the hotel but it also has stopped the elevator.

The American Embassy installed a radio communications operation in the eighth floor penthouse. The men who are operating that installation must climb eight flights of stairs in order to reach their radios.

[From the Chicago (Ill.) Tribune, Apr. 30, 1965]

TELLS ROLE OF REDS IN DOMINICAN REVOLT
(By Jules Dubois)

SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, April 21.—The inside story of how this country came within 12 hours of a Communist takeover last Monday was related today by the principal actor in that drama.

Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin, the Dominican Government's anti-Communist military leader at the time, said in an exclusive interview that had he failed to convince the reluctant air force and army chiefs to attack the Communists at 6 a.m. Monday, the Reds would have been in power that night.

FOE OF REDS

I interviewed the tired general—who had not slept or eaten a solid meal since Saturday night and wore a stubble beard—in his office at the army training center several miles from the San Isidro air base. Wessin's telephone lines had been cut by the Communists and he had to use the air force headquarters as a command post.

Wessin is no longer the strong man of the military here, but he remains the most outspoken anti-Communist. He was shoved into this background because he refuses to compromise with the leftists.

He told me that he hoped to resign from the army soon, at the age of 41, and become a farmer. Wessin was educated at the military academy in Venezuela and at the Los Chorrillos Military School in Lima, Peru, when Gen. Nicholas Lindley was commandant. In 1962, General Lindley headed the military junta in Peru.

Wessin blamed deposed President Donald J. Reid-Cabral for ignoring reports that an army conspiracy was brewing against his rule.

"The conspiracy was very big," Wessin said. "We saved the country by only a hairpin. There were conspirators even here at the training center."

"The great majority of the people here did not know what was really happening."

"I had reported the conspiracy to President Reid for 15 or 20 consecutive days," Wessin said, "but he did not pay any attention to me."

Wessin had bitter words about Gen. Marco Rivera-Cuesta, at the time army chief of staff. Wessin said Rivera also was lax about the conspiracy. The rebels captured Rivera last Saturday and held him hostage at the 16th of August fortress, 18 miles from here. The air force blasted that fortress into uselessness, Wessin said.

TELLS THEIR AIM

"This conspiracy was not an isolated one, nor was it exclusively military," Wessin said. "The conspirators were in league with the Communists from the beginning. As part of the subversive preparation they instigated fires that were set in the sugar cane fields and instigated a strike at the La Romana

plantation. The fires there alone caused \$7 million damage."

Wessin said the primary objective of rebel officers was to restore former President Juan Bosch to power.

"I consider this conspiracy was directed by him from Puerto Rico and that Fidel Castro [Communist premier of Cuba] also participated in it. Both have caused so much damage. The Dominican people must now have come to realize that," Wessin said.

While I visited diplomatic friends at the Argentine Embassy today, where eight rebel officers had received asylum, four of them asked permission to leave the Embassy. Embassy officials told me the officers wanted to return to rebel command posts. They were allowed to leave the Embassy.

CONFIDENT OF VICTORY

The Argentine diplomats said that the rebel officers, who were dressed in civilian clothes, were confident that their side would ultimately win in the capital because the junta had up to now been unable to wipe them out. They want to be on the winning side.

Wessin charged that Fidel Castro is involved in the revolution. He said the armed forces intercepted a call to Castro that was made from the presidential palace after the Communists took possession Sunday afternoon.

Wessin said leaders of the Communists entered the palace Sunday afternoon with Bosch's candidate for the interim presidency, Jose Rafael Molina-Morina. Among the leaders were Dato Pagan, who was one of the prisoners released from La Victoria by the military rebels, and the Ducoudray-Juan and Felix Servio, old guard members of the Communist party.

I asked Wessin why he did not attack on Sunday morning as ordered by President Reid.

"The navy started in this with us," Wessin said, "and then decided to be neutral. The same happened with the air force. Then a group of the officers of the air force were ready to surrender and accept the conditions of the rebels."

[From the Chicago (Ill.) Tribune, May 2, 1965]

GI TOLL RISES IN DOMINGO—4 AMERICANS DIE, 38 HURT IN RED ATTACKS—REBELS IGNORE CEASE-FIRE

(By Jules Dubois)

SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, May 1.—Four and possibly five American soldiers have been killed in action, and 38 wounded in attacks by Communists in this war-stricken city.

An 62d Airborne Division soldier was killed today. He was shot in the back as his patrol vehicle passed a building. An armed civilian emerged, and the patrol immediately shot and killed him.

Meanwhile, the airborne division announced that it has captured 33 armed Communist militia and turned them over to the Dominican army.

POW REPORT IS FIRST

This is the first report of the capture of prisoners of war by our forces. The Dominican army is conducting the interrogation.

A paratroop patrol advanced into the city to meet a patrol from the U.S. Marines. After a brief linkup, both withdrew to their respective positions. The paratroop patrol returned to the key bridge on the Ozama River, which the troops secured yesterday. The Marines returned to a point about 6 blocks west of the American embassy.

The airborne division elements yesterday relieved 200 Dominican soldiers on the east bank of the river.

TWENTY MARINES WOUNDED

In the attack against the paratroopers today, there was automatic weapons fire and

eight soldiers were wounded. The Marines suffered two men killed in action, and the 82d Airborne has lost two men. One of the men seriously wounded yesterday died.

Of the wounded 20 are marines and 18 are troopers.

The fringe area patrolled today is almost 2 miles from the heart of the rebel-held territory in the business district of Santo Domingo.

Communist militia action against American troops declined this afternoon. Some shots were fired but no further casualties were reported.

CEASE-FIRE IGNORED

The cease fire which was agreed to yesterday has not been respected by the Communists. The rebel's commander has no control over the Communists.

Col. Francisco Caamano Deno, rebel military chief, added his signature today to the cease-fire agreement signed by the new military junta and two rebel leaders, including Caamano's brother Fausto. Col. Caamano's decision to sign raised hopes for a halt in the fighting.

There was fighting all night. The marine who was shot in the chest and killed this morning was hit in the perimeter of defenses set up by the marines for the American Embassy. The wounded marine was shot in the arm.

Among thousands of well-armed young men entrenched in the downtown area were young officers who began the revolt a week ago.

"We are friends of the North Americans," one soldier said. "We do not want to fight your marines, but we have to defend ourselves."

DENIES COMMUNIST ACTIVITY

They denied that Communists had been active among the rebels.

Snipers, who tried all night to infiltrate the defensive positions around the Hotel Ambassador, were repelled by the fire of the platoon of the 3d battalion, 6th marines. This platoon was reinforced last night by a platoon from the 82d Airborne Division.

"We were fired at by the snipers almost all night," Pvt. Ben Palomar Contreras, 24, whose parents, Mr. and Mrs. Amadore Palomar, live at 5040 E. Southdale Street, Chicago Heights, Ill., told me. Contreras is in the 7th squad of the 81st millimeter mortar platoon.

"Our outer line repelled the snipers with rifle fire, Contreras said.

Contreras was cleaning his rifle when I interviewed him beside his foxhole near the polo field here early this morning. He said he had not slept for 3 nights.

FORMER N.Y. PROFESSOR THERE

A former professor of military science at Northwestern University, who was in charge of the Naval Reserve Officers Training corps there from 1960 to 1963, is playing an important role in the defense of Santo Domingo. He is Maj. Joe Gambardello, New Rochelle, N.Y., executive officers of the 6th Marine headquarters.

Major Gambardello had as his bodyguard Corp. Howard Hummell, 24, of Easton, Pa. who served in Vietnam from April 1 to June 15 last year. The major calls Hummell his "shotgun."

Jose Antonio Mora, secretary general of the Organization of American States, arrived today from Washington to attempt to end the civil war. It is not believed he will succeed unless he can get the military to control the Communists.

[From the Chicago (Ill.) Tribune, May 9, 1965]

UNITED STATES PROTESTS DOMINGO REBEL TRUCE VIOLATION—HOLDS CEASE-FIRE BROKEN SIX TIMES—MARINE KILLED

(By Jules Dubois)

SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, May 8.—The United States tonight protested to

the Organization of American States a new violation of the cease-fire in Santo Domingo by the rebel forces of Col. Francisco A. Caamano against American troops.

A separate note also protested the vitriolic attacks on the Dominican and United States Governments by the rebel radio.

ANOTHER MARINE KILLED

American Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., sent a note to Ambassador Frank Morrice, Jr., of Panama, the senior OAS representative here. Morrice received the note at the Hotel Ambassador where he has his headquarters.

The note was drafted after another marine was killed today by rebel infiltrators at the port of Haina, 12 miles south of here. This casualty boosted the grand total of American dead from rebel bullets to 12. A sailor who fell overboard from his ship was the 13th death.

Of these dead there have been seven marines, five soldiers, and one sailor.

REBELS MORE HOSTILE

The protest letter was sent after attempts by Jose Antonio Mora, Secretary General of the OAS, to talk with Caamano and get him to agree to end hostilities and lay down his arms, failed.

It is understood that the Caamano camp was more hostile to Mora today than it has been before and the rebel "constitutional president" could at no time talk with Mora alone. He was always surrounded by men who blocked the efforts of Mora to talk alone with Caamano.

Radio Santo Domingo, which went silent at 2:15 p.m., returned at 5 p.m. on the regular frequency of the powerful transmitter that is in rebel hands, instead of the special one it was using.

The radio increased the intensity of its attacks against the United States and against Gen. Antonio Imbert-Barrera, head of the five-man military junta formed to oppose the rebels.

The foreign minister of Caamano's "constitutional government," Jottin Curry, sent a strong protest to Ambassador Morrice against the international security zone which is manned by U.S. troops with token forces of Dominican police in army uniforms.

RAPS SECURITY ZONE

Curry complained that the security zone is there solely to confront the Caamano forces with opposing forces and to harbor the Imbert government, which has its seat inside the zone.

No mention was made by Curry of the fact that the headquarters of Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) are also inside the security zone and are open for business.

Imbert was not inactive today. He met with all provincial governors and mayors of provincial capitals. With the exception of the national district of Santo Domingo, they reported the entire country is calm.

[From the Chicago (Ill.) Tribune, May 9, 1965]

HIGH GI SPIRIT IN DOMINICAN FIGHTING TOLD—TRIBUNE WRITER, SON MEET

(By Jules Dubois)

SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, May 8.—A Roman Catholic chaplain from Chicago finds the morale of the men of the 82d Airborne Division very high.

The chaplain, Capt. Edward Kita, whose mother, Mrs. Victoria Kita, lives at 3845 South Albany Avenue, had returned from 13 months in Korea last November when he was assigned to the 82d Airborne Division.

I found a few other Chicagoans here today [and also by coincidence, my son, who is in the Air Force].

MEETS ILLINOIS OFFICER

Maj. Robert Kingsbury, 41, whose parents, Lee and Alice Kingsbury, live in St. Charles, Ill., is information officer at the 82d Airborne headquarters here. He was in the Panama Canal Zone during the flag riots

last year as director of the Armed Forces television station at Fort Clayton.

"I am very proud to be a member of the same army as these people," Major Kingsbury said. "They've done a heck of a good job."

Pfc. James R. Wall, 23, who lived in Chicago before his family moved to Marion, Ill., has been subjected to sniper fire along the neutral zone. A bullet missed his vehicle by only a foot.

LOYAL SOLDIER TORTURED

His patrol saw the tortured and burned body of a loyal army soldier. The man was presumed to have been caught by rebels and brutally tortured before they killed him and set his body afire.

I rode through the corridor and across Duarte Bridge over the Ozama River with Major Kingsbury and Pfc. Allan Prestergard, son of Mr. and Mrs. Ole Prestergard, of Owatonna, Minn., and Pfc. David Creathbaum, son of Mr. and Mrs. Jess D. Creathbaum, of Liberal, Kans.

While interviewing Maj. Gen. Marvin L. McNickle, commander of the air task force, 5th logistic command at San Isidro Air Base, after visiting the airborne units, I was informed that my oldest son, 1st Lt. Jules Edward Dubois, 25, had just arrived.

General McNickle ordered an aide to escort me to the officer's tents, where I found my son being assigned his bunk while his fellow officers were taking their first bath in a welcome rain. (There is no water at the base where the airborne and Air Force headquarters are located.)

My son told me he had received his orders yesterday afternoon and was shipped out immediately. He arrived early this afternoon, leaving behind at Shaw Air Force Base, Sumter, S.C., his wife, Ann, and their newborn son, Shawn Mitchell, my first grandson.

[From the Chicago (Ill.) Tribune, May 10, 1965]

PURGES DOMINGO MILITARY—JUNTA OUSTS TOP BRASS IN PEACE EFFORT—SEEKS SURRENDER OF REBEL CHIEF

(By Jules Dubois)

SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, May 9.—The government of national reconstruction, headed by Brig. Gen. Antonio Imbert Barrera today purged the military forces of ranking officers. It indicated that it will exhaust every peaceful effort to get the rebel forces of Col. Francisco A. Caamano to capitulate before trying to blast them out of the 10 percent of this city which they hold.

That 10 percent is almost the entire business district. Imbert emphasized that his government controls the rest of the country's 27 provinces.

Imbert held a press conference with the four other members of the government. He announced that six of the officers purged already have been shipped out of the country in the best interests of the nation.

NAMES OF OFFICERS

They were: Belisario Peguero-Guerrero, former chief of police; Salvador Augusto Montas-Guerrero, former army chief of staff and commander of the Operation Cleanup that never materialized here; Miguel Atila Luna-Perez, former chief of staff of the air force; Marcos River-Cuesta, former chief of staff of the army; and Felix Hermida, Jr., former director of intelligence. All were brigadier generals.

Also shipped out was Commodore Julio Rib-Santamaria, former chief of staff of the navy.

Two army brigadier generals were purged and allowed to remain here—Manuel Maria Garcia-Urbaz and Renato Hungria-Morell.

OAS ENVOY CONFIRMED

Imbert announced that Ambassador Jose Antonio Bonilla-Atilles has been reconfirmed in his post as envoy to the Organization of American States. He has been acting in a

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dual capacity as Ambassador to the White House. As the United States does not yet recognize the Imbert regime, no mention was made of that post.

The new Foreign Minister, Horacio Vicioso-Soto, was introduced to the press by Imbert. Vicioso said he had cabled all Dominican embassies abroad and instructed the ambassadors to notify the respective governments of the new regime and request recognition.

Imbert announced that Commodore Francisco Javier Rivera-Caminero is the Secretary of the armed forces and police and as such is overall commander of the forces. He also announced the three chiefs of staff as Brig. Gen. Juan de los Santos-Céspedes, air force, a reappointment; Brig. Gen. Jacinto Martínez-Arana, army, a new appointee, and Commodore Emilio Jimenez, navy head.

Imbert said the high officers who were purged and shipped out today acceded to his personal request in behalf of his "partners" in the new civilian-military junta.

"I put as a condition that it was necessary for the country that they leave the ranks of our armed forces," Imbert said. "We thought that it was a good step to get tranquility and peace in this country."

HE BACKS WESSIN

Asked about Brig. Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin, the officer most smeared by the Communists, Imbert said Wessin will remain in his post as commander of the training center. He added that he will not allow Caamano to impose the purge of Wessin as a precondition for the rebel leader to lay down his arms.

"We haven't asked him to resign and we do not intend to ask him to resign," Imbert said.

Imbert stressed that he and his colleagues will not wait indefinitely for Caamano to make up his mind to capitulate. The decision to act will not be made by Imbert alone but will be a result of unanimity with his four "partners," as he calls them.

Imbert reiterated what he said in his inaugural address on Friday—that the rebels will be offered all guarantees for their personal safety and safe conduct if they surrender. He indicated that diplomatic efforts are being made to persuade Caamano to capitulate, although the latter and his spokesmen have stated the contrary.

"Colonel Caamano and myself have been for several years, good, good friends," Imbert said. "We are doing all that we can to avoid any action."

Six 105 mm. howitzers were placed in front of the Hotel Ambassador after bulldozers prepared their sites. The guns have a range of 7 miles and are pointed at the city, toward the rebel stronghold. Tanks reinforced Avenida Abraham Lincoln. Imbert lives in the area of these reinforcements.

THREE MEN RELEASED

Two seabees and a sailor held for 2½ days by the rebels were released today through the OAS. They were Ellard Dana, Virginia Beach, Va., and Donald Martin, Wichita, Kans., seabees, and Mike Monk, a sailor from New York.

Another American marine was wounded today by sniper fire at Checkpoint Chip on the northern flank of the security zone. This brings the total number of marines wounded to 24 and the total wounded to 72, in addition to 2 American correspondents.

Col. Pedro B. Benoit, No. 2 man of the government, reported that a regular army major who had defected to the rebels with 180 army cadets at San Pedro de Macoris, a sugar port to the east, asked a Roman Catholic priest there to arrange his return to the loyal lines. This was done yesterday and he voluntarily became a prisoner at police headquarters.

The 180 army cadets also laid down their arms, Benoit said. Most of them were allowed to return to their homes.

Imbert and Benoit said they consider the cease-fire pact acceptable by the govern-

ment of national reconstruction. Benoit had signed the pact for the former military junta.

[From the Chicago (Ill.) Tribune, May 10, 1965]

UNITED STATES FINISHES BIGGEST AIR LIFT SINCE 1948 OPERATION TO BERLIN—FLAT TIRE IS ONLY MISHAP DURING 1,702 TRIPS (By Jules DuBois)

SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, May 9.—The biggest airlift since that of Berlin in 1948 was completed here with only 1 mishap. That was a flat tire on a C-130 after it landed at the San Isidro Airbase with the man who directed the operation from Pope Air Force Base near Fort Bragg, N.C.

He is Maj. Gen. Marvin L. McNickle, a veteran of 29 years of service in the U.S. Air Force. Today he commands the 5th logistics command, which is the air task force here.

FLIES 13,412 TROOPS

From the time the deployment period started on April 30, until it ended last Thursday, the C-130 and C-124 transports made 1,702 trips from the United States, an average of 243 a day.

The planes carried 13,412 troops and 20,774 600 tons of cargo.

The outstanding feature of the lift was the fact that the planes were turned around here in record time. The average ground time was only 19 minutes for the C-130 and the C-124 in 59 minutes. The latter took 40 minutes more than the former, McNickle explained, because of the more obsolete unloading facilities and the type of cargo, such as graders and mixers.

NOTHING TO COMPARE

"There has never been anything to compare with it in a span of time," McNickle answered when asked for a comparison with the Berlin airlift. "I have never seen anything like it in my 29 years of experience."

The airlift here failed to surpass the daily record of the Berlin airlift in cargo tonnage but if the aggregate of troops flown in were added it most certainly did outdo it.

The record for the Berlin airlift was 1,432 tons of cargo delivered in 1 day. Here the record was 1,403 tons of cargo, only 29 tons less.

VAMPIRE IS DAMAGED

The entire Dominican Combat Air Force, mostly F-51 Mustang fighters, is at the San Isidro Airbase, with the exception of a damaged British Vampire jet which is at the Santiago de los Caballeros Airbase, 75 miles north-northeast of here.

"We asked the Dominican Air Force to bring them all in from outlying bases," McNickle said, "and they have been most cooperative."

PRAISE FOR CONDITION

The F-51's are lined up in formation on a ramp to the left of McNickle's headquarters. The headquarters are in the Dominican Air Force operations building, where a joint weather station—in which Dominicans and Americans work side by side—is in operation. McNickle had high praise for the operational conditions of the more than 30 Mustangs.

"They are in perfect operational shape," he said. "I have on my staff here former World War II fighter pilots who have admired them and say they would just love to fly them."

McNickle may not know it but his statement is a tribute to a Florida newspaper publisher. He is David B. Lindsay, Jr., publisher of the Sarasota Herald-Tribune and Journal and president of the American Newspaper Publishers Association Foundation.

KEEPS UP REPAIRS

Lindsay, also a pilot, has for several years, with the approval of the State Department, been conducting all the repair and maintenance work for the Dominican Air Force at his Trans-Florida Aviation Co. in Sarasota.

McNickle met his wife, the former Betty O'Byrne, of Champaign, Ill., while he was on duty at Chanute Field, Rantoul, Ill. She worked for the auditing firm of Haskins & Sells in Chicago when he met her.

[From the Chicago (Ill.) Tribune, May 12, 1965]

WON'T RESIGN DOMINGO JOB, GENERAL SAYS—VOWS TO CONTINUE FIGHTING REDS

(By Jules Dubois)

SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, May 11.—This country's leading anti-Communist military commander will not resign from the service until the Reds are wiped out.

This is the determined and uncompromising position of Brig. Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin, commander of the army training center. He so told me today in an exclusive interview at his headquarters outside the perimeter of the San Isidro Air Base.

The U.S. Embassy had announced yesterday that Wessin had resigned in a move to bring peace to this embattled Republic but said earlier today that he had changed his mind.

STILL IN COMMAND

Wessin was in command at the base and his morale and that of his officers and men were high.

"I have not resigned," he said. "I do not intend to resign, and nobody is going to pressure me into resigning."

Wessin said that both American Ambassadors W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., and Lt. Gen. Bruce Palmer, Jr., commanding all U.S. forces in the Dominican Republic, were very courteous to him yesterday. But, he added, he resisted pressure by them to quit and to leave the country.

"I did give Ambassador Bennett, at his request, a letter in which I certified that I would be willing to resign as soon as peace was restored to the country and the new government was on its road to reconstruction," Wessin said.

Wessin said that he has not been asked to resign by Brig. Gen. Antonio Imbert Barrera, President of the Government of national reconstruction.

WOULD HELP REDS

"The morale of my troops was at a low ebb yesterday," Wessin said. "My resignation, or my enforced retirement, would not only be a major victory for the rebels but would invite the disintegration of the army."

Wessin said that he was certain that his troops here at the army training center, who total about 2,000, and those in garrisons in the provinces, would, on learning of his resignation from the army, immediately lay down their arms and go home.

"There would be no fight left in them," he added.

"It would be the delivery of the country to the Communists on a golden platter."

TIED UP BY TRUCE

Wessin said that his troops are ready to clean up the rebel city but that the hands of the loyalist forces are tied by the truce of the Organization of American States.

"While the rebels freely attack American troops along the corridor and the entire international security zone," Wessin said, "we are not even allowed to move."

President Imbert said today that he has received no resignation from Wessin, but that he would be "glad to accept one."

Imbert was reluctant to issue a decree yesterday that would have sent Wessin into enforced retirement. He does not plan to do that unless he gets a signed resignation from Wessin. Neither does he plan, at this time, to ask Wessin for his resignation.

The move to force out Wessin was intended by the Embassy to placate rebels led by Col. Francisco A. Caamano, who calls himself the constitutional president.

Meanwhile, the United States made the first direct contact with Caamano, rebel chieftain. It was made by ex-Ambassador John Bartlow Martin and Harry Schlaude- man, chief of the Dominican desk of the State Department.

An Embassy spokesman described the visit to Caamano as "exploratory." He would not go into any details.

The Wessin situation captured the spotlight from the 15 incidents of skirmishing and sniper fire yesterday at the 82d Airborne Division sector along the corridor.

One paratrooper was killed and seven were wounded by the rebels when they were attacked in a crossfire from the north and south of the corridor.

In Washington, the Pentagon identified an Army paratrooper lieutenant and a Marine corporal fatally shot here.

Second Lieutenant Charles T. Hutchinson, of Kiltanning, Pa., died of gunshot wounds yesterday, the Army said. Marine Cpl. David W. Allen, of Gardiner, Maine, died of accidental gunshot wounds May 9.

[From the Chicago (Ill.) Tribune, May 27, 1965]

FIDEL FOILED IN DOMINGO—REDS REMAIN—
DUBOIS TELLS OF MOVEMENT

(By Jules Dubois)

SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.—Fidel Castro had plans to be welcomed here as a conquering hero of a second Cuba on June 14, it was learned today. Those plans have been dashed, but the Communist danger remains.

The 14th of June movement, which has the predominant Communist command of Col. Francisco A. Caamano's forces, had planned to have Castro present to help them celebrate another victory for the master planners of Moscow and Peking.

Castro was to arrive on June 10, by which time the 14th of June movement (known here as the A.P.C.J.) hoped to be ruling the country. They were going to dump both Caamano and ex-President Juan Bosch.

TWENTY IN ACTIVE ROLES

Twenty of the top leaders of the 14th of June movement played active roles in the near takeover, a month ago. All of them were trained in the Soviet Union, Red China, and Cuba. One of them, Juan Miguel Roman-Diaz, was killed last week in a commando assault on the presidential palace. Another casualty in the same attack and from the same party was Rafael Mejia-Liuberes, who was gravely wounded.

The 14th of June movement has what the members call its "Joan of Arc." She is Emma Tavares-Justo, 25, sister of Manuel Tavares-Justo, who led the Communist guerrillas into the hills in November 1963 to fight "for the return of constitutional government." Tavares was killed in a battle with the army.

TO MARK ANNIVERSARY

The Communist plans called for a great rally on the 14th of June to commemorate the sixth anniversary of the Castro-mounted invasion that was dispatched from Cuba to overthrow the late dictator, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo.

It was on June 14, 1959, that Castro authorized a Venezuelan DC-3 aircraft to take off from Cuba for La Constanza, a mountain resort north of here, with Capt. Enrique Moya, a Dominican exile who fought beside him in the Sierra Maestra, as commander of the expeditionary force.

Raul Castro dispatched reinforcements by sea to land at beaches on the Dominican north coast. Those beaches were Playa Maimon and Estero Hondo.

CRUSHED INVASION

Trujillo crushed the invasion, using his campesino [peasant] militia machetemen

[knife swingers] as well as army troops. The machetemen slashed the wrists of captured invaders and the brutal treatment of the prisoners made the frustrated invasion and its date an attractive slogan for the adversaries of the tyrant.

Between 1959 and June, 1960, the 14th of June movement was organized in the underground. Its original declaration of principles and platform appeared attractive to a considerable segment of the Dominican people.

The man who organized the movement was Dr. Tavares, a brilliant young lawyer. Many Dominicans rallied around him. In June, 1960, when Trujillo's security police arrested Tavares' wife, two sisters-in-law, and five other organizers, many more persons rallied to his movement.

ORDERS SISTERS EXECUTED

On November 15, 1960, Trujillo ordered three sisters executed without trial. They were Minerva Mirabel de Tavares, Maria Teresa Mirabal de Guzman, and Patria Mirabal de Gonzalez, wife of Pedro Gonzalez-Crus.

This Trujillo brutality added to the indignation of the people and enabled Tavares to build a broad basis of support for his movement, which was not necessarily Communist at the outset.

It was considered liberal, democratic, and patriotic and Tavares was the single most popular figure of the group. Many of the original affiliates left the movement because of its swing toward Castro communism, as enunciated in statements by Tavares published in the clandestine paper Claridad in a July 26, 1962, special edition.

Although both the 14th of June movement and the Partido Socialista Popular publicly ordered its partisans to abstain from voting in the December, 1962, elections [so as not to taint Bosch's candidacy], the rank and file were secretly ordered to vote for Bosch.

Still to cover a secret alliance with Bosch, Tavares on June 14, 1963, delivered a Communist-line speech in which he attacked the pro-U.S. policy of Bosch. Three months later Bosch was overthrown and Tavares denounced the destruction of constitutional rule.

After Tavares was killed by the army, the 14th of June formed a united front with the other Communist parties. Some of the guerrillas had been captured and were jailed. Although the party gave permission to the imprisoned guerrillas to accept the alternative of voluntary exile instead of trial, Leandro Guzman, now the top 14th of June leader after the death of his brother-in-law, refused and remained in jail.

GO INTO RED EXILE

The strategy was to agitate for an immediate trial and rally public opinion around the guerrillas.

But many 14th of June guerrillas went into exile to undergo training in the Soviet Union, Red China, and Cuba. The party also used underground channels to send others abroad for training in Cuba.

The 14th of June had gained control of the Dominican Federation of University Students and used the latter's contact through the international students' union in Prague to help get scholarships for selected members and gain them prestige.

During the same period, the 14th of June accelerated its efforts to solidify liaison with the Partido Revolucionario Social Christiana [PRSC or Christian Social Revolution party] and the PRD of Boston and infiltrated the latter to such a point that a lot of people of the masses who had supported the ex-president did not know whether they were 14th of June or PRD.

Last January, leaders of the infiltrated PRSC flew to San Juan to sign a pact with Bosch for the restoration of constitutional government. The country had been promised

elections on September 1 but the Communists would not wait and neither would Bosch.

In March and April this year, the 14th of June brought back into the country more than 40 of its partisans who had undergone activist and guerrilla training in Red China and Cuba.

The movement began to take a distinct three-way split. There was a pro-Chinese faction led by Fidel Despradel-Roque, son of Trujillo's ex-foreign minister Arturo Despradel. There was a PSP oriented group which advocated following the Soviet line. And there was a group that desired to maintain the Socialist party.

The 14th of June movement gained ascendancy in the so-called "constitutionalist revolt" on the night of April 25-26. Emma Tavares-Justo appeared April 25 on television and radio inciting the people to rise to support constitutional rule. Then she took over one of the Communist commands.

What originally had begun as an old-fashioned Latin American military coup by disgruntled officers, who were purged, and whose excesses of corruption and other privileges were whittled down by Donald J. Reid-Cabral, who they deposed as president on the morning of April 25, quickly became the "constitutionalist revolt."

They installed Jose Rafael Molina-Urena, speaker of the dissolved house, as "constitutional president," while the three Communist parties, together with the Communist-infiltrated Partido Revolucionario Social Cristiano [PRSC or Christian Social Revolutionary party], demanded arms.

[From the Chicago (Ill.) Tribune, May 27, 1965]

FIRST 650 U.S. MARINES LEAVE SANTO DOMINGO DUTY—RED REBELS DIG TRENCHES IN CAPITAL

(By Jules Dubois)

SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, May 26.—Communist rebels began digging trenches today in their stronghold of Ciudad Nueva in downtown Santo Domingo for a last ditch stand against loyalist forces as 650 U.S. marines were shipped home.

The marines, who were the first here, were airlifted by helicopter to the carrier Bozer.

This withdrawal should raise no hopes among parents and relatives that the 32,000 servicemen who are still here will be leaving soon.

ACTS AFTER PARLEY

Col. Francisco A. Caamano ordered the trenches dug after he had conferred for 4 hours yesterday with McGeorge Bundy, special assistant to President Johnson; Under Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance; Jose Antonio Mora, Secretary General of the Organization of American States and Dr. Jaime Benitez, chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico.

Benitez, who was brought here by Bundy as an adviser, is an intimate friend of ex-President Juan Bosch.

IN THROUGH WINDOW

At a press conference, Caamano praised Bundy and said with amusement that he had met with him and other U.S. officials in the conservatory of music on Avenida George Washington. This is in a virtual no man's land.

"We had thought that the Americans would reconnoiter and secure the meeting place," Caamano said. "And the Americans thought that we would do that. Nobody had a key so we had to break a window to get in."

Caamano said that Bundy sought the meeting because he wanted to take his views back to Washington with him today to report to President Johnson. He said the talks were satisfactory. Vance remained behind for further meetings.

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BOOSTS GUZMAN

Benitez asserted that the only solution for the country is a compromise government headed by Sylvestre Antonio Guzman, a member of the old Bosch cabinet.

"Why I have more Communists in the University of Puerto Rico than there are here," Benitez said. "Guzman is the solution because it will bring a constitutional government."

Caamano said that he told Bundy there would be no compromise on certain specific points. These include:

1. The constitution of 1963 must be restored.

2. The legal position of all government institutions under the 1963 constitution must be recognized, especially the congress, the senate and that of other high officials. His own position as constitutional president is negotiable.

3. All military officers serving under him will have to be retained in their posts.

4. "All interventionist forces,"—including the inter-American peace force of the OAS—must be withdrawn.

MILITARY IS PRESSURE

Asked if much pressure was put on him by Bundy, Vance, and Mora at the talks, Caamano replied:

"The Americans have intervened here militarily. That is the heaviest pressure that a government can be put under."

An American Embassy spokesman announced that Vance, Mora, and Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., met with Brig. Gen. Antonio Imbert-Barrera.

Imbert, president of the government of national reconstruction, again flatly rejected ceaseless efforts to dump him. "Neither the United States, the OAS, or any organization is going to impose any government on our people," he said.

MESSAGES RAP UNITED STATES

Caamano's "senate and house" assailed the United States today in cablegrams sent to the United Nations security council and the OAS. They charged that:

1. Through the employment of dilatory, coercive, and blocking tactics, the United States is pressuring personalities and responsible organizations in Santo Domingo and abroad to impose solutions contrary to the democratic interests of the Dominican people, especially to dump the 1963 constitution.

2. The United States is making a new attempt to strangle the right of self-determination of the Dominicans.

3. The parliaments of the world are urged to make themselves heard "for 3 million men who only wish to find a better, free, and democratic destiny."

[From the Chicago (Ill.) Tribune,
June 7, 1965]

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC REBELS READY TO
COMPROMISE

(By Jules Dubois)

SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, June 6.—The Communists have ordered a change in rebel strategy in the civil war here.

The order was issued after the successful sweep by the army of the government of national reconstruction in the northern sector of Santo Domingo and the unofficial armistice that prolonged the cease-fire last month.

The switch was spelled out in another manifesto issued by the secretariat of the central committee of the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP) dated May 25. This was 4 days after Brig. Gen. Antonio Imbert-Barrera's army routed the Communists in the northern sector and the cease-fire was imposed to produce a military stalemate.

TO CONTINUE FIGHT

The Communists made a reassessment of the situation in the manifesto which they headed, "To combat until victory."

Declaring that any solution of the civil war should be based on the constitution of 1963 and the congress elected December 20, 1962, to be guaranteed by "persons of recognized democratic and constitutionalist trajectory," the PSP added:

"The achievement of a compromise with the enemy, on the basis of those objectives of the democratic constitutionalist movement, signifies an important step that allows the strengthening of the revolutionary forces and the preparation of the working class and the people in order to continue fighting for higher objectives."

WILLING TO COMPROMISE

In simpler language, the Communists advocate a compromise solution that will enable them to make this a second Cuba. This switch in policy is due to the fact the military-political strategists of the party are convinced that the Imbert forces, with their morale high and flushed with victory after the northern sweep, are now fully capable of crushing the insurgents led by Col. Francisco A. Caamano.

It is based on the Marxist-Leninist policy of two steps forward and one step back. This step back is not an about face. On the contrary, the PSP does not discard the possibility of a return of ex-President Juan Bosch.

TRICKLE TO PROVINCES

As part of the new strategy, Communist leaders have been trickling out of the rebel zone since May 25 and going to the provinces to organize and command guerrilla bands. These bands ride loyalist police stations and military posts five times in the last week.

The leader of an attack at San Juan de la Maguana, 125 miles west of here, was one of Cuban Premier Fidel Castro's men. He was Arsenio Ortiz de Ferrand, grandson of Arsenio Ortiz, who was known as the "Jackal of Oriente Province" during the dictatorship of Gerardo Machado in Cuba in the late 1920's. The grandson was killed yesterday while trying to escape from prison at San Juan.

A terrorist plot to sabotage an anti-Communist rally in Moca City, 80 miles northwest of Santo Domingo, was foiled today.

A homemade bomb exploded in a house near the corner of Caceres Park—the main plaza of the city of about 15,000 inhabitants—and a crowd of several thousand threatened to lynch a suspect after a rooftop chase. He was rescued by the police and taken to jail with his wife for questioning.

[From the Chicago (Ill.) Tribune,
June 9, 1965]

EX-PRESIDENT ASSAILS U.S. POLICY IN
DOMINGO—GIVE SUPPORT TO IMBERT, REID'S
SOLUTION

(By Jules Dubois)

SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, June 8.—Ex-President Donald J. Reid-Cabral said today that the United States should support President Antonio Imbert-Barrera and his government of national reconstruction to end the civil war here that Washington has stalemated.

In an interview, Reid, who was overthrown on April 25, expressed concern and bewilderment over the U.S. policy.

"I cannot understand the Americans," he said. "I don't know what objective they are pursuing, but I can see that they are contributing only to the continued paralysis of the life of our country."

SHOULD DECIDE QUICKLY

"The United States should quickly decide whether it wants to ruin the country permanently and turn it over to the Communists, or end the Communist menace which is located in the business district of the city," Reid added.

"As each day passes and Col. Francisco A. Caamano (the rebel leader) remains protected by the United States in the fortified zone," Reid went on, "it is another psy-

chological victory for the Communists. Besides, the United States is giving food to the rebels but Caamano makes political capital out of it by making the distribution. There is no like treatment for the Imbert government."

Reid emphasized that there must be a definite military solution here before there can be a visible political solution.

German Emilio Ornes, editor and publisher of the newspaper El Caribe, and who is unable to publish because his plant is in the rebel zone, asks:

"What the hell is the United States trying to do to us? It will now take us at least 20 years for our economy to recover and each day that goes by without a solution here adds another year to our troubles. Our economy is paralyzed."

THREE SOLDIERS CAPTURED

Ornes conveyed his thoughts in a brief talk with Ambassador Bunker, U.S. member of the Organization of American States mission. The mission was in Santiago de los Caballeros today to pulse the situation there.

Three American soldiers in a jeep wandered into rebel territory today and were captured. They said they got lost.

An hour after the capture, arrangements were made to hold them overnight and then turn them over to the OAS.

"We were looking for a house and we went too far," said Sp. 4c Alton P. Blakely, 21, of Richmond, Calif.

The two others identified themselves as Lt. Henry Cephus LeForce, 24, a communications expert from Nash, Okla., and Pfc. Nelson Belengeri, 21, of Lima, Peru.

Belengeri told a reporter he went to the United States to study English and joined the U.S. Army "because it offered me a career." He had lived with an uncle in Belleville, Ill.

The rebels kept the jeep and three rifles carried by the soldiers.

[From the Chicago (Ill.) Tribune,
June 14, 1965]

COMMUNISTS HAD ROLES OF LEADERS FROM
START OF DOMINICAN REVOLT, HERO
CHARGES

(By Jules Dubois)

SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, June 13.—The myth has been shattered that the Communists jumped on the bandwagon and took over after a revolt erupted here last April 24. At least a dozen Reds were identified in leadership roles from the start.

This has been documented in an interview with Col. Manuel Despradel, commander of the 16th century Ozama fortress the day the revolt began and hero of its siege before the rebels captured it at noon April 30.

WALL IS BREACHED

Despradel lost the fort when a 75-mm. gun fired from a French tank which rebel Col. Francisco A. Caamano had captured from the troops of Brig. Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin breached the wall of the fortress and allowed the rebel militia to pour into the courtyard and subdue the demoralized, starved defenders.

Despradel has been recovering from wounds at the San Isidro air base hospital. Permission for the interview was obtained from Commodore Francisco J. Rivera-Camirero, secretary of the armed forces. Colonel Despradel's story follows:

"I know that on the night of April 24-25, Caamano was with Dr. Daniel Ozuna-Hernandez, a known international Communist. My police reported to me that they saw Caamano driving his car with his uncle, Capt. Deno Suero, seated beside him. In the rear seat behind Caamano was Ozuna.

FREED BY CAAMANO

"Next to Ozuna was ex-Lt. Col. Jorge Gerardo Marte-Hernandez of the police force. Marte was one of the common criminals freed from La Victoria prison by order of Caamano. Marte had been sentenced to 6

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years imprisonment for homicide by a court-martial on March 10, 1964, and stripped of his rank.

"My patrols on El Conde, which totaled 18, 2 for each of the 9 street corners, were reduced to 8 when 10 of them defected. Of the loyal eight, all reported to me that Ozuna had a map on his lap and they could hear him as the car was halted at street corners tell Caamano where to emplace .50 and .30 caliber machine guns and where barricades should be erected.

"On the morning of April 25 Caamano left the American embassy, which he had visited while Ozuna remained in the car, and both were recognized by Maj. Jose Lopez-Benitez of the national police force. Caamano told Lopez: 'I have taken the government and I am going to be the president. Tell Despradel that.'

ORGANIZE FOR GUERRILLAS

Ozuna, who apparently was Caamano's tactician, organized the Communist guerrillas of the 14th of June patriotic movement, known here as A.C.J.P., who fought the army in the hills in 1963. Manuel Tavaréz-Justo, head of the movement, was killed in that fighting.

Ozuna had been shipped out of the country by the council of state in 1962 for Communist subversion. He was captured with the guerrillas in 1963, imprisoned and shipped out to Lisbon, Portugal, on May 8, 1964. He returned clandestinely to the country, presumably early this year.

Despradel returned to his story:

"Before dawn on April 26, officers in the national palace informed me that among those giving orders inside the palace were the following Communist leaders:

"Fidelio Arturo Despradel-Roque, son of former Foreign Minister Arturo Despradel, trained in Cuba, who fought with the 14th of June guerrillas, being a member of the movement, was captured, imprisoned, and shipped to Lisbon with Ozuna and other Communists. He returned clandestinely from Cuba with Arsenio Rafael-Ortiz de Ferrand, a Cuban leader of the 14th of June movement.

OTHERS ARE NAMED

"Antonio Isa-Conde, member of the Partido Socialista Popular and the Fragua, Communist university student movement, who was trained in Cuba.

"Narciso Iso-Conde, brother of Antonio, member of the same party and of the Fragua, who was trained in Moscow, Prague, and Cuba.

"Juan Ducoudray-Mansfield, and his brother Felix Servio, both leaders of the Partido Socialista Popular and both trained in Moscow and Cuba.

"Asdrubal Dominguez-Guerrero, a member of the Movimiento Popular Dominicano, the P.S.P. and Fragua, who was trained in Moscow.

"Delta Soto, Communist women's federation leader and a top figure in the 14th of June movement.

"Freddy Beras-Goico, who virtually declared himself a Communist on television. He is a nephew of Archbishop Thomas Beras.

Hitler Fatule-Chain and his twin brother Mussolini Fatule-Chain, members of the 14th of June.

"Jose Francisco Pena-Gomez of the extreme left wing of the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano of Juan Bosch, and Luis Armando Asunision of the same faction."

"At noon Tuesday (April 27) Caamano called me on the phone," Despradel continued, "and in a very friendly manner, invoking our previous friendship, asked me to surrender Ozama and join his faction because he realized this would be a very favorable psychological blow for him. This was because I was well known throughout the country, he said, and commander of the 'cacos blancos,' (the shock brigade) which was the best-trained police force, and also a brother of the chief of police.

"I replied bluntly that all those circumstances mentioned by him made it imperative that I remain loyal to my brother as chief of police and loyal to my command because I knew for a fact that since April 24 he had been with Ozuna, an internationally known Communist, that I am anti-Communist and moreover, by order of Colonel Caamano, who calls me 'compadre' (blood brother) the supposed great and good friend, my house has been sacked and destroyed and my wife and children were being hunted down as hostages to force me to surrender the fortress."

DECLINED TO SURRENDER

"They didn't stop there, but Caamano, Col. Hernandez Ramirez and Lt. Claudio Caamano-Grullon, a cousin of the rebel chief, called me on different occasions from Tuesday on to surrender the fort. Whenever, they called, I gave them the same answer: I will not surrender the fort to a man who had associated with the Communists from the start."

Despradel has saved Caamano's life at Palma Sola in 1962 when the police were sent there to capture a voodoo priest named Liborio. The fanatical population attacked the police with machettes and clubs.

[From U.S. News & World Report, May 17, 1965]

OFFICIAL RECORD: HOW REDS CAPTURED THE DOMINICAN REVOLT

The Communists who took over a revolution—it's quite a cast of characters turned up by U.S. intelligence officials. Names, places, background—that's the U.S. documentation on the plotters. Many were in action in Santo Domingo. Official files show why the President moved to block what amounted to a Communist offensive in the Caribbean.

This is the official story of how Communists took over the revolution in the Dominican Republic.

The story comes from U.S. Government sources and is based upon information gathered by intelligence agencies.

It names 58 known Communists and Castroites who played leading roles in fomenting, organizing and directing the Dominican rebellion.

Among them are 13 persons who are known or reliably reported to have been trained in subversive and paramilitary tactics by the Cuban intelligence service or other Cuban organizations.

Several had training in Soviet Russia or in Red-ruled Czechoslovakia.

Nearly all are members of three Communist political organizations known to have been involved in the revolt.

Their strategy was to move in on what started out as a military coup d'état and turn it into a Communist take-over of the Dominican Government.

It was on the basis of this documented information that President Johnson sent in U.S. marines on April 28 to save the Dominican Republic from going the way of Cuba and providing communism another Caribbean base.

RED MILITARY BOSS

Named as a key man in directing the Dominican rebel forces is Manuel González González. U.S. officials describe him as an experienced Spanish Communist Party activist who has been working with the Dominican Communist Party for at least the last 2 years. He is known to have a knowledge of military tactics and is reported to be an agent for Cuban military intelligence.

One of the three Communist political organizations involved in the plot is the Dominican Popular Socialist Party (PSPD), an orthodox Communist group which follows Moscow's direction.

Another is the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD), which follows the Chinese Communist ideological line.

Largest of the three organizations is the Fourteenth of June Political Group (APCJ), which is known to have connections with the Russian, Cuban, and Chinese Communist regimes.

AT START—A COUP

The story of the Dominican revolt, as told by U.S. officials, begins as far back as 1963, soon after the former Dominican President, Juan Bosch, was overthrown by a coup.

After that coup, the Fourteenth of June group and the Dominican Popular Movement launched an open campaign of guerrilla warfare in the country's hinterland. Some Dominicans known to have received training in Castro's Cuba took part in that campaign.

After the guerrilla campaign failed, the bulk of the captured rebels were deported, in May 1964, and most of them became exiles in France. From France, many traveled to Communist countries, including Cuba and Red China.

Beginning late in 1964, the exiled APCJ and MPD leaders began to infiltrate back into the Dominican Republic, some secretly. They rejoined their political groups and began to prepare them to take advantage of any opportunity that presented itself. The opportunity came on April 24, when a small group of Dominican Army officers attempted to overthrow the Government of President Donald Reid Cabral.

U.S. officials say that the officers' revolt was inspired by the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), the party of former President Bosch.

Communists, however, moved into it quickly. Within an hour or two after the first move in the revolt, members of the Castorite 14th of June movement were busy in the streets of Santo Domingo calling on the people to come out and demonstrate for Bosch.

ARMS FOR REDS

The rebelling officers seized a Government stock of arms and ammunition. A sizable quantity of those arms fell into the hands of the orthodox Communist leaders of the PSPD.

Members of that Red party were quickly formed into paramilitary teams which fanned out in the downtown and slum areas, taking control of military targets and organizing the populace.

Among the known Communists named by U.S. officials as particularly active in organizing the paramilitary teams were these:

Fidelio Despradel Roques, who got guerrilla training in Cuba in 1963.

Jaime Duran Herndo, who received paramilitary training in Cuba in 1962.

Juan Ducoudray Mansfield, a long-time leader of the Dominican Communist Party with extensive contacts among Communists outside the Dominican Republic. He is described as a link with Cuba in supplying Dominican Communists with weapons.

TRAINING FOR REDS

To show the links of Dominican rebels with Communist regimes in other countries, U.S. officials cited some of their records. Some examples:

José Rodríguez Acosta took guerrilla training in Cuba, he also been in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.

Cayetano Rodríguez del Prado was trained in Cuba, Europe and Communist China. He was involved in a Cuban intelligence operation in 1963 to sneak into the Dominican Republic accompanied by two companions and carrying arms and ammunition.

Nicolás Quirico Valdez Conde has lived in Moscow and speaks Russian so fluently he was Russian interpreter for Fidel Castro in Cuba.

Jaime Capell Bello traveled in Cuba, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.

Rafael de la Otagracia Mejía Llubes—nicknamed "Baby"—was involved in a 1963 attempt to overthrow Venezuelan President Betancourt. He was trained in Cuba.

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Félix Servio Ducoudray Mansfield, Jr., has lived in the Soviet Union and in Cuba. He is believed to be a leader in the Dominican Communist Party.

Silvano Lora Vicente had training in Cuba and in 1964 traveled to Moscow and Algeria. Franklin Franco Pichardo trained in the Soviet Union and made a recent trip to Moscow and Prague.

Antonio Isa Conde trained in Cuba, then went to Russia and Prague.

Pedro Julio Mir Valentín is reputed to be a close friend of Castro's. His travels to Communist countries go as far back as 1947. With such well-trained Communists leading the way, the Dominican rebels quickly set up a military headquarters and armed strong points.

AN EDITOR IS KILLED

They overran a police station, captured and shot policemen, seized police weapons. An anti-Communist newspaper editor was machinegunned to death.

They stormed the gates of the National Palace. Newspaper buildings were sacked and their equipment was used to put out propaganda leaflets. Banks were looted. Rebels took over the government's radio and television stations.

U.S. officials describe the operations of the rebel leaders as being in "typical Castro style." The rebels paraded captured loyalists before TV cameras. They harangued TV and radio audiences with Communist slogans and denunciations of "the bourgeois reactionaries" and "imperialists."

Violence spread, and American officials say the character of the revolution changed.

Communists and their extreme-leftist allies soon made up a significant portion of the rebel forces. The Communists were also decisively influencing the political leadership of the rebellion, which in the beginning had been in the hands of the Bosch party leaders.

JOBS COMMUNISTS COVER

The provisional government that had been set up by the rebels were induced to appoint several persons whose Communist sympathies and associations have been well established. The positions they got were ones which are important to Communists—such as attorney general and director of investigations.

The original leaders of the revolt soon realized that their movement had been captured by Communists. So they gave up the fight and sought asylum.

No important civilian leaders of that original group now remain with the rebels, according to U.S. officials. Martínez Francisco, PRD secretary general, summed up the situation in a radio address to the nation on April 28. He said:

"I beg all to lay down their arms, because this is no longer a fight between political parties."

It was on that date, April 28, that U.S. marines moved in. A political revolt, in just 4 days, had been turned into a Communist takeover.

The story of those 4 days, now revealed by U.S. officials, is what caused President Johnson to act.

[From U.S. News & World Report, May 17, 1965]

AFTER THE BATTLE IN THE CARIBBEAN

(It will be an uneasy peace, at best, for a long time in the Dominican Republic. U.S. troops who rushed in won't rush out so fast. Howard Handelman of the staff of U.S. News & World Report tells why in this dispatch from the scene.)

SANTO DOMINGO.—Every sign here is that Americans will be saddled with a policing job in this republic for a long time to come.

A new government, when one can be established, will need time to prove itself. Tensions are too deep-seated for a conglomerate force of Latin-American military units to provide the stabilizing element needed.

As many as 20,000 civilians now carry arms. Many arms will be hidden away. It is not going to be easy, either, to track down and immobilize the Communist leaders—a good many of them trained in Cuba or in Eastern Europe.

WHAT VIOLENCE PROVED

Some conclusions seem clear to one who knows the island and who has gone through the recent days of violence.

The first is that there is no real base on which political stability can rest in a country with a rapidly rising population and an economy depending for the most part on sugar, the price of which is severely depressed.

The United States is probably going to be forced to make a sharp increase in aid.

Another point being made is that there is no room for a "dreamer" at the head of any new government. When Juan Bosch was President, people got the idea that there was pie in the sky, when actually the outlook without sizable U.S. help would seem to be hopeless.

A firm conclusion is that U.S. military intervention was unavoidable if slaughter of foreigners was to be prevented. It is regarded as a good thing that U.S. power was adequate to deal with heavily armed, Communist-organized mobs. If action had not been fast and in force, loss of life would have been much heavier, and a takeover by Reds an accomplished fact.

With slower action, experts say, there readily could have been another Castro-type base for Reds in the Caribbean.

When U.S. troops had been on Dominican soil 5 days, President Johnson, on May 3, officially stated that the role of those troops was to prevent a Communist takeover as well as to save lives. In a speech, Mr. Johnson said:

"The American nations cannot, must not, and will not permit the establishment of another Communist Government in the Western Hemisphere."

The President with those words reaffirmed U.S. policy justifying intervention in Communist revolutions anywhere in Latin America the United States chooses to move. That policy was not in effect in January 1959, when Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba.

FOR U.S. TROOPS, NO ENEMIES

The performance of U.S. military services in Santo Domingo was a model of restraint. Marines of the Second Division and soldiers of the 82d Airborne Division have not been permitted to shoot unless shot at first. On the night of May 4, troops were ordered to end combat patrols outside their lines. This was considered a risky restraint in the midst of heavily armed guerrillas. Idea was to keep U.S. troops from appearing aggressive.

Rebels have not been referred to as the enemy. An airborne division spokesman, to avoid using the word enemy, even went so far as to describe snipers who machinegunned U.S. paratroopers as people who are anti-82d Division.

Americans have big guns and tanks but have not been permitted to use them. Troops were cautioned, also, to avoid a normal practice of blowing up houses filled with snipers. Officers said that marines and paratroopers were limited to hand-held weapons in the fighting.

A few rounds from 106-millimeter recoilless rifles and from antitank bazookas were fired against boats that sailed into the mouth of the Ozama River carrying snipers. Each of the boats was knocked out, one a large vessel apparently filled with ammunition for the rebels. The ships had come presumably from Cuba.

By May 8, the number of American servicemen here, either ashore or afloat, was more than 30,000. The Army had 14,345 paratroopers on the island; the Marine Corps, 8,924; the Navy, 8,314, and the Air Force, 626. Many will be incorporated into any peace-

keeping force set up by the Organization of American States. Others will be replaced by Latin-American troops.

U.S. DEATH TOLL

Casualties among U.S. forces between April 28, when first marines came ashore, and May 6 included 13 dead, more than 60 wounded.

That toll was mounting despite a so-called firm cease-fire. On May 6, four marines were killed when their patrol made a wrong turn into the rebel-held zone of Santo Domingo. Rebel machineguns cut them down without warning.

Refusal of the rebels to observe the cease-fire was taken as new evidence of Communists' taking over what started out as a popular revolt against the military junta that had been in power.

A semblance of order was restored here only after U.S. troops established an impenetrable cordon around rebel-held territory in the heart of downtown Santo Domingo. In effect, American servicemen bottled up the rebels.

Until that cordon was established, danger was great that the capital would fall to the insurgents. More than 1,000 citizens lay dead in the streets. Rebels had broken the back of Government resistance and captured the police stronghold of La Fortaleza Ozama after a 4-day siege. Large quantities of guns and ammunition were captured.

When the truce was signed, rebels held an area of about 2 square miles in the teeming heart of this city of 400,000. U.S. marines had carved out and are holding an international refugee zone to the west of the rebels, and are linked by a 3-mile corridor to U.S. paratroopers to the east of the rebels and at San Isidro Air Base.

RICE IN THE CORRIDOR

This 3-mile corridor is a busy place now. A large part of it includes the gay quarters of the town, and as long as American soldiers stay clear of diehard rebels they do not seem to be unwelcome to Dominicans. Stores are open, and the troops are making purchases and many are making friends.

On an average day, at 10 points along the "armed corridor," U.S. troops handed out 20 tons of rice to civilians—all comers, no questions asked—as well as tons of beans and powdered milk.

In U.S.-held areas, Dominicans seem to respond warmly to the idea that U.S. civilians, as well as they, are stopped at checkpoints for identification.

American troops are trying to overcome initial fear and resentment. They are seeking to leave a good impression with local citizens.

At first there was fear the Americans would charge into the city to wipe out the rebels. In that case, thousands upon thousands could have been slaughtered.

Instead, U.S. troops went swiftly about the job of evacuating more than 4,000 foreign civilians, including 2,694 Americans and 1,373 from 41 other nations. Anyone who wanted to leave got a hand from the United States.

RELIEF: WILL IT BE REAL?

American officers have been waiting for the first Latin American military contingents to start showing up in force, after an OAS vote of May 6 to pitch in with truce-keeping chores.

There was skepticism, however, about any idea that the United States would be able to cut back in its own commitment substantially, in any case.

Some Latin American states voted against the peacekeeping idea altogether, and some big countries—Mexico, for one—indicated they wouldn't send any troops. Intense jealousies and rivalries among Latin Americans raised further doubts in the minds of some U.S. officials about the ability of many OAS members to pull their weight. For now, Americans here agree, it will be the United

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States that will continue to bear the burden—military as well as economic—of keeping the country from going down the drain.

What Latin American peacekeepers will find is a situation that U.S. diplomats describe as "an unholy mess."

The republic is drifting without a leader—and two sides claiming power.

The United States is officially neutral but has granted a sort of "working recognition" to a military junta backed by Brig. Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin. It was General Wessin y Wessin who kept the rebels from power until U.S. forces arrived.

Rebels are led by Col. Francisco Caamaño Delfo, who was inaugurated as "provisional President" by his supporters on May 4. Behind Colonel Caamaño and 400 other military rebels are between 10,000 and 20,000 armed civilians who now appear to be under the control of foreign-trained Communists, intent on keeping the revolt going at any cost.

Colonel Caamaño, although a U.S.-trained career officer, does not stand high with the United States. He is not known to be a Communist, but U.S. officials say Caamaño "seems to be moving closer to the Communists." One of his chief advisers is Communist leader Fidelio Despradel, a Castroite.

U.S. officials here report that Caamaño conferred with Despradel and other Red leaders who asked for jobs in his government if he won power, and that he assure their escape from the country if he lost. Caamaño was said to have agreed to this in return for Red backing.

CONTINUING THREAT

Danger of a Communist takeover still exists. American officials here say they have no doubt of that. The whole rebellion is said to fit into a blueprint for subversion that was drawn up in Havana last November at a secret meeting of 22 Latin American Communist parties.

As U.S. officials reconstruct the revolution here, the Castro-Communist influence stands out in a striking way.

When 18 rebels took over the government television station on April 24, to start things, the two announcers who were used were chosen because they were easily recognized as Communists.

The whole Communist organization here was geared to move on short notice, and the three main Red groups, previously split, united to move together.

Known Communists stood on trucks and passed out guns and ammunition to any Dominicans who wanted them. At the National Palace, 15 well-known Communist leaders were deliberately conspicuous in the way they gave orders to rebel elements. On television, in those first days, Reds wore Castro-type fatigue caps to give a Castro flavor to the revolt.

American officials believe the Reds did all this to make the point that this was "their revolution."

WHAT UNITED STATES WANTS

Trouble with the Communists, piled on top of the country's natural problems, adds up to a formidable chore for the United States in the period ahead. Getting the OAS to share peacekeeping tasks—even in token form—is the first step toward a solution. What the United States would like to see, beyond a durable armed truce, is a political compromise that would bring a moderate provisional regime to power until free elections can be held—preferably under OAS auspices.

The big U.S. problem is to find a politician capable of running the Dominican Republic with a firm hand—even an iron hand, if necessary—and enable the United States to withdraw its troops soon.

Assurance of any lasting political settlement is regarded as dim. Fighting, it is felt, has solved nothing, merely deepened old resentments.

Now, with Reds committed to action, there's prospect of prolonged guerrilla-style war in the countryside.

U.S. occupation of the Dominican Republic once before was undertaken with hopes of getting out quickly. That occupation, started in 1916, lasted for 8 years.

Once again, the United States is finding that getting in is a lot easier than getting out.

[From U.S. News & World Report, May 17, 1965]

WHO WILL RULE NOW IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC?

(Next big job: finding the man who can put the Dominican Republic back together again and still keep Communists at bay. United States wants no part of present rebel leader or former President Juan Bosch. Both have been tainted by the Reds.)

SANTO DOMINGO.—American officials here are convinced beyond any possible doubt that the man who rose to the top of the Dominican rebellion—Col. Francisco Caamaño Delfo—is only a front for the real conspirators, the Communists behind his movement.

Colonel Caamaño was sworn in by the rebels as "provisional President" of the Dominican Republic on May 4.

To reach that point, according to evidence in U.S. hands, the colonel was forced to make a marriage of convenience with the Communists. And now an old-line Communist, Fidelio Despradel Roques, is his key adviser.

PROMISE TO REDS

This, say U.S. investigators, is what happened:

Early in the second week of the rebellion, Caamaño met with half a dozen of the top Communist leaders in Santo Domingo. They were men who represented the three Communist parties on this island—followers of the Chinese Reds, the Kremlin Communists, and Fidel Castro's Cubans.

Caamaño made a deal:

If the revolution succeeds, the Communists will have key positions in his Government.

If the revolution fails, Caamaño has agreed to insist that the Organization of American States guarantee safe passage for the Red leaders so they can get out of the country.

Despite Caamaño's claims and activities, the United States says there is no effective government in the Dominican Republic. Americans here are determined, as one puts it, "to help the Dominicans find a democratic solution to their problems." But finding it is going to be difficult, indeed.

The United States is opposed to accepting either Caamaño or former President Juan Bosch as the political leader of this troubled country. While neither is considered a Communist, each owes big political debts to the Reds. Of Bosch, one American said, "He has done things that favored the Communists."

Thoughtful Dominicans not involved in the current disorder are casting about now for a man who can lead their nation back to order.

Former President Joaquin Balaguer, presently in exile in New York, is sometimes mentioned as a possibility. He has been keeping his political image alive here through taped broadcasts for a year or more. He is believed to retain a good deal of popularity.

Gen. Antonio Imbert, one of the two surviving members of the group that assassinated former dictator Rafael Trujillo, also is being mentioned. He too is considered politically popular.

THE REAL VILLAIN

There is no easy solution to today's chaos. The more you hear about what's been going on in the Dominican Republic, the more you come to this conclusion: The real

villain is dictator Trujillo, even though he is 4 years dead. Every line you follow seems to lead, in the end, to the old dictator. Under Trujillo, graft became a privilege of the generals. One reason for the downfall of President Donald Reid Cabral is that he tried to take this privilege away. He got rid of two generals and fired the powerful chief of the national police. But it was enemies within the armed forces who toppled him from office.

Among the things Reid Cabral wanted to eliminate was a contracts racket operated by top military men. Until Reid Cabral took office, military contracting officers had a free hand in buying supplies from abroad. The standard practice was to buy only from salesmen who would give the contracting officer a kickback of 10 or 12 percent.

This is but one example of the kind of widespread corruption that has riddled the country in recent years. The Dominican Republic had no foreign debts at the time Trujillo was assassinated. Four years later, its debts totaled almost half a billion dollars.

As President, Reid Cabral ended the contracts racket, but the fact he did so helped bring him down.

SON OF "THE BUTCHER"

The Trujillo era even casts a shadow over the new rebel leader, Colonel Caamaño. He is the son of the late Gen. Fausto Caamaño, known to Dominicans as El Carnicero—"The Butcher"—in the days of Trujillo. Like most professional Army men in the Dominican Republic, Colonel Caamaño has a Trujillo background—one he has tried to obscure—and he has powerful enemies.

You don't have to be on this island long to sense the conflicts and bitterness that permeate the place.

These conflicts ousted Bosch in 1963. They brought the downfall of Reid Cabral at the start of the current rebellion, even before the Communist elements came to the surface. They persist now, leaving many powerful Dominicans hating each other.

That is why it will be a long, long time before a stable government can be set up to guide this troubled country.

[From U.S. News & World Report, May 31, 1965]

CARIBBEAN RIDDLE: HOW TO LET GO

SANTO DOMINGO.—Communists remain a very real threat to the Dominican Republic, 4 weeks after the U.S. Marines moved in to block a Red takeover here.

Known Communists are commanding an estimated 80 to 90 percent of the rebel posts, even though they are not always the men who appear publicly to be in charge.

There is some danger—presently calculated as slight—that the Communists will move out into the countryside and try to spread the revolt, even if it is choked off here in the capital.

What heightens the Communists' opportunities for troublemaking is the almost impossible job of putting together a broad-based coalition government. Several times in recent days negotiators have been on the brink of getting a cabinet organized, only to have everything collapse because of premature publicity.

Under the circumstances, it is clear now that it probably will be a long time before the bulk of the 30,000 U.S. troops on the scene can go home.

U.S. officials were heartened by the decision of Brazil on May 21 to send a substantial force—probably as many as 1,250 men—to join a Latin American peacekeeping mission here. By that date, only token forces were on the ground, and they had not been organized.

Even when the U.S. goal of a broad-based coalition government is attained, Dominican problems remaining will seem insurmountable.

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able. Hatreds run deep. So do international complications.

Look at this tangle of events:

The United Nations moved into the Dominican Republic—its first intervention in this Hemisphere—to try to achieve a ceasefire.

The U.N. move aroused the anger of the Organization of American States, which had pledged itself to restore order but actually accomplished nothing.

U.S. officials, many of them disgusted with OAS delays, were determined to get up some combination of Dominicans to govern the country.

President Johnson rushed a top-level team from Washington—McGeorge Bundy, White House adviser on foreign policy; Under Secretary of State Thomas Mann; Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance, and Jack Hood Vaughn, Assistant Secretary of State of Inter-American Affairs. The mission: to get the shooting stopped and set up a provisional regime acceptable to both sides.

DOMINICANS BADLY DIVIDED

The high-ranking troubleshooters found that the Dominicans themselves seemed almost hopelessly divided.

Said one worried diplomat: "Everybody's playing in this ball game—and there are too many umpires."

The frustrations of diplomatic maneuvering, in which the United States, the U.N., the OAS, and rival Dominican factions were involved, showed what the United States was up against in trying to put the Dominican Republic back together.

Early in the revolution, the United States tried without success to get rid of the rebel leader, Col. Francisco Caamaño Delfo. Then, to placate the rebels, futile attempts were made to persuade Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin, military chief of the loyalist junta, to quit.

IMBERT STANDS PAT

In the fourth week of the conflict, the United States turned its pressure on Gen. Antonio Imbert Barreras, the man it had persuaded to take on the presidency of the junta just 10 days before. But General Imbert resisted all suggestions that he step aside.

On May 20, General Imbert, at a news conference, denied that the Bundy mission had asked him to resign. His associates, however, told a different story. Said one of the junta's top military men, who attended negotiating sessions:

"Mr. Vance told us that we had to accept Antonio Guzman, a friend of Juan Bosch, as interim President and then have elections in 60 days under the constitution of 1963, adopted before Bosch was deposed as President.

"We said we did not object to Guzman but that we could not accept the 1963 constitution. Mr. Vance said we had to accept the constitution because acceptance was the rebel's top demand.

"Then we got mad. We asked, 'Who are the rebels? What do they control?' We pointed out that they controlled only downtown Santo Domingo.

"And we controlled all the rest of the country."

General Imbert argued that, if the United States put Mr. Guzman in the Presidency, the Communists would take over.

No claim is made that Mr. Guzman is a Communist. He is a Santiago landowner who was Minister of Agriculture when his close friend, Mr. Bosch, was President. But the junta and its supporters maintain that Mr. Bosch and his associates showed that they were too weak to stave off the Communists.

That is an example of the suspicion and enmity which permeate the Dominican political atmosphere and hamper U.S. efforts to restore stability.

The United States has encountered trouble in finding people who might run a government of national unity.

WE HAVE SOME LEVERAGE

In spite of the difficulties, the United States remained determined to help set up a coalition government. One U.S. official said: "We think we have some leverage in this situation. By keeping a strong force of marines and soldiers we are making it clear that we have no intention of tossing in the sponge. We are here until a solution is reached.

"The basic plan remains. We want a broad-based regime representing the widest possible spectrum of leadership. That means professional men as well as politicians drawn from several parties. The broader the better. We don't put as much stock in getting one man—the man—as in getting a representative group that will have broad appeal."

WHAT BOSCH LACKED

An opinion expressed by some Americans here is that Mr. Bosch—once thought the idol of the rebels—ruined his chances for a comeback by not returning immediately from exile in Puerto Rico when the revolt began on April 24. One comment: "When Bosch didn't show up, people said he lacked the guts to do so. And if there's one thing that Latins scorn in a man it is lack of 'macho'—manliness or courage."

Political worries—and the fighting that, through May 20, had cost the United States 20 men killed in action, 102 wounded and 1 missing—are only part of the problem. Economic headaches already acute have been aggravated.

Living conditions are miserable for the great mass of the country's 3.5 million people. Many are illiterate.

Sugar is the main foreign-exchange crop. But production costs here are high, world sugar prices are down, and deeper financial trouble results.

Politically, the people are naïve. The reason is that, for more than 30 years under the Trujillo dictatorship, no political activity was permitted.

Now, with all the bloodshed and chaos in Santo Domingo, some Dominicans, rich and poor, are talking wistfully of the "good old days" when Trujillo maintained order with an iron hand.

This attitude has led diplomats to believe that the Dominicans still need a firm, guiding hand—and that if the OAS is unable to do the job, it must be done by the United States.

INSTANT HERO

The way the unknown Colonel Caamaño won wide support overnight was a shocker for U.S. officials. The Americans said that it showed how Communists might be able to exploit an "instant hero" as a figurehead while they executed a Red plot to take over the country.

To those here, it seems certain that the United States will have to dig in for a long stay if the Dominican Republic is to overcome the effects of years of oppression, an imbalanced economy and the political hatreds which exploded in civil war.

[From U.S. News & World Report, May 31, 1965]

THE NIGHTMARE OF CIVIL WAR—LIFE IN DOMINICAN CAPITAL SANTO DOMINGO

After 4 weeks of anarchy, life in this embattled city has taken on the character of a nightmare.

This is accentuated by the sights and sounds and smells of war—the troops and tanks, the sharp crack of rifle fire, the ominous booming of heavier weapons, the acrid odor of gunpowder, the stench of garbage burning in the streets.

Almost nothing is normal.

In Santo Domingo's northern suburbs, armed bands have disrupted crowded industrial areas. Major plants have been forced to close, idling thousands of workers. Food-distribution trucks have been hijacked.

PASSWORD: FOOD

Food reaches both the rebel-held zone in downtown Santo Domingo and the international safety zone sealed off by U.S. forces via trucks from the countryside.

The U.S. ring around the rebel zone opens for food trucks going in and out. Attacks on the trucks have occurred outside the sector guarded by American marines and soldiers. Food distribution continues, but fear of marauders causes truckdrivers to race away at the first sign of trouble.

In the international zone, food stores and restaurants are reopening. The aromas of strong, black coffee and Dominican rum are in the air again.

An outdoor market began operating before the end of the first week of the revolution. It has become a flourishing center of street stalls. For sale are fresh vegetables, fruit, freshly butchered lambs or goats, hanging on dirty boards in the hot sun, attracting buzzing swarms of flies.

On the street alongside the market, young Dominicans hawk American cigarettes—by the carton.

Inside the rebel zone, few stores are open. Most are boarded up. There has been looting. Walk down the palm-lined streets, and you see stores that have been stripped of their goods.

In the international zone, Dominican police are back at work, directing traffic, guarding buildings against looters.

When the civil war erupted, schools were closed. In the third week of the revolution, a few primary schools reopened in the safety zone. But schools in the rebel area still are closed. Children cluster around rebel sentries on the street corners.

Water and electricity again are usually available in both zones. But not always. Electric power was shut off for several hours on May 16, for example.

The main post office is in the rebel zone. But a substitute main office was set up in the fairgrounds, inside the international zone, and mail service—including postal money orders—has been carried on with remarkably efficiency.

Throughout the revolution, hundreds of government employees has been hard at work. From the beginning, the Ministry of Public Welfare has been helping to distribute food, even inside the rebel zone. Employees of the Ministry of Public Health have toiled to clean up the city, hoping to avert an epidemic.

MEETING THE PAYROLLS

The United States gave the beleaguered city's shaky economy a lift by lending \$750,000 to the Ministry of Finance to meet overdue payrolls. People living in the rebel zone can go through U.S. military checkpoints to collect their back pay.

In the rebel zone, grocery stores serve as banks. With most other stores closed, grocers were authorized by rebel leaders to cash government checks. The Dominican junta announced on the radio that it would guarantee payment of the checks.

As weeks of tension and terror go on, some people work, some fight—and some just seem to sit and wait for the nightmare to end.

[From U.S. News & World Report, June 7, 1965]

AND NOW: WHAT NEXT IN SANTO DOMINGO?

SANTO DOMINGO.—The cost has been high: lives of 20 American servicemen, more than 100 wounded, uncounted Dominicans killed—plus millions of dollars involved in supporting an operation of 22,000 U.S. troops.

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Yet, out of it all, these things are being counted as accomplishments.

A second "Cuba" in the Caribbean has been checked. Slaughter among the thousands of American and foreign residents of the island was avoided. The Organization of American States, for the first time in its history, was prodded into taking on the role of armed policeman.

Brazil, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica are the countries that have come through with contingents of troops or police for the inter-American force under the OAS banner. U.S. troops make up the bulk of that force, but a Brazilian general commands it.

A WARNING TO "CASTROS"

As a result of the Dominican precedent, Castro-type leaders all through Latin America are on notice that they can face military intervention if they attempt a take-over.

As for this island republic: It is clear that outside military forces, including U.S. troops, will be here for a long time. The alternative is revival of fighting between heavily armed groups all over the country.

A major task of rebuilding the Dominican economy lies ahead.

Whoever leads a new government will be under much pressure to redistribute land. During the 31 years of Trujillo dictatorship, the Trujillo family gained control of 35 percent of the arable land and 65 percent of the sugar production, which is the mainstay of the economy.

The Trujillo holdings now are in the hands of the government, but no move has been made to put the land into individual hands. In any event, a sugar economy no longer can support the island's 3.5 million people. There will have to be a basic change in agricultural production, probably financed and directed by farm specialists from the United States.

HIGH COST OF ARMY

Another essential is to cut down on the cost of the Dominican military establishment. The government has been spending 40 percent of its income to support the armed forces. Officers have struggled to obtain posts which, foreign diplomats say, have proved immensely profitable to some in graft and favors.

The problems that lie ahead are complicated by the poverty and illiteracy of the Dominican people. About 70 percent cannot read or write. Per capita income of \$200 a year compares with \$2,650 in the United States.

Since Trujillo's assassination in 1961, the United States has poured economic aid into the island. Despite this, the economy is in dire shape. Oppressive taxes and unrealistic wage rates, along with the decline in world sugar prices, have made sugar plantations uneconomic.

The country is a mixture of races. Official estimate is that 15 percent of the Dominicans are white, 15 percent Negro, and 70 percent of mixed blood. Political views of these groups often conflict.

Politically, traditions are based on the legacy of hatred and violence left by Trujillo. All of this compounds the political confusion. Says one U.S. official:

"There is a very deep-seated division among the leaders here. There is almost a polarization of opposing opinions. Our task is to find political figures and forces that can pull together the mass of the people in the middle ground, those who would reject either communism or Trujilloism."

In an interview on May 26, Gen. Antonio Imbert Barrera told me that the junta he heads will make no concessions to the rebels and will not accept any solution "imposed from outside." That's an example of what mediators are up against.

One hot dispute involves the rebels' in-

sistence upon a constitution tailored to their demands.

Among other points of disagreement: How to deal with known Communists who have had key roles in the civil war. How to disarm the groups and ordinary citizens who were issued weapons—or armed themselves—when the rebellion erupted. How to enforce guarantees against vengeance.

YEARS FOR REBUILDING

Much remains to be done before the present crisis is ended. Then comes the big job of rebuilding the economy—a job which could take years, with the United States providing much of the technical aid and most of the money.

[From U.S. News & World Report, July 19, 1965]

U.S. AID WHILE THE BULLETS FLY—THE REAL DOMINICAN STORY

(If you are wondering what's really going on in the revolt-torn Dominican Republic—it is the sporadic gunfire, political jockeying, the presence of United States and other foreign soldiers that make headlines. But the deeper story is a massive undertaking by the United States to save the country from itself. U.S. aid officials rushed in with the troops. Mission: emergency relief to stave off collapse, then long-range development to remake the place. That started almost the moment the revolution broke. So far, \$41 million in U.S. aid has gone in. Millions more are on the way. In charge is Alexander Pirfer, a U.S. expert sent in from Bolivia after earlier experience in Puerto Rico's Operation Bootstrap. Following is the story of U.S. rescue operations in the Dominican Republic in Mr. Pirfer's own words, as told to Howard Handelman of the staff of U.S. News & World Report.)

SANTO DOMINGO.—When this thing broke in April, we were faced with a problem that can be compared with the problem of getting an automobile moving. An automobile has three gears. We had three stages to go through.

Let's take our three gears in order.

The first, low gear, consisted basically of doing everything we could to make sure the revolution didn't break up the channels of distribution—or the functioning of the economy.

We had to do that to make sure that people had enough to eat. So we started with the program to distribute food. We had to make sure that if Dominicans were going to fight each other, they would be fighting about the real issues that were bothering them—not get pulled into the fight because somebody's baby was hungry.

The easiest way to measure what this operation did is to point out that, before the revolution, the food program here was feeding about 7 percent of the people of the country. As we got into stage one—our low gear—we raised that to 17 percent of the people. That is an extremely high figure.

The 7 percent was high. It points up the fact that our country recognized, even before this revolution, that the Dominican Republic was coming out of a period of dictatorship and was going through substantial change in the social structure, and therefore needed help to feed its people.

With the revolution, the need for food aid increased enormously. Let me give an example:

In the town of Monte Cristi, a liter of peanut oil cost 70 cents before the revolution. Peanut oil is essential in Dominican cooking. The price started climbing the minute the revolution broke out. It went all the way up to \$2.50. The moment we announced that we were sending peanut oil into Monte Cristi, the price dropped back to 90 cents a liter.

Now, roughly, that's what this first-gear operation did. It kept tempers down in this

tropical climate, where tempers can flare easily.

The other part of this operation was meeting the Government payroll.

So gear one consisted of emergency steps to keep the economy moving, so that extraneous issues didn't get mixed up with the real political differences they were fighting about. We wanted them to concentrate on their real differences—and hope that somehow these can be resolved.

To meet Government payrolls, we gave about \$14 million—and another \$10 million or so is being paid out in the current distribution. The money goes to pay all Government employees—including the military.

As gear 1 got going full speed, we were able to start thinking about gear 2.

This gear 2 consists of a series of problems. How can you get the economy moving once more? How can you avoid a plain dole, where people get American money but are not on their jobs? Is there some way to get some works projects going?

Over all, is there some way you can get the economy running enough so that you are at least getting something for the American dollars you spend?

As the first moves in gear 2, we tried to get a series of public works projects going. Many of these had been sidetracked by the revolution.

The aid mission before us had been here only a year. Aid had been stopped for 11 months after Juan Bosch was overthrown, and a whole new aid team had to be formed. Well, it normally takes about a year to gear up an aid program and begin to show results.

Heaven knows how long it's going to take us now. We've got orders to do it in much less time than a year. But we have one advantage. A lot of projects were left hanging. We were able to review these projects, and also to take a look at a number of public works projects.

Let me give you an example:

There is a big pipeline coming in from the river near Haina that is supposed to bring water to Santo Domingo. The water supply here has been a constant source of irritation. The project was held up by routine negotiations. We said, "Well, let's get through all this. If we're going to spend money, let's spend it on something useful. We'll put up the money for the pipeline, and there won't have to be any more negotiating about it." So, at this moment, we've got a contract with an American construction firm to build the three major supply lines for this water. That will bring water to the city. This will cost about \$2 million.

Another project, which was easy to get started, is for irrigation. This country has a substantial supply of water. It has many dikes for irrigation.

A lot of these dikes have not been maintained, partly because, as far back as last November, it looked like the country was going to fall apart economically. I've run across some people, little people, who haven't been paid since as far back as November.

Well, these irrigation canals could be cleaned easily. What we did was bring in another American company, and said, "Go take a look at the canals, and let's see what we can do." Well, we put \$400,000 into this.

Both these contracts were signed the other day in Washington—June 30, to be exact. And the engineers are down there now, working out final details before work starts.

The main point in gear 2 is to get people working. You have to have these works projects to keep people working and eating during the time it takes you to plan development projects and get them going.

Gear 2 was put together in about 2 weeks' planning. We kept going to the technicians, beating them over the head. We made some of them try to justify old ideas. We made them pull old papers out of un-

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used files. We made them try to reconstruct old plans that had been lost or burned, when the Embassy had to destroy some of its files in the first days of the revolution.

We really put together a package of about \$6 million, worth of emergency public-works operations. We now are straightening out a road between Azua and San Juan. We are finishing up a number of schools that had been started. We are building a few agricultural schools that the mission had started planning before. This makes sense in preparing for stage 3, when we get to it, because then agriculture will be the No. 1 priority.

We give people employment—which is a gear 2 job—and we keep them on the farms, where they will be needed when gear 3 starts. That's the kind of integration you get as you cross from one gear to another.

Now, let's look at stage 3—the third gear. Frankly, that's what interests me the most. That's where you take a look at this economy and ask what is needed to make it tick. You try to find the major areas where you might be able to do something to change the economy for the better. You start exploring: Is it commerce? Is it shipping? Is it agriculture? Is it industry? What is it that would make the difference here?

After that, you come up with a scheme that, in Agency for International Development terminology, you call priorities. You pick out those areas where you can get the biggest results the quickest.

The most important priority, it seems to us, is agriculture—for a number of reasons. First, you've got a fairly good agricultural system going in this country. The real question is: Can you shove it along, can you boost it? You certainly can do a good deal, like, for example, growing the kinds of things you can sell to Puerto Rico and Florida. The Cubans used to have these markets. The demand there is beef. There is no reason why the Dominican Republic shouldn't grow enough beef to meet its own needs and export to the Caribbean countries, too.

Let's see if we can divide the priority called agriculture into subpriorities.

The first subpriority under this will be to take some of these commodities we know about and start producing. What we've done—and, fortunately, this was in the works—we've got a contract with Texas A. & M. for 11 top technicians in forage crops, vegetables, cattle. They are just starting to come aboard. The first two arrived at the end of June. These people will help us decide which crops make sense, which crops you should get at first.

Then, along with this team, we'll have a group of people working on marketing. But before we get into marketing, which is subpriority B, what you've got to look at is: "Well, all right, but once you make up your mind what ought to be produced, how do you make sure it does get produced?" And the answer to this was: "Why don't we divide up this fairly small country into, say, 12 regional zones?"

Why don't we pick, for instance, the seats of the agricultural bank, where the credit is handed out? Then see if we can't put one really top American extension type in each one of these, and tell these 12 guys we pick up: "You're in competition with each other. Boy, let's see what your zone can do."

Now, backstopping—or really, supporting—this emphasis on production in subpriority B, which is marketing: We've got to make sure that what we tell someone to produce he can sell. So there is a substantial effort on marketing—first, internal; second, the Caribbean; third, the United States. We are aiming at the markets that the Cubans used to meet before—tobacco, cigars, fruits, vegetables—particularly the winter vegetables and fruits.

The next subpriority is credit. It's going to take a fair amount of money, the way it does back home, to help a man buy the seed and the animals he needs, and to fix up his place so he can produce.

What I want to emphasize in all this is that we still, in effect, are designing a new development program—that stage three is still a dream.

But let's get back to our list of priorities. No. 1, which we have been discussing, is agriculture. No. 2 has to do with transportation.

Unless you can get this product you grow into the market, unless you can get the products off the farm, onto some of the major roads, you're not going to do much good. You've got to make sure that the man stays out in the country, producing. He has to be able to send his products out, and then the income comes back to him—and maybe he can even end up buying a television set. So we must have farm-to-market roads.

BRIDGES THAT STOP IN MIDSTREAM

The problem varies tremendously in this country. Some places have good roads. But there are places which I have seen where bridges don't go all the way across rivers. There are roads in the mountains which I've traveled where, frankly, I had my fingers crossed, and wondered whether we could get across the narrow strips of roadway left after landslides.

OK, let's get into the third priority—education. Some figures I have on education are pretty shocking. Thirty percent of the kids in this country apparently don't go to school. And about 70 percent of the teachers don't have more than a seventh- to eighth-grade education.

Well, you can't do very much educating with that kind of thing, so we are thinking of making education priority No. 3. We will concentrate first on agricultural education. It's just easier to spend 4 years, or even 3 years, on a youngster, making him what the Latinos call *perito*. That means half an expert. With that much training, we then can sell the youngster, "All right, now you know something about agriculture. Go back to your father's farm and do something with it."

Actually, some of these children may end up in a Government bureaucracy. That's OK, too. It would be useful to have people with better training than some of those who now work in some of these agricultural institutions.

Priority four is an interesting one. For a while, we didn't think it was going to be a priority at all. It's industrial development. We weren't quite sure that the industrial development in this country had gotten to the stage where you could say, "OK, let's all get out behind industry, and let's try to make something go." But the more we've examined the Dominican situation, and the more we talk to Dominican entrepreneurs, the more we've run into a buccaneer spirit that is really encouraging.

For example, the people of Monte Cristi have a development association. They already have made a deal with some company in Florida to sell melons and tomatoes that they aren't even growing yet. But they know they can grow them and satisfy the Florida market.

We find many people with ideas. So many, in fact, that we are bringing in a man, under contract, to take a look at a number of ideas that we didn't originate—ideas that came from Dominicans.

Let me tell you about one of these, because it illustrates the kind of thing we run across. The other day the mayor's office of the town of Bani sent a delegation of very solid citizens to see me. They have a number of industrial-development ideas.

One was this: They have a building and sewing machines and workers who are idle. They want to go into the shirtmaking busi-

ness. But they need some working capital to buy material to make the shirts. They added that, frankly, they also would like to have someone who can help out on productivity. Well, when you get people coming to you with ideas like this who've put in two-thirds of the resources needed, and then say, "Can you help us go the rest of the way?" this is encouraging.

MANY POSSIBILITIES FOR INDUSTRIES

What has happened to us is this: The more we look at this place, the more convinced we are that there are many possibilities for food processing, for textiles, for a number of other industries. So I'm beginning to think in terms of my old experiences with the Puerto Rican development program. I think you can stimulate a series of new industrial investments here, and we've already started by signing a contract to have some feasibility studies made.

Finally, let's take a look at priority No. 5—the whole range of administrative and fiscal reform. The question for us is: How do you help this Government shape up? How do you cut down, for instance, the expenditure on the military? If it's safe to do that, it would go far toward bringing the budget into balance.

We stopped at priority five because that's as much as you should try to think about at the moment. Actually, as we go along, we may cut the size of the program, because you just can't cover too many fronts at the same time.

Right now, for example, we are entering what they call the dead season in sugar. The sugar corporation people came to us and said, "Under the emergency financing, we normally do a lot of repair work and fix up the mills during the dead season, to keep the millhands working, at least. But there is no Government to turn to now, and we don't have enough money, because we are losing money at this time."

So we have built into the emergency Organization of American States budget about \$2.6 million to help buy some machinery for emergency repairs. We had to do it. If we didn't, sugar production would be hurt next year. Secondly, you've got to keep as many people working as you can—preferably on productive projects like this.

HELP THEM FIND THEIR DESTINY

What about the future?

Well, all I can tell you is from what I know as an economist. This country needs a good deal of help. I am sure that any people has enough pride in itself, is inventive enough—if you can only help these people find their own soul, their own destiny. Then they can cut short the period of time in which they will need development aid.

The real question for the Americas here is not to develop the Dominican Republic but to find some way to make these people decide to solve their own problems, and get at them.

[From Newhouse newspapers, June 1961]

CASTRO-COMMUNIST TAKEOVER MENACES DOMINICANS

(By Daniel James)

MEXICO CITY.—The main danger threatening the Dominican Republic, in the wake of the assassination last week of Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo, is of a Communist takeover with the aid of Fidel Castro. That is the fear expressed by Dominican exiles here.

"In my opinion, I think the Communists have been preparing for this situation and are ready to jump in at any time. That is the main danger."

These are the words of a veteran former Dominican diplomat and ex-son-in-law of the fallen Caribbean dictator, Dr. Ramón Brea Messina.

Dr. Brea Messina was married to Trujillo's oldest daughter, Flor de Oro—Flower of Gold—after she divorced Porfirio Rubirosa,

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her first husband, some years ago. He was the Dominican Ambassador to Mexico three times, until early 1957, when he was transferred to Venezuela. There, in August 1957 he broke with Trujillo and thereafter came to Mexico to live.

"I devoutly hope that we don't fall into Communist hands," said Brea Messina.

The Communists are not strong in the Dominican Republic, he pointed out, but they have kept their organization intact and can expect plenty of help from Red Cuba.

The "Popular Socialist Party of the Dominican Republic"—as the Communists are formally known—is in fact the creation of its Cuban counterpart and bears the same name.

The strangest thing about the birth of the Dominican PSP is that Generalissimo Trujillo himself presided over it as a sort of political midwife.

Immediately after World War II, the Dominican dictator was anxious to establish domestic relations with the Soviet Union, and in order to curry its favor he thought it might be pleased to have a branch of world communism in his island. His fellow dictator in Cuba at the time, Fulgencio Batista, had given the Communists two posts in his Cabinet and the Cuban Communist Party was then (as now) the center of Caribbean Red activities and the logical group to supply Trujillo's need.

Accordingly, he sent his Undersecretary of Labor, Ramon Marrero, to see the Cuban PSP leaders in Havana. (Marrero, who became Secretary of Labor, died under mysterious circumstances 2 years ago after revealing to a U.S. newsmen that he was secretly allied against Trujillo.) The Cuban Reds obliged by sending three of their organizers to Ciudad Trujillo, the Dominican capital, and they established the Dominican PSP, started a Communist newspaper, *El Popular*, and organized some labor unions.

Today, thanks to Trujillo, the Communists have what may well be the only well-organized group inside the Dominican Republic apart from the Government's own Dominican party. The latter, which was purely a personal political machine of Trujillo's, may split up into warring factions now that its chief is dead, exiles here feel.

Although Trujillo outlawed the PSP not long after it was formed, because it began to attract popular support and the dictator grew afraid of his Red Frankenstein monster, it thrived under the dictatorship as Communist parties usually do.

The democratic groups opposed to Trujillo, on the other hand, have little or no organization inside the Dominican Republic. This applies, at any rate, to the known ones. Their leaders have been in exile for as long as a quarter-century. Few Dominicans have ever heard of them.

Castro, of course, lurks in the wings ready to take advantage of the confusion in the Dominican Republic, which, Dr. Brea Messina and other exiles feel is almost sure to grow.

The former Trujillo diplomat doesn't think that Castro had anything to do with the dictator's assassination, although he has made several attempts in the past to overthrow him. The last attempt was made in June 1959, when Trujillo stopped an invasion armed and manned by Castro.

At that time, Castro, who had been in power 6 months, did not have enough arms to insure the success of the invasion. Since then, however, he has received so much armament from the Sino-Soviet bloc that he could supply more than enough for a successful invasion and/or revolution in the Dominican Republic.

This time, if Castro decided it was opportune to try to install a Dominican Government in his own image, he would be more careful than in 1959. In all likelihood, he

would try to act through disaffected people now in the Dominican Republic rather than rely entirely, as before, upon an invading force from outside.

Subversion, perhaps supplemented by invasion, would be his tactic. And he would operate, of course, through the Dominican PSP and a Red front established in Havana called the Dominican Liberation Movement.

As if Cuba weren't enough of a headache, the United States must now keep close ties on events in the Dominican Republic to see that that Caribbean country does not follow the Cuban example.

[From Newhouse newspapers, May 3, 1965]
LATIN AMERICA AND THE DOMINICAN CRISIS
(By Daniel James)

MEXICO CITY.—Despite the loud protests, Latin America is not really opposed to the swift U.S. military prevention of a Communist takeover in the Dominican Republic.

Though they had to rail against our intervention in Santo Domingo, Latin American leaders privately welcomed it.

"On the whole, the governments of Latin America have shown a great deal of understanding of our position," a U.S. official in this crucial Latin capital volunteered.

They themselves were put in a "difficult position" by the rapid dispatch of marines to the embattled Dominican Republic, since that did violate Latin America's traditional nonintervention policy. Specifically, as Latin editorialists have pointed out, it violated article 17 of the Act of Bogotá, which guarantees the right of each American republic to settle its internal affairs without outside intervention.

The presence of marines in Santo Domingo also evoked emotional memories of their landing in exactly the same country 50 years ago, then subsequently occupying it and paving the way for the Trujillo dictatorship.

Leftists throughout Latin America have, in fact, been recalling every U.S. intervention and alleged intervention since the beginning of the century. Even our recognition of Batista in 1952 has been listed, by one leftist writer, as an act of intervention in Cuba although all the Latin countries eventually recognized him.

Still, the Latin response to our pretty obvious military intervention in the Dominican situation has been "relatively mild" as one American observer here termed it.

It is recalled that in the less obvious intervention in Guatemala, in 1954, there was a far more severe concerted criticism in Latin America of the U.S. role there. At that time, the "Societies of Friendship for Guatemala" sprung up in many Latin countries, and Mexico, in particular, became the center of anti-U.S. feeling.

This time, the situation is considerably different.

Mexico, for example, which is the traditional champion of nonintervention, issued an official statement which did little more than "deplore the blood that is flowing" in Santo Domingo, during the fighting.

Recognizing the "reasons of a humanitarian character" which induced the United States to send more Armed Forces to evacuate Americans and foreigners from the Dominican Republic, the Mexican statement then remarked that the presence of marines "evokes such painful memories" in Latin America, and ended hoping that the Dominicans "can resolve their internal problems without any influence . . . supplied from the outside."

Other Latin governments took a similarly understanding approach. Honduras went further, in stating that if the Organization of American States isn't able to function rapidly in such crises as the Dominican, someone must take the initiative.

The Brazilian Government, mindful of that country's own recent narrow brush with communism, has offered to send military

forces to Santo Domingo, preferably under a collective OAS command. Argentina and Colombia have made similar offers.

One of the loudest reactions has come, significantly, from the country which has most to fear from communism: Venezuela. At a secret meeting of Latin Communist parties in Havana, last November, Venezuela, Colombia, and Guatemala were designated as the three main targets of a new Red subversion drive in Latin America.

Understandably, to keep in line the strong non-Communist left and prevent it from falling for Communist propaganda against the United States, President Raul Leoni and his supporters were forced to roundly condemn our Dominican role.

La Republica, the daily organ of Leoni's Democratic Action Party, rapped Washington for committing "a unilateral act violative of the norms which govern the inter-American system." But, significantly, it did not use invective or speak of "Yankee imperialism," as the Communists are doing all over Latin America.

Indeed, a new depth of understanding of the U.S. problem is noticeable in Latin circles, with respect to the Dominican crisis. That was most evident in an editorial on May 3, in Mexico's *Novedades*, a newspaper that is regarded as close to the government of President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz.

The editorial began by recognizing that the rebels who refused to heed the cease-fire arranged by the Papal Nuncio "are the Communist shock forces activated from Havana." Their aim, it went on, was "to strengthen the Castro influence in the Antilles and, from there, extend it with greater force over the whole continent."

President Johnson, continued the *Novedades* editorial, could not remain indifferent to that threat, nor could "the rest of the countries of this hemisphere." His statement condemning the attempted Communist takeover in Santo Domingo "constitutes a denunciation of Cuban intervention" there, and a "logical explanation of the arrival there of North American forces."

Novedades then drew these highly significant conclusions:

"The United States could not assume the responsibility for making possible through indolence or indifference, the installation of another Communist government on the continent. Of a government that would not be the result of the self-determination of the Dominican people, but the outcome of the audacity of armed groups directed from outside the country."

Those editorials are highly significant for two reasons. They, and the editorial as a whole, are the closest anybody in Latin America has come, publicly, to virtually endorsing the U.S. action in Santo Domingo. Second, they come from an important daily in the most antiinterventionist country in Latin America—Mexico—and a paper that is close to that country's Government.

Adding to the importance of the "Novedades" editorial is the fact that it was published even as Mexico had just finished commemorating the 51st anniversary of the U.S. naval landings at Vera Cruz, in 1914—an event recalled in connection with the Dominican crisis and always mentioned here as a black mark against the United States.

Is "Novedades" reflecting what the new Diaz Ordaz Government really thinks but does not dare to utter in so many words? That is the question foreign observers here are pondering.

There is no doubt, however, that our intervention in Santo Domingo, though well understood in Latin America, is raising havoc here.

It came unfortunately, on the eve of the crucial Second Extraordinary Conference of American Foreign Ministers to take place in Rio de Janeiro, on May 20. And that will

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probably determine the tone of the meeting, which was originally called to discuss economic and OAS structural problems.

Some observers here believe that the Rio Conference will now be used as a platform, by certain Latin leaders, to flay the United States. A charge frequently heard nowadays is that we are reviving the Teddy Roosevelt era of "big stick" diplomacy, under the leadership of Under Secretary of State Thomas C. Mann.

Even nonleftists see in our Dominican intervention a radical departure by President Johnson from the late President Kennedy's policy of "understanding" Latin America, and "respecting" its right to self-determination.

The Dominican crisis, then, may well turn out to be a crisis for the Johnson Administration's Latin American policy by the time of the Rio meeting.

But it is also going to challenge the Latin representatives there to regard the Communist threat in this area more realistically. It will challenge, in particular, the lone hold-out against breaking with Castro: Mexico. What will the new Mexican Government do at Rio?

Finally, the question is almost sure to be raised: "Is traditional nonintervention valid in a world where the Communists are constantly intervening to overthrow established regimes?" Thus the Dominican crisis already casts a long shadow over the future.

[From Newhouse newspapers, May 11, 1965]
DOMINICAN CRISIS NOW INTER-AMERICAN CRISIS

(By Daniel James)

MEXICO CITY.—As the Dominican crisis enters its 4th week, it becomes starkly clear that it has been transformed into a hemispheric crisis. It is causing, in particular, a grave exacerbation in United States-Latin American relations.

President Johnson's initial dispatch of U.S. marines to the Dominican Republic was lamented by Latin leaders, but not roundly condemned. In the first week or two of the crisis, Latin America revealed a surprising tolerance and understanding of the American position.

Since then, Johnson has concentrated a reported 40,000 American armed men in or near the island, plus commensurately great naval and air forces, and that is making Latin opinion veer toward decided opposition to him. One might say, further, that each day the Dominican crisis is prolonged sees a corresponding growth of opposition.

Pictures of U.S. marines in full battle dress patrolling the streets of a Latin city, appearing daily in newspapers and on television here, stir up half-forgotten resentments of the marines' traditional role in Latin America of invader and oppressor.

Nowadays every opportunity is seized to flay the United States.

Meeting in the Mexican capital at this moment are 300 delegates to a conference of the U.N.'s Economic Commission on Latin America, which had been scheduled for Santo Domingo but was removed here because of the crisis. Although the conference's sole business is supposed to be Latin America's economic problems, speaker after speaker has preceded his discussion of them with remarks condemning the U.S. intervention in Santo Domingo.

That has been true not only of delegates from Cuba, Russia, Yugoslavia, and other Communist countries—who participate in the Economic Commission deliberations through their U.N. membership—but also those from such friendly nations as Uruguay and even Venezuela.

One notices a sharper tone toward the United States in the normally friendly press, as the days go by, and a growing number of statements and articles by prominent Latin Americans who feel the necessity to

go on record against our Dominican intervention.

High officials noted for their friendship toward us are also being forced to criticize us openly. Thus Argentina's foreign minister, Miguel Angel Zalava Ortiz, who strongly favors an inter-American force "which will prevent subversive war imported by communism," has had to state that "politically the attitude of the United States (in Santo Domingo) has been mistaken."

Even conservatives are openly lining up against us.

Thus the president of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, Bilac Pinto, who belongs to the conservative National Democratic Union, has found it necessary to declare that the United States committed a lamentable error in sending troops to the Dominican Republic without previous authorization of the OAS.

Yet Bilac knows, as all Latin leaders do, that had Johnson sought OAS authority to send armed forces to Santo Domingo he would have been turned down.

Criticism of Johnson's policy, by Latins who have usually been considered more or less pro-United States generally falls into three categories:

1. He did not consult the OAS.

There is great resentment over that failure, even though, as noted above, everybody knows that the OAS would never have approved sending soldiers to Santo Domingo.

A variation of that criticism is that Johnson should have at least called in the Latin representatives in Washington, if only to advise them personally of what he intended to do or had already done.

2. He did not prepare public opinion.

Inevitably, comparisons are made with President Kennedy's handling of the missile crisis, and one hears this pithy summing up: "Kennedy masterfully mobilized public opinion to support action he did not take. Johnson masterfully moved troops into action without the support of public opinion."

People here ask, "Why didn't Johnson call in his U.S. Information Agency chiefs, before acting, advise them of what he planned, then instruct them to pull out all the propaganda stops?"

If Washington then had evidence of Communist infiltration of the Dominican rebels—as it is believed to have had—why was the USIA not told to publicize it everywhere, and so prepare people's minds for retaliatory action?

3. Johnson sent too many soldiers to Santo Domingo.

"Did he have to send practically 1,000 soldiers for each Communist?" the Latins are asking sarcastically. They refer to the reported 40,000 U.S. forces in or near Santo Domingo, and the State Department's official figure of 58 Reds in the rebel camp.

"And why did Marines have to be included?" other Latins ask. "Why couldn't you have sent plain soldiers or sailors?"

It is the Marines, as much as any other aspect of our Dominican policy, who work up more and more Latins. To appreciate how violent they are on that particular subject, one must realize that the Marines, unfortunately, are the "ugly Americans" here because of their occupations of Haiti, Nicaragua, and Santo Domingo herself, in the fairly recent past.

On the other hand, criticism is also made of the Latin's role—or absence of one—in the Dominican crisis.

A leftwing friend from a Central American Republic admitted to me, frankly:

"None of us really cared about the Dominican Republic. We really don't care about any other nation but our own. You do. You worry about everybody. So what happens is that we leave the dirty work to you, and when things don't turn out right we give you hell."

The Latin Republics are, in short, fundamentally isolationist in their outlook. They are always eager participants in inter-

American conferences, but primarily as defenders of their own nationalisms or seekers after economic or other material advantages for their respective nations.

Few Latin countries—as distinct from certain leaders—really think or act in terms of the American community of nations.

That is a fundamental reason why the OAS is weak. Or, as a wag here put it, why it functions "only between crises." There is some recognition of the fact that were the OAS strong—and had it its own collective armed force—U.S. intervention in Santo Domingo might have been avoided.

That question—indeed, the very fate of the OAS—will almost certainly be discussed at the Rio foreign ministers meeting on May 20.

Perhaps the key problem that requires airing is the question of nonintervention, a fetish with the Latin Americans. Is nonintervention valid in the modern world? Is it not suicidal to speak of not intervening to prevent "wars of liberation" from sweeping over Latin America?

Even as criticism of our Dominican policy was mounting here, word was received of another Cuba-sponsored effort to provoke "wars of liberation."

From May 5 to May 9, representatives of 40 "student" and "youth" groups from all over the world attended an "International Congress for the Liquidation of Colonialism in Latin America," in Havana. They passed 23 resolutions "solidarizing" themselves with "peoples struggles" not only in Santo Domingo but also its next-door neighbor and U. S. associate, Puerto Rico, as well as in the Caribbean colonies of England, France, and Holland and those favorite Castro targets, Colombia and Venezuela.

One resolution made it clear that more than moral aid is intended.

"Solidarity and moral help, to be truly efficacious and to constitute real help to the movement of national liberation," said the resolution, "must be accompanied by material aid that is effective."

And what "material aid" can be more "effective" in a "war of liberation" than arms and trained fighters?

One wonders what De Gualle will say and do if one day he soon is confronted by "Santo Domingos" in French Guiana, Guadeloupe, and Martinique, all of which were singled out at Havana "anticolonial" meeting to receive Communist "material aid" in the future.

The Dominican crisis, then, deepens and broadens and is engulfing the whole Western Hemisphere, in a universal crisis of profound gravity.

[From Newhouse Newspapers, May 27, 1965]

SANTO DOMINGO THREATENS TO BECOME POLITICAL BOG

(By Daniel James)

SANTO DOMINGO.—The Dominican crisis threatens to become a treacherous political bog for the United States, unless the Johnson administration approaches the problem here with more realism than it has thus far.

The efforts of Presidential Adviser McGeorge Bundy to form a broad provisional government have failed, after 10 days of negotiations with both sides in the Dominican civil war, because they were predicated upon the impossible notion that both warring parties could be brought together under the same roof.

Bundy left here utterly bewildered by a situation that grows increasingly confusing. Yet certain basic facts stand out clearly.

The first is that the rebels, under Col. Francisco Camacho, are now eager to join a provisional regime because they have lost the military struggle and have everything to gain politically by such a move. Their Waterloo proved to be the northern zone of this city, which they tried to occupy but were expelled from after a week of heavy

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fighting in which they sustained an estimated 1,000 casualties.

The rebels are now locked in an enclave only 1 1/4 miles square in downtown Santo Domingo, with the sea at their backs. During several visits to that enclave, the reporter saw few armed men and almost no big arms. Also, Camaaño is said to be running out of a munition, and it is hard to see how or from where a new supply could be shipped in to him.

Judging by the forlorn look of Ciudad Nueva—New City, as the rebel enclave is named ironically—and its poor citizens, it is doubtful whether Camaaño can count upon much of a civilian response.

The next key fact to consider is that Gen. Antonio Imbert's government of national reconstruction, on the other hand, now controls not only nearly all of this capital but everything in the rest of the country. Its forces hold Santiago, the second city, as well as all other urban centers and the rural areas.

A significant fact apparently unnoticed in the United States is that neither the peasantry—comprising perhaps 80 percent of the Dominican Republic's 3 1/2 million inhabitants—nor the urban working class has lifted a finger anywhere in this country to help the rebels.

An authoritative military estimate given this writer is that the Imbert regime's armed forces total about 16,000 trained men as against only 4,000 for Camaaño, of which perhaps one-quarter are former regular military men and the rest untrained volunteers.

Asked if it were not unreasonable to try to "equalize" such manifestly unequal sides by making them partners in a new government, a high U.S. official here grinned and answered:

"You make sense to me."

Yet Bundy tried to do just that.

Another reality the administration is failing to take into account is that the Imbert government is adamantly opposed to doing business with the rebels on political grounds. It believes that even though the Communists are no longer openly in command, and that Camaaño himself is no Communist, they are all "compromised."

That word was used by Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin in an interview with this reporter. Wessin y Wessin is presently the forgotten man of this crisis, but is very much a factor to be reckoned with. His forces form the "bulwark," as he put it, of the Imbert regime, and he was responsible for the decisive victory over Camaaño in the northern zone last week.

The general provided me with documents seized in rebel homes which add evidence that the rebels were heavily infiltrated by the Communists. He said that copies of them have been turned over to the U.S. Army Intelligence.

Though Wessin y Wessin's armed forces are Imbert's bulwark, there is little doubt that he enjoys a good deal of civilian support as well. Exactly how much, it is difficult to say. Many Dominicans are either too afraid or too confused to say where they stand. But in the past few days there have been three pro-Imbert demonstrations in Santo Domingo, and two consisting entirely of women, each of which drew 2,000 to 3,000 participants.

A women's demonstration before the U.S. Embassy here Tuesday, carried such slogans as "Let us clean communism out of Ciudad Nueva," and "We don't want another Berlin."

The slogans refer to Imbert's insistent demand that he be permitted to send his forces against the Rebel enclave and fight Camaaño to the finish. He is prevented from doing so by American troops holding the corridor which separates the rival groups, and who have orders to forbid anyone with

arms from crossing from one side to the other. This neutrality as it is officially called, is having the effect of protecting Camaaño from certain annihilation.

The American attitude is based partly upon the desire to prevent death and destruction to the noncombatants—including women and children—and buildings in downtown Santo Domingo.

Another civilian element supporting Imbert is what is left of organized labor, known by its initials as Conatral. Its leaders have been conferring secretly with Imbert this past week. Conatral claims to represent 150,000 Dominican workers.

Still another fact Bundy and other Presidential aids have apparently overlooked in their eagerness to patch together a provisional regime is that their candidate to head it, Antonio Guzman, is personally unacceptable to the dominant Imbert forces.

"He is a Don Nadie"—a "Mister Nobody"—as they frequently put it.

"Guzman has neither the energy, the character, nor the education to resolve this country's problems," in the opinion of a former member of Juan Bosch's cabinet who sat in it when Guzman was Agricultural Minister.

Above all, those who support Imbert fear that through Guzman the Bosch elements and the Communists will somehow infiltrate the government machinery again, and the present conflict will inevitably flare up once more.

"The United States can impose a Guzman upon us, but he will last only a few months and then we will have to fight all over again," is what the Imbertistas are saying.

Though Bosch and Boschism are apparently finished here, there is no doubt that the vast majority of Dominicans yearn for what the ex-President symbolized: democratic civil government. The people identify with Camaaño to the extent that he represents "constitutionalty"—to them synonymous with civil rule—but reject his Communist allies as well as anything resembling a return to military domination.

It is just possible that the point has now been driven home to the generals. Wessin y Wessin told the writer:

"There will never be a military government here, nor a dictatorship, of either right or left. We want a civilian democracy."

Imbert has made similar statements publicly. Furthermore, to add to the many ironies abounding in this incredible crisis, Imbert, who has been labelled Stateside as a "right-winger," has in fact had recent ties with the extreme left. This reporter has it on utmost authority that earlier this year Imbert actually trafficked with the Castroite June 14th movement and is said to have supplied it with some arms. A nephew, Manuel, is commonly charged with being a Communist sympathizer.

What it all shows is that nothing here is black and white, and any effort by administration leaders or the press to classify the Dominican factions according to preconceived political formulas will be proved folly by bedrock reality. This is not a computerized American election campaign but a deepgoing civil war in which every known human emotion is finding expression.

And it is a war whose end is not yet in sight.

[From Newhouse Newspapers, May 29, 1965]

DOMINICAN COMMUNISTS: WHERE ARE THEY?

(By Daniel James)

SANTO DOMINGO.—Washington has been strangely silent of late about the Communists it intervened here to save the Dominican Republic from, and now Secretary of State Rusk has declared that the threat they presented a month or so ago has been very substantially reduced.

Has it? Have Santo Domingo's Red minions been killed off? Have they been jailed?

Where are they? What has happened to them?

This reporter can find nobody here who is willing to suggest that the Dominican Communists have disappeared off the face of the earth. True, they are no longer visible—mark that word, visible—either in the rebel ranks of Col. Francisco Camaaño or anywhere else in this country. But they are alive somewhere, and as far as anyone knows pretty much intact as a force.

Indeed, excepting a handful who met death in battle, a case could be made out to show that Dominican communism is stronger today than it was when the revolt began on April 24. The threat it represents, then with all due respect to Secretary Rusk, has probably been substantially increased rather than reduced.

Dominican communism has traditionally been a cat with nine lives. Every time somebody thought it dead, it suddenly came back to life more vigorous than ever.

On June 14, 1959, Castro backed an insurrection here to overthrow Trujillo and the Dominican dictator drowned it in blood after a few weeks. The Communist threat was thereupon pronounced dead.

But out of that insurrection was born the June 14th Movement, a typically Castro organization, and it grew over the years into a formidable force. It was strong enough by November 1963, to launch what it has called the November Insurrection.

Whereas the 1959 affair was helter-skelter and touched only three small towns, its 1963 successor was a well organized guerrilla war which embraced six zones. The J/14 command was, in fact, divided into six distinct military districts and was organized along classic guerrilla lines.

The fighting lasted 23 days, and was bloody. The founder of the J/14, Manuel Tavares Justo, lost his life, and so did other important leaders. "Surely with Manolo Tavares and the ringleaders out of the way," many Dominicans reasoned, "we shall live in peace from now on."

Then came the April 24, 1965, revolt, with the results we now see.

The June 14 proved, by its performance in the present revolt, that it was stronger than in 1963. And more practiced, more expert.

The writer has in his possession an interesting document, "The Insurrection of November," published by the June 14, on March 30, 1964, which it calls a self-criticism of its behavior during the earlier insurrection. It is intelligent and frank, and for that reason formidably dangerous.

The document complains that preparations for the "November Insurrection" were "defective" and its participants "disorganized and precipitate." Then it goes on:

"These technical and organizational defects . . . do not permit one to be categorically certain that 'the absence of conditions for the development and triumph of the armed insurrection' was the 'fundamental cause, the determining factor in the failure of the guerrillas.'"

It concluded by reaffirming the June 14 thesis that guerrilla warfare is practicable in the Dominican Republic, and "calls attention to the errors committed (before) for purposes of their correction."

Anybody who has witnessed the Communist performance here during the revolt knows that the 1963 errors, were, indeed, "corrected." The Reds took military command of it with a speed and efficiency that knocked Washington off its feet, and made imperative the sending of armed forces totalling near 40,000 at their height. What makes Washington think today that those same men, nearly all of them still alive, cannot bring off a similar performance again—and next time succeed?

Next time, the attack might not necessarily come in the capital itself. Prevailing opinion among seasoned observers here is

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that, rather, we can expect guerilla war in the countryside.

Already, the mountainous area in the north is being called the "logical Sierra Maestra" of the Dominican Republic. And it is there, some suspect, where some of the Communists fighting cadre have hidden themselves.

To be sure, the Communists suffered a resounding defeat when our troops moved in and preventing them from making this country's a "second Cuba." But they have made certain gains which we should be intelligent enough to recognize.

1. They have gained valuable military experience. They learned how to fight pitched battles, as well as urban guerilla war. They picked up some formal military knowledge from the regular troops who revolted and fought alongside them.

2. They acquired a great store of weapons of many kinds. Caamaño gave out untold numbers of arms, seized by the revolting soldiers from army supplies, and it is known here that the Reds cached away a large quantity soon after the U.S. forces moved in and they knew the military struggles was lost.

3. They undoubtedly won over adherents from the wild-eyed "tigers"—"tigers"—the young street rabble who supplied the backbone of the Rebel army. They will almost surely follow their Communist mentors into the hills, for no matter what political settlement is effected here they will feel unsafe even under an OAS trusteeship, for there are many "loyalists" out for revenge.

4. It would not be surprising if many, or even most of the estimated 1,000 former regular troops with the Rebels joined the Communists although they might differ with them ideologically. The reason is self-preservation: they are deserters, formally speaking, and it is certain that the Dominican armed forces will deal with them summarily if and when they lay hands on them.

5. The rising anti-Americanism here as a result not of our intervention but our fumbling and bumbling, has created an atmosphere more favorable to the Communists than has ever existed before.

6. Finally, the disorder and chaos, and the tendency to violence which runs through all segments of this tragic people, provide ideal conditions for the growth of communism.

Given their ability to criticize acutely their tactical and strategic errors, as the J/14 Movement did after the "November Insurrection," the Dominican Communists, in this writer's judgment, are much stronger today than they were on April 24.

Next time too—for there will be a next time—another factor is likely to come into play whose role in this revolt was essentially indirect, Cuba.

Curiously, the Communists joined the April revolt without orders from Havana or any other Red center. It took them by surprise, for it was a spontaneous affair organized not by Communists but by a pro-Bosch military faction working with Bosch's Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD).

The oldest Communist group, the Popular Socialist Party (PSP) had in fact been politicizing against the J/14, before the revolt, that the "time is not ripe" for insurrection. The matter in quotes, in the J/14 critique of the November Insurrection above, referred to PSP discouragement of further attempts at violent upheaval.

Broadly speaking, the J/14 follows the insurrectionary line of Castro and Peiping, while the PSP favors the more "peaceful" Moscow approach. But PSP leaders assumed commanding positions in the April revolt when it came, just the same. And so, of course, did the "cabezas calientes"—"hot-heads"—as the PSP terms its younger J/14 comrades.

A letter written by a PSP leader reveals, however, that Castro was preparing to hop into the Dominican fray but never got the

chance thanks to President Johnson's swift action. The letter was turned over to Dominican authorities by a Communist courier who was searched at the airport here as she was leaving. Written by Asdrubal Dominguez, a well-known PSP figure, it said:

"If it had not been for the intromission of the Yankees, this [revolt] would have terminated by the end of April and the hero of Latin America, Comrade F. C. [Fidel Castro], would have entered the country in triumph."

Dominguez continues:

"I must tell you that we counted on much help from C. [Cuba], which F.C. [Fidel Castro] has promised to send us, but the presence of the imperialists prevented its arrival."

Dominguez reveals, further, what the real Communist attitude is toward the rebel leader, Caamaño:

"Of the man who leads the struggle, you and the others know much about him, but don't feel upset, because he will be nothing, he will represent nothing when this [country] is in our hands."

He predicted that on the next day the rebels would try to seize the national palace to establish themselves there, and they did then launch their attempt but without success.

Castro has shown often enough, most conspicuously in Venezuela, that he is ready and willing to help out needy guerrillas at any time. There is every reason to believe that he will do so if the Dominican Communists begin as they apparently plan, a guerrilla war.

It was the decision of a secret meeting in Havana last November to give "active aid" to "national liberation movements" in Latin America. The Dominican Republic, unlike Venezuela, is only a stone's throw from Cuba. Even Secretary Rusk should not be surprised if he wakes up one morning to find "substantially reduced" threat here has taken on the form of a Castro-supplied "Sierra Maestra."

[From Newhouse newspapers, May 29, 1965]

REBEL CRY: "CONSTITUCIÓN, SI!"

(By Daniel James)

SANTO DOMINGO.—In the tiny downtown district held by the rebels in this strife-torn capital, you see scrawled on the walls of many buildings the slogan, "Constitución, SI!"

A crowd gathered at a meeting in the central plaza to eulogize the killed rebel commander, Col. Francisco Fernández Domínguez, chants "Constitución! Constitución!"

The "government" of Col. Francisco Caamaño, the rebel chieftain, is called the "constitutional government," and its army the "constitutional army."

Even outside Santo Domingo, you hear on many lips the phrase, "Constitución, SI!" You hear it in the second city, Santiago, far to the north. You hear it in the third city, San Pedro de Macoris, to the east.

Wherever you go in the Dominican Republic, people will tell you all they want is the Constitution, nothing more. That, in fact, was the original rallying cry of the rebellion that broke out on April 24, and that has since altered radically the destiny of this country, and shaken the entire Western Hemisphere.

Yet, paradoxically—nearly everything here is a puzzling paradox—ask a Dominican what the Constitution is all about and you will likely get a blank stare in return. Even the educated Dominicans cannot cite specifically what it is in the Constitution that makes them passionately for—or against—

The Constitution they refer to was passed by the Dominican Congress in 1963, while Juan Bosch was President, and went into effect on April 29 of that year. It was promptly suspended 5 months later when Juan Bosch was overthrown.

Since then, the 1963 Constitution—sometimes called the Bosch Constitution—has been the issue in Dominican politics and has deeply divided the Dominican people, despite the curious fact that few here can cite any of its key clauses even in general terms.

There is as much vehemence among opponents of the 1963 charter as among its supporters. They usually attack it as "communistic," "antireligious," "anti-private property," and so on.

The demand of the rebels that the 1963 Constitution be restored is the central reason—so stated, at least, by the rival "government of national reconstruction" of Gen. Antonio Imbert—why the two sides in the Dominican civil war have thus far been unable to form the broad provisional regime.

The Imbert forces insist that the country be governed, instead, by the 1962 Constitution. That was passed after the assassination of the Dominican dictator, Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo, and was the basis of the rule of a seven-man council of state—called simply, the Consejo—until Bosch was inaugurated in February 1963.

What is there about the 1963 Constitution which so divides Dominicans? What are the basic difference between it and its 1962 predecessor?

The befuddling answer is: The two documents are practically identical.

An official U.S. Government analysis of them shows that they differ on only the most minor issues.

Take for example, the key question of property rights. Both constitutions safeguard them. Both agree that the state may take private property for public purposes, and must pay fair compensation in return.

One difference between the two documents on the property question is that the 1963 version provided that compensation be determined by balancing the public and private interest, both.

A more serious difference—but not fundamental—was that it limited one from owning land "in excessive quantity," and prohibited "latifundios"—that is, big estates. But such prohibitions exist in many Latin American constitutions, and by no means resemble anything communistic.

The Bosch constitution also forbids foreigners from owning property except with congressional approval, while its predecessor of 1962 says nothing on the subject. That is perhaps the most serious difference between them, but again not unusual in Latin America. Mexico, for example, makes it just as tough for foreigners to own land, and within a certain distance of her borders and coastlines no foreigner can own property at all and no Congress can change that.

Far from being "communistic" the 1963 Constitution says in article 3, that "private economic initiative is declared free." Such an open statement favoring capitalism is not contained in the 1962 document.

Both constitutions favor social security, and the 1963 version adds a clause encouraging free trade unionism. And both jealously guard national sovereignty and inveigh against foreign intervention.

Nowhere in the Bosch document can there be found a single word on religion. Any charge that it is "atheistic" or "antichurch" is therefore untrue.

On balance, the 1963 Constitution is about as far from being radical as any document can get. It is, in fact, much milder than the Cuban Constitution of 1940, the banner under which Batista was overthrown, and it is downright conservative compared with the revolutionary Mexican Constitution of 1917 which rules Mexico to this day.

Why, then, has the 1963 Constitution caused so much division here?

It is only after many days here, and many hours of talking with all sorts of Dominicans, that the answer begins hazily to penetrate one's mind. The key that unlocked

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the puzzle came to the writer one day when he conversed with two young women from the Cibao, the rich north-central region. They were embarrassed when I asked them why they favored "Constitución, Sí," and could not quote anything from it. Then one of them burst out:

"We don't want military rule."

It suddenly dawned on me that that was what the Dominicans were driving at. It wasn't a question of citing this or that clause which distinguished the 1963 constitution from any other, but a yearning for civil rule—for democracy, for representative government.

Under Bosch, the Dominicans did have civil, representative democratic government for the first time since Trujillo became dictator in 1930. Actually, it was the first time in half a century or more, because Trujillo's predecessors were not elected under conditions of complete freedom. Bosch was.

The Dominicans, then, identify the 1963 constitution with the brief 7 months they experienced democracy under Bosch. But—here goes another paradox—they no longer identify with Bosch personally. "We will take anybody," a worker answered in reply to a question whether he wanted Bosch to return, "as long as he adheres to the Constitution." That is as long as he governs democratically.

"The Constitution has become a symbol, a mystique," is the way a Latin American observer familiar with the Dominicans put it. He added, "It might be imperfect. If so, it can be amended—always constitutionally."

The mystique over the Constitution is not likely to disappear from the popular imagination. Quite the contrary, it seems to be taking a firmer root every day among the vast majority of Dominicans.

Since that is the case, it appears obvious that no solution will be found to the Dominican problem unless it is based upon what the 1963 constitution symbolizes: civil government under representative democracy. Any other formula will meet, eventually, with the wholesale disapproval of the Dominicans. It could produce a revolt more widespread and even bloodier than the present one.

[From Newhouse Newspapers, June 1, 1965]
 DOMINICAN REBELS AND REDS: HOW CLOSELY RELATED?

(By Daniel James)

SANTO DOMINGO.—Did Dominican Communists control or substantially influence the rebels during the early days of the revolt here, as the Johnson administration has charged? Is there discernible Communist influence today in the regime of rebel leader Col. Francisco Caamaño? How strong is Dominican communism?

To try to answer those key questions—they are at the root of our armed intervention and continued presence in the Dominican Republic—the writer has talked to many people here, both Dominicans and foreigners of various shades of political opinion. He has also drawn upon his own past firsthand knowledge of this country, going back more than a dozen years, and of continual reading and studying of it.

A majority of the persons this reporter has talked with agree that the Communists had begun surfacing within 24 hours after the revolt had started, on April 24, and that within 72 hours were acquiring control over it.

A minority believes that Communists, pro-Communists and a few who serve Communist designs without approving of the Reds ideologically are still inside the rebel regime.

Since the latter statement may come as news to the reader, let us begin with it.

A top U.S. official here believes that Caamaño's intransigent opposition to the OAS, and to compromise solutions offered by

it, indicates that there are still Communist elements among the rebels who don't want a settlement."

He added that a 4-hour rebel attack on the electric plant here during the last week in May, the destruction of which would seriously inconvenience everybody in the war-torn city, shows that there are people in the rebel ranks "who want economic chaos"—a known Communist aim.

Other officials supply names of persons in Caamaño's government with suspected Communist leanings.

Jottin Cury, Caamaño's "foreign minister," is regarded as of the same stripe as Castro's foreign minister, Raul Roa, who, though not a professed Communist, is willing to be a Red wheelhorse.

Working under Cury is an alleged member of the Agrupación Política 14 de junio (APCJ), the "mass" front of the Peiping-oriented June 14 movement. His name is Francisco "Quilque" Acevedo.

Caamaño's "public health minister," Dr. Marcelino Velez Santana, is also considered a "Roa type." He was asked to lead the June 14 movement after its abortive insurrection in November 1963.

Caamaño's under secretary of interior and police, Euclides Gutierrez Felix, is another alleged Communist sympathizer in the rebel regime. He was the defense lawyer of the June Fourteen guerrillas arrested after the 1963 insurrection.

Silvio Nolasco Pichardo, a member of the APCJ's central committee, is also in the Caamaño regime (as director of a cadastral survey).

As of mid-May, Caamaño was still in contact with the Dominican Reds, according to reliable informants. Hard evidence that prominent Communists continued to play a leading role in the rebel military command up till the third week in May, is the fact that four of them were killed at that time in the heavy fighting around the National Palace.

Most prominent of the four was Juan Miguel Roman, who had been leading an attacking unit with Col. Francisco Fernandez Dominguez, the close associate of ex-President Juan Bosch, who had just been flown in from Puerto Rico and also succumbed in the fighting.

Roman was a member of the June Fourteen central committee and its chief advocate of guerrilla warfare—its "Che Guevara." Trained in Cuba, he was a top commander in the June Fourteen abortive 1963 insurrection. After its failure he escaped, and last November turned up in Algeria on a June Fourteen mission.

Seven other June Fourteen central committee members with training in Cuba have been identified among Caamaño's commanders in the revolt.

Ten other Communist leaders—most of them from the Popular Socialist Party (PSP), the official Dominican Communist Party—also trained in Cuba, have been likewise identified.

Obviously, these are not just any Communists but a group of men highly trained to lead masses of people in revolutionary situations such as the one of last April.

For highly visible evidence of how important the Reds were—and may still be—in the Dominican revolt, drive through the grimy, garbage-littered streets of the rebel enclave in downtown Santo Domingo right now. There you see scrawled on the walls such inflammatory slogans as "Arms to the People," and underneath, usually, the initials PSP (Popular Socialist Party) or June Fourteen.

"Arms to the People" is a basic Communist slogan, first used by Lenin in 1917 to seize power in Russia.

It was when Caamaño, perhaps unaware of the significance of his act, gave arms to the "people"—actually to a young street rabble called "tigres" (tigers)—on the revolt's

second day, April 25, that the U.S. Embassy and other foreigners here realized it was coming under Red control.

At about that time, it has been learned, a certain Oscar Luis Waldez, suspected of being a Cuban G-2 (intelligence) agent, landed in Santo Domingo on a false passport. Things got really rough.

Soon, known Communists, leading rebel military formations were spotted by "reliable eyewitnesses," in a U.S. official's phrase, and rebel-held radio Santo Domingo—possessing the Republic's most powerful transmitter—began spewing forth "Havana-style" propaganda.

Among Caamaño's Red commanders then were, besides Román, at least three other important June 14 leaders: Jaime Duran, Fido Despradel, and Luis Genao; plus leaders of the other Communist groups, among them Roberto Duverge and Julio de la Peña.

One of Caamaño's close military advisers is said to have been the Spaniard, Manuel González González, who has lived here since 1940 and is a veteran PSP leader. He is reportedly an expert on military tactics. When the writer inquired about him, he was told:

"González González knows guns backward and forward."

Another little-known foreign Red in the Caamaño military hierarchy was a Frenchman, André Riviere, a relatively recent resident of the Dominican Republic. An informant claims that Riviere organized the assault on Ozama Fortress early in the revolt.

The little group of Haitian Communist exiles in Santo Domingo, numbering perhaps 12 to 15, also eagerly joined the Caamaño camp.

How many Communists there were, or still are in Caamaño ranks, is relatively unimportant. A "numbers game," unfortunately started by the State Department when it issued a hastily prepared list of 58 Reds conspicuous in the revolt's early days, is being played by ignorant or dubious writers who are thus obscuring the real significance of the Communist role.

First of all, many of the leading Communist participants have been trained in Cuba and/or Russia. The State Department named 18. Sources here put the total at nearer 50. That is more than enough to seize the leadership of a surging mass with little or no military experience and no knowledge whatsoever of the strategy and tactics of revolutions.

Secondly, the chief Communist group, the June 14 group had had ample experience in revolutionary warfare during the 1963 insurrection, and when the April revolt occurred could throw into it seasoned fighting cadres.

Besides, the June 14 group is not just a few names on an official U.S. list but a formidable movement with "thousands" of followers, to quote an observer intimately acquainted with Dominican politics. Mainly through its front, the APCJ, it has a hold on certain segments of the people, notably the youth and three major professional groups, the doctors, lawyers, and engineers.

Third another Communist group prominent in the revolt, the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD), is also experienced in conducting violence and guerrilla warfare. Thus it, too, accounted for more than its relatively few members in terms of ability to lead masses.

The MPD is Peiping oriented like the June 14 group; and a splitoff of the Moscow-leaning PSP. It has been considered the "action arm" of the formal—that is, non-Castroite—Communist movement.

Finally, even though the PSP and still a fourth Communist grouping, the National Revolutionary Party (PNR), are seemingly more "peaceful" and smaller than the other two, they contributed significantly to the revolt.

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The veteran PSP leader, Juan Ducoudray, for example, is probably the leading Dominican Marxist theoretician and on a first-rate brain—no small asset for revolt search of professional revolutionists. While president, incidentally, Juan Bosch signed an order permitting Ducoudray to return home from exile to lead the PSP—a case of misguided democratic zeal.

The PNR is the smallest of the four Communist groups but its leader, Dato Pagan, who was released from jail after the revolt started, is also an able Marxist intellectual. In a 1962 interview with the writer, he prophesied:

"The Dominican Republic has become, since Cuba, the neuragic point of all American military strategy in the Caribbean. The Caribbean will become a zone of antilimprialist struggle."

The father of Dominican communism, curiously enough, is none other than the late dictator Generalissimo Trujillo.

In 1946, the incredible Trujillo sent word to the Cuban Popular Socialist (Communist) Party to organize a Dominican counterpart, and it kindly obliged. With the wartime Soviet-Alles marriage still on, Trujillo hoisted thereby to please both Moscow—with which he sought diplomatic relations—and the West, with his display of "democracy."

He went so far as to heap praise upon Stalin and referred to communism, according to Selden Rodman's excellent book, "Quisqueya, a History of the Dominican Republic," as "one of the great forces for welfare and progress on which the democratic world can count."

Indirectly, too, Trujillo spawned communism in creating a political atmosphere in which only extremism can flourish. It is not surprising, therefore, that in Dominican Communist ranks today are many former ardent Trujillistas. Colonel Camaño himself, though no Communist as far as we know, is an old Trujillista not averse to working with the Reds.

Although the April revolt took the Communists by surprise, and they acted without orders from Havana or Moscow, they had been preparing for revolution during the previous 6 to 8 months.

Back in January, for example, the June 14 commenced a series of inflammatory broadcasts from 6:15 to 6:45 p.m. daily. One consisted of a taped statement by Bosch himself.

And week after week, the June 14 and other Red groups would virtually take over downtown Santo Domingo with demonstrations and street meetings which paralyzed all business and traffic. It is now apparent, too, that behind the scenes they must have been preparing their fighting cadres.

Though the revolt was not Red-organized, it is not surprising in the light of the above facts—and many others still to be learned, no doubt—that the Dominican Communists should surface into its leadership and come within striking distance of capturing it altogether.

[From the Washington Star, May 15, 1965]

DOMINICAN PUPPET?—CAAMANO'S CONTROL DOUBTED

(By Jeremiah O'Leary)

Washington authorities expressed doubts today that Dominican rebel leader Francisco Caamano Deno, for all his ranting and quasi-military posturing, actually controls the 15,000 mixed force of armed civilians and soldiers under his nominal command.

They believe he may merely be a figurehead, a puppet of well-organized Communist leaders of three separate movements. They say that the Red leaders most of whom were identified by U.S. sources earlier this month probably hold the real power within the enclave of Santo Domingo where the rebels are entrenched.

These officials said they doubt that Caamano, even if he were inclined, could sign a meaningful truce; order his men to lay down their arms or join in a coalition government.

DESCRIBED AS TOUGH

The 32-year-old colonel is described as tough and hotheaded and impressed with a sense of dramatic involvement of the rebels.

There are no Communists in the rebel high command, officials believe, nor is Caamano himself a Communist.

As one official put it: What is the use of being Minister of Interior or Foreign Minister in a government that only controls a few acres of a poorer section of Santo Domingo? Those with the real power are the Communists who control the armed civilians, the roughly disciplined youths who owe allegiance to the three main Communist groups.

These groups are the PSPD, or orthodox Moscow line party; the MPD, which adheres to the philosophy of Peiping, and the Havana-line APCJ or June 14 movement.

Caamano, son of a prominent figure of the Trujillo regime, is regarded here only as a frontman in which can hardly be called a government at all. Caamano presides over what is basically a revolutionary command post.

Hector Arísty, 32, who wears the title of "Minister of Government" in the rebel regime, is thought to be a sort of "gray eminence" behind Caamano's public posture.

Quite a bit is known in Washington of Arísty's past and he is regarded as more an opportunist, a typical product of the Trujillo years, than a partisan of any political school of thought. He has a record of involvement in movements of both the far left and the far right in the past.

BLESSING FROM BOSCH

The Caamano faction bases its claim to legitimacy on the blessing it has received from Juan Bosch, who was ousted as President in 1963. Caamano had himself named President to finish Bosch's term and promised elections in December 1966.

The problem of the Organization of American States and President Johnson is to bring about an effective cease-fire and find a interim government until elections can be held. Washington wants them to be held at an early date so that the intervention can end.

But Caamano will not consent to disarm and the rebel militia probably would not obey him if he ordered one. The alternatives may be to go after the rebels in full-fledged battle or starve them out.

In the meantime, the Caamano forces are separated from the junta forces of Gen. Antonio Imbert Barreras and Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin only by the presence of 21,000 U.S. Marines and paratroopers. Officials say it is an impasse that could continue for a long time unless some solution is found soon.

[From the Washington Star, June 7, 1965]

DOMINICAN DISPERSAL OF ARMS SPARKED U.S. TROOP BUILDUP

(By Jeremiah O'Leary)

The massive U.S. troop buildup in the Dominican Republic after the Marines landed there was impelled by intelligence reports that large quantities of arms seized by the rebels had been sent to interior areas of the country, authoritative U.S. sources disclosed today.

President Johnson's advisers recommended increasing the strength of U.S. forces from 400 Marines, to about 22,000 troops because it was feared the chaos and the Communist take over of the revolution might spread to areas far beyond the capital of Santo Domingo.

Even today, the location and exact quantity of these arms is not known by U.S. intelligence. This uncertainty and the threat of possible new uprisings in the interior have a direct bearing on official estimates that the Inter-American Peace Force will have to remain in the Dominican Republic for an extended period.

Former President Donald Reid Cabral, now in hiding and out of the political picture, told this reporter he knew that the arms seized by the rebels early in the insurrection did not all go to the forces of Col. Francisco Caamano Deno in downtown Santo Domingo. Many truckloads of weapons and ammunition were spirited into the interior, he said.

Reid and U.S. sources agree that these arms constitute the biggest menace to a lasting peace in the Dominican Republic, even if the Organization of American States is able to negotiate a political settlement.

U.S. officials, who initially released a list of 53 known Communists participating in the revolution, now say they have identified several hundred. Most of these are members of the three illegal Dominican Communist Parties: the Moscow-oriented PSPD; the Peiping-aligned MPD, and the 14th of June movement, which follows the Havana line. Informed sources said these three parties, although usually in disagreement on strategy, united as one to take advantage of the chaos spawned by what started as an army revolt.

The three-man OAS Committee now in Santo Domingo is not bound by any previous formulas in the renewed effort to achieve a settlement. However, authoritative sources here said the most likely direction to be taken by the Committee would be to seek a provisional government now with OAS-supervised elections to follow no later than 6 months.

The Committee consists of U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker; Brazilian Ambassador Ilmar Penna Marinho and El Salvador Ambassador Ramon de Clairmont Deenas. It was appointed to guide OAS Secretary Jose A. Mora in his mediation efforts and to advise the peace force commander, Brazilian Gen. Hugo Panasco Alvim. But the committee has taken over the main responsibility for finding a solution.

Some officials here feel that former Dominican President Joaquin Balaguer, who was chief of state when Dictator Rafael Trujillo was assassinated in 1961, might be able to weld a government acceptable to a majority of Dominicans.

[From the Washington Star, June 13, 1965]

UNITED STATES DOCUMENTS RED ATTEMPT TO SEIZE REVOLT—3 SEPARATE GROUPS WORKED TOGETHER IN DOMINICAN CRISIS

(By Jeremiah O'Leary)

The organized effort by three Communist parties to capture the revolt in the Dominican Republic and seize power in that country has been documented in an official U.S. paper compiled by intelligence sources expert in Communist activities.

The report, chronologically and in narrative form, describes the day-by-day activities in Santo Domingo between April 24 and May 5 of 77 known Communists. Many of the 77 were previously identified as participants in the revolt by U.S. Government sources on May 6, but the new document gives intimate details of their participation before and after the American intervention.

The document, obtained last night, is the first disclosure of details of the Communist participation in the revolt from U.S. sources since a list of 58 leftists was disclosed.

At least 45 of the extremists had been deported from the Dominican Republic in May 1964, and most of them received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba before they started filtering back into the Dominican Republic last October, the document disclosed. Cuba's principal agency for promoting revolutionary

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activities in Latin America, the General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI), trained many of the Dominican rebel leaders, the document said.

THREE RED PARTIES LISTED

DGI has for some time provided financial support to two of the three Dominican Communist Parties: the 14th of June Political Group (APCJ), and the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD). The APCJ Party, according to U.S. sources, has between 3,000 and 5,000 members and has been Communist-run and pro-Castro since early 1963. MPD, which follows the Peiping line, has about 500 members. The other Dominican Communist group, which cooperated in the rebellion, is the Dominican Popular Socialist Party (PSPD) with between 800 to 1,000 members who follow the Moscow line.

The U.S. document said the parties acted in harmony in the current rebellion.

It said the largest department in the DGI is the one responsible for directing Latin American guerrilla warfare activities. Identified as the DGI officer who handles revolutionary operations for the Dominican Republic is Roberto Santiesteban Casanova, who was deported by the United States for engaging in espionage in 1962 while serving with the Cuban delegation to the United Nations.

The 26-page document is virtually a "white paper" on the Dominican revolt and reflects the official U.S. version of what transpired there. The following is a day-by-day account of Communist activities in the Dominican revolt as compiled by U.S. intelligence sources from April 24 to May 5:

APRIL 24

Elements of the Dominican Army, led by disaffected middlegrade and junior officers, revolted against the government of Donald Reid Cabral. They seized control of the 27th of February Military Camp, making prisoners of the army chief of staff and his deputy.

A group of civilians seized two radio stations in Santo Domingo and announced that Reid had been overthrown. The radio stations were retaken later in the day by Reid forces, but just before they were forced off the air, the rebels called on the civilian population to join the anti-Reid movement and to go into the streets to support the rebellion.

Communist leaders of all three parties issued orders to their members to incite the civilian crowds gathering in the streets, and to stage rallies and demonstrations. The Communists began organizing their forces and assigning members to various functions throughout the city.

Among those Communists active in the first hours of revolt were: Narciso Isa Conde, of the PSPD, already armed with a sub-machine gun; Diomedes Mercedes Batista (PSPD), who was relaying instructions to party members to stand up for further orders; and Amin Abel Hasbun, APCJ member, engaged in organizing for Communist participation in the revolt, operating from a house on Elvira de Mendza Street.

The situation in Santo Domingo became increasingly confused. Senior officers of the Dominican Air Force and Army informed Reid that they would not support him, and he resigned and went into hiding.

PSPD members carrying weapons gathered at Parque Independencia early in the morning and harangued civilian crowds in support of the revolt. Among these again were Diomedes Mercedes Batista and Narciso Isa Conde. Also active was Asdrubal Dominguez Guerrero, a student leader who received training in Russia in 1962. Throughout the morning, mobile loudspeaker units, including a white Volkswagen station wagon operated by Diomedes Mercedes Batista, patrolled the city urging the population to join the revolt.

In what later proved to be a key element of the revolt, rifles and machine guns seized by

rebellious army elements were handed out to the civilian crowds during the day. One of the rebel officers, Capt. Mario Pena Tavares, arranged for distribution of several thousand weapons, including machine guns and hand grenades. Arms from the camp were loaded on trucks and sent to the downtown area of Santo Domingo where they were passed out to civilians. The following Communist leaders participated with army rebels in uhgodantn e in handing out arms and, in some cases assumed control of the distribution:

Hugo Tolentino Dipp, PSPD leader who received guerrilla training in Cuba; Fidelio Despradel Roque, APCJ leader, trained in Cuba and one of the chief figures in the guerrilla uprising in late 1963; Felix Servio Ducoudray Mansfield of the PSPD, former resident of the Soviet Union and Cuba and one-time employee of the Peiping Communist New China News Agency; Eduardo Houeiemont Roques, APCJ, who was in Cuba in the 1963 guerrilla operation.

Other Communists who handed out arms were: Buenaventura Johnson Pimental, Juan Ducoudray Mansfield, who once worked on Havana Radio broadcasts to the Dominican Republic, and Gerardo Rafael Estevez Weber, all of the PSPD; and Maximo Bernard Vasquez, of the APCJ, who worked with subversives in the Dominican military in the 1963 guerrilla movement.

Bottles and gasoline from tank trucks at several points in the city were distributed to civilians for making Molotov cocktails, MPD members being particularly active in this work.

A mob of several thousand civilians, armed with clubs and rifles, marched on the National Palace, responding to a call issued over a rebel-held radio station. Among them were armed Communists.

Rebels seized the National Palace and the rebel army officers gathered to assume control. Members of the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) arrived with the intention of installing an interim government headed by PRD leader Rafael Molina Urena, pending return of the ousted former president, Juan Bosch. The PRD leaders and rebel army officers who were pro-Bosch prevailed and Molina became provisional president. But military officers who had not joined the rebellion declared they would attack the rebels unless a military junta were installed to prepare for national elections in September.

Many important Communists attended political meetings in the National Palace that day. Among those conferring with Molina was Facundo Gomez, a PSPD member and part owner of the *Scarlet Woman*, a boat used in the attempted landing of Cuban arms in the Dominican Republic in November 1963. Another, Alejandro Lajara Gonzales, an APCJ member who had been active in distributing arms to civilians, was appointed by Molina to be Deputy Director of Investigation (the Security Service).

Communist agitators began inciting the armed mobs to burn, destroy property and seize additional arms. MPD members were told their party planned to kill any policeman found on the streets. Armed civilians roamed the city, many of them looting stores and private homes.

The offices and plant of the anti-Communists newspaper *Prensa Libre* were seized by an armed group which included Communists. They prepared immediately to publish propaganda leaflets.

The offices of three anti-Communist political parties, the democratic conservative Union Civica Nacional; the moderate right-wing Partido Liberal Revolucionista and the moderate center Vanguardia Revolucionaria Dominicana, were broken into and sacked.

During the afternoon, Communist organizers continued to distribute weapons to groups regarded as reliable by the Commu-

nist parties, as well as to round up additional manpower for civilian militia units. Weapons depots and distribution points were set up.

Mercedes Batista, and other PSPD leaders were observed leading a paramilitary force armed with submachine guns, rifles and grenades.

Other armed Communist groups were observed on streets and in buildings including one led by Manuel Gonzales Gonzalez, Spanish Civil War veteran and Cuban intelligence agent.

APRIL 26

Antirebel forces, which had been badly disorganized, now began to move against the rebel-held area of the city under command of Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin, head of the Armed Forces Training Center. The Dominican Air Force bombed and strafed rebel-held installations. The ferocity of this and subsequent attacks consolidated public resentment and inadvertently presented the rebels with an effective propaganda weapon.

A large quantity of arms and ammunition had, by this time, fallen into the hands of the Communists. Teams of party members were fanning out through the central part of Santo Domingo organizing paramilitary groups.

Agitators from all three Red parties continued to exhort the mobs. They distributed mimeographed propaganda sheets calling on the people to fight, and stating, in part, that "the hour has arrived to give arms to the working class . . . to form common units of soldiers and civilians and to organize people's combat units."

Additional Communist leaders were identified among the armed mobs and in the rebel military forces, including Juan Miguel Romman Diaz, of the ACPI, who participated in the 1963 guerrilla operation, and Jaime Duran Herando, Cuban-trained guerrilla expert.

Gustavo Ricart who returned from Cuba in 1963 bringing money to finance MPD activities, was identified as the commander of another rebel stronghold. Five other Communists were in charge of production of a considerable number of Molotov cocktails during the day.

The leaders of the various Communist parties were well equipped with weapons and became an increasingly important element in the rebel force. Rebel army officers and men, numbering about 1,000 at the outset, were soon greatly outnumbered by armed civilians who, in a state of disorganization, became easy prey for disciplined Communist leadership.

Efforts by the U.S. Embassy toward a ceasefire between the rebels and elements of the Dominican armed forces were unsuccessful. During the day, a large number of American citizens assembled in the Hotel Embajador seeking safety. They requested assistance from the U.S. Embassy in evacuating them from Santo Domingo, which was under bombardment by the Dominican Air Force and was by this time the scene of widespread rifle and artillery fire between the opposing factions. The Embassy secured from the rebel leaders agreement to cooperate in evacuating Americans from the nearby port of Haina. Armed civilian groups, over which the Molina regime had lost control, paid no attention to this agreement.

APRIL 27

About 100 armed civilians, hearing over the rebel radio that a prominent Dominican newspaperman and broadcaster, well known as anti-Communist, was at the Hotel Embajador (actually he was not there) went to the hotel and fired several hundred shots. April 27 saw the complete breakdown of law and order. Molina, the so-called provisional president, went to the U.S. Embassy in apparent defeat, accompanied by rebel army leaders, Col. Miguel Angel Hernandez Ramirez and Col. Francisco Caamano Deno. Shortly

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afterwards, Molina abandoned office and took asylum in the Colombian Embassy.

During the day, Lajara Gonzalez of the APCJ arranged for additional arms to be passed to Communists. The offices and plant of the newspaper *Listin Diario* was taken over by armed PSPD Communists headed by Asdrubal Dominguez Guerrero and Jose Israel Cuello Hernandez, both carrying automatic weapons.

APRIL 28

The antirebel armed forces commenced by General Wessin established a three-man military junta headed by Col. Pedro Barolome Benoit (air force), Col. Enrique Aiolinario Casado Saladin (army), and Capt. Manuel Santana Carasco (navy). Early in the day, the junta seemed to make progress against the rebels but encountered heavier resistance in the afternoon and lost momentum.

The situation in the city was increasingly tense and confused. Junta forces, tired and disorganized, began to crumble. Armed mobs terrorized the city, firing on homes and other buildings, including the United States and other embassies. With collapse of the Molina government, PRD leaders abdicated their positions of leadership fearing their cause lost and their lives in danger. They left the rebel movement in the hands of politically immature army officers who had lost command over armed civilians who now far outnumbered the rebel army forces. Communist leaders, by then in control of the armed mobs, moved quickly into the political leadership vacuum in Santo Domingo.

Late in the afternoon, the junta and police authorities informed the U.S. Embassy they could no longer assure the safety of Americans lives. U.S. Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett recommended that U.S. Marines be landed to establish a safety perimeter from which Americans and other foreign citizens could be evacuated. By that night, approximately 600 Marines were landed and had taken positions around the Hotel Embajador.

APRIL 29

The rebels held the central part of the city and retained the military initiative. An armed mob under Communist MPD leaders began a full-scale assault on the remaining police stronghold, Ozama Fortress. The fortress fell next day. Another armed mob sacked the cathedral.

Communists among the university students were active in organizing the crowds.

House-to-house fighting continued. The United States and several other embassies remained under sniper fire. The U.S. Government ordered the landing of an additional 1,100 Marines and during the night of April 29-30, approximately 2,000 troops of the 82d Airborne Division landed at San Isidro. Reinforcements arrived on succeeding days.

Leaders of all three Communist groups met to discuss tactics in the light of new developments. They also met with rebel military officers.

APRIL 30

The official rebel radio broadcast instructions to armed mobs not to fire on U.S. troops but firing continued and a number of casualties were inflicted on U.S. personnel.

Two Communist commando groups were particularly active roaming the city looking for targets. Other Communists working closely with rebel army officers included two who received political and guerrilla training in Cuba in 1963.

MAY 1

A shaky cease-fire was achieved but snipers were active throughout the day, firing on the U.S. Embassy and U.S. troops. This was in keeping with propaganda emanating from the rebel-held area that the real purpose of the cease-fire was to permit junta forces to reassemble and attack from a sanctuary provided by U.S. troops.

About 50 Communists probably a high command group of all three parties, met in one of the Communist strongpoints fortified with machinegun emplacements on the roof.

MAY 2

A short-wave radio transmitter in the home of a Communist broadcast instructions to the civilian mobs to shoot Americans on sight. A large crowd gathered in the Parque Independencia heard a violently anti-American speech from a Communist.

MAY 3-4

Rebel leaders began to consider how to give their movement the form and structure of a legitimate government. Communist leaders discussed among themselves the desirability of their top leaders withdrawing from open participation in the rebel movement in order both to support rebel claims that the movement was free of Communist influence and to afford protection to the principal figures of the Communist parties.

Col. Caamano Deno, generally regarded as anti-Communist, had said on several occasions during the revolt that he was aware the Communists had been playing an increasingly important role.

MAY 5

It was the consensus at meetings of Communist leaders that, while rank-and-file members of the three parties should fight on, prominent Communists should begin withdrawing from the scene. Some went into hiding, others attempted to leave Santo Domingo for towns to the north. One of these was later captured by antirebel forces.

Some of the APJC and PSPD leaders who left Santo Domingo were under instructions to attempt to organize local party members and sympathizers for eventual guerrilla action in the north. False identity cards were prepared for Communist leaders.

MPD leaders also agreed that the more prominent party figures should go under cover for the time being. They further decided that arms and ammunition in the hands of party members should be hidden for possible use in guerrilla operations. Orders were given to secure as many arms as they could and deliver them to party headquarters.

[From the Washington Star, June 14, 1965]
SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF REBELS ACTIVE IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, U.S. AIDE SAYS

(By Jeremiah O'Leary)

There are still substantial numbers of Communists and Communist sympathizers on the rebel side in the Dominican Republic impasse, Assistant Secretary of State Jack H. Vaughn said yesterday.

Vaughn, who heads the Government Department's Inter-American Affairs Division, held out scant hope for an early end to the deadlock and the outpouring of U.S. funds to keep the Caribbean nation from slipping into chaos. He said:

"We have spent nearly \$20 million for . . . food (and other relief supplies) and this could go on for many months . . ."

He said Communists have influenced Gen. Francisco Caamano Deno's rebel side from the beginning of the revolt.

In an interview on the ABC show "Issues and Answers," Vaughn said, "Our guess is that there are close to 5,000 Communists in three groups in the Dominican Republic. Dozens more have been identified as leaders.

"The point is they were well organized and trained in Cuba, Russia, Czechoslovakia, and Red China. They came back to the Dominican Republic in a clandestine way from exile determined to take advantage of this revolt and to subvert it. It has been their interest for many years."

He identified by name several Communist leaders of Dominican, Spanish, and Haitian origin whose roles in events leading to American intervention were described in a

Star story yesterday based on a government document.

Vaughn said many of the Communist leaders have filtered out of the rebel zone into the Dominican countryside.

A resumption of fighting, he said, is considered possible because the United States knows large quantities of arms were distributed by rebels and Communists. Some of these arms had been hidden in the interior of the republic and there is a threat that they might be used.

IMBERT STRENGTH GAINS

The junta forces of Gen. Antonio Imbert Barrera are believed to be stronger now than they were when the fighting was stopped by the intervention, Vaughn says.

He indicated belief the junta forces might be able to win a military decision but that such a clash is unlikely due to the presence of the Inter-American Peace Force, sent by the U.S.-supported Organization of American States.

Vaughn also indicated disbelief in informal polls taken by some newsmen purporting to show that Caamano has overwhelming popular support in the Dominican Republic.

"We question whether either Caamano or Imbert has overwhelming support. It's easy to take a poll and have all the cab drivers agree."

"What the overwhelming majority of the Dominican people want is the sort of democratic government that has been denied them for so many years."

SEES ELECTIONS FAR OFF

He said a civilian, more moderate than Caamano, would be more attractive to the Dominican people, and cited former president Joaquin Balaguer as a man who would be a frontrunner in any future election.

Vaughn said he did not believe the rebel constitutionalists would win if elections could be held in 3 to 6 months.

However Vaughn added, his personal belief is that elections will not be possible in the Dominican Republic for 12 to 18 months.

He said the OAS committee that includes U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker has been in the Dominican Republic for 10 days now and has made little progress in finding agreement on a coalition government. The negotiators aren't even close to finding a caretaker government in advance of the hoped-for elections, Vaughn said.

He added that there is a complex military, political, and emotional situation and that even if agreement is reached with leaders, it might be difficult to enforce among the Dominican people.

[From the Washington Star, June 16, 1965]

PEACE CHIEF LAYS FIRING TO DOMINICAN REBELS

(By Jeremiah O'Leary)

The Brazilian general in charge of the Inter-American Peace Force in the Dominican Republic charged today that rebel forces under Col. Francisco Caamano Deno were in flagrant violation of the cease-fire in Santo Domingo.

Gen. Hugo Panasco Alvim, in a preliminary report to the Organization of American States on the fighting yesterday in the Dominican capital, said "Indiscriminate firing . . . always originates from the Caamano zone" against the troops under his command that divide the rebels and the junta forces.

He asked the OAS three-man committee charged with the task of resolving the country's internal dispute "to bring an immediate end" to the attacks.

U.S. officials, meanwhile, were attributing the new shooting incidents to the growing strength of the Communist 14th of June Movement in the Caamano-held zone of Santo Domingo.

MORE CLASHES FEARED

Yesterday's battle between rebel forces and the largely American troops of the peace force

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had been expected, Washington sources said, and it is feared the clash will not be an isolated incident.

Informed sources said they believe the shooting was brought about by increasing divisions among the groups under the ostensible control of Caamano.

The view in Washington today is that the 14th of June group of hard-line, Havana-influenced Communists is gradually gaining control in the rebel enclave.

Officials pointed out that the speeches in the Parque Independencia Monday celebrating the June 14 national holiday were made by known members of the Communist MPD and 14th of June parties. The speeches were of "foreigners" in the Dominican Republic.

ATTITUDE CHANGED

Last month in the same park, rebels who tried to make anti-American speeches were shouted down and even pulled away from the platform by other Caamano partisans.

In his report to the OAS on yesterday's battle, Alvim said fighting began when his troops were attacked at 8:10 a.m.

"The IAPF did not return the fire for 20 to 25 minutes, but after this period my troops returned fire in order to defend themselves after we had sustained wounded.

"The brigade commander observing the Caamano troops reported that the attacking troops were trying to maneuver and capture positions in the security zone. We denied them this objective.

"All this occurred until 11:30 a.m. at which time events were calm once again. At 12:25 p.m. the Inter-American troops located near the Hotel Jaragua were violently attacked and were compelled to return fire.

"ARSON REPORTED

"We have information that armed civilians in the Caamano zone were putting fire to warehouses on the waterfront."

The United States has identified dozens of members of three Communist parties as having joined the rebellion presumably with the intention of taking it over. Caamano is not regarded as a Communist.

[From the Washington Star, June 17, 1965]
DOMINICAN RED EFFORT TO STIR U.N. IS SEEN
(By Jeremiah O'Leary)

U.S. officials analyzing attacks by Dominican rebels against the Inter-American Peace Force believe the rebel strategy is to attempt to bring the United Nations further into the crisis.

Sources said this is a policy of desperation by the Castro-leaning 14th of June movement and is not necessarily a policy Col. Francisco Caamano Dena, the nominal rebel leader, can do anything to change.

It is believed, the sources said, that the Communists in Caamano's camp hope to lure the largely U.S. peace force to retaliate with such vigor that Washington will be forced to make an otherwise unacceptable settlement with the rebel side or, alternatively, stand branded before the world as the Russians were after crushing the Hungarian revolt.

This theory of the cause of the latest outbreak of shooting in Santo Domingo was supported last night by Under Secretary of State Thomas C. Mann in a rare speech before the Organization of American States.

Mann, sitting as American representative in the absence of Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, took the floor to defend the American intervention. In so doing, he laid the blame for the new crisis at the feet of the June 14 movement.

He cited a pamphlet distributed in Santo Domingo Tuesday by the group urging that the backers of Caamano set off a struggle throughout the Dominican Republic with the aim of showing the Yankees out.

Every day, Mann said, the evidence of Communist involvement in the revolution becomes more overwhelming.

The OAS session was called at the request of two opponents to the intervention, Chile, and Venezuela, and Mann appeared to bridge at some comments concerning the original unilateral American intervention.

He said he had not heard, of all the discussion of intervention, any reference to the fact that "a year ago we were talking here of intervention by Cuba in Venezuela."

Mann said the Communists intervened in the Dominican Republic on June 14, 1962, again in 1963, and added, "my government had reason to believe a third attempt was made by international communism in 1965."

He said the United States has suffered many casualties and cited 900 separate violations of the cease-fire by the Caamano side. The only U.S. motive, he said is to create a situation in which the Dominican people can elect a government that suit them.

"We are not partial" either to Caamano or to the junta under Gen. Antonio Imbert Barrera," Mann said. "Between the two extremes there must be a ground of reasonableness the great majority of the Dominican people will accept. We had only two choices—to turn our backs and walk away, or to take the strong action we did."

Venezuelan Ambassador Enrique Tejera Paris said he hoped the peace force would not be an instrument of war against a heroic Dominican people.

Chilean Ambassador Alejandro Magnet said the number of deaths in the recent battle was "distributed unequally" and said the "action has not been quite equal."

Mann said all of the peace force casualties had been Americans except for one wounded Brazilian lieutenant.

[From the Washington Daily News, May 3, 1965]

LBJ TAKES NEW TACK ON LATIN AMERICA
(By Virginia Prewett)

The explosion in the Dominican Republic means that the United States and the Latin American members of the Organization of American States must find fresh solutions for hemisphere problems.

Latin American outcry against President Johnson's dispatch of Marines to the Dominican Republic was predictable and completely understandable.

In their never-ending power struggles, Latin Americans fear U.S. intervention. For if the United States favors one side today, it may favor the other tomorrow.

In the light of history, it is surprising that the Latin American protests have not been shriller.

The Johnson administration's action means three things:

It recognizes the defeat of the theory so long espoused by Washington that "raising Latin American living standards" can by itself establish peace and political stability in Latin America.

Mr. Johnson is making new policy and does not mean to be limited by all the fictions and shibboleths of inter-American relations. When he sent the Marines into the Dominican Republic he made it plain that the lives of American citizens may not henceforth become pawns in internal Latin American struggles. Nor will the United States stand idly by when such internal struggles deteriorate toward Bogotazo-type anarchy which would open the way to a Communist takeover.

Most clearly of all, the U.S. action, followed closely by the President's personal appeals for the OAS to act, says to the Latin American governments that they, too, must quit fiddling around with the thesis that the hemisphere's political problems can wait till economic problems are on the way to solution.

The one most significant fact in all the circumstances surrounding the Dominican explosion is this:

Not a single OAS member—and this includes the United States—had any specific plan ready to bring before the May 20 hemisphere meeting to be held in Brazil that would provide a quick orderly and multilateral answer to such situations as developed in the Dominican Republic.

Venezuela and Costa Rica reportedly meant to suggest new rules for judging whether de facto governments should be recognized. But mechanisms for deciding questions of recognition would be useless in restoring civil order and political justice out of the chaotic Dominican situation.

The OAS, with Washington's tacit encouragement, has been dragging its feet and trying to ignore that deadly power struggles threaten all over Latin America.

But things are changing. If the Latin Americans don't want the Marines moving in on such situations, says the Johnson message, they had better get busy on effective OAS solutions for them.

[From the Washington Daily News, May 7, 1965]

L.B.J. COULDN'T GAMBLE ON CONSULTATION
(By Virginia Prewett)

What risks did President Johnson run when he sent the Marines into the Dominican Republic without consulting the Organization of American States?

Frantic appeals from the U.S. Embassy there said the provisional regime of pro-Bosch Dr. Jose Molina Urena had collapsed and nobody controlled the fighting. Wild-eyed teenagers with tommy guns had lined up Americans at their Hotel Embajador refuge and shot over their heads. Others soon might shoot straighter.

A small band of Communist conspirators at any moment could seize an airstrip, declare themselves a government-in-arms and call in Fidel Castro's Russian-trained paratroops or other units of his 200,000-man army.

If Mr. Johnson had consulted, high officials would have had to make the calls, each of which would have taken at least 20 minutes. Even if Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Under Secretary Thomas Mann and our OAS Ambassador, Ellsworth Bunker, had worked on it, calls to 19 embassies would have taken nearly half a working day.

If President Johnson had lost the time gamble, he would have had to face an enormous uproar from an outraged American people, one many times greater than the outcry after the Bay of Pigs.

Mr. Johnson's relations with Congress would have been deeply impaired. Congressional and U.S. public backing for his Vietnam policy would have splintered on the question—"Why fight for peace and freedom in Vietnam and let the Caribbean go?"

In the next election, the Democrats would have been accused of giving both Cuba and the Dominican Republic to communism.

Further, a Cuba-backed regime in the republic would have meant another confrontation with Russian and new danger of nuclear war over the Caribbean. It would have dashed hopes of settlement of Vietnam in any foreseeable future.

If Mr. Johnson had taken the consultation gamble and lost it, the American people would never have forgotten that Americans were massacred and the Caribbean fell to communism while their President talked to the OAS over the phone.

The ever-stronger latent U.S. resentment over foreign aid costs would have flowered. Whatever popular suffering still remains for our much-criticized Alliance for Progress would have diminished sharply.

Our President must have known when he decided not to consult that most Latin American governments would be secretly relieved not to have to give their prior indorsement to his sending the Marines.

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Mr. Johnson's action in fact permitted the Latin Americans to have their cake and eat it too. For they can deplore his sending in the Marines, yet enjoy the benefits of the protection the act affords them.

[From the Washington Daily News,
May 14, 1965]

RED-CUBAN PLAN UPSET BY DOMINICAN REPUBLIC BLAST

(By Virginia Prewett)

The Dominican explosion upset a Communist-Cuban timetable that called for a Chinese-Guatemalan guerrilla leader to start brush-fire action in Central America when the Communists launch their monsoon offensive in South Vietnam.

The leader is Marco Yon Sosa, called El Chino and son of a Chinese father and a Guatemalan mother. As an army officer in 1960 he tried to lead a rebellion because former President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes allowed the CIA-backed Cuban exiles to train in Guatemala. He was imprisoned but army friends arranged his escape.

Yon Sosa began to operate in eastern Guatemala, in Izabal State, with a band of 20 men. During Col. Enrique Peralta's 2 years of military rule, this band has grown into a toughened force of 500 men.

"COMANDANTE"

Though he never attained the rank, El Chino calls himself "comandante"—the Spanish for major—like top Castro officials. As did Castro in the Sierra Maestra, Yon Sosa grants foreign newsmen interviews in his hideout.

Information about the master plan for Central America comes from the same Latin Americans who revealed that atomic missiles were in Cuba long before the United States officially admitted they were. The plan was for Yon Sosa to start a Vietnam-type action in Guatemala and spread it to Honduras, not far from Izabal. From there, the fire could creep on.

Yon Sosa's Chinese blood gives him a strong propaganda link with southeast Asia. Guatemala is communism's "lost province," where a CIA-backed revolt toppled a heavily infiltrated regime in 1954. And the unpopularity of Colonel Peralta's regime, which took power in 1963, gives the guerrillas their opening.

Even anti-Communist Guatemalans today admit sadly that Yon Sosa is winning peasant support. Peralta is ruling under martial law, with tight censorship, all political parties paralyzed, and all rights suspended that could protect citizens from arbitrary search and seizure.

PRICES FALL

To complicate the situation, coffee prices have fallen in recent months and this is dimming the relatively bright economic outlook that has been Peralta's one boast till now.

The Dominican situation was a "target of opportunity" for the Communist apparatus there, not the prime Caribbean target. The apparatus emerged there to promote chaos after army men and civilian opponents of the military-backed regime began to rebel. The Communist shock troop organizations emerge and submerge, according to the situation.

Having the showdown with the United States over new infiltration in the Caribbean take place as it has on the island of Hispaniola is disadvantageous for the Communist world. Their longtime objective is to start serious trouble on the continent's mainland, where it is not easy to contain.

[From the Washington Daily News,
May 24, 1965]

THE INSIDE STORY: THE ORDER TO LAND THE MARINES

(NOTE.—This is the story of how President Johnson came to his decision to send the

Marines into the Dominican Republic. The source, which must not be named but is of the highest and most unimpeachable rank, provided the material for this vivid account by Virginia Prewett, Washington Daily News columnist on Latin America and winner of the Maria Moors Cabot Gold Medal for outstanding hemisphere coverage in 1964.)

(By Virginia Prewett)

At 5:30 p.m. on Wednesday, April 28, 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson and five of his top advisers were discussing Vietnam at the White House. An urgent message from the Dominican Republic interrupted him.

There was silence in the little, newly decorated green West Wing lounge as the President scanned the slip of paper. He sat in his favorite high-backed, deep-cushioned chair, his long legs stretched out by the hassock he often props them on. On the wall nearby hung a new decoration that he proudly shows visitors—the pictures of five Presidents with whom he has worked, mounted in one frame.

ADVISED

With him were Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Special Assistant for National Security McGeorge Bundy, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Assistant Secretary of State George Ball, and Special Assistant Bill Moyers.

The President told them that all the nine top U.S. officials in our Santo Domingo Embassy requested urgent military assistance to save American lives in the Dominican Republic.

Earlier messages had warned that Santo Domingo city was engulfed in anarchy. About 1,000 American men, women, and children, gathered for evacuation at the Hotel Embajador at the city's edge, were cut off from the escape route via the little Caribbean port of Haina, 9 miles away. The U.S.S. Boxer and other naval ships had been lying off Haina since Sunday, April 25.

THE MARINES

President Johnson and his advisers now discussed sending in U.S. Marines to protect the stranded Americans.

At 6:30 the President gave an order that made April 28, 1965, one of the world's historic dates, comparable in drama to October 22, 1962, the day of the Cuban missile showdown. He sent in the Marines. President Johnson immediately started a series of statements and speeches to assure the world he sent them to save lives. He revealed that a Communist apparatus had been spotted surfacing in the anarchy. He stated his goal: to restore peace and help establish democratic government in the Dominican Republic.

The great majority of Americans, say the public opinion polls, heard and approved. But the image of Marine landings has been used in anti-American propaganda for over half a century.

Latin American nationalists use it. Nazis used it before World War II and the Communists before and since. Most Americans, if they think about it, disapprove of the Caribbean landings of the 1920's, when Calvin Coolidge said: "The business of the United States is business."

Woodrow Wilson's still earlier Marine missions in the Caribbean to counteract German plotting during World War I and to try to help along democracy afterward were blurred by the later use of the marines in "dollar diplomacy."

OUTLAY

Two criticisms greeted the Johnson action on April 28. There was outcry in the unfriendly segment of the U.S. press that the President did not amply consult our Latin American allies in the Organization of American States. Senator ROBERT KENNEDY echoed this in a public statement comparing President's actions with those of his late brother, and faulting President Johnson.

Next, the President was accused of intervening to help an unpopular military clique,

headed by Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin, against constitutional rebels favoring the deposed President Juan Bosch.

The administration had to endure these charges for the moment. Refuting them would have hindered chances of progress in the fast-moving Dominican situation.

CHARGES REFUTED

But Mr. Johnson's firefighting team confounded the critics first by attempting to get General Wessin to step out in the interest of a coalition. Again, Mr. Johnson refuted the charge of favoring the military clique by sending a top team to Santo Domingo to try to negotiate a coalition headed by Antonio Guzman, a former member of Bosch's cabinet.

Nevertheless, as U.S. efforts to help settle tangled problems of personalities and power in the tragic country continued, a world debate rolled on about the intervention itself. Speculation returns again and again to Mr. Johnson's reasons for intervening. And the impression rolls on, often cited as a fact, that he did not bring the Organization of American States into the crisis.

MANN'S ROLE

As a corollary, President Johnson is charged with being overpersuaded by his former Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, the present Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Thomas C. Mann.

The left-of-center Americans for Democratic Action, who do not like Mr. Mann because he is supposed to have favored sending U.S. military help to the Cuban exile brigade battling at the Bay of Pigs, have officially demanded Mr. Mann's resignation for supposedly masterminding the Dominican landing.

The charge is false.

The answer to these continuing questions should not be lost to history as a new black legend of U.S. intervention hardens now in 1965. The story can now be told.

At its briefest, it is this:

The immediate reason for landing the marines was to save American lives. The growing danger of a second Cuba on the island of Hispaniola reinforced the President's determination.

MANN'S FATE

But, Mr. Mann was not even present at the meeting when President Johnson and his advisers first considered landing the marines. And incidentally, the untrue ADA attack has guaranteed Mr. Mann will be in U.S. Government as long as Lyndon B. Johnson is President.

Moreover, the charge that the United States acted without the knowledge of the other member states of the OAS is not so.

The White House and the U.S. State Department, long before the order to land marines was given, had established contacts with Latin American embassies over the situation. The machinery of the OAS had already been set in motion, at U.S. request. Not only were the embassies in Santo Domingo of South American countries notified, the Washington embassies were as well.

President Johnson, when he ordered in the marines, also ordered all Latin American embassies in Washington to be notified as quickly as possible of the landing and of the U.S. request for an OAS meeting at the earliest possible hour. By 10 that night, all were notified.

The day-by-day log of events as they affected the White House will tell the story.

[From the Washington Daily News, May 25, 1965]

THE INSIDE STORY: KNOWN REDS SPOTTED DURING ARMS HANDOUT

(NOTE.—This is the second of three articles in which Virginia Prewett, prize-winning Washington Daily News columnist on Latin America, gives a behind-the-scenes report on how President Johnson decided to send U.S. forces into the Dominican Republic. Miss

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Prewett received information from a high source, who does not wish to be identified.)

(By Virginia Prewett)

Trouble broke in the Dominican Republic at 3 p.m., on Saturday, April 24. Army officers seized their chief of staff and Santo Domingo's most powerful radio station proclaimed a coup against President Donald Reid Cabral.

Former President Juan Bosch was not mentioned.

The White House was informed. Coup threats had been frequent since Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin and other officers deposed Juan Bosch in September 1963. But General Wessin did not move that Saturday.

At 5 a.m., Sunday, the White House was told the revolt was serious. At 7:10, Sr. Bosch, by radio from Puerto Rico, named Jose Rafael Molina Urena constitutional president for his cause. General Wessin now acted. Crowds around the centrally located presidential palace shouted for Sr. Bosch. At 10:30 a.m., President Reid Cabral resigned.

NAVY MOVES

At 8:45, Sunday morning, President Johnson, from Camp David, ordered U.S. Navy units to move near Santo Domingo and lie offshore, out of sight.

This was no novelty. When the longtime Dominican dictator, Rafael L. Trujillo, was assassinated in May 30, 1961, the then Vice President Johnson, acting for President Kennedy in his absence, sent U.S. Navy ships to stand off Santo Domingo.

President Kennedy himself sent them there in December 1961, when Trujillo's surviving family threatened to retake power.

President Johnson learned on Monday, April 26, that Santo Domingo's city manager, around 11:30 a.m., called to urge our Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett: "Do something about your people, for God's sake." Rioting and fighting had spread. The Pepsi-Cola plant, an American symbol, was burned and bottles were stolen for Molotov cocktails.

At noon Monday, the Embassy began warning all Americans to gather for evacuation at the Hotel Embajador, on the city's outskirts. About 2,500 Americans were in Santo Domingo—diplomats' families, business residents, tourists.

At 6 p.m. Sunday, the Dominican Air Force joined General Wessin. On Monday, they bombed the presidential palace and strafed the rebel-held end of the strategic Ozama Bridge.

On Monday, the rebel radio broadcast the names and address of the pilots' families. The pilots' wives and mothers were taken to the Ozama Bridge as hostages against further strafing.

On Monday, our State Department discussed the situation with the Brazilian and Chilean diplomats.

A cease-fire was arranged for from 11 a.m. till 2 p.m. on Tuesday, so the 1,170 Americans at the Embajador could be taken by bus to Haina port and evacuated.

LUCKY

Soon after 8 a.m. Tuesday, an armed rabble burst into the Embajador. They had been given rifles and tommyguns by defecting army men. They sprayed bullets over the heads of prostrate Americans inside and outside the hotel. By luck, no one was shot.

The later cease-fire held long enough for the Americans to reach Haina, 9 miles away.

That same morning, Colombia's OAS Ambassador, Emilio N. Oribe, called on Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Jack Hood Vaughn. They discussed bringing the OAS into the crisis.

White House approval was prompt. And at Tuesday noon, the U.S. alternate representative to the OAS, Ward Allen, called an urgent meeting of the Peace Committee.

The committee composed of the United

States, Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, and Nicaragua, discussed calling an emergency foreign ministers' meeting.

ENVOYS CONCERNED

When President Johnson checked reports later, he saw that Mr. Vaughn had also briefed the Venezuelans. At 7 p.m., he learned, the Costa Rican Embassy asked U.S. aid in evacuating Costa Ricans. During the day, the Embassies of both Peru and Ecuador called our State Department to express concern about their nationals. They stressed the need to protect their nationals and to protect law and order in Santo Domingo.

A little later, L.B.J. learned with relief that the first thousand or so evacuees were safe aboard American vessels. New refugees were filling the Hotel Embajador.

General Wessin's men were attacking heavily. In the late afternoon, Molina Urena and 15 rebels, including Col. Francisco Caamano Deno, called on Ambassador Bennett and asked him to help arrange a settlement. Mr. Bennett tried, but the move failed.

Around Tuesday midnight, Molina Urena took refuge in an embassy. Colonel Caamano left the front of the stage. He did not reappear as rebel chief until April 30.

On Wednesday morning, President Johnson learned more arms were passed out indiscriminately.

REDS EFFICIENT

"I never saw such efficiency," read an eyewitness report. "Thousands of rifles were distributed in what seemed minutes." Known Communists were spotted in the operation, which bore the earmarks of paramilitary planning.

President Johnson had known for months that Castroite Communists planned to take over the expected action against Sr. Reid Cabral. Now they were surfacing. The TV took on "a Castro tone." Shouts of "pare-done!" (to the firing wall!) were increasing in the tumult.

At 10:30 a.m. Wednesday, our OAS Ambassador, Ellsworth Bunker, briefed the OAS Council.

Around noon came more messages. Colombian Ambassador Jesus Zarate reported from Santo Domingo: "It is now a question of Communists versus anti-Communists."

A bank had been looted, police stations overrun. Thousands were dead and wounded.

YANKS CUT OFF

The Americans at the Embajador were cut off from Haina. Soon after 1 p.m. Wednesday, the President learned the crisis was worsening.

In the afternoon, Col. Pedro Benoit, in charge of military ground forces, warned he could not protect the Americans. Police Chief Col. German Despradel said the same.

At 5:30 p.m., when President Johnson was discussing Vietnam problems with Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, and Bill Moyers, came the plea for military assistance.

After discussing landing Marines, L.B.J. sent out calls to other officials. They included Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance, Ambassador Bunker, Mr. Vaughn, Under Secretary of State Thomas Mann, CIA Director William Raborn, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Earle Wheeler—the full team.

The hard and historic decision had to be made.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Daily News, May 26, 1965]

THE INSIDE STORY: L.B.J.'S PROMPT DOMINICAN REPUBLIC'S ACTION SAVED AMERICAN LIVES

NOTE.—This is the last of three articles in which Virginia Prewett, prize-winning Washington Daily News columnist on Latin America, gives a behind-the-scenes report on how President Johnson decided to send U.S. forces

into the Dominican Republic. Miss Prewett received information from a high source, who cannot be identified.

(By Virginia Prewett)

When President Johnson between 5:30 and 6:30 p.m. on April 28 quickly telephoned or called in the Nation's top officials about landing marines in the Dominican Republic, a conversation was being held between our Embassy there and the Washington message center.

News was relayed to the President that the embassies of El Salvador, Argentina, Guatemala, and Ecuador had been fired on. The U.S. aid mission had been raided. The evacuation zone around the Embajador Hotel had been broken into again.

At 5:30 p.m., a unanimous request had come from our nine-man diplomatic "country team" in the Dominican Republic requesting immediate military assistance to save the lives of a thousand Americans in the Embajador Hotel.

THAT CUTS IT

"That cuts it," said President Johnson. "I'm not going to have the American people wake up tomorrow morning and find a hundred of our people dead down there because I didn't do anything."

He took the position that if he did not act, he risked immediate blood guilt for the Americans. The vision of another Cuba was strong in his mind.

He said later of the moment: "We know there are evil forces everywhere—in this country and everywhere else. But here in the United States, they're not in control. At that moment, in Santo Domingo, they were in control."

Mr. Johnson ordered multiple messages to go into effect at 6:30 p.m. The marines were to land. The first pathfinder group did land in LCT's at Haina seaport not long afterward. By 7:50 p.m., 405 marines were ashore.

SETTLEMENT SOUGHT

With the military order, Mr. Johnson stressed his urgent hope for a cease fire and a settlement of Dominican differences.

He also called for congressional leaders to meet with him at 7:15 p.m.

When he issued the landing order, he directed the area officers of the State Department's American Republics Division to notify all Latin American Ambassadors that many Latin American Embassies and diplomats in the Dominican Republic had called on the United States for help, that the U.S. Marines were landing to save American and other lives, and that the United States urgently requested an OAS meeting the next day.

REDS SPOTTED

The congressional leaders stayed with the President until 9 p.m. When they asked about Communist influence, Mr. Johnson told them that the Communist apparatus had been spotted emerging.

At first two known members of the Communist apparatus were spotted seizing strategic command or groups or objectives, then nine were spotted, and more and more. During the day the pro-Castro talisman cry of "Paredon!" (to the wall!) had multiplied as mobs sacked, looted and killed.

After 6:30 p.m., nine State Department area chiefs for Latin America were called to their offices. Their instructions were to telephone the President's message to every Latin American Ambassador. This the nine diplomats did. Not only OAS members, but also Jamaica and Trinidad were called.

Senator ROBERT KENNEDY, Democrat, of New York, has critically compared President Johnson's procedure with the Latin Americans with that of his late brother during the Cuban missile crisis.

WHEN J.F.K. SPOKE

On October 22, 1962, President Kennedy spoke to the Nation at 6:30 p.m., announcing

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his intention to order a naval quarantine around Cuba. That night he had the Latin American Ambassadors notified and, like Mr. Johnson, called an OAS meeting for the next day. After the meeting officially approved his action, he ordered U.S. Navy units already in position, to impose the quarantine.

President Kennedy could do this because the United States had the initiative in this crisis. This permitted him to control the timing.

President Johnson, in contrast, was at the mercy of timing imposed by the wild mobs in Santo Domingo. If he had announced he meant to send in Marines the next day, it virtually would have invited a mob attack on the Embajadore Hotel—and the emergence of a regime of some kind controlled by Communists.

REASONS DISCUSSED

On Thursday, April 29, at 10:30 a.m., the OAS met and Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker reviewed the landing and the reasons for it. The OAS asked the Papal Nuncio in Santo Domingo to arrange a cease fire. Late that night the OAS called an emergency foreign ministers' meeting and approved establishment of an international safe haven in the Dominican Republic.

On April 30, the special meeting sent Secretary General Jose Mora to Santo Domingo. The next day the OAS named a special five-man peacemaking team and sent it to Santo Domingo on a U.S. military plane.

Acting at its swiftest, the OAS thus managed to get its peace team in 4 days after the crisis peak when a thousand Americans were in danger at the Embajador.

The OAS simply did not have the machinery or the precedents to go in quickly and protect the foreign nationals. The hope is that it will develop the needed muscles out of the Dominican crisis.

CONTRADICTIONS SHOW

A significant feature of the U.S. press criticism of the order to land the marines is that it comes from the same spokesmen who most vociferously and tenaciously defended the Castro regime. Antiwar crusaders condemn the order to land the marines in one breath and call for Cuba-type revolutions throughout Latin America in the next.

But what President Johnson recalls is that thousands of American lives were in danger. He sees a new and vicious subversion creeping into the Western Hemisphere, the kind we are fighting in Vietnam.

If he had it to do over, he would land the marines again.

Important in the story is the fact that U.S. forces in Santo Domingo have evacuated many more nationals of other countries than our own countrymen.

MANY MOVED OUT

In all about 2,000 Americans were moved out. And more than 2,500 citizens of 45 other nations.

They include people from Canada, China, Europe, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bulgaria—the world. Latin Americans evacuated include Argentines, Bolivians, Brazilians, Chileans, Colombians, Costa Ricans, Cubans, Dominicans, Ecuadorians, Salvadorians, Guatemalans, Haitians, Panamanians, Nicaraguans, Mexicans, Peruvians, Uruguayans, Venezuelans, and Jamaicans.

These are the people you might ask whether Mr. Johnson should have sent in the marines.

[From the Washington Daily News, May 31, 1965]

CASTRO THREAT IN CRISIS WAS REAL—OAS (By Virginia Prewett)

Latin Americans who balk at supporting the new militant role of the Organization of American States should read the report the OAS ambassadors themselves made on

the threat of Communist subversion in the Dominican Republic.

When the OAS special peace commission turned in its formal report, its members also answered, in a closed session, the direct question about the extent of Communist involvement in the Dominican crisis.

NO DISSENT

The Ambassadors of Colombia, Argentina, and Brazil, without dissent from those of Guatemala and Panama, the other two peace team members, stated their belief that the forces of Col. Francisco Caamano Deno were during the crisis heavily infiltrated by pro-Castroites.

They said the Santo Domingo diplomatic corps agreed with this view.

Ambassador Alfredo Vazquez Carrizosa of Colombia reported:

"With regard to the sector led by Col. Francisco Caamano, whom I do not know personally to be a Communist, there are numerous persons on his side that, if they are not members of the Communist Party, are actively in favor of Fidel Castro's system of government or political purposes."

Argentina's member of the peace team, Ambassador Ricardo M. Colombo, said the above was "affirmed by a large number of representatives of the Diplomatic Corps," in Santo Domingo.

NO AUTHORITY

Ambassador Ilmar Penna Marinho of Brazil said there was "a complete collapse of public authority. The country became a sort of no man's land."

"The arsenal had been given to the people and an entire disoriented population of adolescents and fanatics was taking up modern automatic arms, in a state of excitation that was further exacerbated by constant radio broadcasts of a clearly subversive nature."

He said that no one believed that either Juan Bosch or Col. Caamano was a Communist. But he said it was agreed by the majority of the Ambassadors at Santo Domingo, that in the anarchy "any organized group that landed on the island could dominate the situation" and the revolution that had been democratic in its origins "could be rapidly converted into a Communist insurrection."

[From the Washington Daily News, June 9, 1965]

U.S. PRESS HIT FOR STORIES ON VITAL SPEECH (By Virginia Prewett)

U.S. press coverage of the Dominican crisis has become the subject of an international debate. Among incidents that liberal Latin Americans are now deploring is that an extremely important pronouncement by a great Latin American statesman was compressed in the U.S. press into a stark, one-point comment.

When ex-President Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela June 3 spoke to more than 800 members and guests of the Inter-American Association for Democracy and Freedom in New York, he did indeed, as our press highlighted, say unilateral U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic was, in his Spanish term, "repudiable."

Depending on your ear for languages, this can mean "repudiate-able" or "objectionable" or perhaps best of all, "inacceptable."

ONLY A PART

But this was not by far the whole Betancourt message, as the press reports implied. Rather it was a preliminary statement of the speaker's conviction that unilateral intervention must not become acceptable in the Inter-American system after so great an effort has been spent to make it unacceptable.

The Venezuelan statesman said the outcome of the Dominican intervention will be fateful for U.S. relations in the hemisphere and fatal to the Organization of American States unless the outcome is "the reestab-

lishment of constitutionality and democracy" and not another military dictatorship.

Then he began firing his salvos. Preserving Latin America from "new Cubas," he said, or "further Sovietizing misadventures" is "an inescapable duty and responsibility."

This can be done, he said, only when OAS maintains in function an effective mechanism for collective action "directed alike against the perils of Communist expansion and the present reality of arbitrary and self-elected governments."

He warned:

"In all the Latin American countries where usurper governments are in power, peoples' rebellions are incubating, similar to that which has shaken the Dominican nation to its roots."

The Communists infiltrate these uprisings because they are trained for violent subversion and not for peaceful indoctrination. Their most favorable climate is insurrection."

Dr. Betancourt stressed the urgency of the thesis—now so well proved in both Cuba and the Dominican Republic—that Latin American governments not originating at the polls—"those that are dictatorial and at the service of the wealthy minorities, national and foreign"—are excellent breeding grounds for uprisings and collective upheavals, "which the Communists take advantage of."

The true pacification of Latin America, he said, categorically, will not be possible until an OAS mechanism, backed by democratic Latin governments and the United States guarantees democratic regime.

DEPOSED DOMINICAN CHIEF—REID CABRAL BLAMES COMMUNISTS FOR REVOLT

(By John T. Skelly)

WASHINGTON, July 15.—The deposed head of the Dominican Republic triumvirate, Donald Reid Cabral, today questioned President Johnson's view that the Dominican uprising was democratic in origin but was immediately taken over by Communist forces.

In his speech before the National Press Club, Cabral said:

"What happened in Santo Domingo on that fateful day of April 24, was not a conventional Latin American military coup that got out of hand and, as one observer put it, was taken over by the Communists in a flash almost as rapid and blinding as a nuclear explosion."

"To the contrary, it was a revolution that had long been planned by European and Havana-trained Communists, it was triggered by Communists, and to this day remains in the hands of hard-core Communists."

(On June 1, President Johnson said: "The Communists did not, in our judgment, originate this revolution, but they joined it and they participated in it. They were active in it, and in a good many places they were in charge of it.")

However, he backed up the President's decision to send in American marines and paratroopers. Reid Cabral also expressed hope that the Inter-American Peace Force would not stay in the Dominican Republic longer than necessary.

"No Dominican can be free of sadness at seeing his country occupied by foreign troops, but President Johnson's courageous decision in sending marines and paratroopers to the Dominican Republic without a shadow of a doubt saved thousands of lives and spared us occupation today by Soviet troops, such as those now in Cuba."

"I am convinced that the Inter-American Peace Force will not remain in the Dominican Republic for a moment longer than is necessary, and that my country will have suffered less from their temporary presence than it would have suffered from permanent occupation by extra-continental forces."

Reid Cabral said that he did not think "it prudent or wise to attempt to hold elections

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too soon after the installation of a provisional government."

In a question and answer period, he said that many of the Communists in the revolution entered the Dominican Republic by boats from Cuba. He said that the only way to get rid of Castro and Communist infiltration in other Latin American countries was by a complete isolation of Cuba.

Asked to supply some specific names of the hard-core Communists who control the revolution in the Dominican Republic, he answered that it was difficult since most of them keep out of sight.

"They don't show their faces," he said. "However, one of the leaders is Pedro Mir."

(Pedro Julio Mir Valentin is listed on the U.S. Embassy's list of 53 and has traveled to Cuba and the Soviet Union.)

In answer to a question he explained that there is much fear in the Dominican Republic now and under these circumstances "only the extreme left can win."

"How can a free and honest election be held in this poisoned and fear-ridden atmosphere?" he asked. "An election in such a climate would be a mockery, and only the extreme left could emerge victorious," he said.

Reid Cabral said that the deposed President Juan Bosch introduced racial and class hatred to the country for the first time in its history. Asked if he would serve in a coalition government with Bosch, he said at this moment in history every responsible Dominican should work for the good of the country.

INDOCTRINATION COURSE REVEALS AIMS OF REBELS

(By John T. Skelly)

SANTO DOMINGO.—G-5, indoctrination branch of the constitutional government headed by Col. Francisco Caamaño Deno is controlled by the Social Christians. However, representatives from the PRD, the largest political party in the rebel zone, are also from the armed forces as well as from the Marxist-Leninist-Fidelista group. They lecture at every command post or commando in Ciudad Nueva every night.

The two non-Marxist parties with the most influence in the zone are the PRSC (Social Christians) and the PRD—Partido Revolucionario Dominicano—the party of deposed President Juan Bosch, now in exile in Puerto Rico. These two parties joined in January 1965, in the pact of Rio Piedra, Puerto Rico, to return the Dominican Republic to government under the constitution of 1963, that was in effect when President Juan Bosch was overthrown in September of that year.

The principal Dominican military officers who were not part of the Rio Piedra Pact, but who were in the conspiracy to overthrow the triumvirate headed by Donald Reid Cabral, were Col. Francisco Caamaño Deno, Col. Miguel Hernandez Ramirez, and Col. Rafael Fernandez, the leader of the military. He was the liaison man with the PRD and the Social Christians. According to persons who signed the Rio Piedra document, the PSD, the 14th of June, knew about the conspiracy but at no time were an active part of it nor were they ever consulted.

Thus, as soon as the Caamaño government was installed the key jobs like indoctrination courses were controlled by the PRD and PRSC.

The following is a list of topics that are discussed nightly at rebel indoctrination courses:

"1. The Constitutionalist uprising, its meaning and objectives—a precedent in the Dominican Republic and Latin America."

"2. Constitutionalism in Latin America—past and present situation."

"3. Imperialism in history. American Intervention. (a) U.S. imperialism, (b) Russian imperialism."

"4. The OAS and its functions as a Ministry of Colonial Affairs of the United States."

"5. Why the United States is an empire."

"6. Latin American integration."

"7. Human Rights. The U.N. Declaration of Human Rights."

"8. Makeup of the family, the state, and society."

"9. The Dominican Republic revolution."

"10. The structure of the constitutionalist government."

Each command post in the rebel zone is represented by members of all political parties, as well as thousands of independents who before the uprising did not belong to any organized party. The number of exact command posts and members in each unit is a military secret.

In some posts, members are all armed and estimated at anywhere from 25 to 150-200. The Social Christians have one such post located on one of the corners of Plaza Independencia. Their office occupies the top floor of a two-story building.

They are the only command post in the zone made up entirely of armed men from one party. Communist groups have leaders distributed throughout the various command posts. In five or six posts they are in charge of the commandos.

Almost all weapons in the command posts have been registered with the military officers who operate their own little armed forces. The Caamaño officers conduct their own court martials. Those found guilty of violations of any of the constitutionalist government's rules and regulations are packed off to jail in the Ozama Fortress where they are separated from prisoners of the other side.

The Social Christians who lecture to the commandos are all well versed in Social Christian ideology. They are university graduates, many who have studied in their own colleges, as well as universities in the United States and Latin America.

They have all passed through IFEDEC (Instituto de Formacion Democrata Cristiana—Institute for the Formation of Christian Democracy) in Caracas, the hemisphere indoctrination center for all young Christian Democrats. It is conducted by professors from Latin America and Europe and maintained by contributions of Christian Democratic Parties in Europe and Latin America.

One of the principal courses offered to the youths is the history of Marxism and the ways of communism. Thus the Dominican Social Christians who lecture to command posts—as well as the Social Christians and other rebels who are occasionally exposed to Marxist theories—are well aware of the Communist line.

All lecturers in the constitutionalist government courses have sworn to be as objective as possible in their presentation of material. They must not present material from a strict party line, whether it be PRD, PRSC, or Marxist.

One of the PRSC lecturers says that on some subjects—like family life, the state and society in general—each side presents the material according to its beliefs. The audience asks questions.

Many of the armed rebels—ranging in age from 16 to 21—are sons of laborers and farmers. They invariably show eagerness to form a workers party as the nucleus of the revolution.

One point that the PRSC lecturers have trouble with is American and Russian imperialism. Everytime they bring up the subject of Russian imperialism, there are heated debates from the Marxists.

"We try to tell them that the Russians are imperialist as well as Americans, but they reject this argument. They always counter-argue by pointing out that American troops are occupying our country, not Russian troops," the lecturer said.

The Social Christians explain their position by saying:

"We know that the Russians are worse in that they deny all freedoms while in the United States you have basic freedoms. But your freedoms are for your own people. Your foreign policy denies other people freedom."

"We cannot afford at this time to attack the Communists. We have to let the people see that we are on their side in this fight against the Americans. Maybe someday we will say something nice about the Americans."

The Dominican Social Christians are divided, not in numbers but in leadership. One of the founders of the party, Guido D'Allesandro, was put out early this year because he followed the "linea suave"—soft line—as opposed to the "linea dura"—hard line—of the present leadership of the party.

Those who follow the soft line favored closer relations with the U.S. Embassy, like attending embassy functions and receptions, or trying to get along with the Triumvirate. The hard line advocates, such as President Antonio Rosario, believe it unwise to be friendly with the U.S. Embassy.

The PRSC, founded in 1961, forms part of ODCA (Organizations Democrata Christina de America), the hemisphere-wide organization of Christian Democrat parties. For this reason, both President Frei of Chile and Rafael Caldera of Venezuela have denounced the U.S. landings in the Dominican Republic.

The fact that President Frei, first Christian Democrat to be elected chief of state of a Latin American country, has endorsed the Constitutionalist government of President Caamaño has given the Dominican PRSC's stock new value in the eyes of the masses.

The PRSC's slogan in the revolution is "green light for the poor of the Americas." They have thousands of posters all over the rebel zone. The man who operates their headquarters in the absence of Dr. Antonio Rosario in exile in New York, is Andres Lockward.

Lockward, a public accountant by profession, studied the cooperative movement at the University of Wisconsin for a year. He sits behind a plain wooden desk, machine-gun by his side, and directs both the military and political operation. He frequently smiles and appears to have the right temperament for the frustrations and confusions that go on continuously in the constitutional government.

The PRSC, Lockward says, will not participate in the Provisional Government. It is, however, fully behind the Caamaño government. The probable President of the Provisional Government, Hector Garcia Godoy, conferred with Lockward and his top advisers last week for about an hour.

Backing up Lockward in the high command is an attractive mother of eight children, nonpracticing physician, Dra. Josefina Padilla. Two of her oldest boys, 18 and 19, participated in the fighting and are now part of the yellow helmets MP's of the constitutionalist.

The PRSC's got 60,000 votes in the last free elections in 1962. Lockward points out that they had at least 150,000 but that many voted for Bosch, because they knew that the PRSC's could not win. The PRSC's will not say how many armed followers they have in the rebel zone. They point out, however, that in addition to the party militant, they have the Christian workers with them (CASC).

Furthermore, they point out, the leaders and members of most Catholic groups in the Dominican Republic have joined them in the fight to restore the constitution. These groups include BRUC (the Christian bloc at the university), JRC, Young Christian Revolutionaries, and FEDELAC (the agrarian Christian leagues), that are spread throughout the country.

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The PRSC's, mostly young, are enthusiastic. However, there are many sympathizers to their cause who raise serious doubts about their ability to organize and their ability to meet the Communists head on.

This also appears to be the U.S. view toward the PRSC in the Dominican Republic as well as the other Christian Democrat parties in the hemisphere.

Friends of the Dominican Social Christians point out that the Communists are always well organized and disciplined, follow a dictatorial line, and will eventually make fools of the Social Christians. These sources believe that the PRSC's are too demagogic in their attacks on the United States.

Lockward and the other PRSC's laugh this off. They point out that the Communist groups—MPD, PSP, and 14th June movement—are small and lack leadership. They think that the Communists should be allowed to participate in elections as they did in Chile. Meantime, the PRSC's continue, along with the other rebels, to chant, "Quisquaya sí—Yankees no."

[From the Latin American desk at Time magazine]

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: THE COUP THAT BECAME A WAR

Led by tanks with 90-millimeter cannon and armored troop carriers, the 2d Battalion of the 8th U.S. Marines rolled across the road dust of a once trip polo field on the western outskirts of Santo Domingo and moved cautiously into the war torn capital of the Dominican Republic. As the columns churned down Avenida Independencia, past the empty side streets, people suddenly appeared in windows and doorways. Some waved. Others stared. A few spoke. "I wish the Americans would take us over," muttered a woman. A man nearby sighed and nodded. "Since they are here, we had better take advantage of it."

In counterpoint to those desperate words of welcome, the rattle and burp of rebel gunfire echoed from the smoking city center barely a mile up the road. Down the street went the marines, most of them green, all of them scared, grimly clutching M14 rifles, M80 machineguns and 3.5-inch bazookas. Now the firing grew in intensity, and rebel bullets whined past the U.S. troops. Near the U.S. Embassy, two marines caught the full blast from a hidden machinegun nest in an unfinished building a short distance away. Nine more were wounded before bazooka men came up to blast the nest to shreds.

At approximately the same time, a battalion of the U.S. 82d Airborne Division rolled out of San Isidro airbase, 14 miles away on the other side of the city. Linking up with loyal Dominican troops, the GIs drove up to the bridge spanning the Ozama River—and into another volley of rebel fire. Three hours passed and the casualty toll mounted to 20 wounded before the U.S. forces could declare their objectives secured: the paratroopers to clear the approaches to the Duarte Bridge into Santo Domingo, the marines to carve a 3.5-square-mile international zone out of the city as a refuge for U.S. nationals and anyone else who hoped to remain alive in a city gone berserk in the bloodiest civil war in recent Latin American history.

TO THE WALL

It was the first time that U.S. troops had gone ashore on business in the Caribbean since 1916, the first time since 1927, when marines landed in Nicaragua, that U.S. forces had intervened in any Latin American nation. Yet if ever a firm hand was needed to keep order, last week was the time and the Dominican Republic was the place. In 7 confused days of coup, counterattack, and mounting warfare, the small Caribbean island republic had experienced a bloodbath

surely as violent, and certainly more prolonged than the Bay of Pigs invasion by Cuban exiles against Fidel Castro.

No one had an accurate count of the casualties as frenzied knots of soldiers and civilians roamed the streets, shooting, looting and herding people to their execution with cries of "Paredón. Paredón." (To the wall. To the wall.) Some reports put the dead at around 2,000, with the wounded perhaps 5 times that. The Dominican Red Cross was burying people where they lay. In the hospitals, harried doctors were operating by flashlight and without anesthetics, Santo Domingo was a city without power, without water, without food, without any semblance of sanity. The rebels executed at least 110 opponents, hacked the head off a police officer and carried it about as a trophy.

In the narrow sense, U.S. troops were there merely to protect some 2,400 terrified U.S. citizens and other foreign nationals after U.S. Ambassador William Tapley Bennett, Jr. had informed Washington that Dominican authorities wanted U.S. help, that they could no longer guarantee the safety of American lives. In a much larger sense, the troops were there quite simply to prevent another Cuba in the Caribbean. What had happened, in its blindest terms, was an attempt by highly trained Castro-Communist agitators and their followers to turn an abortive comeback by a deposed Dominican President into a "war of national liberation."

The fighting started as a revolt by a group of junior officers in favor of ousted President Juan Bosch, currently in exile in Puerto Rico. Within 3 days, that military revolt fizzled. But not before vast stocks of arms had been passed out to pro-Bosch civilians and their Castroite allies, who succeeded in transforming the attempted coup into a full-scale civil war.

FLANK SPEED AHEAD

The Dominican most responsible for the U.S. military presence was Eufasio Wessin y Wessin, a tough little brigadier general who commands the country's most powerful military base and at the time the marines landed was the key force for law and order. Twice before, General Wessin y Wessin, 40, had relied on his planes and tank-equipped supporting troops to settle political disputes in the Dominican Republic. He was the man who deposed Juan Bosch in 1963, after a series of angry confrontations over Communist infiltration in the government. Now he was fighting again, as he saw it, to prevent a political struggle from becoming a Communist takeover. And for help this time, he called on the United States. Said Wessin y Wessin: "We saved the country by only a hair. The conspiracy was very big. The majority of people did not even know what was going on."

The U.S. decision to go in involved well-known risks. Memories of previous U.S. interventions are still very much alive in Latin America; the words "Yankee imperialism" are a rallying cry for leftists everywhere.

President Johnson weighed the possible damage to U.S. prestige and to the Alliance for Progress, huddling with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, CIA Boss William Raborn. As the situation grew more alarming by the hour he, snapped: "I will not have another Cuba in the Caribbean." At last orders went out to Task Force 124, centered on the aircraft carrier Borer and with 1,800 combat-ready marines, to make flank speed for Santo Domingo. Another set of orders started the 82d Airborne at Fort Bragg, N.C., toward its C-124 and C-130 transports.

On TV, Johnson explained his decision to the Nation. "The United States Government has been informed by military authorities in the Dominican Republic that American lives are in danger," said the President. "I have

ordered the Secretary of Defense to put the necessary American troops ashore in order to give protection to hundreds of Americans who are still in the Dominican Republic and to escort them safely back to this country. This same assistance will be available to the nationals of other countries, some of whom have already asked for our help."

The Soviets, Red Chinese and Cubans reacted with howls about imperialist aggression. In a shrill May Day speech, Castro called the U.S. landing "one of the most criminal and humiliating actions of this century." The comment from the rest of Latin America was surprisingly mild. Few of the expected mobs materialized to hurl rocks at U.S. Embassies. Chile's President, Eduardo Frei and Venezuela's Raúl Leoni issued public statements deploring the U.S. landings. But privately, many Latin American statesmen admitted the necessity for quick U.S. action. Some even went on record about it. Mexico's Foreign Ministry said that it regretted a move "which evokes such painful memories," but recognized the humanitarian reasons and hoped the marines stay "will be as brief as possible." Added Argentina's Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Zavala Ortiz: "Sometimes those who appear as intervening actually are only reacting against a hidden intervention."

The Argentine was talking directly to Fidel Castro. The 1962 missile confrontation may have taken Russian IRBMs out of Cuba—or so the United States believes—but it did nothing to halt Castro's campaign of subversion around the hemisphere. According to U.S. intelligence, Cuba training schools turn out more than 1,500 American graduates each year as guerrilla cadres. Venezuela's Army has been chasing them through the interior without notable success. Colombia's even more expert army no sooner cleaned out the country's bandits than a pair of Castro-style guerrilla bands cropped up in the same Andean hills. There have been reports of Communist guerrillas in Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, Argentina, Brazil—and of course the Dominican Republic, for which Castro has a special affinity. Way back in September 1947 Fidel himself, then a student, was involved in an unsuccessful attempt to launch a 1,100-man invasion force from Cuba.

Considering the island's ugly history, it is a wonder that the Dominican Republic's leftists did not make their move long before. The tinder for revolution has been building for generations, and in the unstable years after dictator Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, the Dominican military has been the strongest anti-Communist influence. Most often it was in the person of Wessin y Wessin.

The son of poor Lebanese immigrants, Wessin is a rare bird among the fine-feathered Dominican officers. He prefers fatigues or uniforms to fancy uniforms, scorns the usual fruit salad decorations, and no one has ever accused him of growing rich on graft. He lives in a modest \$12,000 concrete house with his wife and two sons, enjoys cockfighting and baseball. He is painfully shy among strangers, speaks only Spanish, and seldom says much. But he is a devout Catholic in a part of the world where males pay little attention to their religion, and he regards communism with a bleak, uncompromising hatred. As commander of the military training establishment at San Isidro airbase, he instituted mandatory Sunday Mass for recruits, taught courses in how to spot Communists. He also has at his disposal a sizable chunk of the Dominican Republic's firepower: 8 F-51 propeller-driven fighters, 8 Vampire jets, a company of 23 tanks, and 2 infantry battalions totaling 1,700 men.

In 1962, Wessin y Wessin helped stop the Armed Forces Secretary from overthrowing the seven-man civilian Council of State that administered the country after Trujillo. A

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year later, he led a coup to depose the country's newly elected President, Juan Bosch, whose promises of reform won wide praise but whose attitude toward Communists was highly permissive. Bosch declared an amnesty for all exiles, permitted scores of far leftists to return from Cuba and Europe—"the better to watch them," he said. When Bosch refused to restrict the Communists' right to travel and even allowed trips to Cuba, Wessin y Wessin demanded that the President outlaw the Communist Party. Bosch refused and demanded Wessin y Wessin's resignation. Instead, in September 1963, the general staged the bloodless coup that ousted Bosch and sent him into exile in Puerto Rico. "As far as I'm concerned," says Wessin y Wessin, "Bosch is a Communist."

Donald Reid Cabral, 41, a Santo Domingo auto dealer, emerged as the leader of the civilian triumvirate that succeeded Bosch. With the general's backing, Reid instituted some beginning social and economic reforms, even tried to stop the time-honored military practice of smuggling in goods from overseas. All the while, Bosch's supporters plotted for their leader's return—and apparently found considerable backing among young army officers. Bosch's men also found encouragement among the country's leftists, notably the Castroite 14th of June movement, which attempted an abortive anti-Trujillo invasion from Cuba in 1959. To exactly what extent Bosch himself knew of the Castroite involvement is unclear. The fact remains that in the past few weeks, according to intelligence sources, considerable numbers of Cuban-trained Dominicans have been slipping across the Windward Passage. Last week three boats loaded with about 65 Dominicans were seen leaving the Cuban port of Santiago. "I reported the conspiracy to President Reid for 15 or 20 consecutive days," says Wessin y Wessin, "but he paid no attention to me."

"KILL A POLICEMAN"

On Saturday, April 24, at 3:30 p.m., three army sergeants and a handful of civilians seized Radio Santo Domingo and announced a "triumphant revolution to restore Juan Bosch to the Presidency." The announcement was enough to send the crowds boiling out onto the streets, where agitators whipped them into a frenzy. Army units at two nearby bases joined the revolt, and mobs invaded the central fire station, stole the engines and drove them all night, sirens howling, through the city streets.

The next morning, high-ranking army officers, anxious to use the revolt as an excuse for getting rid of Reid, told him that they would not fire on the rebel troops. Reid had no choice but to resign, and fled into hiding at a friend's home. It was already too late to smother the mob's pent-up passions. Insistently, the rebel radio exhorted: "Kill a policeman! Kill a policeman!" "Come into the street and bring three or four others with you!" The frightened army men who had forced Reid's resignation turned the government over to lawyer Rafael Molina Ureña, a Bosch supporter, until Bosch himself could return. In San Juan, Bosch announced that he would be in Santo Domingo "just as soon as the air force sends a plane for me."

"BRING THEM TO US"

The Dominican Air Force was loyal to Wessin y Wessin. Up to this point he had only watched from the sidelines at San Isidro. At last he took a hand. Instead of a DC-3 to San Juan, he ordered his F-51's to strafe the palace and the approaches to the Duarte Bridge, which his tanks would cross to reach the city. Several people were killed in the raids, which roused the rebel radio and TV stations to a new frenzy. Well-known members of three Communist groups, including the 14th of June, appeared on TV in Cuban-style uniforms to harangue the audience into

action. They broadcast the addresses of loyalists' supporters and relatives. "Wessin's sister lives at 25 Santiago" "Find the pilots' families and bring them to us." And the mob did. Wives and children of air force pilots were dragged before TV cameras. Warned the announcer: "We are going to hold them at the bridge. If you strafe there, you kill them."

On Sunday afternoon, army defectors distributed four truckloads of weapons among rebels in the Ciudad Nueva, a low-cost housing area in the city's southeast: bazookas, .50-cal. machineguns, automatic rifles. Pro-Bosch rebels numbering about 2,000 to 4,000 began waging an urban guerrilla war, making forays into the business district, thus paralyzing the city. Rebel mobs sacked the new Pepsi-Cola plant, set fire to the offices of a pro-Reid newspaper, destroyed Reid's auto agency.

From his command post at San Isidro, Wessin y Wessin announced operación libre to liberate the city. The army garrison at San Cristóbal rallied to his side; the navy joined in, lobbed 3-inch shells at the palace. Air Force planes made repeated strafing runs. Then across the river rumbled the tanks, firing almost point-blank into rebel Ciudad Nueva.

Meanwhile the U.S. Embassy was gathering Americans and other foreigners at the Embajador Hotel for evacuation. More than 500 people were waiting at the hotel and on the grounds when a group of rebel teenagers, most of them kids from 16 to 18, suddenly appeared waving burp guns. They lined the men up against a wall as if to execute them, then fired their automatic weapons harmlessly into the air. "Those brats just seemed to delight in terrorizing us," said one U.S. housewife. Only the arrival of a rebel army colonel stopped the gunplay and permitted the removal of the refugees to the port of Haina, 12 miles away. There the U.S. Navy was already waiting to load 1,172 of them aboard transports. Some 1,000 other Americans elected to stay behind, hoping the disorder would soon be ended.

COLLECTIVE MADNESS

For a time, it did seem about over. Deciding that they were licked, most of the leaders of the army revolt trooped into the U.S. Embassy, asked U.S. Ambassador Tapley Bennett to arrange a cease-fire. He called Wessin y Wessin, who immediately agreed. Fearing reprisals, dozens of rebels, including Acting President Molina, fled to political asylum in foreign embassies. A junta composed of pro-Wessin y Wessin officers was sworn in as a provisional government.

The surrender of the army rebels had little effect on the civilians, who by now were beyond recall. All day Wednesday the fighting intensified; Wessin y Wessin's troops launched assault after assault in an attempt to cross the Duarte Bridge. Each time they were driven back. President Johnson ordered the first 405 marines ashore to protect American lives at Embajador and to guard the U.S. Embassy downtown. Helicopters evacuating the remaining Americans and other nationals drew rebel gunfire. Snipers opened up on the Marine company dug in around the Embassy; the leathernecks fired back, killing four rebels. The Salvadoran Embassy was sacked and burned; shots spat-tered into the Mexican, Peruvian and Ecuadorian Embassies. "This is collective madness," U.S. Ambassador Bennett told newsmen. "I don't know where we go from here."

LIST OF REDS

In San Juan, Bosch had his kind of answers. He charged that the United States had been duped into intervening by military gangsters in the Dominican Republic. "The only thing that Wessin y Wessin has done," he said, "is to bomb the first city of America like a monster." Bosch conceded that "a few Communists" might be fighting on his side,

but insisted that his supporters were in complete command of the rebels. In reply, the State Department released a list of 58 Communist agitators, many of them graduates of Red Chinese and Czechoslovakian political warfare schools, who were leading the street fighting. Some of the leaders: Jaime Durán, a Cuban-trained member of the Dominican Young Communists' Party; José D. Issa, a Communist who received guerrilla training in Cuba, visited Prague in 1963, Moscow in 1964; Fidelio Despradel Roques, a Peiping-lining Communist.

The tragic fact was that no one seemed to be in real command any more—not Bosch's people, not the remaining army rebels, not the Communists. At one rebel headquarters in the Ciudad Nueva, a group of young rebels pleadingly told Time's reporters: "We are not Communists. We are active anti-Communists. We are fighting for the constitution, for Bosch. When the constitution is restored, we will keep the Communists out. We can handle them." Very possibly those youngsters genuinely thought that they were fighting for democracy. But before anyone could talk rationally about restoring anything in the Dominican Republic, there had to be a cease-fire, and at week's end that still seemed beyond any immediate grasp.

Meeting in emergency session in Washington, the Organization of American States asked Msgr. Emanuele Clarizio, the papal nuncio in Santo Domingo, to negotiate a cease-fire until a five-man truce team could fly down to work out a lasting settlement. Wessin y Wessin and other loyalist commanders and some rebel elements agreed under two conditions: that no one would be punished for any acts during the fighting, and that the OAS would supervise the formation of a provisional government. Even as Msgr. Clarizio reported the hopeful news to Washington, rebel forces captured Ozama Fortress, the police headquarters, with its stocks of weapons and ammunition. The shooting continued throughout Saturday, and the rebels claimed 10,000 armed fighters compared with 3,000 for Wessin y Wessin's loyalist forces.

DRIVING IN EARNEST

That was probably a gross exaggeration. However many there were, there was no letup in the bloodbath or in the sniping at U.S. troops. Going into action for the first time in earnest, the 82d Airborne joined Dominican Infantrymen in pushing out from the bridge perimeter, fought their way through the city's heart to link up with a Marine column attacking from the western International Zone. The drive cost another two U.S. dead, at least a dozen wounded—and brought an announcement from Washington that 2,000 more troops were being sent in bringing the total contingent to 7,000 men.

The likelihood is that some sort of peace, either through force of arms or OAS persuasion, will eventually be imposed. But the dangers of anarchy-fed Castroism will remain for a long while. To prevent that, President Johnson has accepted a clear and unwavering U.S. responsibility. "The United States," said the President, "will never depart from its commitment to the preservation of the right of all of the free people of this hemisphere to choose their own course without falling prey to international conspiracy from any quarter." The meaning was as unmistakable as the presence of U.S. combat troops in Santo Domingo.

HISPANIOLA: A HISTORY OF HATE

"There, in that high and mountainous land, is the land of God." The date was September 12, 1504, the speaker was Christopher Columbus, and the occasion was his fourth and final departure from the island he discovered in 1492. Columbus named it La Isla Española because it re-

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mind him of Spain. For the Spaniards and French who followed him, for the Indians they slaughtered, for the Negro slaves they imported, and for anyone within a bullet's range last week, Hispaniola was more like hell on earth than the warm, jasmine-scented paradise it might be. Last week market, the third time in 50 years that U.S. troops have been forced to intervene in the affairs of the forlorn, hate-filled little Caribbean island.

Hispaniola became Spain's first permanent colony in the New World, its key harbor and free port to all the Indies. From the Santo Domingo capital, Ponce de León sailed north to Florida, Balboa discovered the Pacific, Pizarro invaded Peru, and Cortés conquered Mexico. It was the site of Latin America's first cathedral in 1514, its first university in 1538. Even then it was a land of violence, where men carried the law in their knives, and the captains from Castile thought nothing of shearing an ear from a disobedient Indian or letting their dogs disembowel him.

Through war, wife and treaty, France managed to get possession of the 30,000-square-mile island toward the end of the 18th century. Concentrating on the western third of the mountainous land the French brought in thousands of colonists, and with them came vast numbers of Negro slaves from Africa. The French called their Caribbean possession Saint Domingue, termed it the "Queen of the Antilles." So it was. In the 1780's, its foreign trade approached \$140 million a year, with vast profits from sugar, coffee, cocoa, cotton and indigo flowing back home. Before long, 40,000 whites were holding it over 450,000 blacks. Then one night in August 1791, the island's painfully oppressed slaves rose in bloody revolt. Armed with pitchforks, torches and machetes and chanting voodoo dirges, they massacred 2,000 French planters and their families on the western third of the island.

HAITI

The fighting lasted more than a decade. France sent 20,000 troops to end the rebellion—only to see half of them wiped out by yellow fever and the rest thrown into disarray. In 1804, a former slave named Jean Jacques Dessalines proclaimed Haiti a free and independent nation and became its Governor General. "To draw up the charter of our independence," he felt, "would require the skin of a white man as parchment, his skull as an inkwell, his blood as ink, and a bayonet as a pen." Dessalines died by an assassin's bullet within 3 years. His successor, Henri Christophe, cared little for charters—black or white. He proclaimed himself King, set up a ludicrous aristocracy (including such titles as the Duke of Marigade and Count of Limonade), and ruled as a merciless despot until 1820, when his ambitions revolted, and he committed suicide by firing a silver bullet into his brain.

Over the next century, dictator followed dictator in Haiti. By 1910, rebellions had ousted 13 of Haiti's first 18 Presidents. Then, in the space of 47 months, one President was blown up in his palace, another was believed poisoned, three were deposed, and the last was grabbed by a mob and hacked into small pieces. President Woodrow Wilson finally ordered U.S. Marines to occupy the country in 1915. They remained 19 years—and gave Haiti the only true peace it has ever known. Acting through puppet Presidents, they disarmed rebels and bandits, built roads, irrigation projects, sanitation facilities, and organized schools and hospitals. F.D.R. withdrew the marines in 1934, and Haiti returned to its old ways: nine governments in 20 years, the last headed by François "Papa Doc" Duvalier, 58, a onetime country physician who took office in 1957, proclaimed himself "President for Life," and ruled through voodoo mysticism and the strong-arm terror of his 5,000-man Ton Ton Macoute secret police.

Of Haiti's 4,500,000 people, 90 percent are illiterate. Life expectancy is 32.6 years; per capita income has slipped to \$70 a year, lowest in the hemisphere. "Haitians," says Duvalier in his soft whisper, "have a destiny to suffer." And if his people complain, they can pray—from a 63-page "Catechism of the Revolution" turned out by the Government Printing Office and circulating last week in Port-au-Prince. The Lord's Prayer: "Our Doc who are in the National Palace for Life, hallowed be Thy name by present and future generations, Thy will be done at Port-au-Prince and in the provinces. Give us this day our new Haiti and never forgive the trespasses of the enemies of the Fatherland, who spit every day on our Country. Let them succumb to temptation and under the weight of their own venom. Deliver them not from any evil. Amen."

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

In the Dominican Republic, the people speak Spanish rather than Creole French. Its soil is more fertile, and its population density only half that of its smaller neighbor. What it shares is a common history of chaos. As in Haiti, bloody rebellions drove out the European governors, first the French in 1809, then the Spanish, who had tried to reassert their dominion. No sooner had the Dominican Republic declared its independence in 1821 than it was invaded by neighboring Haiti, which occupied the country for 22 brutal years. The Haitians banned all foreign priests, severed papal relations, closed the University of Santo Domingo, and levied confiscatory taxes. Not until 1844, when Haiti was torn by one of its many civil wars, did the Dominican Republic finally break free—only to stagger through 22 revolutions over the next 70 years, including a brief period (1861–65) when it once again reverted to Spanish rule.

At one point, in 1869, the hapless Dominicans actually sought annexation by the United States and won support from President Ulysses S. Grant. Congress refused on the grounds that it would violate the country's sovereignty. In 1916, the United States did the next best thing—it sent in the Marines after a bloody series of revolts. Unlike the intervention in Haiti, there were no puppet presidents. In the words of the U.S. Navy's official order, it was "military occupation . . . military government . . . military law." The occupation lasted 8 years, and along with their public works, the Marines created a national police to keep peace after their departure. The police became the instrument for one more dictator: Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina, an ambitious colonel who rigged elections in 1930 and ruled the country for 31 deadening years.

Trujillo's favorite titles were "benefactor of the fatherland," "chief protector of the working class," "genius of peace." In a grim way, there was something to the brags. He imposed a rare order on his powder-keg country, built efficient hospitals, crisscrossed the country with good roads, built housing projects for his 2,900,000 people, improved the water supply, and increased literacy. Business prospered, and so did Trujillo—to the tune of an estimated \$800 million fortune. He and his family owned 65 percent of the country's sugar production, 12 of its 16 sugar mills, 35 percent of its arable land. Home was a dozen palaces and ranches dotted around the country, each with a full staff of servants who faithfully prepared every meal every day in case the benefactor stopped by.

Thousands of political opponents died in his secret police dungeons, mysterious auto accidents, and suicides. There were electric chairs for slow electrocution, another many-armed electrical device attached by tiny screws inserted into the skull, a rubber collar that could be tightened to sever a man's head, plus nail extractors, scissors for castration,

leather-tongued whips, and small rubber hammers. PA systems in the torture rooms carried every blood-curdling scream to other prisoners waiting their turn. If Trujillo favored a variety, he also favored volume. One October night in 1937, he ordered his army to eliminate all Haitian squatters in the Dominican Republic. In a 36-hour bloodbath, some 15,000 men, women, and children were massacred.

Trujillo's end came in 1961 when four gunmen intercepted his car on a lonely road outside the capital and riddled him with shotgun and pistol fire. In the 4 years since, the Dominican Republic has suffered four coups, and five changes of government, trying to find its way out of the political vacuum created by Trujillo's death. Democracy is still hardly more than a word in a land that has never known any law save force.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star, June 1, 1965]

SOME ANSWERS TO SECOND-GUESSERS

(By Eric Sevareid)

The tide of second guessing about the American intervention in Santo Domingo—as to its justification, its size, its methods and its aims—had reached oceanic proportions by the time this writer managed to get to the first European city established in the New World. There in what Columbus called "the land of God," had come the first teachers and preachers, yet here remains, after five centuries, one of the political hellholes of the hemisphere, its sordid streets once again thronged with armed men from abroad.

The scenes of bitter sorrow in Santo Domingo have been well described; there are other things, perhaps, worth putting down at this late date. I thought I had rarely seen such brave work by combat reporters, rarely such emotional involvement on the part of some of them, rarely such a wealth of unconfirmable reports and rumors, rarely such a disastrous lack of contact between reports and American officials who were not only physically remote but for a long time silenced by Presidential orders. And rarely have I read such certain conclusions in American press editorials about a phenomenon in which so much was uncertain and inconclusive.

For me it is impossible to believe that the Communist threat was a myth, impossible to believe that a democratic and stable government could have been formed by the impassioned leaders of thousands of armed and impassioned people, a vast number of them youngsters. It is hard for me to believe that we could not have prevented the tragic fighting in the northern part of the city, easy to believe that we did prevent an even more awful bloodletting in the congested downtown region.

I cannot understand the cry that we put in far too many men. An airport, several miles of corridor and a safety sector with a long perimeter require thousands of soldiers who require other thousands to support and supply them. Nor can I understand the complaint that this President acted with too much haste.

Over many years I have been adjusted to the complaint of "too late with too little." I find it hard to make a quick switch to the complaint of "too soon with too much." I fail to understand the editorialist who points out with disdain that after all, there were only a few handfuls of Communists present.

In a very real sense their lack of numbers is their strength. It was because they were few that President Bosch had not bothered to deal severely with them. It was because they were few that they could do much of their work undetected. It was because they were few that they could act with rapidity when the explosion came. It was because they were few that foreign opinionmakers

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could make the Americans seem ridiculous and give us a propaganda defeat. As John Bartlow Martin reminds us, Communists do not make revolutions, they take them over.

Partly because of this—their small numbers—American troops could not invade the heart of the city, or allow anyone else to invade it.

You cannot risk causing many deaths in order to capture a few individuals and expect, ever, to justify such an action to anybody, certainly not to the American people. So, at this writing at least, the Dominican Communists remain, finding safety as they first found strength, in their numbers—their small numbers.

And their small number in various other Latin American countries lies near the heart of the profound dilemma that confronts the United States for the future. Revolts are brewing in other nations to the south. In all these revolts Communist elements will be present. Are we to put down every uprising because a Communist threat is present? Obviously we cannot, even though some of these uprisings probably will produce Communist governments. This is why Castro laughs in his beard. He believes the political metamorphosis of Latin America is not manageable on our terms.

But nothing in this realm of human action is inevitable; the game is not lost as long as we act on the assumption that it can be won. There are Latin societies strong enough to handle the Communists on their own. Others will be galvanized into counteraction by Communist victories or near victories close by their borders.

Meantime the nonsense arguments should stop. To say that the United States has kept the Dominican Republic from enjoying a free, stable democratic government is nonsense; we have given them another chance to find their feet on the long, hard road to democracy. To say that the real fear in Latin America is of American gunboat diplomacy is nonsense; every literate Latin American knows that American interventions have always been temporary while communism is permanent.

It is nonsense to indulge any longer the self-conscious idea that Latin America's troubles are the fault of the United States. Some are; most are the fault of Latin America. Its ways of life are superior to ours in more than a few respects, but not in respect to the art of government. In the last century and a half there have been in all of Latin America approximately 3,700 coups, rebellions, and civil wars.

[From the New York (N.Y.) Journal-American, May 16, 1965]

WORLD IN FOCUS: INTERVENTION VERSUS AGGRESSION

(By Pierre J. Huss)

The Soviet Union, Red China, and Communist Cuba never tire of branding U.S. military intervention in South Vietnam and in the Dominican Republic as "naked aggression." We are so accustomed to hearing this propaganda smear that we shrug it off. But the Reds know from the big lie technique that the oftener you tell a whopper the more will unconsciously sink into the minds of those you target as your next victim.

To set the record straight, then, what is intervention and aggression—especially if you put it in the light of the large-scale landing of U.S. Marines in the Dominican Republic? I ask one of the foremost experts in U.N. to answer that question, Ambassador Liu Chieh of Nationalist China.

I turn this column over to Ambassador Chieh:

"Intervention and aggression are not necessarily synonymous or interchangeable words. In recent world history most flagrant acts of aggression have been com-

mitted without involving overt and direct acts of intervention. In our day this type of concealed, indirect but carefully calculated aggression—usually carried out through the familiar tactics of infiltration, subversion, and the use of proxies—has been developed by the Communists into a fine art. Indeed, it has become the most favored, as well as the most effective tool of Communist foreign policy."

Ambassador Chieh added:

"Yet this type of aggression has received no careful consideration in the textbooks of international law. One of the basic tenets of international law is the concept of direct responsibility of states for their international conduct. In the Communist strategy of protracted conflict, direct action is more often than not avoided.

"This being so, it is often difficult to fasten on the Communist governments the precise legal blame, even when they have in fact committed legal aggression.

"The Communist governments do not set great store by bourgeois international law. Yet they do not hesitate to turn traditional judicial concepts to their own advantage. Now the U.S. action in the Dominican Republic was admittedly an act of intervention. The U.S. Government never concealed this fact. This intervention, far from being an aggression, was intended to accomplish the dual purpose of protecting American lives and forestalling the Communist takeover of a sister republic. So the U.S. action was in fact but a response to Communist intervention and aggression."

Ambassador Chieh emphasized that if a sovereign people in a helpless country are threatened by the Red foe, their right must be upheld to pick a government that is the choice of the popular majority.

"It should be remembered," he said, "that the right of self-determination can be properly exercised only in unfettered freedom.

"In the case of the Dominican Republic, there was ample evidence that Communist conspirators attempted to exploit the chaos and confusion that initially broke out in Santo Domingo. It would have been a mockery of the principle of self-determination if the Dominican people had been left at the mercy of these Communist adventurers."

[From the Washington (D.C.) Daily News, May 12, 1965]

U.S. DOMINICAN ACTION IS BOOST FOR VIETNAMESE

(By Ray Cromley)

President Johnson's quick, strong action in the Dominican Republic may have a major effect on morale in Vietnam.

A Vietnamese guerrilla fighter now in town says privately that "the United States Dominican stand is more significant to him than American raids in North Vietnam."

The northern raids have boosted South Vietnamese confidence markedly. But there has still been the nagging fear these bombings may be part of a U.S. buildup in preparation for negotiations. There's a strong belief in South Vietnam that negotiations mean defeat.

SOMETHING ELSE

Moving U.S. troops into the Dominican Republic, without shilly shallying, to stop a Red thrust in that tiny country, is something else again.

It means to this guerrilla fighter, and to other Vietnamese he is in contact with, that President Johnson really means to stop communism.

Since Laos, they don't believe promises or speeches.

But if Mr. Johnson is willing to stake U.S. prestige in the tiny Dominican Republic, then it's not likely, they reason, the Presi-

dent could afford to let Vietnam go down the drain.

By the same token, this Dominican action may be discouraging to Hanoi.

The nagging fear among South Vietnamese officials, military men, hamlet chiefs, police, and everyone else who has stuck his neck and his family's neck out in fighting the Communists, has been that the United States would pull out despite President Johnson's assurances to the contrary.

BIG QUESTION

The one question almost every Vietnamese I saw asked me on my trip through South Vietnam was, "Will the United States stay if the war is long and discouraging?"

These men knew a pullout would mean death for themselves and their families at the hands of Communists.

This worry about what the United States would do has not engendered courage. In some cases, it has meant that local officials hedged their bets and kept tightly to neutrality, straying neither to the Communist nor Government sides.

The feeling that the United States would leave accounts in sizable measure for Cambodia's Red China leanings, for Burma's careful leftist "neutrality," and for the cautiousness of millions of uncommitted people in southeast Asia.

EXPERIENCE

Experience in the mainland China and other Asian wars suggests that when the people are certain which side will win a war, they leap to that side in large numbers.

Because of the Korean, mainland China, and Laos wars, there's a strong feeling in Asia that the United States is good at "quickie" fights, but that it wears in long struggles. This feeling accounts for the belief in many Asian minds that in the long run the Reds will win.

The trickle of information from South Vietnam the past few days seems to indicate the Dominican action will help convince some doubters that the war is not in the Communist bag.

[From the Bridgeport (Conn.) Post, May 4, 1965]

AN ERROR RECTIFIED

It is now clear that the United States originally underestimated the role of Communists in the Dominican Republic. But when the error was discovered, it acted swiftly with armed forces.

That simplified analysis was made in informed diplomatic circles in Washington over the weekend following the turbulent week of rioting and shooting in Santo Domingo.

The United States sent nearly 5,000 marines and airborne troops into the island, solely to rescue American and other foreign citizens whose lives were endangered by the rising anarchy. President Johnson announced that 4,500 additional marines and paratroops were being sent to the Republic.

Some critics had been arguing that our military operation was larger than necessary, and was primarily intended to halt a rebellion which threatened to open the way to Communist domination of the little nation.

Actually, President Johnson's moves appear to have been based on both considerations. In his announcement that more troops were to be sent to Santo Domingo, President Johnson said their presence was necessary to secure the island against communism, as the Red uprising had been taken over by Communist conspirators directed from abroad.

This would seem clearly to mean that Castro and his deadly crews are behind the anarchy in the Dominican Republic. Law and order broke down completely when rebellious army leaders who started the uprising acknowledged they could not control

the elements they had set loose. Those elements were under control of hardcore Communists trained in Cuba and Czechoslovakia, and they began deliberate moves to attack U.S. nationals and property.

By last midweek more than 50 Communists had been identified, actively engaged in arming and leading toughs and criminals in an effort to set up a second Communist bastion in this hemisphere.

President Johnson moved quickly, despite the knowledge that many Latin Americans and Europeans would be infuriated by unilateral Yankee action reminiscent of gunboat diplomacy. The President took the action because he felt that at the moment there was no other course. It was certainly better to bruise Latin sensibilities than risk the deaths of U.S. citizens, and a continued trend to anarchy which would eventually make another Cuba out of the Dominican Republic.

UNDER FIRE IN SANTO DOMINGO: A WOMAN REPORTER'S ACCOUNT OF A DAY OF FIGHTING (By Dickey Chappelle)

SANTO DOMINGO.—Behind the seeping sandbags protecting us from the rebel machine gun—or was it guns—somewhere up the littered street, the paratroop sergeant squinted at nothing in particular and grunted like a chance, "Lousy. It's lousy. The whole lousy business."

I didn't answer him because the machine gun stuttered then and he raised himself a few inches to fire back three short, professional bursts. But I wanted to tell him that he had just said the most important thing about that Tuesday in Santo Domingo.

It was as lousy—as savage, brutal, messy, dirty—as any fighting I've seen Americans have to do in 20 years.

To them—no, to us for I was on their line for 18 hours that day last week—the stated mission of "peacekeeping" was an unspeakable joke. What I saw them do roof by roof and room by room and house by house was simply fight their way through a dozer blocks of real estate from which people had been—and kept right on—trying to kill them. By the time it was over, the area cleared of guns and gunners was only a few hundred yards larger than it had been at the beginning. But the sweaty, terrifying and bloody business under the white glare of the sun had gone on so long that I had to make an effort to remember stillness, or the sensation of feeling safe. Those were experience that belonged in another world a very long way from where I was.

AS THE DAY DAWNED

The sunrise that day had broken on that other world; we had talked about which outfit was going home and when and what souvenirs could be bought and how big the baby would be, a boy born the week before back at Fort Bragg to one of the recon scouts in the vanguard of U.S. troops here. One of the machinegunners told me he was just writing his dad in Wyoming about "the 13th day of quiet on my position" when suddenly it wasn't quiet any more. "I can't remember where I left the pencil and paper but I know I've fired 400 rounds today so far, and we sure aren't done yet," he finished the story, feeding a new belt into his weapon on a rooftop.

For most of the men, it was the fourth day of combat of their lives (they had undergone three late in April moving into their guard positions on the buffer zone between rebels and junta forces). It was utterly unlike any military tactic they had practiced; they never had rehearsed what to do if you were being shot at by "thousands of rounds of fire" (the official description from the OAS) and could neither see nor charge out toward the places the bullets were coming from.

But on this day their limited experience did not seem to bother them. The score of

dead from among their ranks in earlier fighting had taught them to keep their eyes on every roof and doorway before them and their fingers tight on their triggers. That way they could often spot the flicker of movement when a gunman on the other side pulled his weapon in or out through a window frame or porch or balcony.

What burdened them heavily was plain frustration under the surging symphony of gunfire. It was only a nagging anguish in the morning really, because the volume of incoming bullets built higher every hour, and so we could hope we were going to make an attack to suppress the fire. In the noon heat, when the order came to group ourselves in several protected side streets, we luxuriated in the knowledge that this was the first step toward attacking. But then we heard the battalion colonel acknowledge on his jeep radio the order to break up the waiting groups. The men were to be sent back to their static positions, the same old rooftops and road blocks and balconies where they had been in the first place. Even the sunshine dimmed with disappointment.

INTO NO MAN'S LAND

Through the afternoon, the sheer need to find the guns hitting and wounding among them drove little teams of troopers to dart and seep into the back yards of the No Man's Land they could not cross frontally. By dusk, their firing had diminished the incoming rounds to the point where I was again able to count the shots I heard (in 2 minutes, 62, including grenade blasts). By near-darkness, a jeep brought us hamburgers and fresh water only a block behind the forward positions and we stood around filling our mouths and canteens without ducking.

But then we tried to go back to the "front." It was Ruiz Street, and the rebel tank (destroyed by 106-millimeter recoilless rifle fire after it gunned off Trooper Richard Green's left leg) was still smoking over the body of its dead crewman. Here as we ran zig-zag across the street every one of us drew fire. ("You run like a ballerina—pretty slow, if you know what I mean," one soldier told me with amusement and contempt.)

"We can take care of those sniper jokers from down here," his sergeant reassured us, settling down on his elbow behind the earth bank left in the street by the rebels a week before as they dug out a tank trap.

A VOICE FROM A BALCONY

"Movement behind those parked cars down there, sarge—I see it," coolly called the voice of a paratrooper on an overhanging balcony. There were two cars, 200 yards forward of us on the rebel street.

There weren't any more words for a few minutes but I couldn't have heard them anyway over the four rifles talking next to me. Then a lieutenant with his upper arm tightly bandaged handed me his binoculars. The body of a man in a yellow shirt, who had just been hit as he ducked behind the nearest car, lay on the street.

The sergeant was grumbling that we still hadn't gotten the other sniper when the lieutenant, running bent over, came to us. He said, low, "Consolidate across Caracas Street—those are the orders."

"You mean, pull back the whole block?" asked the sergeant, rolling onto his other elbow.

"That's exactly what I mean," replied the officer, holding his bandaged arm with his good one as he crouched.

The sergeant swore. I said "It's a lousy business." He said, "You bet."

"YOU MUST KNOW THAT YOU HAVE BECOME LEGEND"—TRACING CASTRO'S BOATMAN BEHIND THE REBEL LINES IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

(By Dickey Chappelle)

SANTO DOMINGO.—"Ten to one—those are at least the odds against finding him," I

thought. Those were the chances against my locating in the Dominican Republic one man I'd known briefly 8 years before as a wounded fighter in Fidel Castro's Cuban guerrilla forces.

But there were some clues. One was the text of President Johnson's statement that the U.S. Government possessed hard evidence of Communist leadership in the Dominican rebel forces.

The second, from a book I'd written, was an excerpt of my story as a U.S. reporter inside the Castro army between Thanksgiving and Christmas, 1958. Marked in the margin was a passage describing a wounded, bearded officer who was "not even a Cuban but a Dominican fighting Batista now so Castro's men can fight Trujillo later." The wounded man had been known as "Castro's boatman," pilot of the ill-fated Gramma when it landed Fidel and his 80-odd cohorts from Mexico onto the beaches of Cuba's Oriente Province in 1956.

A CLUE IN THE NEWS

The final clue was a clipping from the National Observer, a report that Ramon Pichirilo Mejia, a Dominican who had served as helmsman of the Gramma, was now a secret rebel troop leader in his native land.

If I did find him, I wondered why he would confirm publicly his being a flesh-and-blood link between two Yankee-go-home fighting forces, one in Cuba and one in the Dominican Republic. But certainly there was no harm in asking. So I came to Santo Domingo.

For a week in the bullet-scarred Caribbean city my search uncovered nothing. He was said to be here, out in the country, back in Cuba. He was said to be alive, dead, wounded, a Red propaganda story, an American propaganda story.

It seemed I was on the right track, though. The PRD, the Constitutionalist Party of Col. Francisco Caamano Deno, exuded much of the atmosphere I remembered with increasing vividness from Castro's 26th of July movement. There were the same unkempt and youthful hoods swaggering the littered streets with the same rifles. (This was literal in regard to the weapons, for many of the first Fidelistas were armed with rifles they called "Santo Domingoes" after their place of manufacture in the Dominican Republic.) There was the same lip-twisted, sloganeering bitterness against the United States.

HONEYMOON WITH THE PRESS

Finally, at the rebel headquarters in the Copillo office building on Conde Street, there was the same honeymoon with the U.S. press that the Fidelistas, had once so profitably enjoyed.

In vain, I heard veteran U.S. reporters who had covered the Castro story and were now in Santo Domingo warn their less experienced colleagues how the tactic carbon-copied other Red efforts. I remembered, too, the extreme to which the Fidelistas carried their we-have-nothing-to-hide-from-the-free-press policy; they had once confided to my care, at a time when they knew I was going back through Batista's lines, a map correctly marked with their full troop deployments. Would this characteristic phase of candor existing here and now help my search for Castro's boatman?

It developed that it would.

While the American reporters daily came back and forth through the street barriers to rebel territory for press conferences, they continued to sleep and live back in the international security zone. So, when I told Rafael Dominguez, erstwhile press secretary for exiled Juan Bosch and now the chief liaison from Colonel Caamano to the foreign press, that I wished to actually live with rebel fighting men in their zone for a few days, he seemed a little taken aback. But it was quickly arranged. They could prove the second step to finding Castro's boatman.

"Please tell the truth about us—only not our last names," said the three men and a

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girl (the invalid wife of one of them) whose life and quarters and meals it had been agreed that I share.

AN ATTRACTIVE GROUP

The quarters were a cool five-room apartment on a rebel-zone thoroughfare whose original occupants had fled the city when the shooting started. The food was pitiful, but the four young revolutionaries were a thoroughly attractive crew, though their world was not mine.

Their leader was Raul, who at 19 possessed not only the face, form, and deep-lashed eyes of a Byron, but even enough talent and stick-to-it-iveness to have drafted a book-length diary of the bloody fighting.

The latter chapters, of course, were a tome of hatred against U.S. military forces. To him, every suffering of a rebel noncombatant was fresh proof of Yankee infamy. When I said I felt it important for Americans to hear his reasoning, and offered to help see that his book manuscript was considered for publication by the same Yankee editor who printed my books, he looked quizzical.

He objected, "I do not have the money to publish my book. I have never had a job but as a clerk."

"In America, you do not pay to have a book published; you are paid," I explained. "Es verdad? (Is that true?)" he said, and stared wonderingly.

"I WONDER IF I'LL BE A WIDOW"

Celia, the blond girl-bride member of the group, was his wife, a missionary's daughter, born in Cuba. She had spent some time in the United States and spoke English no more accented than mine. "Each night when Raul goes out I wonder if I'll be a widow before the sun comes up. Like Rosa, my neighbor. Your Marines killed her man, and she had a miscarriage. Twins. She was like one dead at first. But now she is combing her hair and putting on lipstick again."

The other white-collar member of our group was sturdy, gentle Juan, 22. He had worked as a bookkeeper in an import agency closed by the strife. But he wanted to prove he was an impressionist painter by promising me one of his paintings as soon as he could get back to his studio, which was under paratroop guns, he said. If the fortunes of war corresponding had allowed, I would have accepted it too, for he was too pragmatic a soul to have created a daub.

The real activist among the four was square-featured, square-shouldered Umberto, at 26 the oldest, and by trade a stevedore. He joked about how his chocolate-colored skin made him a less visible target on night patrol than were all of us with our white faces. Clearly, he mothered the group, remembering to count ammunition and monitor lights after dark and make sure people, who were to be on duty in the chill of the night had a warm if ragged sweater tied around their middles when they went out.

BY A CANDLE'S LIGHT

We ate together for the first time at dusk that night, and I counted 12 rifle shots—3 sounded very close—during the meal, although nobody else paid any attention to them. The decor of the living room was a kind of beatnik-Sears Roebuck and included four ill-matched, once-white garden chairs. What light we had flickered from a fat candle in a spattered glass set on the swept tile floor so we could not be silhouetted in the wide window facing the nearest American lines 150 yards away.

Celia and Umberto fixed a chipped plate for each of us in a dark, tiny kitchen. The meal consisted of one egg, well salted and fried in corn oil from a tin marked "gift of the people of the United States not to be sold"; two plantanos (they look like bananas and taste like potatoes) similarly fried, and one small cup of sweet coffee almost thick enough to pour like sirup.

When I averred I liked working with Latins and Turks because of their authoritarian coffee, I knew I'd said the right thing to please my hosts. I did not try to put into words my sense of shock that we were going to try to do military work all night on the few hundred calories we had just had; behind the guns facing us I knew American riflemen were at that hour eating three times as much.

The coffee brought with it near-conviviality. I asked curiously: "If you could, what would you say to our readers?"

While Raul was thoughtful, Juan talked: "We want to say the same as we write on the walls: 'Yanqui—go. OAS—go.'"

I asked, reservedly, "Do you mean that?" "We will fight until you go or we are dead," Raul intoned.

Trying to keep my voice empty of emotion, I said, "If we were all to go, you know you would bear certain consequences."

"Only one," was Raul's answer. "Only one. Then we could fight the junta troops again. We had won over them the night your Marines landed—if we had been losing, your Ambassador would never have called for troops. If we fight them again, we will win again."

"How can the few of you in the rebel zone win with your rifles over their tanks and planes?" I wanted to know.

"As we won before over the tanks and planes. The soldiers of the junta do not want to fight and they will come over to our side as they came before you Yankees invaded us."

It was quiet in the flickering candlelight; their view of history—even recent history—was not the same as generally believed in the United States. Then I was remembering how 8 years ago I had watched Castro's riflemen vanquish Batista's gunners and pilots because "they did not want to fight."

Raul broke in, "What would America do if we won again?"

TWO YEARS IN PRISON

I tried to choose words carefully. "You can be sure the United States will not cease to apply whatever measure of control is needed in the Dominican Republic to make certain your country does not become another Cuba. You cannot want that to happen, either."

"We do not know about other countries," replied Raul without heat. "But we do know about our life under the old Trujillo guards who lead the junta. When other boys were going to high school, I lived 2 years in prison because my father had made Trujillo angry. That is why I am a revolutionary."

Umberto took a fat steel watch out of his pocket and interrupted us by pointing to its face; it showed 8:30. He explained that rebel infantry guard shifts at night were 3 hours long—9 to 12, midnight to 3, 3 o'clock to 6. If I wanted to observe them all, I was to start with Raul, Juan, and Umberto. They would hand me over to their reliefs.

The men shortly reported to their command post with a dozen others for arms and the night's orders. It was a brightly lighted back bedroom in another deserted apartment up the street. Their assignments were given by a spanking-neat professional young officer who carried in a glittering X over his uniformed shoulders two belts of linked machinegun cartridges. He had recently been a lieutenant of the junta forces.

A FEAR OF PICTURES

At first, the scene was in low key—just young men in dark jackets and tennis shoes each taking and loading a rifle. Aside Juan told me, "Orders are the same—we cannot fire from our positions until the perdidos Yanquis shoot at us." I did not tell him that only a few days before, I had covered the nearby paratroops and heard their orders: "You will not fire unless fired on and then

only if the target is human, armed within 50 yards and moving toward you."

Then I started to take a picture—and the scene galvanized into shrill Latin hysteria. A gangling rebel with beagle-like features, black-rimmed glasses, and a loaded automatic rifle objected volubly to what I was doing. His colleagues called him Four Eyes, he called me a perdida Yanqui, and my friends lost the argument. I made no photographs in the command post.

A half-dozen of the men and I shortly went out to an emplacement of sandbags beside a roadblock at the corner of Cabral and Arzobizbomarina Streets, a rifle shot south of the U.S. paratroop line. In cloud-dimmed moonlight, I could see that the position had been chosen professionally and built to the recommendations of any military manual in print. Half was roofed with heavy timber and sheet metal, held in place by a double layer of sandbags; it could have protected most of us from light artillery and all from machinegun fire. There were ports for six riflemen.

We had just settled down to sentry duty at the post—I was almost dozing as I sat on a broken concrete block—when three spaced single shots spun over nearby. An exploding flare overhead washed us in silver like statues.

Both light and noise seemed to come from the no man's land beside us. There was no movement to be seen in the light, but as it faded, Four Eyes shrilly whispered something about the perdida Yanqui. I did not think it was a compliment.

He was interrupted when several black wraiths soundlessly materialized on the street before us. Juan challenged, his "Halt" an octave higher than his speaking voice.

"It is the inspecting party of our senior officer," Raul whispered to me, and then I could make out the figures. Even without Raul's identification, though, I would have known which was the commander from the on-balance stance on his wide bulk, and from the reassuring depth of his chuckle at something reported to him. Obviously, here was a man who had spent so many nights in this kind of tension that it was now his natural habitat. He murmured a sentence with the words *la Americana*.

Juan whispered to me. "The commandante asks if you want to see the most dangerous place on our lines."

"I do," I whispered back, thinking afterward that the words from the marriage ceremony were a singularly inappropriate choice under the circumstances.

"Then follow him," Juan moved me by my shoulder out from behind the sandbags. The commandante's shape moved off with only a sibilance of boot scrape. I was glad I was wearing tennis shoes so I could be as quiet. His silhouette showed no rifle, though his three aides held theirs unshouldered at the ready in their hands.

THE FEEL OF FIGHTING

I don't know if there are any words to tell about the next hours I spent following the commandante, or, for that matter, the nights I had done the same thing behind a tall American paratroop leader on the other side of the line. The modern world of war in darkness, even when the guns are silent or as here, sounding only one shot at a time, still has no true poet. I wonder if Raul someday will find the lines to say meaningfully how it really is.

The silence weights—hostile, uncaring, ghostly, only one effort at self-control removed from the dark of the sobbing child who wakes afraid of the dark. There is no comfort in the familiar feel of rubbed asphalt under your feet, and you step up dim curbs and rises and on faith, only because to stumble would admit the demons of imagination across the consciousness.

I fixed my eyes on the moving darkness ahead I knew was the commandante. The

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reassurance of his broad back was almost warm on my face in the gentle night wind. We went up a rising street to the north and were challenged three times, almost every 10 yards, by other rebel commandos. Another single shot spun past very high. I agreed to myself with the commandante's judgment that where we were heading was the most dangerous place. For I recognized it; we were approaching the lines of the 508th Infantry of the 82d Airborne alongside whose company commander, Capt. Bernard Tullington, I had only a year before watched South Vietnamese infantrymen in combat in the Mekong Delta. More to the point, I'd been overnight with these paratroopers here and knew them to be utterly alert. I very much did not want to be probing around in front of their lines in darkness with an armed party.

I did not have time to finish the thought, which probably was just as well. We had come to the street along Ozama River through the heart of Santo Domingo. With an imperious gesture, the commandante motioned me first to his side, then out through a wooden shack. I could hear the lap of waves under me; the shack seemed to be on stilts over the water.

THE "INVASOR YANQUI"

"Look through the window before you; you see the invisor Yanqui before you—very close," a voice whispered to me.

I did. My guide was right. The nearest U.S. rifle barrel seemed near enough to spit at.

We oozed back in the darkness a block along the riverfront street. The commandante motioned me to his side again. One of his aides translated.

"He says, if he were the paratroop commander, he would not let his enemy come so close."

I did not say anything. We went back another block along the water. Then the commandante needed again.

"We think American soldiers are afraid," I knew I had to make the answer fast, but I remembered to keep it low. "We are all afraid—we and you too—to see your people become like Castro's. Americans will fight anyone to keep that from happening."

I could see the commandante coolly cock his head to one side as this was repeated in Spanish. His translator clearly was amused.

"The commandante wants to know if you have friends who are mothers of Yanquis down here."

I said yes.

"Well, can't you reporters get them to make a campaign writing letters to beg to bring their boys home before we kill them? Like the American mothers did in Korea, you know."

I said, very distinctly, "Probably the press could do just that. But it is not going to do so." A rifle fired almost beside us. And at us.

We had been a knot of perhaps five people standing in the darkness of the narrow street next to the water. The single shot had come from so close I thought I could have put my hand over the shocking incandescence of the muzzle blast, too near to have come from the American line. The bullet had passed between us heading toward the paratroopers. Would the U.S. forces answer?

All of us were lying flat on our stomachs behind the nearest concealment—a wooden hut—before I'd finished that thought. The silence was absolute. I disentangled my leg from a rifle barrel as the commandante materialized erect in front of us.

He said, "Ho-kay," adding in Spanish that the shot had come from one of his own sentries. Later, I found out why he fired. He had heard English being spoken and concluded we must be an American scout party from across the river where another

American unit was positioned. But how he happened to miss all of us at that range, I never did find out.

BACK TO THE STARTING POINT

With a welcome sense of anticlimax almost flowing over us, we climbed another rising street that brought us back almost where we'd started. Here the commandante talked in low but nearly normal tones.

"Do not underestimate us as weak, Americana," he began. "Even the church is on our side. Our bishop gives us the food so we can fight."

I asked where the bishop got the food.

The commandante said he would come back to get me so I could see for myself as soon as it got light. "Will you rest now?" I asked as he turned to go. He chuckled at my question, "I do not sleep, Americana. I cannot, because the troops facing mine are from your country. If they were from the junta instead of the United States, I could sleep. But they are American so I will be alert all night." And after this gallantry he was gone.

I spent the rest of the hours of darkness with the other shifts of the rebel fighters south of Raul's positions. I watched and walked as their lines were checked. When the sun rose again over the far river bank and seemed to balance on the U.S. gun position atop a high flour mill over there, the commandante again appeared. He wanted me to photograph the hilltop slum close by the paratroop position where, on the night of June 4, according to Colonel Caamano's reports to the United Nations, an artillery barrage had killed two noncombatants.

PHOTOGRAPHING THE SLUM

It was a hideous, sprawling slum. I first photographed on a laundry line a dress and newly washed jeans, so torn that I believed, as I was told, that their last wearers had died in artillery fire. Next I saw half a dozen wide shell holes in the shacks and interviewed a score of survivors, some of them bandaged. I came away sure the community had been savagely hit but—like the United Nations investigators—unable to decide by whom.

The commandante learned I'd said this and, angrily, he mounted a smashed table before a broken mirror to dig out of the wall fragments of a shell that had come through the roof and exploded in the living room. He assured me I'd find the fragments were from a made-in-U.S.A. round. I agreed but reminded him that all sides in the fighting here possessed arms supplied by the United States under military aid agreements dating back to Trujillo. "You must remember that," I finished.

"I don't know," he said. "I was not here then."

For the first time in the brightening morning light, I looked squarely in his face. Was it truly familiar, or was my judgment suspect after the night's misadventures? Standing amid the rubble slum, I drew a deep breath.

"Were you in Cuba then? I mean, were you—Castro's boatman?"

The eyes narrowed and the answer came by reflex—proudly.

"I was the commander of Fidel's Gramma and later, in the mountains where you were, Americana, a leader of a battalion for him."

"Are you Pichirilo?"

"My name is Ramon Pichirilo Mejia."

"Did you remember who I was?"

He looked pityingly at me. "Si, si, Americana," he grinned and spoke slowly as if the words tasted good. "Surely you do not think I, a leader of soldiers, would permit someone I did not know into my sector?"

"Are you then well after what happened to you in Cuba?"

"Well enough to have led people against their oppressors in Bolivia and Columbia and

Venezuela and Costa Rica and Guatemala since last I saw you," he nodded.

"Then you must know you have become a kind of legend. You are secret no longer. Will you not permit me to take your picture?"

He posed. I shot fast. He raised his hand. "Now do not say I am a Communist, Americana. If I were truly a Red, I could have a good life staying in Cuba. But you see I am here instead, where I was born."

We walked back to Raul's apartment almost without speaking.

I was mulling over a fact with an unpleasant cutting edge. Upon me now was a moment of truth that comes uniquely to most professional observers of human conflict. My own life had at different times and places been protected by two groups of armed human beings now committed to mortal combat against each other.

The paratroops so well defending the freedom they knew; the rebels as best they could resisting an oppression they knew—how had these forces come face to face with loaded weapons?

The last chapter came a day later. First, from the balcony of Raul and Celia's borrowed apartment I photographed a crowd of several thousand who had lined up at dawn to receive a gift of oil and rice and milk through the U.S. food-for-peace program. Later, I was to see official reports that five trailer loads, each of 10 tons, had crossed into the rebel zone the previous afternoon for this distribution. In fact, some of it was at that hour being given out to families living in the rebel zone by the Catholic charitable agency, Caritas.

But at the distribution point I visited, no food had been delivered. Instead, the people were turned away with the rumor that the Yankee invaders had not permitted the trucks to cross the roadblocks into the rebel zone.

So it was a crowd grumbling against America that receded emptyhanded past the doorway to which Celia and I went down to greet Raul, Juan, and Umberto as they came "home" from their sentry duty just after 6 o'clock. I saw that "Four Eyes" was with them. He at once addressed me with weary hostility.

"You see, it is just as I always say. All Americans are bad. Always."

Juan raised his hand to "Four Eyes." He seemed offended more at his fellow rebel's manners than his sentiments, but he said, "Speak not so to her."

This only sparked "Four Eyes" further. He said distinctly, "I will speak so. I say, all Americans are bad. All of them should be killed." He looked squarely at me across the half dozen feet between us.

The truth is that he was not very frightening, and I simply said mockingly, "I don't think you mean that. There are 190 million of us, Chico. You don't even intend to start with this one—" and I pointed to myself.

"I would like to, only you are a woman and so—"

The threat was never finished. Moving so swiftly I don't know from which direction he came, Commandante Pichirilo suddenly stood rock steady between us. His face furious, he thrust me back into the vestibule with one hand, and "Four Eyes" out into the street with the other. When he had seen "Four Eyes" walk slowly off, he ruefully turned to me. He said, "Till we meet again," and marched off himself without a backward glance. I left the rebel zone later that morning.

Several days later, I sat down to write this story. Someone asked me: "Well, did you find your villain of the piece?" "I found the boatman," I said. "But I don't know if that answers your question. I just don't know."

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STATEMENT BY THE AFL-CIO EXECUTIVE
 COUNCIL ON SUPPORT PRESIDENT JOHNSON
 IN VIETNAM AND SANTO DOMINGO
 WASHINGTON, D.C.,
 May 19, 1965.

The executive council has considered the latest developments in war-ravaged Vietnam and in strife-torn Santo Domingo. We have examined the course pursued by President Johnson to end Communist aggression against the South Vietnamese and to prevent Communist subversion of the efforts of the Dominican people to return to constitutional government. The executive council, acting on reports from its own investigators on the spot, declares its unequivocal support of the measures, taken to date, by President Johnson to meet these critical situations.

We note with regret the rejection by Moscow, Peking, and Hanoi of the repeated offers by President Johnson for unconditional discussions of ways and means of securing a just peace in Vietnam. We particularly deplore their callous opposition to the President's program for fortifying the foundations of a lasting peace by improving the living conditions of the long-suffering, impoverished peoples of this turbulent area. These Communist rulers have even scorned the peace efforts of the 17 nonaligned nations.

The executive council welcomes the prompt and energetic measures taken by the President to prevent the Communist attempt to seize control of the Dominican democratic revolutionary movement and to foist a Castro-type dictatorship on Santo Domingo. Had our Government shown such prompt initiative in 1959, Cuba would today be a free country and not a Communist slave state.

We reject as unfounded in fact the position taken by Senator Goldwater and others that the President's Dominican policy is a throwback to old line gunboat diplomacy. Our Government's initiative is motivated solely by a determination to safeguard the lives of American and other nationals and to prevent a dangerous deterioration of the Dominican crisis which could lead to the establishment of another Communist terror regime and the slaughter of thousands. In sharp contrast to the gunboat diplomacy which often supported reactionaries and protected private exploitation, President Johnson has offered to give unstinting economic assistance to the Dominican people so that they may build a prosperous democracy and strengthen their national independence.

The President deserves the full support of the people of our country and all Latin America in his tireless efforts to hasten the building of effective inter-American peace-keeping machinery and achieve collective responsibility for normalizing the situation and assuring the Dominican people of the earliest opportunity to elect a government of their own free choice. The administration's acceptance of the U.N. good offices, alongside of the OAS, in the Dominican crisis, further demonstrates Washington's earnest desire to end the destructive conflict.

The crisis in Vietnam and Santo Domingo, though continents apart, are basically interrelated. They must be faced in the context of the entire world crisis. To date, Castro has made three attempts to intervene in Santo Domingo and foist a Communist dictatorship on the Dominican people. In Santo Domingo, as in Vietnam, our country seeks only to thwart a new and most dangerous form of intervention by the fifth columns of Communist imperialism. There are differences between the war in Vietnam and the tragic struggle in the Dominican Republic, but it is the common factors in the two critical areas which are of overriding importance. Aided, armed, and directed by Moscow and Peking, by Hanoi and Havana, the Communist subversives in both countries have resorted to all-out military action for the purpose of imposing their dictator-

ship on the people. Furthermore, the Dominican and Vietnamese Communists share the same fundamental purpose: to discredit our country and undermine its power as the strongest democratic barrier to the international Communist drive for world domination.

Months ago, the Communist North Vietnam Premier, Pham Van Dong, emphasized that the war waged by his forces in South Vietnam "attracts the attention of the world, especially the peoples in South America. The struggle of our southern compatriots is as great a contribution to the people's revolution in the world as the battle of Dien Bien Phu." The Communist military leader, General Giap, struck the same note when he stressed that "South Vietnam is the model of the national liberation movement in our time. If the special warfare that the U.S. imperialists are testing in South Vietnam is overcome, this means that it can be defeated everywhere in the world."

Our country can never defeat the Communist reactionaries by supporting other reactionaries or by relying solely on military means. The building of a strong democracy requires adequate social reforms and a healthy economy. It is the historic duty of the trade unions to play a decisive part in strengthening democracy and fostering social justice as the firmest barrier to Communist subversion and domination. The executive council supports President Johnson's efforts to help in the restoration of constitutional democratic government and the promotion of social reforms and economic progress in Santo Domingo. In this light, our Government would be well advised to accord full diplomatic recognition only to a constitutionally established Dominican democratic government.

Even with the most generous assistance from our country, it will take much time, patience and persistence to develop stable democratic institutions in South Vietnam and Santo Domingo. Serious difficulties in the path of their democratic development are unavoidable because the Communist menace in both countries is continually supported by outside powers. In such grave situations, it is the responsibility of our country, which alone has the will and the power for deterring aggression, to take prompt and timely initiative in the interest of peace and freedom.

STATEMENT BY THE AFL-CIO EXECUTIVE
 COUNCIL ON GERMANY

WASHINGTON, D.C.,
 May 19, 1965.

Twenty years ago this month, Nazi Germany capitulated and World War II ended in Europe. During the two decades that followed its crushing defeat, Germany has undergone a profound transformation. With the help, support, and encouragement of the Western allies, especially the United States, Germany has become a prosperous country with a sound economy. What is more, it has also become a strong and healthy democracy.

In sharp contrast with the political situation after the First World War, when chauvinistic, reactionary and radical elements undermined the Weimar Republic, the German people have repudiated militarism, extremism and all expansionist and aggressive designs. They have established a stable parliamentary system and free institutions, including vigorous trade union movement.

The change had been so complete that 10 years after its utter destruction, the democratic powers granted Germany, on May 5, 1955, its sovereignty. The German Federal Republic was received into the Western community and admitted to NATO where it has become a most loyal and reliable member.

Nevertheless, there is still a German problem today—a problem that a constant source of international concern and tension. This problem is rooted in the partition of Ger-

many that began after the end of the war as a temporary arrangement for occupation purposes but has continued because of Moscow's stubborn refusal to permit German reunification in freedom. In these 20 years the division of Germany has steadily deepened and worsened, as has the Soviet intransigence in denying the German people the right of self-determination.

To whatever extent there has been a detente in Soviet relations with the West since Khrushchev's defeat in the Cuban missile crisis, the German issue was not affected by it. On the contrary, the attitude of the Kremlin rulers toward the Federal Republic has hardened in recent months. Their slanderous campaign against Bonn has been intensified. When the Bundestag exercised its right to meet in West Berlin, the Soviet authorities resorted to irresponsible harassment and rejected all unofficial feelers for new negotiations about Germany.

Notwithstanding this adamant posture of the U.S.S.R., it is a matter of great urgency that the problem of German national unity in freedom should be reactivated. Since the Geneva Conference of 1959, no talks on Germany have been held. The United States, Great Britain and France which, together with the Soviet Union, have assumed, under the Potsdam agreement, the responsibility for German reunification, should take the initiative and insist on new four-power negotiations on the German problem. As in the case of Austria, a permanent four-power commission should be formed which would continue to meet until a final peace treaty had been arrived at with a freely elected all-German government.

It may be that a new Allied diplomatic initiative might not accomplish significant gains. But it will, at least, remind Moscow that the free world will not tire in its efforts to bring about German reunification in freedom.

Otherwise, Moscow will come to believe that the West has become accustomed to the status quo and is prepared to accept it de facto, if not de jure, as permanent. To dispel any doubts about the Allied interest in ending the partition of Germany, we should persist in making it continuously and unequivocally clear to the Soviets that the West will not release them of their obligations regarding German reunification and that it will not consider any detente as genuine and durable as long as the German problem has not been settled in accordance with the principle of self-determination.

All such efforts will, however, be doomed in advance if the West does not act in unity and strength. Only if the three Allies are united and determined will their dealings with Moscow have a chance of success.

Unfortunately, the unanimous policy of the three Western Powers has been endangered by President de Gaulle's declared intention to "Europeanize" the German question. The consequence of his claim that the solution of the German problem is a matter for Germany's neighbors would be to exclude Great Britain and, above all, the United States from any future negotiations and decisions on German reunification. This would mean the end of four-power responsibility and make France and the Soviet Union the sole arbiters of Germany's fate.

It is obvious that the absence of America and Britain from the conference table would tremendously weaken the Western negotiators while the bargaining position of the Soviet Union would be strengthened. In such a power constellation the cause of a free and united Germany would be in the gravest jeopardy.

It would be a mistake to offer Moscow, even before negotiations have begun, any concessions such as recognition of the Oder-Neisse line. The frontiers of a free and united Germany should be left to a final peace conference.

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Recognizing that without a just and sound settlement of the German question, there can be no secure peace in Europe, the Executive Council of the AFL-CIO urges our Government to make new efforts to bring about a resumption of talks on Germany. We commend the administration for its firmness in upholding the principle of four-power responsibility for German unity. We propose that the Allies should intensify their support of the Federal Republic's endeavors to be recognized throughout the world as the sole legitimate representative of the entire German people. We further urge that our Government strongly oppose any measure which might promote consolidation of the odious Ulbricht regime or enhance its international prestige. Finally, the executive council calls upon our Government to continue to defend vigorously the freedom of West Berlin, its right to maintain close bonds with the Federal Republic, and free access to the city.

On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the day that brought the most tragic and shameful period in German history to a close, and on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of their becoming again a sovereign nation, the AFL-CIO Executive Council assures the German people and particularly the German free trade union movement, the DGB, of American labor's friendship and solidarity.

[From the Inter-American Labor Bulletin, July 1965]

AFL-CIO SUPPORTS JOHNSON POLICIES IN DOMINICAN CRISIS

The AFL-CIO has strongly voiced its "unequivocal support" of President Johnson's policies in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic and declared that the crises in these countries are "interrelated" by the "fifth columns of Communist imperialism."

In a statement issued at its meeting in Washington, D.C., the federation's executive council assailed as "unfounded" the position taken by former Senator Barry M. Goldwater and others that the President's Dominican policy is a throwback to old-line "gunboat diplomacy." The President is neither supporting reactionaries nor protecting private exploitation, the council said, but offering economic assistance to the Dominican people to build a prosperous economy and strengthen their independence.

The administration's efforts to terminate the fighting in Santo Domingo, the council said, was evidenced by its acceptance of the United Nations good offices and its efforts to build peacekeeping machinery through the Organization of American States.

In its analysis of the two crisis areas, the council said "there are differences between the war in Vietnam and the tragic struggle in the Dominican Republic, but it is the common factors in the two critical areas which are of overriding importance. Aided, armed, and directed by Moscow and Peking, by Hanoi and Havana, the Communist subversives in both countries have resorted to all-out military action for the purpose of imposing their dictatorship on the people."

"The Communist reactionaries" can never be defeated by supporting other reactionaries or by relying solely on military means, the council declared. The answer is to build a strong democracy on a healthy economy and adequate social reforms, the statement said, adding:

"It is the historic duty of the trade unions to play a decisive part in strengthening democracy and fostering social justice as the firmest barrier to Communist subversion and domination."

In the Dominican Republic, the council urged the administration to accord full diplomatic recognition "only to a constitutionally established Dominican democratic government."

It will take much time, patience, and persistence to develop stable democratic institutions in South Vietnam and Santo Domingo, the council concluded, adding that "it is the responsibility of our country, which alone has the will and the power for deterring aggression, to take prompt and timely initiative in the interest of peace and freedom."

[From the Inter-American Labor Bulletin, July 1965]

AFL-CIO EXECUTIVE COUNCIL STATEMENT ON VIETNAM AND SANTO DOMINGO (Condensed)

The executive council has considered the latest developments in war-ravaged Vietnam and in strife-torn Santo Domingo. We have examined the course pursued by President Johnson to end Communist aggression against the South Vietnamese and to prevent Communist subversion of the efforts of the Dominican people to return to constitutional government. The executive council, acting on reports from its own investigators on the spot, declares its unequivocal support of the measures, taken to date, by President Johnson to meet these critical situations.

The executive council welcomes the prompt and energetic measures taken by the President to prevent the Communist attempt to seize control of the Dominican democratic revolutionary movement and to foist a Castro-type dictatorship on Santo Domingo. Had our Government shown such prompt initiative in 1959, Cuba would today be a free country and not a Communist slave state.

We reject as unfounded in fact the position taken by Senator Goldwater and others that the President's Dominican policy is a throwback to old line gunboat diplomacy. Our Government's initiative is motivated solely by a determination to safeguard the lives of American and other nationals and to prevent a dangerous deterioration of the Dominican crisis which could lead to the establishment of another Communist regime and the slaughter of thousands. In sharp contrast to the gunboat diplomacy which often supported reactionaries and protected private exploitation, President Johnson has offered to give unstinting economic assistance to the Dominican people so that they may build a prosperous democracy and strengthen their national independence.

The President deserves the full support of the people of our country and all Latin America in his tireless efforts to hasten the building of effective inter-American peacekeeping machinery and achieve collective responsibility for normalizing the situation and assuring the Dominican people of the earliest opportunity to elect a government of their own free choice. The administration's acceptance of the U.N. good offices, alongside of the OAS, in the Dominican crises, further demonstrates Washington's earnest desire to end the destructive conflict.

The crises in Vietnam and Santo Domingo, though continents apart, are basically interrelated. They must be faced in the context of the entire world crisis. To date, Castro has made three attempts to intervene in Santo Domingo and foist a Communist dictatorship on the Dominican people. In Santo Domingo, as in Vietnam, our country seeks only to thwart a new and most dangerous form of intervention by the fifth columns of Communist imperialism.

There are differences between the war in Vietnam and the tragic struggle in the Dominican Republic, but it is the common factors in the two critical areas which are of overriding importance. Aided, armed, and directed by Moscow and Peking, by Hanoi and Havana, the Communist subversives in both countries have resorted to all-out military action for the purpose of imposing their dictatorship on the people. Furthermore,

the Dominican and Vietnamese Communists share the same fundamental purpose: to discredit our country and undermine its power as the strongest democratic barrier to the international Communist drive for world domination.

Our country can never defeat the Communist reactionaries by supporting other reactionaries or by relying solely on military means. The building of a strong democracy requires adequate social reforms and a healthy economy. It is the historic duty of the trade unions to play a decisive part in strengthening democracy and fostering social justice as the firmest barrier to Communist subversion and domination. The executive council supports President Johnson's efforts to help in the restoration of constitutional democratic government and the promotion of social reforms and economic progress in Santo Domingo. In this light, our Government would be well advised to accord full diplomatic recognition only to a constitutionally established Dominican democratic government.

Even with the most generous assistance from our country, it will take much time, patience, and persistence to develop stable democratic institutions in South Vietnam and Santo Domingo. Serious difficulties in the path of their democratic development are unavoidable because the Communist menace in both countries is continually supported by outside powers. In such grave situations, it is the responsibility of our country, which alone has the will and the power for deterring aggression, to take prompt and timely initiative in the interest of peace and freedom.

[From the Inter-American Labor Bulletin, July 1, 1965]

ORIT AND THE CRISIS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

(The following statement on the crisis in the Dominican Republic has been issued by Arturo Jáuregui H., ORIT General Secretary.)

ORIT appeals to wiser reflection on the part of the combating forces in the Dominican Republic so as to prevent their actions continuing to cause victims among the people, whose loss of life is already heavy and material damage enormous, thus setting back considerably the already slow economic and social development of the country.

During the hateful dictatorship of Trujillo, ORIT condemned that regime and collaborated both with trade unions and with other democratic elements fighting to re-establish freedom in the Dominican Republic. ORIT warmly welcomed the electoral victory of President Juan Bosch, which brought back constitutional government to the country. Later, it deplored the fact that military action brought down such a hopeful regime. These facts give us the moral authority to call publicly for a halt in the fratricidal struggle and appeal to all for calm, so as to overcome this dramatic crisis.

ORIT regrets that the Council of the OAS did not carry out its peacemaking functions with the speed and energy required. If it had done so, it might have avoided a worsening of the conflict particularly since the junta, headed by Mr. Donald Reid Cabral, had convened presidential elections for next September, which would have again given the Dominican Republic a constitutional government.

It would be obviously foolish not to recognize that Communist elements have intervened in the conflict and have caused a worsening of the situation by their agitation and terrorist methods and so created chaos and anarchy, thus making a solution of the crisis more difficult. We should unite against these elements and fight to overcome them, not only in the Dominican Republic, but in all the countries of the American Continent.

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It would also be unjust to call the steps taken by the United States similar or equivalent to earlier unilateral decisions which caused so much deterioration in inter-American relations. For this reason, we are confident that U.S. participation, originally inspired by humanitarian motives, will cooperate with the OAS mission to bring an end to hostilities and will aid in the work of reestablishing democratic institutions for the Dominican people by means of effective suffrage, the only source of national sovereignty.

With the frankness and responsibility which always characterizes ORIT in its statements, we have to point out that the unilateral action by the armed forces of the United States in this serious Dominican conflict on the one hand has enabled thousands of persons to be saved and at the same time under the guidance of the OAS Commission has contributed to making the hostilities of civil war less cruel. The intervention by the United States has provoked a psychological and doctrinal reaction corresponding to the traditional Latin American feeling about intervention of armed forces of one country in the internal affairs of another. This could have been avoided if there had been greater urgency in the action of the international intergovernmental organizations concerned, as the situation required.

In safeguard of the basic principles of the inter-American system, ORIT calls on the OAS:

To explain to American opinion its activities since the moment it became aware of the present crisis in the Dominican Republic;

To give a report in the greatest possible detail about the activities of the Armed Forces of the United States in the Dominican Republic;

To publish a complete report on the nature of the internal and external elements participating or engaged in this most disturbing conflict.

MINUTES OF THE FOURTH PLENARY SESSION (CLOSED)

(Document 46 (Provisional) May 7-8, 1965)

Chairman: His Excellency Ambassador Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa, special delegate from Nicaragua.

Secretary general of the meeting: Dr. William Sanders.

Present: Their Excellencies Alfredo Vázquez Carrizosa (Colombia), Roque J. Yó dice (Paraguay), Alejandro Magnet (Chile), Ramón de Clairmont Dueñas (El Salvador), Rodrigo Jácome M. (Ecuador), Juan Bautista de Lavalle (Peru), Ricardo A. Midence (Honduras), Enrique Tejera Paris (Venezuela), José Antonio Bonilla Atiles (Dominican Republic), Humberto Calamari G. (Panama), Raúl Díez de Medina (Bolivia), Ricardo M. Colombo (Argentina), Carlos García Bauer (Guatemala), Rafael de la Colina (Mexico), Gonzalo J. Pacio (Costa Rica), Emilio N. Oribe (Uruguay), Ellsworth Bunker (United States), Fern D. Baguidy (Haiti), Ilmar Penna Marinho (Brazil).

Also present at the meeting was Mr. Santiago Ortiz, assistant secretary general of the meeting of consultation.

Recording secretary: José F. Martínez.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE

The PRESIDENT. Your Excellencies, I have the honor of opening the 4th plenary session of the 10th meeting of consultation of ministers of foreign affairs, which has been called for the principal purpose of receiving a confidential report from His Excellency, Ambassador Ricardo M. Colombo, Representative of Argentina and Chairman of the Special Committee that went to the Dominican Republic, which has prepared a confidential report. Ambassador Colombo addressed the following note to me today:

"Your Excellency, I have the honor of transmitting to you the first report of the

Special Committee of the 10th meeting of consultation of ministers of foreign affairs of the member states of the Organization. I respectfully request you to direct that this report be distributed to the Special Delegates to this Meeting of Consultation. Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration. Ricardo M. Colombo, Ambassador of Argentina, Chairman of the Special Committee."

First of all, I wish to express to His Excellency Ambassador Ricardo M. Colombo and to his distinguished colleagues on the Committee, Their Excellencies Ambassador Ilmar Penna Marinho, of Brazil, Ambassador Alfredo Vázquez Carrizosa, of Colombia, Ambassador Carlos García Bauer, of Guatemala, and Ambassador Frank Morrice, of Panama, the deep appreciation of the meeting, and especially of all of their colleagues, for the magnificent and efficient work they have done in carrying out the delicate mission entrusted to them by the Meeting. We have followed their work with a great deal of attention and interest, and feel proud of having appointed them; and we are sure that the Americas, our people and our governments, applaud that work, and this Meeting expresses its appreciation and praise for it. In accordance with the Regulations, plenary sessions are public. When I spoke this morning with our colleague Chairman of the Committee, it seemed to me appropriate that this meeting be closed, precisely because the report to be presented by Ambassador Colombo, in behalf of the Commission of which he is Chairman, is, precisely, of a confidential nature. This decision by the Chair, that this meeting be closed, I am sure will not be objected to by the Representatives. I am happy that everyone agrees that this meeting should be closed. This will be recorded in the minutes. I recognize the Ambassador of Argentina, His Excellency Ricardo Colombo, Chairman of the Special Committee, so that he may be good enough to present the report referred to in the note I had the honor of receiving this morning. The Ambassador has the floor.

Mr. COLOMBO (the Special Delegate of Argentina). Thank you very much, Mr. President. I should like to make clear, before beginning to read the report, that it begins by referring to the very time of our arrival, or rather, to our departure from Washington, for which reason we do not record here the fact, which we do wish to point out, that at the time of our arrival, and in compliance with a resolution of the Council of the OAS, the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, Dr. Mora, was already there carrying out his duties, regarding which he will give his own report.

[Reads the first report of the Special Committee.]

Mr. COLOMBO. May the meeting consider the report to have been presented in behalf of the Committee duly appointed. Thank you very much, Mr. President; thank you very much, gentlemen.

The PRESIDENT. I take note of what Ambassador Colombo has just said, and, clearly, we have been most pleased with the report. Your Excellencies will have noticed its fine quality.

Mr. GARCÍA BAUER (the Special Delegate of Guatemala.) If the President will allow me, I should like to recommend to all the Delegates that they take the following note with respect to the documents that contains the report of the Committee that has just been read, and has also just been distributed, pardon me. On page 9 there are certain errors that were made in transferring the

The first report of the Special Committee, with the corrections indicated below by the Special Delegate of Guatemala and accepted by the other members of the Committee, has been published as Document 47 of the meeting.

text to the stencll. In the last line on that page, where it says "guardia de policía militar," the word "mixta" should be added, so that it will say "una guardia de policía militar mixta." On page 12, in the next to the last line from the bottom, where it says "y de que ésta mantendría," it should say "y de que mantendría los contactos." On page 13, at the end of the second paragraph, it is necessary to add "En la última parte de la entrevista estuvo presente el General Wessin y Wessin a solicitud de la Comisión" at the end of the paragraph. And on page 26, in the second paragraph, where it says "la resolución del 30 de abril" it should be "resolución del 1.º de mayo." [These corrections were taken into account before the English text of the document was issued.]

The PRESIDENT. The Chairman asks the distinguished members of the Committee whether they accept and consider incorporated in the next of their valuable report the observations made by His Excellency the Ambassador of Guatemala. The Chairman of the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE. I fully accept them, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. Undoubtedly we shall receive a second edition of this report containing precisely the amendments already accepted by the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. GARCÍA BAUER. Mr. President, they are not things to accept, but rather the question is that in the report of the Committee these points were omitted.

The PRESIDENT. That is just what I was referring to, that the Chairman of the Committee has precisely accepted the incorporation of the omitted matter, the clarifying of the points. He has accepted, as Chairman of the Committee, in behalf of all its members, that the observations should be taken into account in the new edition that is to be made of the report. In other words, they are corrections of form.

Mr. GARCÍA BAUER. No, Mr. President, those are not corrections of form, they are omissions made in copying the report of the committee.

The PRESIDENT. Precisely, the Chair was mistaken, they are omissions of form, precisely. Gentlemen of the Special Committee, the report, which has just been read by our distinguished Chairman, Ambassador Ricardo M. Colombo, of Argentina, reveals a job done that the Chair would describe as extraordinary, very worthy of the sense of responsibility and the personal capabilities of the distinguished Ambassadors who make up this historic Committee on the inter-American system. Being extraordinary, it is a job worthy of our appreciation, of the appreciation of this Meeting of Consultation and of those of us who are honored to call ourselves colleagues of the Ambassadors who make up the Special Committee. In saying this, I am honored to confirm to you what I said to His Excellency Ambassador Ricardo Colombo in the message that I had the honor to address to him today, which reads:

"The Honorable Ricardo M. Colombo, Chairman of the Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs: I am pleased to express to you and to your colleagues on the Committee of the Organization of American States established by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs the appreciation of the Meeting for the prompt and interesting information furnished in your two messages received on May 3 and 4. The Meeting has taken note of the messages and hopes that the important tasks being undertaken with such dedication and efficiency may soon be completed with full success. Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. Sevilla-Sacasa, President of the 10th meeting."

I have the satisfaction of informing you regarding a communication the Chair has re-

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ceived from His Excellency Emanuel Clarizo, Papal Nuncio, dean of the diplomatic corps accredited to the Government of the Dominican Republic. It reads:

"Guillermo Sevilla-Sacasa, President of the Tenth meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs"—this communication is dated May 5—"I thank you with deep emotion for message Your Excellency sent me on behalf of Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. I have sincere hopes that providential assistance by Organization of American States quickly begun in Santo Domingo by Secretary General Mora and happily assumed by Special Committee of worthy members headed by Ambassador Colombo will soon achieve for the beloved Dominican nation the humanitarian ideals of peace and well-being that inspire that high and noble institution." It is signed by Emanuel Clarizo, Papal Nuncio of His Holiness.

I said at the beginning that naturally this meeting is of a closed nature, which indicates that, at the proper time, a public plenary session should be held, in order publicly to take cognizance once again of the text of the report and the opinions expressed regarding it. It seems logical for the first step to be to obtain the second edition, as I call it, of this report, in which the omitted matter so correctly mentioned by our colleague from Guatemala will appear: in order that the General Committee of the Meeting of Consultation may take cognizance of the report and then submit its decision on it to the plenary. This is what the Chair has to report on the matter for the present, but naturally, we would like in this closed meeting, in the private atmosphere in which we are now, to hear some expression by some distinguished Representative on the text of the report that was read by the distinguished Chairman of the General Committee. The representative of Mexico, Ambassador de la Colina, has asked for the floor, and I recognize him.

Mr. DE LA COLINA (the Special Delegate of Mexico). First of all I wish to express, or rather, join in the comments that you, Mr. Chairman, have made in appreciation and deep recognition of the distinguished members of the Committee we took the liberty to appoint, in recognition of not only this wonderful report they have presented us, but also the efforts they doubtlessly have made under most difficult conditions and with great efficiency and dignity. Now I would like to know, Mr. Chairman, whether it would be possible to ask some questions, especially since we are meeting in executive session, for clearly our governments surely are going to want to know the very learned opinion of our distinguished representatives regarding some aspects touched on only incidentally in this most interesting report, with the reservation, naturally, that perhaps in a later session, also secret, we could elaborate on some other aspects that, for the moment, escape us. Would that be possible, Mr. President?

The PRESIDENT. I believe the question is very important. The President attaches great importance to the question put by the Ambassador of the Republic of Mexico regarding our taking advantage of this executive session to ask the distinguished Committee some questions.

Mr. COLOMBO. I ask for the floor, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. You have the floor, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. COLOMBO. The Committee is ready to answer, insofar as it can, any questions the representatives of the sister republics of the Americas wish to ask its members.

The PRESIDENT. Very well. Is the Ambassador of Mexico satisfied? You have the floor.

Mr. DE LA COLINA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For the time being I would like to know whether it is possible, after having listened closely to everything our distin-

guished colleague, the Representative of Argentina, has told us. I have the perhaps mistaken impression, from the technique as well as from the quick reading I was giving this document we just corrected, that there seems to have been a certain consensus between the opposing sides as to the possible elimination of the generals. Perhaps I am mistaken, but it seems to follow from that reading and from this idea that on both sides the colonels were more or less disposed to create, let us say, a high command, other than the one that has remained thus far. I wonder whether it would be possible for you gentlemen to elaborate on this, or whether you simply have no ideas on the matter.

The PRESIDENT. Would the Chairman of the Committee like to respond to the concern of the Representative of Mexico?

Mr. COLOMBO. With great pleasure. As the report states, Mr. President, the request to exclude the seven military men, whose names I have read in the Committee's report, was a complaint by the junta led by Colonel Caamaño and transmitted by the Committee to the military junta led by Colonel Benoit. The Act of Santo Domingo, furthermore, is clearly written, and the stamped signatures of the parties ratifying it are affixed. I believe I have responded to the concern of the Ambassador of Mexico.

Mr. DE LA COLINA. Another point now, if I may.

The PRESIDENT. With pleasure.

Mr. DE LA COLINA. I would like to know, if this is also possible, whether the distinguished representatives could give us their impressions regarding the degree of Communist infiltration in the rebel or constitutional forces, or whatever you want to call them. For example, there was the reference to this Frenchman * * * who came from Indochina, and who trains frog men * * * etc.; perhaps there is some thought that this person might have close ties, for example, with other Communists; or do they have the impression at least that, in the high command of that group, the rebel group, there is now definite and significant Communist leadership. Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. COLOMBO. As for myself, I, as a member of the Committee, not as Chairman, have no objection to answering the question by the Ambassador of Mexico, but as a matter of procedure for answers, I wish to provide an opportunity for the Chairman to speak in general terms in order not to deny the distinguished members of the Committee their legitimate right to answer as members of the Committee, which we all are; that is, I would not want to be monopolizing the answers because, without prejudice to a given answer, we can give another of the members of the Committee an opportunity to give the reply that, in his judgment, should be given. Thus, in order to respect fair treatment and not find myself in the middle of the violent and inelegant position of monopolizing the answers—and I ask the members of the Committee whether some of them want to answer, then I ask you to give the floor first to Ambassador Vázquez Carrizosa, of Colombia.

The PRESIDENT. The Ambassador of Colombia, member of the Special Committee, will answer the question by the Ambassador of Mexico.

Mr. CARRIZOSA (the Special Delegate of Colombia). Mr. President, the Representative of Mexico asks what the opinion is. I will state mine, because I am not going to answer on behalf of the Committee, as to the degree of Communist infiltration on both sides. Of course, the question must refer to the command or sector led by Colonel Francisco Caamaño, because I do not think it refers to any Communist leanings by General Wessin y Wessin, Colonel Saladin or any of his colleagues. With regard to the sector led by Colonel Francisco Caamaño, many diplomats accredited in the Dominican Republic, and I can include my country's

diplomatic representative, feel that, if not Colonel Francisco Caamaño, whom I do not know to be personally a Communist, there are indeed numerous persons on his side that, if they are not members of the Communist Party, are actively in favor of Fidel Castro's system of government or political purposes. There is such a tendency in the opinion of many diplomats I spoke to, and I do not mention other countries in order not to commit countries represented here. They are firmly convinced that on that side there are many persons, I do not say members registered in an officially organized Communist Party, but persons who do have leanings toward a well-known trend is prevalent in Cuba.

Mr. DE LA COLINA. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

The PRESIDENT. Does any member of the Committee wish to add to the answer requested by the Representative of Mexico? Is the Representative of Mexico now satisfied with the information given to him? The Ambassador of Guatemala.

Mr. COLOMBO. If the President will allow me, I do not know what system the President may have to gauge the kind of questions.

The PRESIDENT. Well, your Excellency said that he wanted his colleagues to participate in the answers in their, let us say, personal status, in order to distribute the task of answering, and, naturally, the President took note of the fact that your Excellency had invited his colleague from Colombia to answer the question put by the Ambassador of Mexico. I, by way of courtesy, am asking your Excellency whether any other colleagues would like to express their opinions on the same question the Ambassador of Mexico asked. I request your Excellency to tell me whether any other of his colleagues would like to ask any questions.

Mr. COLOMBO. I am going to add very little, of course, to what the Ambassador of Colombia, with his accustomed brilliance, has just said, by saying that this report, affirmed by a large number of representatives of the Diplomatic Corps, is public and well known to any one who cares to make inquiry. But despite the respect that I owe to the opinion of the Diplomatic Corps, in order to establish this in precise terms—for I was concerned as much as was the Ambassador with being able to verify this question—I wanted to go to the source; and we spoke with the different men who were in this rebel grouping and, a notable thing, from the head of the revolution, Colonel Caamaño, to some one known as Minister of the Presidency, they recognized that they were their great problem, they explained to a certain extent briefly the process of the history of the Dominican Republic, they confessed to us how gradually a number of elements were being incorporated with them whom they called Communists, and that their problem was to avoid infiltration for the purpose of springing a surprise and seizing control. They said this clearly, and even at one point—I in the sometime difficult task of dividing this formal nomination of the chairmanship in which there is no merit greater than that of any one else, because perhaps in the other four members there is much talent for doing what the Chairman did—I spoke with Colonel Caamaño and asked him in a friendly way whether he honestly believed that such infiltration existed. He confirmed this to me, but he gave me the impression that he had the courage to face it. He said to me: "They are not going to grab the movement, and my concern is that in their losing the possibility of control, they have stayed behind the snipers, today there are those that do not wish a solution for the Dominican Republic," and already he put the political label on a good part of the snipers on both sides. It should be said, Mr. Ambassador, that you will understand the extent of responsibility of the answers and the depth of the questions, and I would

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like to satisfy your own concern; but I have fulfilled with loyalty by reporting the conversation to you objectively, telling you that I believe that those who have the answer to this question is to be found among the actors, the protagonists of this hour who are living in the Dominican Republic. This is what I wanted to say now, Mr. Chairman.

The PRESIDENT. Very well, Mr. Ambassador. Mr. DE LA COLINA. Mr. Ambassador of Colombia, I greatly value this reply; I wanted both, but naturally with reference to the reply whereby you explain one more aspect. Many thanks, Mr. Ambassador.

The PRESIDENT. Would the Ambassador of Guatemala like to say something on the question put by the Ambassador of Mexico?

Mr. GARCIA BAUER (the Special Delegate of Guatemala). Mr. Chairman, for the moment, no; certainly this point was discussed in the Committee; the Committee also had a series of things, and since there is not yet any criterion of the Committee, I do not for the moment wish to present any viewpoint.

The PRESIDENT. The Ambassador of Brazil.

Mr. PENNA MARINHO (the Special Delegate of Brazil). Mr. President, I should like to corroborate the statements made by my colleagues from Colombia and Argentina, and add one more aspect that I believe could help to clarify the approach that could be given to the problem. I should like to add, gentlemen, that with the complete collapse of public authority—since neither the forces of the Government Junta of Benoit, Santana, and Saladin nor those of Colonel Caamaño were in control of the situation—the Dominican state practically disappeared as a juridical-political entity, and the country became a sort of no man's land. The arsenal had been given to the people and an entire disoriented population of adolescents and fanatics was taking up modern automatic arms, in a state of excitation that was further exacerbated by constant radio broadcasts of a clearly subversive character. Neither do I believe that I am, nor does any of the members of this Committee believe that he is, in a position to state with assurance that the movement of Colonel Caamaño, inspired by the truly popular figure of former President Bosch, is a clearly Communist movement. But one fact is certain: in view of the real anarchy in which the country has been engulfed for several days, especially the capital city, where bands of snipers have been sacking and killing and obeying no one, any organized group that landed on the island could dominate the situation. For that reason, and our understanding coincides with that of a majority of the depositions of the chiefs of diplomatic missions accredited there, all of the members of the Committee agree in admitting that the Caamaño movement, fortunately truly democratic in its origins, since none of us sincerely believes that Caamaño is a Communist, could be rapidly converted into a Communist insurrection; above all it is seen to be heading toward becoming a government of that kind, susceptible of obtaining the support and the assistance of the great Marxist-Leninist powers. Therefore, Mr. President, we do not believe that Colonel Caamaño and his closest advisors are communists. Meanwhile, as the entire Caamaño movement rests upon a truly popular basis, by certain areas escaping from the control of that democratic group of leaders it would be quite possible for that movement to be diverted from its real origins and to follow the oblique plan of popular-based movements, which can be easily controlled by clever agents and experts in the art of transforming democratic popular movements into Marxist-Leninist revolutions. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. The Representative of Ecuador, Ambassador Jácome, has requested the floor.

Mr. JÁCOME (the Special Delegate of Ecuador). I wish to adhere with all sincerity and warmth of the words of the Representative of Mexico, praising the selflessness and the arduous work as well as the spirit of sacrifice with which the Committee performed its functions, and for having succeeded, by the time of its departure, in leaving a somewhat more favorable situation than the one it found upon arrival. Now that we are asking for the opinions of the distinguished colleagues on the Committee, I would like to know if they have any impression as to a formula, or if there is any desire on the part of the two factions to bring about peace by transforming the cease-fire, the truce, into a peace that will permit the political organization of the Dominican Republic and the natural process that should be followed in order to have a constitutionally stable system. It has been gratifying to hear this opinion, at least on one side, that the so-called constitutional government of Colonel Caamaño is certain that it can at a given moment control and capture the infiltrators that are determined to block peace, and, in order to take advantage of that situation, to continue the chaos that has prevailed in Santo Domingo up to now. But if that command hopes to keep and is confident that it can keep control it is natural that whatever the command thinks with regard to the possibility of a formula for stable peace through an understanding with the others—the present enemies—would be very useful and constructive to know because we would then, with a little tenacity, through friendly, fraternal mediation, have a favorable prospect of arriving, within a reasonably short time, at an understanding between the two combatants. This would be the best guarantee that the Americas, as well as the Dominican Republic, could have that those infiltrators and those elements that wish the chaos to continue, would be eliminated and hence definitely neutralized.

I would like to know what opinion the Committee formed, after it succeeded in talking with the parties in conflict, what impression does it have of the opinion or of the formulas or of the hopes they have regarding a final agreement that may return the situation to normal.

The PRESIDENT. Would the Committee like to answer the question raised by the Representative of Ecuador? One of the colleagues on the Committee, the Chairman, Ambassador García Bauer, Ambassador Vázquez Carrizosa, Ambassador Penna Marinho, the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Colombo, in his capacity as Representative of Argentina?

Mr. COLOMBO. Perhaps this is the question that I shall answer with the greatest Americanist feeling, Mr. Chairman. I cannot deny, Mr. Ambassador, gentlemen, that I also, like the Ambassador of Mexico, have confessed to him that I shared and still share the concern expressed in his question and that, perhaps, it was the question that caused me the greatest concern. The most urgent problem when we left was not to find ideological banners distinguishing the parties, but to put an end to the conflict that was already becoming bloody and that could become a blood bath in the Americas. We talked with the two parties and believe me, Mr. Chairman, I at first had the feeling that law was dead; it was chaos in the Dominican Republic. We all shared it—all members of the Committee, the military advisers, the General Secretariat, our civilian advisers—and when we arrived we found chaos, such as we had never seen or even imagined. I felt that law did not exist, and we all thought there was little hope that they wanted to find a solu-

tion that would be feasible, despite the moral authority that we represented. We were only a very few, as men, as individuals, but we bore the weight of the historic tradition of the system whose 75th anniversary we celebrated, and this inspired all the members of the Committee. From the first man of the rebel band with whom we spoke, Colonel Caamaño, to the first man with whom we spoke from the Command of the Military Junta, Colonel Benoit, we found that they were both weary of the conflict that darkened the Americans. We found in both of them a desire to achieve peace that was equal to ours.

It would be untrue, Mr. President, if I were to say that I found the wish to continue the fight at this stage of the tragedy in the Dominican Republic. There was a longing for peace and we were caught in the enthusiasm to achieve it. But we were completely surprised, Mr. Ambassador, by something more important than this objective which is essentially what we all desire; the two parties said that the solution lay in the inter-American system. Nobody assumed the right to impose peace because—and let there be no misunderstanding—the side that wishes to triumph in Santo Domingo is stabbing the sister republic. Both factions understood the intensity of the tragedy that was unfolding in Santo Domingo; both placed their faith in the inter-American system.

During the course of conversations, when all members of the Committee asked them if they would be faithful to remaining within the system, they answered yes; with all their faith. But it was more than that, Mr. Ambassador: it was what Colonel Caamaño said, voluntarily. A newsman asked him, "If your cause was denounced in the United Nations, what would you do?" and he confessed to us that he answered that he would in no way accept that channel because he was within the system and the answer had to be found within the system. For that reason he was happy to see the committee sent by the OAS. He placed his faith in the Organization of American States to find the solution. And when we spoke with Colonel Benoit he gave us the same affirmation; his faith is in the system.

I believe that in the midst of the agony of the Dominican Republic, this system that among ourselves we have talked so much of strengthening was more alive than ever and in an hour of testing, in the midst of a struggle more fierce than any I remember within the system, I could see that both sides felt this to be the only possible solution that could maintain peace in the Americas. Both took into account the possibility that it was being compromised: they knew that the peace of the hemisphere might be endangered if the conflict wasn't soon stopped. This, Mr. Ambassador, is what I can tell you, with great satisfaction, and I look to the system for the solution just as all of us are going to look, and you will see that the system will find that solution.

The PRESIDENT. The Representative of Guatemala will contribute to the answer that the Representative of Ecuador has requested.

Mr. GARCIA BAUER. Mr. President, I wish to add a few words to what the Ambassador of Argentina has said, in reply to the question asked by the Ambassador of Ecuador. I, as a member of the Committee and as Ambassador of Guatemala, confirm the statements made by the Ambassador of Argentina, as to the faith that the inter-American system can help in solving the problem that, so unfortunately, is faced in the Dominican Republic today. Obviously, that country is weary of struggle and would like to arrive at some solution. I, at least, found that there certainly is a basic desire to reach an understanding between the parties and over-

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come present difficulties. We were surprised, for example, when we began conversations with the Rebel Commander, that a colonel was present who was a liaison officer between the Military Junta of San Isidro and the Papal Nuncio. And the manner in which he was treated, by Colonel Caamaño as well as the other members of the Rebel Command, surprised us because he was in a group completely opposed to the one he represented. We did not see the hatred that might have been expected in such circumstances. We can bear witness, therefore, to that deference, to the treatment that was shown. Also the Rebel Commander offered to the Committee itself to deliver about 500 prisoners so that it might take charge of them; that is, acts such as these indicate how they wish to end this situation that is dividing the people of the Dominican Republic; from these acts, and from others that we have seen, I have reached the conclusion that at bottom there is a desire, a keen desire to reach an understanding. The question is to find the formula for making this understanding a reality.

The President. Other representatives have asked to speak. I ask the members of the Committee if any of them wishes to join in the reply to the question raised by the Representative of Ecuador. The Representative of Ecuador.

Mr. JACOME. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am infinitely grateful for this reply which is truly promising because it has confirmed the suspicion that every human being has who knows the tragedy of a civil war; that those persons who have stained their country with blood and caused so many deaths, who have seen so much suffering and caused so much suffering, would now have reached the moment of longing for peace and perhaps each of them feeling remorse for the sufferings and the misfortunes they have caused. This is an eminently human reaction that we all know. But I am equally satisfied to hear that both parties rest their faith in the inter-American system, but I have now seen a report, a report concerning the statements made by Colonel Caamaño to the effect that he will not accept the Inter-American Force established by the last resolution of this Meeting of Consultation. We have already seen that it also seems that Colonel Caamaño and his partisans have not accepted the present state of affairs, the presence of foreign troops in Santo Domingo. Hence, would not perhaps Colonel Caamaño, and in the end all Dominicans, whatever their ideologies and whatever the barricade on which they have stood, prefer a mission of peace to a mission of guns? We might think of a permanent peace mission of the Organization of American States, which would receive the same impressions but which would be seeking a concrete formula to bring those parties together who wish to reach an understanding and give them the opportunity of not feeling pressured by arms or not having the inward suspicion that those arms are playing the game of their adversaries. I should like and I venture to put this question to the members of the committee, and I beg your pardon, as tired and fatigued as you all must be, for still abusing your time with these questions. Thank you very much.

Mr. COLOMBO. I said something, a little circumstantially, in replying to the question posed by the Ambassador of Mexico, regarding this concern that troubles the Ambassador of Ecuador. Here is the most important instance for telling the whole truth, not part of it. And I am going to tell how I saw it. The effort—I said—is mutual and so is the desire to attain peace. Mr. Ambassador, but it is not that I suspect but that I am certain that the two sides in the struggle are not controlling their movement, because the ceasefire was accepted by the fighting groups; but an uncontrollable ingredient conspired

against the carrying out of the act of Santo Domingo, an element that history shows does not find a solution by peaceful means and that grows larger whenever attempts at reaching peace are made, because what will happen, to a great extent, is what happened to us, in parleying for peace, with an absolute ceasefire by the commands so as to talk with the peace mission, but we had to parley for two hours and a half under incessant machine-gun and rifle fire. Who did that? Colonel Caamaño? I think not, categorically no.

It is the sniper ingredient, because in a town where arms are handed out to civilians, there can be only two forms of control: either when the civilians lay down their arms and surrender, them willingly, or when this is achieved by a force superior to the civilian force. Let all of you ponder the difficult task of imaging a peace attempt, in which we again have the signatures of the two parties, we have the security zone, and the incident is being provoked as a factor breaking out into a tremendous catastrophe. I honestly confess that until now I could not explain how something much worse did not occur. The provocation of the snipers is constant. There are among them, no doubt, the two classes of snipers that there are in such events: those who grab a gun and continue using it with a resentment that no reasoning will lead them to lay it down, and those who continue using it with the resentment of one who cannot control the revolt. That is, these are factors that cannot be controlled by a mission no matter what flag of peace it carries.

The Government of Santo Domingo will not achieve peace until it can be imposed in a climate where conditions in a peaceful Santo Domingo exist for the recovery of institutional normality in the country. Sincerely, Mr. Ambassador, in the choice that you have given me I sacrifice my wish—which is equal to yours—to a realistic concept that one can only appreciate, unfortunately, by having been there. We wished, and we five ambassadors who were on the mission mentioned it many times to one another, that all of you could have been there, that not one had been missing, Mr. President. That you could have been at the scene of events to see what we were seeing. In the tremendous confusion, in which it is difficult to find the thread that would open the knot we were trying to untie, where there is political and military confusion, economic disaster, confused people, general anguish, no one can find the ingredient for guidance. I believe, Mr. Ambassador, that it is urgent to seek peace in the Dominican Republic and to tarry as little as possible in discussion, because every hour of discussion is an hour you give to someone who, with good or evil intentions, could still pull the trigger that would prevent the Act of Santo Domingo from being fulfilled. This is my personal impression.

The President. The Representative of Ecuador has nothing more that he wants to say? I recognize the Representative of Uruguay, Ambassador Emilio Oribe.

Mr. ORIBE (the Special Delegate of Uruguay). Mr. President, first of all, I want to adopt the words of the distinguished Ambassadors who have spoken before me in congratulating the Committee on its work and expressing the admiration of my delegation for the way in which they have performed this first part of their task. And so, our warmest congratulations to all of them. Since it is late, Mr. President, I would like to confine myself to some very specific questions. The first of the questions is as follows: for this Meeting of Consultation to be competent to take measures to bring peace and to carry forward the work begun, it is necessary, above all, in the opinion of my Delegation, to ascertain whether the situation in the Dominican Republic is a situation

that can endanger the peace and security of the hemisphere. This is the requirement of Article 19 of the Charter for carrying out collective action in matters that normally are within the domestic jurisdiction of the states. As is known, Article 19 states: "Measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing treaties do not constitute a violation of the principles set forth in Articles 15 and 17," which are those that refer to nonintervention. Hence my Delegation believes that a pronouncement must be made by this Meeting of Consultation to the effect that the events in the Dominican Republic constitute a situation that endangers the peace and security of the hemisphere. Departing from that basis, I should like to ask the Committee if it is of the opinion that this is the case, that is to say, that the situation in the Dominican Republic constitutes a threat to the peace and security of the hemisphere. That is the first question.

The second question is as follows, Mr. President: the first part of the task with which the Committee was entrusted has been carried out, and we all congratulate them. We have received a very complete report, which will be studied by the delegations and the foreign ministries. There remains, then, the second part of the Committee's task, under the letter b, which reads as follows: "to carry out an investigation of all aspects of the situation in the Dominican Republic that led to the convocation of this Meeting." Naturally, my Delegation understands very well that this cannot be done in one afternoon or one day. However, I should like to ask simply if the Committee believes that there is sufficient evidence to issue a report on this point within a reasonable period of time. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The President. One of the distinguished members of the Committee would like to refer to the first question put by the Representative of Uruguay, Ambassador Vázquez Carrizosa, Representative of Colombia.

Mr. VÁZQUEZ CARRIZOSA (the Special Delegate of Colombia). Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The first question is this: Is the situation such that it can endanger peace and security? My reply is yes. Yes, there is a situation that endangers the peace and security. The reasons are very clear. A disturbance or even a guerrilla action in a member state where the elements of order and constituted authorities exist is not the same as in a state where the absence of the state is noted, evaluated, and recorded. What is to be done, Mr. Delegate, in the absence of the state? What does the system do when the state does not exist? What happens when blood is running in the streets? What happens, Mr. Delegate, when an American country—and I am going to speak quite frankly so that you may think about this with all the perspicacity we know you to have—is, under these conditions, in the neighborhood of Cuba? Do we sit on the balcony to watch the end of the tragedy?

Do we all sit down as if we were at a bullfight waiting for the crew to come? What are we to do, Mr. Delegate? We are in a struggle against international communism; and we are in a world, Mr. Delegate, in which America is not even separated from the other continents even by the ocean. We form part of the world and we form part of the conditions existing in the world. The Dominican Republic, like any other country in the Americas, is a part of the system, and it is the system that will suffer from the lack of a head of state in any of its members. The matter and the problem cannot be expressed in juridical terms, in hermeneutics, needed to fit an act into a lawyer's criterion. The problem is one of deep political meaning, of profound significance, of hemisphere importance much more serious than any of the other American revolutions could be.

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There have been many revolutions in America. There have been revolutions in my country; there have been some, I believe, in yours, and I do not believe that a revolution in itself justifies the intervention of the inter-American system. That has not been my theory; that has not been the theory of my country. However, the acephalous condition of the state constitutes a problem that has occurred on very few occasions. What are we to do, Mr. Delegate, when, as the report states, the President of a Junta says: "I cannot maintain order with respect to the diplomatic missions"? And what are we to do, Mr. Delegate, when that Chief presents a note in which he requests the assistance of another country and confesses with the sincerity that we have heard: "Gentlemen of the Special Committee, have the diplomatic representatives asked me for protection and I did not have the elements with which to protect them?" That is the answer to his first question. Now we have the second question: What is happening to the investigation? It is very clear, Mr. Delegate. The complex political events, the multitudinous situations are very difficult to investigate. All of us who have had contact with problems of criminology know about mob psychology: everything that is studied in the classroom, which is very simple, an investigation of a local event, an individual event, let us say.

However, when there are mobs, when they are in the midst of great movements an investigation can be conducted, investigations must be carried out. But they are obviously difficult investigations. I would spare no effort to support any machinery, agency, or committee that would carry forward that investigation. It would be very desirable. But, of course, such investigations of complex events are not very easy, because many things have happened. Actually, two or three revolutions have taken place. There was the first revolt of colonels. Then there was a revolt of a party; and after that, a revolution of a whole series of guerrilla groups, so that each one may have a different impression of the same event.

I think that, rather than an investigation of the past, what is of interest to the Meeting of Consultation and what is of interest to America is not the investigation of the past, but the investigation of the future. It is the investigation of the future that interests us. The problem is not to stop to fix responsibility, to ascertain who began to shoot first, who entered the National Palace first, who opened the windows, who got out the machinegun, who saw, who heard; all that would be an interminable process that would fill many pages and many records of proceedings. The important thing is not to look backward, but to look ahead.

The PRESIDENT. The Representative of Uruguay.

Mr. ORIBE. I thank Ambassador Vázquez Carrizosa for his remarks. He has told me just what I wanted to know.

The PRESIDENT. The Ambassador of Brazil.

Mr. PENNA MARINHO (the Special Representative of Brazil). Yes, Mr. President. And I also want to say to the Delegates that my reply is also yes. There are two governments, but each one is weaker than the other, completely incapable and powerless to control the situation that prevails in the country. Peace was made on uncertain terms. The Act of Santo Domingo is not a definitive peace; it is a difficult truce, a temporary armistice that may dissolve at any moment. Therefore, the Committee suggests, among the measures that in its judgment might be adopted immediately by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, the appointment of a technical military group in the city of Santo Domingo to supervise the cease-fire, as well as other measures agreed to by the parties to the Act of Santo Domingo. We must keep watch over that peace and create conditions to prevent the struggle from breaking out

again—because it could start again, Mr. President, at any moment. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. Does any other member of the Committee wish to speak on this question? The Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Colombo.

Mr. COLOMBO. The truth is, Mr. Chairman, that after the words of my distinguished colleagues, the Ambassadors of Brazil and Colombia, there is very little that I might be able to add; but the responsibility involved and the importance of the question, so ably phrased by the Ambassador of Uruguay, compel all of us to make clear our position on this question. When, among the powers and duties, the duty of investigating was decided upon, I cannot conceal the fact that I felt the same as I always feel whenever an investigating committee is named. Generally it investigates nothing; few, indeed, are the investigating or factfinding committees which, in the parliamentary life of all of our countries, show any fruitful jurisprudence in their results. But this Investigating Committee did have the possibility of good results. And that was because it was aimed at two fundamental objectives that were governing events in the Dominican Republic.

I understood, first, that the investigation was to determine the scope of the danger resulting from the events, which are a matter of concern to the Ambassador of Uruguay. If this was a situation that did not threaten the peace, we would verify that immediately. If the situation was under the control of groups intent on stirring up tension in the Americas, in a struggle in the history of America, which is full of struggle between brothers, in this incorrigible vocation that is periodically written into the history of our countries, that delays the advance of law and democracy, then we would verify it immediately; and we have verified it.

This could be the beginning of a struggle confined to the two well-defined groups. But the presence of those uncontrollable factors, which I urge the Ambassadors to analyze in detail, in the evaluation of facts in order to reach conclusions, they are going to be impressed, as we ourselves were impressed, without seeing them; they have become more dangerous than the groups themselves put together. To my mind, they have become the element that will determine the fate of what is going to be done. If those groups did not exist, and if those responsible for the struggling movements had not confessed that they cannot control them, in view of the existence of a security zone, freely agreed upon by both parties, with a U.S. military force that is engaged basically in the process of keeping custody over the diplomatic zone, I would also believe, Mr. President, that perhaps we might be able to delimit the process and trust that the peace would not be so obviously jeopardized as it is in this process; because in all revolutions, even a small local one, there is the possibility that there may be the spark of a process that will affect the peace of the Americas.

But the dimensions of this situation, with elements of disturbance on both sides, who are constantly lashing out against the protection offered by the security zone, and in which, Mr. President—and this struck my attention—there is still control to prevent confrontation in a struggle that could technically be called a military struggle; or in other words, there is no military confrontation between the defenders of the zone and the contending groups of the civil struggle. And that struggle is capable of being unloosed, because of the constant harassment by those who are seeking a way to unloose it. Hence, Mr. Ambassador, this matter urgently demands that all of us succeed in finding the way to resolve this situation; that we find the way to dispel the undeniable danger that threatens the peace in this hemisphere, which is the purpose of our organization. Because all of these things are important; economic

development, social tranquility, justice, the progress of the countries; but all of them are built on peace; without peace there is no possibility for the triumph of the inter-American system. There cannot be the slightest doubt, Mr. President, that the peace of the hemisphere is in grave peril.

But with respect to the second part of the investigation, which is also a matter of anxiety, we have contributed something in the time we had to make our investigation; more than the investigation is the word of the leaders themselves. This act is a confession, and a partisan confession without proof, Mr. Ambassador. It is not a matter of our characterizing the ideology, nobody goes about trying to do that when, actually, it has already been characterized by the leaders of the governments themselves. If necessary, that should be left to the last. I have said at previous sessions: my delegation is willing to make and is going to make an exhaustive investigation of the facts, in order to determine the blame according to the action. We shall do nothing to cover up a sharing of responsibility. But in the matter of priorities, investigation has been well placed by the Ambassador of Uruguay. The first thing to be investigated was the projection of the episode, the possibility of its affecting the peace of the hemisphere, the need for urgent action in case it is proved. We five members of the committee shared that opinion when we were there, and we reaffirm it now. The peace of the hemisphere is in such danger, Mr. President, that if the system does not respond to the call of both parties to the struggle, I believe that the peace of the Americas would not be in danger, that peace will be broken. This urgency is shown by the way we have tried to answer the concerns of the Ambassador of Uruguay.

The PRESIDENT. I ask His Excellency the Ambassador of Guatemala if he would like to speak on this point.

Mr. GARCÍA BAUER. Mr. President, I would like to add my voice and my opinion to those of my distinguished colleagues on the Committee. I shall also reply, rather emphatically, as was done by the Ambassador of Colombia, that the peace and security are in danger. As was already said, we in the Committee often asked ourselves and commented on the advisability of having all of the members of this Meeting visit the Dominican Republic in order to see, on the scene itself of the events, the situation prevailing in that country: in a state of war, when we arrived, without water, without lights, without telephones, without public services. The lobby of the very hotel where we stayed was a scene of war—children and women sleeping in the lobby itself. The Diplomatic Corps, which met with us, also told us of the serious situation which they had gone through and were going through; anarchy ruled; the attacks that the diplomatic missions themselves had suffered; the wounded, including the diplomatic missions that had given asylum to wounded persons; and this was something that went on hour after hour.

Undoubtedly, peace and security are seriously affected when there is no authority that is respected, for although there are those who proclaim that they represent authority in each sector, it may be seen later that they do not possess it to such a degree that peace prevails; and although they sign documents, such as the cease-fire that was arranged before we arrived, or the Act of Santo Domingo, which we signed; nevertheless, it can be seen that they have no absolute control over the situation when the spectacle of wounded and dead persons is seen. We asked how many had died, how many had been wounded; and I believe that I can say, as an opinion gathered from persons of whom it can be said, insofar as this is possible, that they are better informed on the matter, that at least one thousand five hundred persons have died in Santo Domingo.

And how are the forces distributed? How is the country? Fighting has taken place so far only in the city of Santo Domingo itself, but who can assure us that it will not spread throughout the country?

The rebel command states that they have maintained peace there, because they have not wished to arouse feelings in the rest of the country, and the Military Junta in San Isidro states that they control the rest of the country. What is the real situation? The Committee did not have time to travel through all of the Dominican Republic; but it is evident that chaos exists, that the situation is deteriorating; it changes from one hour to the next; that is clear. The day after we had an interview, under the fire of snipers, as has been said here—with the Constitutional Military Command, the next day, I repeat, the Chief of that Command was proclaimed President of the Republic, Constitutional President; and the Military Junta of San Isidro, which we had talked with and which signed the act of Santo Domingo, does not now exist, according to reports arriving today through the news agencies. The teletype has just brought for example, a cable reading: "Domingo Imbert, President of the new Five-Member Junta, quickly convened a press conference and called for a peace-making effort to rebuild the country and restore national unity without discrimination on account of political affiliation." He described Colonel Caamaño as a good personal friend.

The other members of the new Junta are: Julio Postigo, 61 years old, a lawyer whom some people consider a militant in the Revolutionary Party of Juan Bosch; Carlos Crisella Polomey, 51 years old, governor of one of the provinces under the deposed regime of Donald Reid Cabral; Alejandro Sebré Copo, 41 years old, an engineer; and Colonel Benoit, a member of the previous Military Junta of three. Imbert did not explain how or why the earlier Junta resigned, or how the new one was formed. Although Caamaño could not be found to give us a statement, the leader of the Revolutionary Party, José Francisco Peña Gómez, stated over the rebel radio that the new group represented an underhanded maneuver against the interests of the Dominican people. In the Dominican Republic we constantly heard rumors, stories that got to us, to the effect that they were inciting to arms over the radio, even during the cease-fire.

The circumstances prevailing in Santo Domingo are most difficult, tremendously difficult; it would be a good thing if the representatives were to go and see how things are developing there and how, in the report we have submitted, we cannot give an exact picture of the prevailing situation, which has disturbed us deeply. The situation undoubtedly endangers peace and security, and not of the Dominican Republic alone. The representative of Uruguay also referred to the missions of investigation; and indeed, among the duties entrusted to the Committee was the duty of making an investigation of all aspects of the situation existing in the Dominican Republic that led to the calling of the Meeting. But the kind of investigation that was asked is not one that can be made in a few hours. The Committee had to give priority to what demanded priority, and the first thing was to try to restore peace and conditions of safety, to restore things as much as possible to normal, under prevailing conditions, in order that it could carry out an investigation such as we believed the Meeting of Consultation had requested.

We are in agreement that this investigation should be carried as far as it is desired; but in the short space of time we were there, and with all the tasks we had; and although we sought opinions and points of view on various sides; although we asked all members of the Diplomatic Corps to give us their views in writing, that is, their views on the

situation as they saw it; although we asked the disputing groups also to explain to the Committee and to the Meeting what they considered the truth about the Dominican Republic, and also asked the governors of the provinces whom we interviewed to do the same, and did likewise with everyone with whom we had an opportunity to talk and question; although we sought all of the evidence that might serve as a basis for this investigation and to enable the Committee to offer its conclusions to this Meeting of Consultation; despite all this, the time was very short and we cannot give conclusions in the report we have just submitted, not even if we were to be able to change them a little later.

Points of view have been given and information collected, sometimes in personal conversations, as mentioned by the Ambassador of Argentina with respect to his conversation with Colonel Caamaño, or in conversations the members of the Committee had with various persons on the scene; but we should also listen to all parties concerned, to all who want to say something; and such an investigation takes some time. This is the reply we must give to the Ambassador of Uruguay. With respect to this second point, we have done all that we could within the short time available, in an attempt to make the cease-fire effective for the protection of refugees and those who had taken asylum, and so that food distribution could be undertaken, to bring in food, medicines, etc., that can be distributed with the necessary safety. We did a vast amount of work in a very short time, but in regard to investigation, we can say that we have scarcely begun. And despite the little that was seen, the Committee has been able to contribute something in reply to the questions that have been asked here.

The PRESIDENT. I understand that the Representative of Uruguay is very well satisfied with the thorough manner in which the interesting questions put to the members of the Committee have been answered.

Mr. ORRIS. Of course, Mr. President, I would like to express my appreciation once again, and I believe that what has now been said here is fundamental; because the conviction of the members of the Committee will surely allow us, through consultation, to take appropriate measures without getting into the problem of intervention.

The PRESIDENT. I recognize the Special Delegate of Paraguay, Ambassador Yódice.

Mr. Yódice. Thank you, Mr. President. First, I wish to join in the words of appreciation that have been spoken here to the ambassadors who composed our special committee that traveled to Santo Domingo and completed the great task of which we are so proud. I am very happy that from the first time the floor was requested until now we have had a series of statements from the distinguished ambassadors on the Committee, and their statements make my congratulations even warmer. As the Chairman of the Committee, the illustrious Ambassador of Argentina, Dr. Ricardo Colombo, has said, this is the moment of truth and the Delegation of Paraguay is quite pleased with the action of the members of the Committee.

The Delegation of Paraguay, Mr. President, is proud of this Committee because it has, in the first place, effectively carried out the peacemaking aspect of its mission as fully as is possible; it is proud of this Committee because it has justified the confidence of the Paraguayan Delegation placed in it, inasmuch as the distinguished ambassadors who composed it, whose ability and inter-American spirit all of us know, as was said when the committee's membership was approved, would determine whether or not international communism had a part in the bloody events in the Dominican Republic. If the distinguished Representative of Mexico had not raised the question he did on the

matter, I would have done so. I might, however, have put it differently, since I would not have confined myself to inquiring as to the possibility of Communist intervention in a specific group, but would have extended the inquiry to all aspects of the serious conflict that the Dominican people are undergoing today.

The Government of Paraguay, as I stated clearly when approval was given to the establishment of the collective inter-American force, believed from the beginning that continental security was at stake. The replies by the Ambassadors composing the Committee reporting today on certain questions regarding these delicate aspects of the Dominican situation have been categorical. My government was right. Continental security is threatened. The danger existed, and still exists, that chaos and anarchy will permit international communism to transform the Dominican Republic into another Cuba. With his customary clarity, courage, and energy, the Ambassador of Colombia, Mr. Alfredo Vázquez Carrizosa, has categorically mentioned the highly political nature of the problem we are facing. In reply to a question of the Ambassador of Uruguay, he has rightly said that the peace of America is threatened, that the security of the hemisphere is threatened, and that there is a possibility that another Cuba, another Communist government in the hemisphere will arise out of the chaos and anarchy in the Dominican Republic.

We are proud of the action of our committee, because, as the Ambassador of Uruguay said, it is helping to clarify the problem we are facing. Paraguay had no doubts when it voted on the resolution for the establishment of the inter-American force. As I said: "The Government of Paraguay approves the sending of U.S. forces to the Dominican Republic, considering that this does not imply armed intervention prejudicial to the right of self-determination of the Dominican people, but, on the contrary, that it is a measure of hemispheric defense against the intervention of Castro-Communist forces. The Government of Paraguay is aware that U.S. armed intervention has been necessary in view of the urgency of preventing extracontinental and Cuban forces and funds from annulling the Dominican people's right of self-determination, since it was evident that it would be difficult for the inter-American system to act rapidly and energetically. The Government of Paraguay reaffirms its support of the proposed establishment of a hemispheric force and will participate in it if a substantial majority of the governments of the member states do likewise."

Mr. President, if there is anything to regret it is that, for the time being, this valuable, clear explanation of the seriousness of the Dominican problem furnished to us by our committee is known only to the delegates of this Meeting of Consultation.

Obviously we are going to come to a moment when the enlightened judgment of the President and of the Delegates, in my opinion, will decide that these vital conclusions reached by our Committee should be known by all of the Americas, by all of the people of the hemisphere. Because for my Delegation, Mr. President, these conclusions, which appear in the written report and in the replies to the questions posed here, should not be known only by the Delegates; they should be known by all the people. I emphasize this point because I am proud that my Delegation, from the very beginning, has been concerned and has established a position with regard to the seriousness of the conflict, in view of the intervention of international communism in the Dominican events.

Once more, I congratulate the members of our Committee; I am confident that the conclusions they now bring to us from their

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trip to Santo Domingo and that they will continue to bring will greatly help this Meeting of Consultation. The inter-American system must find the permanent solution referred to by the distinguished Ambassador of Ecuador in order to bring about a return of constitutionality in the sister Dominican Republic, a return of the reign of representative democracy and of human rights, and of all those inalienable principles of sovereign peoples that motivate the resolutions of this Meeting of Consultation in dealing with the Dominican problem. I believe, Mr. President, that with the clarity of the conclusions of the Committee we shall be walking on firmer ground. The basic conclusion that I want drawn from this statement I am now making is that we should act on the basis of these important conclusions furnished to us by the Committee; not only the conclusions appearing in the report that has been distributed, but also those verbally expressed tonight by the members of the Committee. I repeat my congratulations to the ambassadors and my confidence that these highly important conclusions will shortly be brought to the attention of all the Americas. Many thanks, Mr. President.

Mr. TEJERA PARIS (the Special Delegate of Venezuela). Mr. President, I wish to make a motion.

The PRESIDENT. What is the motion of the Ambassador of Venezuela?

Mr. TEJERA PARIS. Mr. President, two days ago when it was desired to undertake a thorough analysis of the problem, I asked this distinguished meeting to await the return of the Committee, so that we might question it and hear what proved to be an excellent and highly important report. On behalf of my government, I wish to express appreciation for the work that has been done and the sacrifices that have been made. I now wish to call attention to the following point: perhaps this session should devote itself exclusively to questions and answers, so that by speeding things up we can obtain the information as precisely as possible, leaving basic statements and studies of possible solutions until tomorrow's plenary; otherwise, we shall have to repeat many of the things already said here. This is my motion, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. Mr. Ambassador, the Chair entirely agrees with you. It would really be interesting to devote ourselves to questioning the honorable Committee and its distinguished members, and the answers that they give us will be very edifying.

Time goes on, and we must take advantage of the privacy of this meeting precisely to present this type of questions and, in this same confidential setting, to obtain the answers of the distinguished Committee members. Naturally, the occasion will come for us to make detailed statements on behalf of our governments on the text of the important report presented by our colleagues on the Committee. I offer the floor to the Representative of Chile.

Mr. MAGNET (the Special Delegate of Chile). Thank you, Mr. President. The opinion that the President has just expressed so wisely is in complete accord with what I am about to say now. Although, for reasons clearly explained at the time, the Delegation of Chile abstained from voting for the establishment of the committee that has now returned to our midst, I can do no less than corroborate, briefly but sincerely, the expressions of praise that the committee has earned. Moreover, the position taken by my country does not inhibit me, for everyone's benefit, from asking some questions that are of interest to my country, and, as I understand, to the others as well. In the Act of Santo Domingo, referred to by the President in his statement, mention is made of a security zone in that city, whose limits would be indicated in a plan appended to this document. Mr. President, I believe that this security zone is a

highly important factor in the cease-fire that has been obtained and that a clear delineation of this zone and knowledge of it, not just by the parties involved but by everyone, will be very helpful in forming an idea of what might happen if, as may be feared, this security zone were violated. If acceptable to the Committee, I would request, Mr. President, that this plan not only be incorporated into the Act, but also circulated by the secretariat as soon as possible.

The PRESIDENT. I ask; I imagine that the Chairman of the Committee wishes to reply to Ambassador Magnet's question.

Mr. COLOMBO. The Committee, through me, reports that the map is now being distributed, and I apologize to the Ambassador of Chile because it was not attached to the report when this was distributed. The explanation may lie in the undeserved expression of appreciation for the Committee's work, on the part of the Ambassador. Material difficulties prevented distribution, but I now present the map to the Chair so that, as the Ambassador of Chile has wisely requested, it may be distributed as soon as possible, since it is necessary for the proper information of the Ambassadors.

The PRESIDENT. The Chair shall proceed accordingly, Mr. Chairman, Ambassador Colombo.

Mr. MAGNET. I wish to explain that my words did not imply the slightest criticism or reproach of the Committee.

Mr. COLOMBO. I wish to make quite clear that I have not even remotely suspected such an attitude from one whom I know to be a gentleman and distinguished ambassador who honors the inter-American system.

The PRESIDENT. Your second question, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. MAGNET. It is more than a question, Mr. President, to try to achieve some kind of friendship. I think it is quite clear both from the text and the context of the report we have just had the pleasure of hearing, especially the Act of Santo Domingo—with which we were already acquainted and which is contained in the report signed on May 5—that there is not, nor was there on that date a constituted government in the Dominican Republic able to represent the country, but two parties or conflicting factions. The committee, with the knowledge it gained through its on-the-spot activity, and with its spirit of impartiality, deemed it necessary to hear the two parties or factions in order to reach some useful result. I would like to ask the Chairman of the Committee, through you Mr. President, if the evidence that has been gathered corresponds to the truth.

The PRESIDENT. Shall I refer the question to the Chairman or to the distinguished members of the Committee?

Mr. COLOMBO. I think that, in substance, we have already answered the Ambassador's question. That is, all of us Committee members have confirmed the impression of chaos that we found in the Dominican Republic, the complete lack of authority, the existence of two groups that appeared to be standard-bearers in the conflict and with whom we felt impelled to establish immediate contact. I do not know if this will satisfy the Ambassador, and I wish he would let me know if he has any doubts that I can clear up.

The PRESIDENT. What does the Ambassador of Chile have to say?

Mr. MAGNET. It seems to me that what the Ambassador has said confirms what I—

Mr. COLOMBO. I think it is the same thing, Mr. Ambassador.

The PRESIDENT. Is there any other question? Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. MAGNET. If it is not an imposition on you or on the meeting, Mr. President, I wonder if it would be too much to ask the Committee to tell us how many asylees or refugees still remain in the embassies in Santo Domingo, if it has been able to obtain this information.

Mr. COLOMBO. The truth is that at this time, Mr. Ambassador, it is impossible to answer your question because, fortunately, the evacuation of asylees has already started. I have information regarding the asylees at my embassy: there were 14 who have already been able to leave. That is, this changes according to the help received, food and other, because the asylees take advantages of arriving planes in order to arrange their transportation; therefore, at this moment it would be practically impossible—because of the time that has elapsed since our arrival—to say how many asylees have been able to leave the country. Fourteen have left my embassy. The PRESIDENT. Is the Ambassador satisfied?

Mr. MAGNET. I hope I am not being too insistent, Mr. President, but perhaps with the testimony of the other members of the Committee we might obtain an approximate figure, at least.

The SPECIAL DELEGATE OF BRAZIL. Mr. Ambassador of Chile, I wish to inform you that in the Embassy of Brazil there were thirty-eight asylees, of which only six wished to leave the Dominican Republic. The other thirty-two told us that they would prefer to await the return of normal conditions in their country. Therefore, only six asylees in our embassy left the Dominican Republic.

The PRESIDENT. Does Ambassador Vásquez Carrizosa wish to contribute anything?

Mr. VÁSQUEZ CARRIZOSA (the Special Delegate of Colombia). There were about 30 asylees in the Embassy of Colombia in Santo Domingo, some of whom did not wish to leave Dominican territory. Many of them, especially women and children, left on May 5 on the plane that brought in food, medicine and medical equipment.

The PRESIDENT. The Ambassador of Guatemala.

Mr. GARCÍA BAUER. There were 28 asylees at the Embassy of Guatemala, of whom nine left. There are now 19 asylees at present who will be evacuated as soon as possible on the plane arriving from Guatemala with food and medicines. The Secretariat has already been informed of this.

Mr. MAGNET. Mr. President, I wish to leave on record my gratification and to pay public tribute to the patriotism of the Dominicans, since so many of them have chosen not to abandon their country, in spite of the prevailing chaos.

The PRESIDENT. We give the floor to the Representative of El Salvador, Ambassador Clairmont Dueñas.

Mr. CLAIRMONT DUEÑAS (the Special Delegate of El Salvador). Thank you Mr. President. I am going to ask a question, but I wish at this time to express by government's appreciation for the excellent work of the Committee in the face of the tragic events in the Dominican Republic. Our thanks, gentlemen. The question is as follows, and I wish to refer to the distribution of weapons to the civilian population. I wish to ask the members of the Committee whether they then had sufficient time to investigate how this distribution was made, what was the source, if it is known, whether distribution was made indiscriminately or to persons of any special tendencies, and who were the originators of this distribution. Thank you very much.

The PRESIDENT. I refer the question to the members of the Committee. The Ambassador of Brazil, if you please.

Mr. PENNA MARINHO. Mr. President, I wish to reply to the question posed by the Ambassador of El Salvador, and I do this on precarious bases, because the information we received was precarious, and, above all, contradictory. There was, however, a common consensus in these replies, that the arsenal of weapons had been opened, access to it was given to the population, and that the civilian population, a part of which was controlled by Colonel Caamaño, was armed with automatic weapons considered by sev-

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eral authorities we interviewed as the best and most modern existing in the Dominican Republic. And we were able to ascertain, when we opened negotiations with the group led by the Commander of the Revolutionary Government, Colonel Caamaño, we were able to see various persons, teenagers, women, all armed with machineguns, forming small groups in the streets of the neighborhoods of Santo Domingo that were under the control of the rebels. And so there was a distribution made of all the weapons that were stored in the arsenal of the Dominican Republic to the civilian population that supported Colonel Caamaño's group. This is the information we were able to gather by means of the contacts we had with the various authorities of the Dominican Republic.

The PRESIDENT, Ambassador Vázquez Carrizosa, Special Delegate of Colombia.

Mr. VÁZQUEZ CARRIZOSA. I cannot, of course, give an opinion on the way in which the weapons were distributed, but the truth is that in the sector of the city where Colonel Caamaño's command was located, the presence of weapons, of machineguns, was visible and clear; of all citizens in the streets and of all who were around us, each citizen carried a machinegun, so the weapons were as numerous as the persons who were around us. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT Does the Ambassador of Guatemala wish to give any opinion in this respect?

Mr. GARCÍA BAUER. Yes, of course it could be seen in the city, as far as we could see, that automatic and other weapons were in the hands of many young civilians, and even of women. Now, according to information I received early Sunday morning, April 25, many young civilians were armed with automatic weapons from the 16 de Agosto Camp.

The PRESIDENT, The Representative of El Salvador, Mr. Clairmont Dueñas.

Mr. CLAIRMONT DUEÑAS. Thank you, fellow Delegates. I have a second question, if the President will permit me. I wish to ask the members of the Committee if they have seen, foreseen, or gathered, according to how we use the term, the possibility that the sector controlled by Colonel Caamaño is receiving weapons supplied by another country, not the Dominican Republic—from another country, let us say, Cuba—of its using the weapons that they have there at this time.

The PRESIDENT, The Representative of Colombia, Ambassador Vázquez Carrizosa.

Mr. VÁZQUEZ CARRIZOSA. There is such a profusion of machineguns in the sector of the city that we visited that in reality the importation of this item is unnecessary.

The PRESIDENT, The representatives, who may wish to add something to the reply. The Representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Tejera París, has the floor.

Mr. TEJERA PARÍS. Mr. President, I should like to ask the Committee two questions, the first precisely about arms. Did the Committee learn of the existence, or was it able to verify that there is some system of distribution or some inventory whereby, in the forthcoming peacemaking activities, it could check what part of the arms has been returned? My experience in such matters has been that it is possible to have a very large part of the arms given to civilians returned, and then, by a supplementary house-to-house search they can be controlled. In general, the military are very good bureaucrats; they generally make inventories, and so the question I ask is not absurd.

The PRESIDENT, I refer the question to Ambassador Colombo, Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. COLOMBO, Mr. President, the question asked by the distinguished Ambassador of Venezuela I have also asked the various bands or groups in Santo Domingo. All of them were very sorry that they could not provide me with accurate pieces of evidence,

which would have been very valuable. When we were about to leave, in connection with the activities reported on in our dispatch, our report, the only part on which we obtained a reply that would help allay the Ambassador's fears was given by the United States, when the Ambassador of the United States in Santo Domingo told me that many of those who are arriving in the security zone bring arms with them and turn them in. I tried to go further into this question to ascertain the number of arms. The reply was not definite. I was told merely that this was a report that he had received from General Palmer, who had told the Ambassador of the United States that they had a certain amount of arms that were being turned in by people who were arriving in the zone for diverse reasons, many of whom were coming in search of food or medical care and who were voluntarily turning in their weapons. This is the only thing I can say, but I believe that I have contributed something to allay your fears, Mr. Ambassador; nothing more.

Mr. TEJERA PARÍS. Thank you very much, Mr. President. The other question would be this: I was very favorably impressed and feel optimistic at the fact that the Committee noted among both the Constitution- alists and the rebels a fervent desire to have the OAS intervene to seek a solution; and that even, according to what I think I heard the Chairman of the Committee say, Colonel Caamaño himself said that he rejected the Security Council solution and preferred an OAS solution, because it belongs to the system. Now I should like to ask you this: Did the Committee explore the possibility, or did it hear of any methodology of any special system, for example, the presence of a high commission of eminent persons or a high commission of good offices that could assist in returning the country to constitutional normalcy now? Does the Committee believe that there would be some possibility that such a solution would be acceptable to all the bands in conflict? I understand that now there is another change in the country.

The PRESIDENT, I refer the question to the Committee members. Mr. Vázquez Carrizosa, please.

Mr. VÁZQUEZ CARRIZOSA. It is still premature to go into that. Of course, we can find evidence of contact, points of common reference, but within an atmosphere of tension and anxiety such as surrounded us, it is difficult right now to think of formulas for a government that might unite the two parts. I do not exclude it as a possibility for the future, but apart from a similar reference to the Organization of American States, I think it is impossible for the Committee (although my colleagues may believe otherwise) to answer that question more precisely. No system came into view. The thing is it was not our job to investigate political conditions of a new government. Our mission, which was precisely set forth by the resolution of May 1, was to obtain a cease-fire, guarantees for the departure of refugees, and safe conditions for the embassies, and also to organize humanitarian aid. Moreover, the terms of the resolution of May 1 did not authorize us to enter into discussions of matters that are the concern of the Dominican people, and personally, my theory is that our mission was essentially to bring about peace—not to prejudice the will of the Dominicans regarding their own future; at least, that is my reasoning.

The PRESIDENT, The floor goes to the Representative of Guatemala, member of the Committee, to reply to certain aspects of the question raised by Mr. Tejera París.

Mr. GARCÍA BAUER. There is no better way to answer the question raised by the Ambassador of Venezuela than to refer him to the terms of reference of the May 1 resolution of this meeting. The work mentioned by the Representative of Venezuela is not found in

the terms of reference, and consequently, the Committee was prohibited from entering into that area. Undoubtedly, and this we have already said, there is a desire for understanding; there is an evident wish for peace, since a number of relationships are involved; there are people, friends of one side and of the other. The Dean of the Diplomatic Corps told us of how, through him, splendid acts of humanitarianism had been performed. People asked him about their friends rumored to be wounded or dead, and he was able to give them explanation and set their minds at rest. In other words, that atmosphere has existed, and if the Ambassador of Venezuela, for example, remembers the cable that I read earlier, it mentioned one of the members of this new junta who described Caamaño as a personal friend, and also mentioned a lawyer, whom some think to be a militant partisan of the revolutionary party of Juan Bosch. In other words, it shows that there is a desire for understanding, that that desire is evident, and, of course, that there is faith in the inter-American system. How is that desire to be channeled? How can the OAS help to solve that problem that essentially must be solved by the Dominicans themselves? That is something that must be considered at an opportune time by the system, by the organs of the system. I yield the floor to Ambassador Tejera París.

The PRESIDENT, The Special Delegate of Venezuela has the floor.

Mr. TEJERA PARÍS. I first want to explain that my question was not intended as criticism of the Committee, nor did I think that it could have wished to go beyond its terms of reference. I was only referring—perhaps I did not explain myself clearly—to the idea proposed informally by the Delegation of Costa Rica—I don't know if all of you know about this—for setting up a delegated committee, a committee that, by delegation of this conference, would go to the Dominican Republic for the purpose of carrying out the second part of the task of reestablishing peace—that is, the administration of the mechanics of reestablishing peace and a return to institutional normalcy, not the formation of a government and other such matters. Then I asked myself if such an idea had already occurred to other countries in some form or other, since such ideas are normal. That was my question. Now, I have a third one.

The PRESIDENT, The Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Colombo, will be so kind as to answer these questions.

Mr. COLOMBO. I want to say a couple of words regarding this concern of the distinguished Ambassador of Venezuela. I share the opinion just expressed by Ambassador García Bauer that our immediate job was to obtain a prompt peace. Also, we were obsessed with the fact—as undoubtedly everyone else was, without exception—that the solution to the Dominican Republic's political problem should be in complete keeping with the principle of self-determination of peoples, and that in the last analysis it was the Dominicans who must determine the direction of their institutional life. For us, it has been enough to know that they respect the jurisdiction and authority of the system and that the system assures the solution. But, Mr. President, with all respect to the Ambassador of Venezuela, neither do I think that this is the time to start discussing these matters, since, precisely for the reasons given by the Ambassador earlier, we should concentrate on the report and on the questions and answers from the Ambassadors and the Committee members respectively.

The PRESIDENT, The Special Delegate of Venezuela has the floor.

Mr. TEJERA PARÍS. I just want some personal information, as all of us do. And another thing. From my own country's experience, especially during the dictatorship of Pérez Jiménez, Communist infiltration is

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generally chaotic everywhere and tries to produce chaos in the various factions. Experience shows us that it is much easier and more common for Communists to ally themselves with elements of the extreme right than with liberal ones. And so I ask whether the Committee noted or inquired as to the presence of agents and provocateurs on the side of Benoit, Wessin y Wessin, and company, or whether they investigated the presence of Communists from the other side, because some of their action seem—give the impression of being—provocations rather than judicious acts.

The PRESIDENT. Would the Chairman of the Committee like to say something in this regard?

Mr. COLOMBO. Thank you, yes. That also is a very pertinent question, and I think that we answered it to a certain extent when we acknowledged the existence of snipers on both sides. That is, there are snipers everywhere; they are a general disturbing element throughout the country, although we cannot attribute to them the particular ideology mentioned by the Ambassador. But it is apparent that anyone who plays the part of a sniper and has escaped the normal command of either of two groups is following his own ideology. That is all, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. Would Ambassador Penna Marinho like to comment on the question presented by Ambassador Tejera Paris? Ambassador Vázquez Carrizosa? Ambassador Bauer? Would you like to, Mr. Ambassador?

Mr. VÁZQUEZ CARRIZOSA. Well, I just have this thought: if there are snipers in both parties, why can't they be snipers of the Wessin Communists, or snipers of the Caamaño rightists, or simply nationalists?

The PRESIDENT. Is there any comment on these last statements, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. COLOMBO. I should not like to continue this dialogue because that would lead us into a maze of conjectures, Mr. Ambassador, but I believe, and I will say, that there is a fundamental difference: Colonel Caamaño's commands recognized the existence of Communist elements that were seeking to infiltrate and to gain control of his movement—an affirmation that I did not hear, nor do I believe that any of the members heard it, from Colonel Benoit.

Mr. TEJERA PARIS. Maybe they are not so politically sensitive.

The PRESIDENT. Well, reportedly so, according to some opinions.

Mr. TEJERA PARIS. I thought as much, but I just wanted to make sure. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

The PRESIDENT. Our thanks to you, Mr. Ambassador. We shall now hear from the Ambassador of the United States, Mr. Bunker.

Mr. BUNKER. I would like to express on behalf of my delegation, and indeed on behalf of my Government, appreciation and praise to all of the members of the Committee of the Meeting, individually and collectively, who, under the brilliant leadership of my friend and colleague, Ambassador Colombo, have accomplished so much in so brief a period, and under, as they have described to us, the most difficult and trying circumstances. We have heard the report of the Committee this evening, and I am confident that this Meeting will agree with me, that the Act of Santo Domingo marks an outstanding achievement in what has been our priority objective under the terms of the resolution, an agreement on an effective cease-fire in the Dominican Republic. As Ambassador Colombo has reported, the Secretary of State has communicated to the Committee that the United States supports its work in Santo Domingo, and pledges to cooperate fully in the observance of the provisions of the Act of Santo Domingo.

Mr. COLOMBO. Mr. President, something has gone wrong with the interpreting equipment, because I heard the English spoken by the Ambassador much more loudly than the Spanish interpreter to whom I was listening.

The PRESIDENT. Is the Ambassador's speaker turned too high?

Mr. BUNKER. Shall I proceed? Well, it seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that the questions which have been put by my distinguished colleague to the Committee, and the answers of the members, have shed further light and have made a very great contribution toward a greater understanding of the situation existing in the Dominican Republic; a contribution so valuable that I think it should become public knowledge, Mr. Chairman. I believe that it was agreed at our previous meeting that the proceedings of the private meetings and the records would become public. I trust that that will be so in this case, because I think the record is extremely valuable to provide a much wider public knowledge of the actual conditions in the Dominican Republic.

The Committee has succeeded in taking this first step of major importance. It seems to me that this meeting can now move to a second major stage of the task, for I think we can all agree that much remains to be done before conditions return to normal in that tragic and torn country. It is quite obvious, from what the Committee has said, that there is today no effective national government in the Dominican Republic. There are contending forces, each in control or perhaps quasi-control in separate areas, but no political grouping or faction can lay a well-founded claim to being the government of the country. I say quasi-control because we had word from our Embassy in Santo Domingo today that the palace inside the rebel zone, in which 400 people, I believe, have taken refuge, had been attacked three times during the day. This may be indeed a violation to the cease-fire.

But it remains, Mr. Chairman, for the Dominican people, with the help of the OAS to which I understand they are looking, from the words of the Committee, to organize a government and to provide for future constitutional arrangements of their own choosing. It seems to me that it is of the greatest importance that the OAS should endeavor to assist patriotic and outstanding citizens of the Dominican Republic, and I am sure they can be found, to establish a provisional government of national unity, which could eventually lead to a permanent representative regime through democratic processes.

Mr. Chairman, we must now seek to find paths of peace and to build on the base which has been established by this act of Santo Domingo. I want again to express the appreciation of my government for the splendid work of this Committee because they have established, through what they have done here, really the first and essential base for any further progress. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The PRESIDENT. I recognize the Representative of Uruguay, Ambassador Oribe.

Mr. ORIBE. Mr. President, I would like to second what the Ambassador of the United States has said with regard to making the minutes of this session public. I do this with the understanding, naturally, that they will be published as is usual; that is, that they will be complete, verbatim minutes. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. It is so agreed. Ambassador Facio, Special Delegate of Costa Rica.

Mr. FACIO. First, I would like to join in the congratulations given the distinguished members of the Special Committee for their splendid work. Second the question I am going to ask is to clarify a concern I have with respect to the possibility of securing an effective peace in the Dominican Republic. I wish to ask the members of the Committee if they interviewed Col. Caamaño or any members of his group after that band was established as what they allege to be the Constitutional Government of the Dominican Republic?

Mr. COLOMBO. The value of the Act of Santo Domingo is precisely that it was signed after

the establishment of Colonel Caamaño's group as the titular Constitutional Government, nothing more.

Mr. FACIO. Then, you had the opportunity to discuss with them their claim to be the only constitutional government of the Dominican Republic, because whether or not this claim can be maintained in either relative or absolute terms depends on their being peace through mediation between the two groups.

The PRESIDENT. The Chair again recognizes the Ambassador of Argentina.

Mr. COLOMBO. Mr. President, replying to the important question asked by the Ambassador of Costa Rica, I am pleased to tell him that the Committee delivered the Act previously to Colonel Caamaño for consideration, in order that he would have the opportunity of going into the intricacies of its legal implications, because what we wished to achieve was the first step that would lead all of us to achieve peace in the Dominican Republic, and if you read the beginning of the Act of Santo Domingo, it sets forth what Colonel Caamaño and Colonel Guerra thought of the Act and the opinion of the parties. I recall simply that it reads: "The Parties signing below who declare that they represent, in the capacities mentioned," that is, in the act of signing they declared their capacity and as we had no authority to pass judgment on the titles, which would have implied a dangerous incursion into a territory that was forbidden to us, we limited ourselves to record the capacity of each one of the groups and with all loyalty to say to frankly and without any legal doubt at the beginning of that Act which would, undoubtedly, be the road to begin working seriously to bring definitive peace to Santo Domingo.

The PRESIDENT. Ambassador Facio wishes to ask another question.

Mr. FACIO. Many thanks. No, I am satisfied and, of course, the question did not imply any criticism whatsoever or any desire that they depart from that norm.

The PRESIDENT. Ambassador Vázquez Carrizosa, the Special Delegate of Colombia.

Mr. VÁZQUEZ CARRIZOSA. The Ambassador of Costa Rica asks whether the constitutional government invokes the qualification of government for the whole country and whether it authorizes the presence of another government.

Mr. FACIO. No. Naturally it is evident that each one of the parties which proclaims that it is the government aspires to this, but did you, specifically from this contact, reach the conclusion that Colonel Caamaño was in an irreducible position; not to yield. And I ask this question because after the signing of the Act of Santo Domingo, Caamaño has insisted that he does not accept the participation of an inter-American force and that the solution is that he is the President, and that he be recognized as Constitutional President, and that he represents legality.

Mr. COLOMBO. First of all, Mr. Ambassador, I would like to know whether this statement by Colonel Caamaño has been officially communicated.

Mr. FACIO. No, it is a publication.

Mr. COLOMBO. That is why I was very surprised that Colonel Caamaño transmitted that note.

Mr. FACIO. No, no, Doctor, it is a statement made in a newspaper.

Mr. COLOMBO. If we follow the newspapers in this process, Mr. Ambassador.

The PRESIDENT. The Representative of Colombia.

Mr. VÁZQUEZ CARRIZOSA. What the newspapers say is one thing and what really happens is another, but it should be noted that many news items that are published should be investigated or it should be known to what extent they correspond to what was said or to what is done. I can only say the following: the demarcation of the zone and the existence of a corridor communicating the San Isidro zone with the center of the

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city were discussed personally with Colonel Caamaño. There was even a doubt regarding the conditions of the guard in the corridor. An incident had occurred the day before—many incidents occur—regarding some patrol that had entered farther than the two blocks that on one side and the other were authorized by the regulations in order to safeguard this public road; and Doctor Héctor Arístides maintained that it was intolerable that United States patrols should go beyond the limits. The military adviser who accompanied us—he was the military adviser of the Ambassador of Guatemala—who had had the occasion to read the regulations and the truth regarding the incident, explained in perfectly fair terms the truth of the fact, rectifying Doctor Arístides' understanding, but as Doctor Arístides insisted, Colonel Caamaño intervened, with some vigor, to say "no, this is something between the military and we understand one another. I believe that what the military adviser says is true; I believe that it is acceptable; I have no objection." I am stating this fact in case it clears up your doubts.

The PRESIDENT. The Special Delegate of Guatemala, Mr. García Bauer.

Mr. GARCÍA BAUER. I only wished to mention, with regard to something that has been discussed before, especially by the Ambassador of Costa Rica and also with respect to a question that was asked before, that in Document 17 Add. 3, in which the fourth radio-telephone message of the Secretary General of the OAS, Doctor José A. Mora, reports—you all have the document before you—that the Military Junta has already traveled to Santo Domingo and is installed in the National Congress, it states, Center of the Heroes, then—

The PRESIDENT. Of the Military Junta that traveled to Santo Domingo? The fifth or the—

Mr. GARCÍA BAUER. Yes, the Military Junta that was in San Isidro. It doesn't say here whether it was the five-man Junta or the three-man Junta, because I don't know if it was done before the five-man one was established, and then, in today's May 7 document, it says: "as to what is happening here, the situation continues to be very delicate, since the cease-fire agreement is being enforced with great difficulty. It is particularly affected by radio broadcasts that confuse and excite the population. Every effort is being made to stop the Santo Domingo station from issuing messages that excite the people. If this is achieved it would prevent a state of violence. The same is true with respect to the San Isidro Radio. Yesterday I went to the two broadcasting stations and transmitted a message intended to calm feelings and calling upon the Dominican people to comply with the agreements in the Act of Santo Domingo. Nevertheless, Radio Santo Domingo and Radio San Isidro continue sending messages that aid in inflaming spirits and maintaining the situation of violence." And this same document mentions the asylees who have left and gives up-to-the-minute information regarding them. This is important in relation to the questions that we were asked previously.

The PRESIDENT. Thank you very much. Is Ambassador Facio satisfied?

Mr. FACIO. Thank you very much.

The PRESIDENT. The Representative of Honduras, Ambassador Midence.

Mr. MIDENCE. My delegation wishes to join in the congratulations extended to the Committee for its magnificent work under such difficult circumstances. My Delegation feels sure that the report that has been presented today will be of immense value to this Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Thank you very much.

The PRESIDENT. Ambassador Bonilla Atilas, Special Delegate of the Dominican Republic.

Mr. BONILLA ATILAS. Mr. President, Delegates: I think that of all the delegates pres-

ent here none can feel the pain that I have at what I have heard tonight. Words were too few to express my appreciation to the members of the Committee. I have just had a long-distance telephone conversation, from Santo Domingo, with Mr. Antonio Imbert, and he told me that in a search for possible solutions the Military Junta had turned its power over to a civilian-military junta composed of: Antonio Imbert, president; Julio Ortigo, Alejandro Seller, Carlos Grisolia Paloné, and Colonel Pedro Benoit. This junta will try to cooperate with the mission from the Organization of American States to find solutions, which are still premature to discuss. He also informed me that the Junta has discussed with Dr. Mora the problem of the radio broadcasts, and it has been proved that Radio San Isidro has not made any inflammatory broadcasts. As to the last attack on the National Palace, of which Ambassador Bunker spoke, he confirmed to me that there are civilian refugees there.

I am not mentioning this as accusation but as fact. What interests me most at the moment, since it involves my own responsibility and that of the government, whichever it may be, and that of the Dominican people, is that out of this meeting shall come the necessary and imperative declaration that what is happening in Santo Domingo threatens the peace of the hemisphere. After knowing the facts, this is the only justification this body has for having taken the steps that it has. I do not propose that this problem be dealt with or discussed tonight because it seems to me that we are all sufficiently tired, morally and physically, so as to be unable to face this problem immediately; but I do urge the Tenth Meeting of Consultation as soon as possible to make emphatically this decision, so that the fire will not be extinguished, not only in the Western Hemisphere but in all political quarters of the world. I have nothing more to say.

Mr. PENNA MARINHO. Mr. President, before ending this session and to a certain extent supplementing the report of the special committee, which has just been submitted by its Chairman, Ambassador Ricardo Colombo, allow me to mention one point that ought to be brought to the attention of this Meeting of Consultation. I wish to refer to the magnificent activities of Monsignor Emmanuel Clarizio, the Papal Nuncio in Santo Domingo. He is an exceptional figure, a veritable Don Camillo on a grand scale, with free entrée into all political areas of Santo Domingo. With astonishing ease, he leaves the headquarters of Colonel Caamaño to go to the Government Junta and from there to the American Embassy. He is a respected friend of Caamaño, as he is of Benoit and of Ambassador Bennett. They all like him and they all have the same high regard for him. It is due to his thorough understanding of things, to his moving spirit of human solidarity and to his profound love for the Dominican people, that the drama in that country did not assume more terrible proportions. I know that the Meeting of Consultation has already paid just tribute to Monsignor Emmanuel Clarizio, but it never will be too much to point out, for the eternal gratitude of America, the admirable labor of this extraordinary prelate in behalf of peace and tranquillity in the troubled Dominican Republic. The Delegation of Brazil, expressing sentiments that I know are those of all of the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, manifests its deep appreciation and above all its admiration for the continuous and tireless collaboration rendered by Monsignor Emmanuel Clarizio, Papal Nuncio in Santo Domingo, to the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation during its stay in the Dominican Republic. Thank you very much.

The PRESIDENT. Ambassador Ricardo Colombo has the floor.

Mr. COLOMBO. Mr. President, with deep feeling the Delegation of Argentina wishes to add to the words of the Ambassador of Brazil concerning the outstanding work of the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, that messenger of peace in the Dominican Republic. The only tribute—because everything has already been said—that I can pay under the circumstances, is to repeat here, Mr. Chairman, before the entire meeting, his final words of good-bye to us: Take—he said to me—my blessing to the Meeting of Foreign Ministers that they may achieve the high objectives of peace; the peace that, at all costs, must be preserved in this Republic where I hold this apostleship. Nothing more, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. Ambassador Vázquez Carrizosa, Special Delegate of Colombia, has the floor.

Mr. VÁZQUEZ CARRIZOSA. Mr. President, it is only right to say a few words, as my colleagues from Brazil and Argentina have already done, to emphasize the merits of the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, the Papal Nuncio, in the face of such a difficult situation. There is more; none of our action would have been possible without the advice, without the help of that eminent diplomatic representative. And still more, for the future—for it would be very difficult to think about the future of the Dominican Republic without speaking of him who so perfectly represents the ideal of Pope John XXIII concerning the coexistence of men of good will. But I have asked for the floor to speak on a point which may not be appropriate at this time but would be at another. Our report ends with several recommendations, which I do not propose to discuss at this session, but I do want to point them out, to the Chair so that at the time and in the way provided for in the regulations or when it is considered opportune, they may be submitted to the Tenth Meeting of Consultation for discussion, because they do not deal with political questions, such as those we have discussed intensely, but specific points on the future organization of activities in the Dominican Republic. They are specific points of the greatest urgency, such as supervision of the cease-fire, the appointment of a group qualified to organize the relief measures for the Dominican people and evaluate their needs, the study and planning of an Inter-American Force and the coordination of all its services. Detailed, careful, and immediate consideration of these points seems to me absolutely necessary. Thank you very much.

The PRESIDENT. The Special Delegate of Guatemala, member of the Committee, has the floor.

Mr. GARCÍA BAUER. At this time I only wish to refer to the tribute that my colleagues, the members of the Committee, have already paid to the Papal Nuncio and Dean of the Diplomatic Corps in Santo Domingo, Monsignor Emmanuel Clarizio, for the great work that he has performed since this grave conflict began in the Dominican Republic. The Papal Nuncio was exceptionally kind to the Committee, offering it every facility within his power, and it was through his great services that the Committee was able to accomplish what it did. He was present, tirelessly, at our interviews with Colonel Caamaño's command and with the Military Junta and, because the confidence both parties have in him, the Act of Santo Domingo was signed. He always used persuasion to the effect that the purposes for which the Organization of American States was in Dominican territory should be borne in mind. As the Ambassador of Brazil has said, the Papal Nuncio was respected in every area, regardless of which authority was in power. He is a person who has the confidence of the different parties and through his good offices, because of the great collaboration he rendered, the Committee was able to accomplish its task. Hence the Committee was moved and felt that its

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own wishes were fulfilled when, at the Papal Nunciature in Santo Domingo, we delivered to the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps the message from the President of the Tenth Meeting, Mr. Sevilla Sacasa, notifying him of the action of this Meeting some days ago concerning Monsignor Clarizio's work.

The PRESIDENT. Ambassador Colombo, Special Delegate of Argentina has the floor.

Mr. COLOMBO. I only wish to add one remark that seems to be strictly justifiable. In order to be able to act with the urgency that the case requires, the five-member Committee had to move up its return so that the Tenth Meeting could be as thoroughly informed as possible with all available data, but we were deeply concerned that before our departure the fundamental problem of the faith in the system as stated by the two sides in the struggle would not have been resolved, and the Committee was the link, at the scene of action, during the emergency, remaining in order to be able to carry out the powers accepted by both parties. It was for this reason that the Delegate of Panama, in an act that honors him, and which I cannot ignore, remained at the center of action, representing our mission. In this way, according to the conversations we held with the parties, it would be as though the Committee were present and together with military advisers and the civilian personnel he could undertake to solve whatever it might be possible to solve, to the extent that we are able—to solve the difficulties arising from the events that have taken place and that are taking place in the Dominican Republic. I want this generous act of the Delegate of Panama, from a country that has so many reasons for counting on the tradition of brotherliness in solving basic problems, to be recognized at this session. Panama is with us on the Committee, represented by its distinguished Delegate. Ambassador Calamari also wanted to be here, physically, with the Committee but was not able to do so. I want to stress this act of the Delegate of Panama because it is eminently fair to do so—to take note of one who has firmly carried the banner of the inter-American system into the midst of the fight. Nothing more.

The PRESIDENT. We are sure that our colleague, Ambassador Calamari, must be gratified by the eulogy given by his compatriot and our dear colleague, Ambassador Frank Morrice. [Sic]

Ambassador Diez de Medina, Special Delegate of Bolivia, has asked for the floor; and then Ambassador Tejera Paris, Special Delegate of Venezuela.

Mr. DIEZ DE MEDINA. Mr. Chairman, I have not asked for the floor to pose any question. I have no questions to ask. I have only words of praise—of warm praise and congratulations—for the distinguished members of the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, for the intelligent and devoted manner in which they carried out the delicate mission entrusted to the Committee. I only wish, Mr. President, to add my wish that the minutes of this plenary session should also include words of congratulation and appreciation for the task being so successfully performed in the Dominican Republic by Dr. José Antonio Mora, Secretary General of the Organization of American States. Thank you very much.

The PRESIDENT. Very well, we shall do so. Ambassador Colombo, the Special Delegate of Argentina has the floor.

Mr. COLOMBO. The Ambassador of Bolivia is quite right in proposing formal recognition of the fact that the Committee was able to fulfill its mission because of the brilliant efforts that were begun by Dr. José A. Mora before our arrival in the Dominican Republic. Appreciation should also be expressed to the Secretariat, which, although few in number gave much in efforts and efficiently contributed to the success of our actions. There-

fore, I second the Ambassador of Bolivia's proposal but would like to point out that we had intended to submit this matter during the session.

The PRESIDENT. The Ambassador of Bolivia and the Committee have interpreted the feelings and thoughts of the Chair and of all our colleagues very well. Ambassador Tejera Paris, Special Delegate of Venezuela has the floor.

Mr. TEJERA PARIS. The Delegate of Bolivia anticipated what I was thinking and what is certainly the thought of all of us here. My intention was I now confirm it, to ask the chair to ask this Tenth Meeting of Consultation to give to the Committee, to the Secretary General, and to the members of the General Secretariat a vote of applause for the work they have done. The test that the Committee has passed has been hard both there and here, and I believe that since this is a problem that affects the whole security of the hemisphere, these colleagues deserve not only our thanks but the thanks of our governments and of their peoples, and, at this moment, enthusiastic applause which I am sure the President will be the first to begin. [Applause.]

The PRESIDENT. All of us join in the praise and tribute the Special Committee has given to the prelate Emmanuel Clarizio, Papal Nuncio in the Dominican Republic and Dean of the Diplomatic Corps in Santo Domingo. We share in this with real appreciation, with affection, as our common duty. His services for the peace of the Americas, his vows and his blessings we applaud with emotion; with emotion, I say, which corresponds to the emotion that he experienced when he received our expression of deep gratitude for his magnificent labor for the peace of the Americas and for that people that we all love so well: the Dominican Republic. This closed plenary session has been highly important. We have heard the interesting report of the Special Committee. We have posed broad questions; we have obtained splendid and very clear replies, from which we can appreciate even more the extraordinary task accomplished by the Committee. Our repeated applause and eulogy for it and its members, all of whom we are honored to call our colleagues and friends. Unless you think otherwise a plenary session of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation should be indicated to consider the report in the aspects noted by the Committee, so that the meeting may act on that report. We have asked questions and have obtained answers; now comes the job of considering the report and analyzing the action to be taken by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation on the recommendations proposed by the Special Committee and the conclusions that it reached.

I ask you only whether tomorrow's plenary session should be open—I understand that it should be. It should be open so that the public will know everything that we have said, both with respect to the work of the Committee and to the contents of its interesting report. I would call another closed meeting, if the Committee so wishes, but the meeting I am going to convoke for a little later today, should be public and its purpose will be to consider the report of the Special Committee, discuss it and propose decisions concerning the recommendations it makes. The delegates have already seen and have in your briefcases for later reading the fourth radio-telephone message from our Secretary General, Dr. Mora.² It is not necessary to have the Secretary read it, since I am sure all of you have read it. With respect to the minutes of this plenary session, I ask you to take note that you have 24 hours in which to give the Secretariat your corrections of

² The complete text of the fourth message of the Secretary General is published as Document 17 add. 3.

style. I ask you to take note of that time period so that the Secretariat can speed up the final edition of the minutes of the plenary session.

Mr. COLOMBO. Mr. President, I should like you to repeat the last part as to the time and place, according to the Chair's plan, as was suggested. Please do me the great favor of repeating it.

The PRESIDENT. Yes, sir. We are going to adjourn the session and meet again in a few hours, let's say, perhaps this afternoon. It will be a plenary session of the Tenth Meeting, public, for the purpose of considering the report of the Special Committee. To consider it, analyze it, discuss it, and decide on the recommendations and conclusions reached by the Committee. It is assumed that this session should be public. The next plenary session will not be closed like this one; it will be public, so that public opinion of the hemisphere will be informed, but not just of what is in the report of the Special Committee, because I am hereby suggesting that the report should be made public, unless for some reason the members of the Committee indicate to the Chair that it should not be made public but that we ought to wait until tomorrow's session.

Mr. COLOMBO. Absolutely, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. Therefore, gentlemen, as of now the report of the Special Committee is public. Consequently, it can be turned over to the press and sent to anyone wishing it. Naturally, if at tomorrow's meeting we reach conclusions on the suggestions made by the Committee, we shall feel highly gratified. In any case I think that the time has come for the Meeting of Consultation to make concrete statements on the chaotic situation that seems to grow worse every hour. Therefore, within 5 or 6 hours, possibly for 4 or 5 o'clock this afternoon, I am going to convoke the fifth plenary session of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation to meet in this same place and take up the report of the Committee.

The Representative of Venezuela.

Mr. TEJERA PARIS. Mr. President, only to ask if you would be good enough to include in the order of business two specific points that I believe are relevant to the announcement you have just made: first would be consideration of whether or not the present situation in the Dominican Republic affects the security of the hemisphere; second, establishment and implementation of measures to help the Dominican people return to full constitutional democracy.

The PRESIDENT. Very well; it seems to me there is no objection to discussing these two points in the public session we shall hold shortly—the one suggested by the distinguished Representative of Uruguay and supported by the Representative of Venezuela, and the other just mentioned by the distinguished Ambassador Tejera Paris. I recognize the Representative of the Dominican Republic.

Mr. BONILLA ATELES. Mr. President, I shall wait until tomorrow to formally present a draft resolution on my proposal that the Organ of Consultation declare the situation in the Dominican Republic to be a threat to the peace of the hemisphere.

The PRESIDENT. Very well. The Representative of Paraguay has requested the floor.

Mr. YÓDICE. I only wish to ask two questions, Mr. President. I understand, or rather, I actually heard you mention a decision on the request of the Delegate of the United States that the minutes of today's session be made public. This request was seconded by the distinguished Representative of Uruguay. From this I assume, that is, I hope, because the suggestion is also mine, that it will be agreed to make public the minutes of this session.

The PRESIDENT. The chair has so resolved. Mr. YÓDICE. I beg your pardon. Thank you.

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The PRESIDENT. That's quite alright.

Mr. YODICE. Now, I have another question to ask of the distinguished Representative of Costa Rica, arising from an earlier statement by the Ambassador of Venezuela, because it refers to the matter of considering measures to bring democratic normality to the Dominican Republic, and during this Tenth Meeting of Consultation, I don't recall having heard any informal proposal by the distinguished Ambassador Facio regarding the establishment, as the distinguished Ambassador of Guatemala said, of a committee of statesmen, or something similar. Therefore, I would like to ask if Ambassador Facio did or did not make such an informal proposal, because I would not want to fail to inform my foreign ministry of something that had been proposed here. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. Thank you. The Delegate of Costa Rica.

Mr. FACIO. Mr. Representative of Paraguay, I have not yet made any proposal of this sort. Perhaps it can be clarified in this way: there has been some discussion of a proposal, but not one of mine, to put some of the recommendations of the Committee into effect. I shall be very happy to give you a copy at the end of this session. But the proposal was not made by Costa Rica; it has been discussed among several delegations but is nothing specific.

Mr. YODICE. I understand. Thank you. I wanted to know if it was proposed here.

The PRESIDENT. Ambassador Tejera Paris. Mr. TEJERA PARIS. I would like to ask the Committee on Credentials if it would be possible to have a meeting early tomorrow to re-examine all our credentials, because it appears there are certain doubts that should be clarified in the light of the information transmitted in the cable that the Ambassador of the Dominican Republic reported on a short time ago.

The PRESIDENT. Ambassador Jácome, the Representative of Ecuador.

Mr. JÁCOME. As Chairman of the Committee on Credentials I can report that I have called a meeting of the Committee for tomorrow at 3:30 p.m. Any representative who has any doubt as to himself or to his colleagues may present his complaints to the Committee.

The PRESIDENT. Gentlemen, we have taken note of the announcement just made by our colleague, the Chairman of the Committee on Credentials, and it is now the time to adjourn the session and to announce that the fifth plenary session of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation will be held here this afternoon at 4 p.m. The session is adjourned.

[From the Baltimore (Md.) Sun, June 9, 1965]

AN EXPERT'S VIEW OF SANTO DOMINGO (By Vernon Sherwin)

SAN JUAN.—President Johnson was quite right in dispatching troops to the Dominican Republic and the administration was equally wrong in giving the impression that they were sent there to support Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin, in the opinion of Rufio López-Fresquet.

Dr. López is no novice in Latin American affairs in either their peaceful or violent aspects. A Cuban by birth and a democrat by nature, he was forced into exile while still a student at the University of Havana for his opposition to the dictatorship of President Gerardo Machado. Maturity and education gained in Mexico and the United States made Dr. López an abler opponent to Machado's successor tyrant, Fulgencio Batista. He became chief money raiser for Fidel Castro and served as the first Secretary of the Treasury in the revolutionary government. He resigned the post when he sensed the direction the regime was taking.

Now in his second period of exile at the

age of 53, Dr. López is serving as an economic advisor to the Puerto Rican Treasury Department.

Dr. López believes the Dominican affair is the latest, but certainly not the last, manifestation of a social revolution underway throughout Latin America. This movement, he says, is sparked not by the masses as might be superficially assumed, but by an emerging middle class that is opposed to both the present aristocratic oligarchy and communism. The masses seek a better lot wherever it may be found.

The middle-class revolutionists are, he says, liberal democrats who want no more Batistas, Trujillos or Perons and would greatly prefer economic alliance with the United States to Castro's 6,000-mile supply line to Soviet Russia.

Had the Marines landed at the International Airport in Santo Domingo rather than at the Dominican Air Force base held by General Wessin and been sent from there on their primary mission of aiding the trapped U.S. citizens a proper impression of neutrality could have been created, Dr. López believes.

This would have opened the way for a civilian government of professional and businessmen and intellectuals of the middle class with which the United States must ally itself throughout Latin America, Dr. López says, if the cold war is to be won.

And this alliance was the policy of President Kennedy, he believes, and is the policy of President Johnson. Its failure to materialize he lays to a breakdown in the chain of communication between State Department agents in the field and the White House.

The breakdown, Dr. López says, stems from the tendency of too many American diplomats to associate only with the ruling aristocrats in Latin America and to ignore the rising middle class which has neither the money to join the country club nor the time to play golf. Yet they are the yeast in the social ferment.

As for the act of intervention itself in the Dominican Republic, Dr. López says that there is widespread misconception of the intent and purpose of the Pan American agreement on nonintervention in the internal affairs of member nations.

The idea was broached at the Pan American meeting in Montevideo in 1933, he says, as a proposed protection against economic intervention, i.e., the dispatching of marines to protect a defaulted loan and like unpleasanties the United States had been known to engage in. To this President Roosevelt readily agreed as a symbol of sincerity in his Good Neighbor policy.

"We are now engaged with events that were unforeseen at that time," Dr. López says. "We are at war. A cold war if you like, but we are faced with an enemy who is out to bury us."

In this new situation, he asserts, the Montevideo accord on nonintervention does not apply.

"The Organization of American States has stated that communism is incompatible with the democratic principles of Latin America. The United States has a right to intervene against the Communists—the enemy."

Dr. López believes that Communists were involved in the Dominican disorders.

"They are everywhere," he says, "and they are trained to infiltrate popular movements."

Their number is immaterial, he says, for 53 trained Communists working with an armed civilian militia would be plenty under the chaotic conditions that prevailed early in the revolt.

Where the United States made a mistake, Dr. López says, was in trying to name them. He suspects that someone in the Santo Domingo Embassy had not done his homework and, when pressed for names, reached to the files and came up with an old list.

"Why should the United States name them?" he asks. "The United States was not on trial."

Castro, ever under the scrutiny of Dr. López, "played it cool" in the Dominican affair. Had the marines not landed, he says, Castro's troops would have.

President Johnson's quick move forestalled action by the Cuban leader, in the opinion of Dr. López, because Castro feared that an open confrontation in the Dominican Republic would lay him open to attack on his home grounds.

"We had hoped that he would make this mistake," he says, "but he didn't."

The present situation in the Dominican Republic has been complicated by the United States allowing the impression to be gained that it backed General Wessin, Dr. López says.

He believes that Wessin is still running the show with Gen. Antonio Imbert Barrera as a front, rendering any compromise with the rebel forces of Col. Francisco Caamaño Deno unlikely.

Dr. López describes Imbert as an aspirant to the toga of Trujillo.

"Imbert is a petty business man," he says, "who was handed an honorary army commission for his part in the plot to assassinate Trujillo. He promptly donned a uniform, covered himself with decorations and insisted upon being addressed by his full title. It is not difficult for even an amateur psychologist to understand that sort of personality."

Dr. López is well-acquainted with Juan Bosch, constitutional president of the Republic ousted by General Wessin. Bosch spent many years in Cuba, exiled by Trujillo. Now both he and Dr. López are exiles in San Juan.

Dr. López knows Bosch as a scholar, an honest man and a sincere democrat whose feet are not on the ground. Without administrative experience and lacking in executive ability, he was inefficient as president, Dr. López says, and was in some degree responsible for his own upset.

He criticizes Bosch for unwise remarks during the first 72 hours of the Dominican revolt and for not taking an anti-Communist stand during that period. In the latter instance, Dr. López says, he forfeited his responsibility as a democratic leader and missed an opportunity to influence the thinking of many Americans and thus help shape U.S. policy.

With the Wessin-Imbert and Caamaño forces implacably opposed and Bosch a reluctant hero, whither the course of government?

"It is time," Dr. López says, "that democracy became sophisticated, as sophisticated as the enemy it faces. Democracy should become militant and must fight both the Reds and the right." (The right, that is, as represented by aristocratic power structures and military governments.)

Making no claim as to its infallibility, Dr. López advances this plan of action in the Dominican Republic:

Maintain the status quo in Santo Domingo, holding rebel and junta forces at bay. Beat the bushes for liberal middle class civilians—mayors of other cities, former members of the Bosch regime, professional and business men—and set up a new government in Santiago. Give this new group the army payroll and make Imbert and Caamaño come to Santiago to get it.

Neither would be long in recognizing the new setup, Dr. López thinks, and a new army could be formed around a cadre of younger officers, including military attachés with first-hand contact with democratic processes called home for the purpose.

"This might not work," Dr. López admits, "but I would try it. I don't think the Latin American combined force will become a liv-

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ing thing, but it is a good idea for the United States to work at it so that in the future they will have a record of having tried.

"The United States must succeed in the Dominican Republic. It is vital to set a precedent for future trouble spots which will surely develop."

REPORTING: TAKING SIDES IN SANTO DOMINGO

Covering the war in the Dominican Republic has been a battle in itself. Reporters have found U.S. officials, both military and civilian, closemouthed and uncooperative, when information has been given out, it has often been wrong. When reporters have taken to the streets for their stories, they have been shot at by snipers, have hitched rides with hysterical drivers while bullets whizzed past. They spend much of their time helping the wounded to hospitals.

Aggravated by one thing or another, most of the 160-man press corps has soured on the U.S. position and flocked to rebel headquarters, where people seemed anxious to make their case to reporters. Predisposed to side with the underdog against a Latin American military junta and against U.S. military intervention, many of the correspondents wrote glowing accounts of their fleeting interviews with the rebels.

Cabled the New York Herald Tribune's Barnard Collier: "The U.S. action was meant to thwart internationally trained Communists who are fighting alongside the leftist rebels. Its effect has been to give the Communist world a rallying cry, to create dozens of Dominican Communist martyrs, and to turn an increasing number of rebels against the United States." Said New York Timesman Tad Szulc: "The United States finds itself identified with a military junta that is widely hated, and it may be standing on the threshold of a violent showdown with the highly popular rebel movement."

Los Angeles Timesman Ruben Salazar interviewed a rebel accused by the State Department of being a Communist: "Florentino doesn't look dangerous. He's slight of build and sports a thin mustache. I went away wishing we had done something to win him to our side." Wrote Dan Kurzman of the Washington Post: "Innumerable conversations have strongly indicated overwhelming popular support for the rebel regime and a corresponding anti-American sentiment arising from U.S. antagonism toward that regime."

WARY OF CLAIMS

Back in the United States, many editorialists and columnists sided with the men in the field. Said the New York Times: "Little awareness has been shown by the United States that the Dominican people—not just a handful of Communists—were fighting and dying for social justice and constitutionalism." Even Walter Lippmann, who had supported the U.S. intervention, hoped for the success of what he called the "legitimatist party—that of the Constitutionalists." But the fact is that Col. Francisco Caamaño Defio, boss of the so-called Constitutionalists, had helped overthrow the Constitutional President, Juan Bosch, in 1963. And the Bosch constitution that Caamaño was supposedly supporting forbids any military man—Caamaño, for example—to hold office.

Not all reporters, to be sure, were happy with the rebels. Warned the Herald Tribune's Rowland Evans and Robert Novak: "Adventurers are running the rebel command, but they maintain only tenuous control over all their forces. Rebel strongpoints, particularly in the southeast section of Santo Domingo, are manned by Communists with only token allegiance to Caamaño." And after spending a week in Santo Domingo, Newsday's Marguerite Higgins filed another minority report: "Be wary of all those claims of widespread support for the rebel Constitutionalists of the loyalist junta. This reporter

has been impressed by the hazards of trying to diagnose the feelings of a massively illiterate nation. Oddly enough, in this topsyturvy world, the very deftness with which Dominicans can switch sides may prove to be a strong card that the Americans can play in an effort to bring seemingly irreconcilable factions together."

NO CHILD'S PLAY

Through it all, U.S. Government spokesmen were baffled by the antagonism of the press. Some reporters seemed determined to become policymakers. The Trib's Collier complained to U.S. officials that marines were allowed to shoot back when shot at from outside the international zone. "He got quite upset," says one. "He refused to understand that this is not child's play and that our men must protect themselves." Both Collier and Szulc reported last week that U.S. troops were helping the loyalists fight the rebels in northern Santo Domingo, but no other reporters confirmed this story, and many flatly contradicted it. The New York Times ran an Air Force picture purportedly showing U.S. troops aiding the junta last week by arresting rebels. Actually, the photo was taken 2 weeks ago in the international zone, where rebels were being rounded up for suspected sniping. The Trib ran a similarly slanted photo of a marine firing his rifle, with a caption that upbraided him for defending himself.

Among the trump cards in the U.S. Government's hand is a devastating report of five OAS ambassadors that backs up U.S. contention that Communists played a substantial part in the revolution. Yet when the report was first issued on May 8, not a single U.S. paper picked it up. Next day Ellsworth Bunker, U.S. Ambassador to the OAS, held an hour-long press briefing on the report, but even that was given scant play in the press.

Finally, Alaska's Senator ERNEST GRUENING, one of the most vocal critics of administration policy in Vietnam, delivered a furious speech in the Senate: "Unhappily, the U.S. press has been gravely derelict in reporting what has transpired in the OAS with regard to the Dominican crisis. Commentators express doubts regarding the wisdom of expanding our mission to prevent a Communist takeover. Many reports question the extent of Communist infiltration. Yet, to my knowledge, none of the major wire services, newspapers, or radio-television systems have taken the trouble to examine the findings of the OAS investigating team."

LABOR DEPARTMENT ACCEPTS SUGGESTION TO BROADEN "TRAINING PROGRAM" REGULATIONS

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I call attention to the fact that the Labor Department, at my request, has just issued new regulations which very considerably broaden the opportunity for on-the-job training for employees. I believe these new regulations will open up many new opportunities for training.

On August 10, 1965, the Administrator of the Labor Department's Wage and Hour Division issued revised regulations dealing with training programs under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The amended regulations, which were prompted by an inquiry from me on April 26, 1965, liberalize the conditions under which an employer may establish a training program for his employees without running afoul of the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The regulations, which appear in title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations, define "hours worked" which must be paid at the minimum wage rate and counted for overtime purposes. Basically, the requirements for a training program which an employer may conduct for his employees without counting the training time as hours worked are: First, that the program be conducted outside regular working hours; second, that attendance be voluntary; third, that the program not be directly related to the employee's job; and, fourth, that the trainee perform no productive work during training time.

In my letter to the Administrator, I pointed out that the requirement that the program not be directly related to an employee's job had a tendency to deter employers from instituting bona fide programs for upgrading of employees. For example, if an employer institutes a program for mechanics' helpers to train them to be full-fledged mechanics, the program might be related to the employee's job because it would help the employee to be a better mechanics' helper. I also pointed out to the Administrator that an exception for this sort of program has always been included in the regulations under the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, and there is no reason why the same exception should not be made a part of the broader FLSA regulations.

The Administrator agreed with me, and a new section 785.29 of the regulations under the FLSA was issued last week which included the following:

Where a training course is instituted for the bona fide purpose of preparing for advancement through upgrading the employee to a higher skill, and is not intended to make the employee more efficient in his present job, the training is not considered directly related to the employee's job even though the course incidentally improves his skill in doing his regular work.

I would hope that the broader view reflected in these new regulations will provide added incentive for employers to institute additional training programs to help meet the ever-present challenge of automation.

I would also hope that workers and labor leaders will read this material very carefully and counsel their employers in their own States as to how training opportunities for workers may now be broadened.

BETH ISRAEL MEDICAL CENTER—COBALT THERAPY CENTER ENDOWED

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, it is clear to all concerned with the situation that Congress has taken giant strides in the field of medical care legislation this session. I was proud to be present at the signing of the recently enacted Social Security Amendments Act of 1965, providing medical care assistance to the aged, as well as at the signing of the Health Research Facilities Amendment Act of 1965, providing \$280 million for grants to hospitals and other medical centers for research and equipment to

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assist our struggle to defeat crippling diseases.

In light of these important activities of the Federal Government, activities which I have consistently supported, I would like to call attention to the fact that many private organizations are making similar progress on their own. Federal programs are designed to supplement the efforts of private, civic, or religious organizations, where the real initiative, management, and responsibility rests, and without these organizations and their response to the needs of their community, little could be accomplished in this most important field.

One organization of which we are very proud in New York, is the Beth Israel Medical Center. This particular center has been consistently expanding on its own to meet the growing needs of the area it serves, which is the area in which I grew up, the lower East Side of Manhattan.

Beth Israel began as a dispensary in 1889, financed by a group of 40 recently arrived immigrants, who were attempting to improve the quality of the medical services the people in the neighborhood were receiving. Since then it has maintained an exemplary record of service and improvement, so that today it is a modern medical complex with 891 beds. An outpatient clinic, named after a long-time friend, the president of the Beth Israel Board of Trustees, Charles H. Silver, was added in 1954 and it now handles over 8,500 cases per year. In 1961, a modern student nurses residence and medical unit was added, and is now being converted into a new school of nursing. New staff living quarters were completed in 1963, and a new 350-bed wing is presently being constructed.

But, Beth Israel has also expanded in other ways. It operates the Gouverneur Ambulatory Clinic, in cooperation with the New York City Department of Hospitals, and has recently been asked to staff all of the medical services of the new 200-bed Gouverneur Hospital, presently under construction by the city of New York. Further, in 1964 Beth Israel purchased the Manhattan General Hospital, a major center for the treatment and study of problems of narcotic addiction. This addition allowed the hospital to be redesignated a medical center, complete with a wide range of up-to-date facilities for treatment of a variety of diseases. In keeping with its new position of importance, it plans to open the Mount Sinai Medical School in 1968.

With this record of improvement and expansion, it might be expected that those who have assumed the responsibility for the leadership of the center's activities would want to relax with a proper amount of pride in their accomplishments. But this is not the case, for they have continued their efforts to improve the services they offer their community and, indeed, the entire city of New York.

Construction of a new cobalt therapy center to assist in the treatment of cancer is now planned. This would provide a tremendous improvement in the quality of the treatment the center will be able to offer, and it is particularly interesting that this boon to New Yorkers

has been made possible almost entirely by the efforts of one man, an old friend and schoolmate of mine, from P.S. 20, Charles Guttman. I think it is an important tribute to the strength of the free enterprise system that Charles Guttman could start a life in the public schools of the Lower East Side of Manhattan, become a successful businessman, and retain his public spiritedness and interest in his city's welfare to the extent that he would finance this therapy center, which will cost over a third of a million dollars. I need not point out what a great undertaking this is for a private citizen, and how much of a sacrifice it represents.

Mr. Guttman's gift once again proves the utmost importance of private philanthropy today, even while we continue to make progress in bringing the resources of the Nation to bear in the field of medical care and research. I know that this new center of modern therapy will be a lasting monument to his devotion to the people of his city. Today, I want to add my thanks to that of millions of New Yorkers, and to wish him and his family the best of health and happiness in the efforts to come.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PUBLIC WORKS APPROPRIATIONS, 1966

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 9220) making appropriations for certain civil functions administered by the Department of Defense, the Panama Canal, certain agencies of the Department of the Interior, the Atomic Energy Commission, the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the Delaware River Basin Commission, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, and for other purposes.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, the Senate has under consideration this afternoon, H.R. 9220, a bill making appropriations for public works which includes the civil functions of the Department of Defense, the Panama Canal, the Interior Department with respect to reclamation projects, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the Atomic Energy Commission.

The amount of the bill passed by the House aggregates \$4,241,636,500. The Senate made a net increase in the sum adopted by the House of \$85,952,500. Therefore, the total in the bill as reported to the Senate is \$4,327,589,000.

The amount of the Budget estimates considered by the Senate for fiscal year 1966 is \$4,387,616,000.

So the bill are reported to the Senate is under the Budget estimate by \$60,027,000, and under the appropriation for 1965 by \$41,427,700.

Mr. President, before the Senate for consideration is the bill that deals with

moneys appropriated for the civil functions of the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, the TVA, certain agencies of the Department of the Interior including the Bureau of Reclamation, and the Delaware River Basin Commission. I am very hopeful that consideration of the bill can be concluded this afternoon, so that, as soon as possible, we may go to conference with the House on the disagreeing amendments.

The bill passed the House on June 22 and was referred to the Committee on Appropriations on June 23. The bill was reported to the Senate on August 19.

I do not believe it is necessary for me to give a lengthy explanation of the bill. The report on it is on the desks of the Senators, and I believe it quite clearly sets forth the action of the committee.

Except for two or three items, I believe the bill is noncontroversial. I expect that amendments will be offered to decrease amounts recommended for certain public works projects.

At the conclusion of my statement, I will ask that the committee amendments be adopted en bloc and that the bill as thus amended be considered as original text, so that the Senate will have ample opportunity to work its will on the bill.

Mr. President, as is customary, the Subcommittee on Public Works divided itself into three subcommittees for the consideration of the pending bill. The portion of the public works appropriation bill dealing with the Bureau of Reclamation and the power marketing agencies of the Department of the Interior was handled by my good and able friend, the distinguished senior Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN], who is also the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations. The portion of the bill covering the Atomic Energy Commission and the Tennessee Valley Authority was handled by my good friend, the distinguished senior Senator from Alabama [Mr. HILL]. I handled the portion dealing with the civil functions of the Department of the Army, and the Interoceanic Canal Commission.

The hearings on this bill started on April 6 and continued through July 13, 1965. The subcommittee held 34 sessions for the purpose of taking testimony and 5 executive sessions for the purpose of marking up the bill. The subcommittee heard 889 witnesses, which included representatives of various organizations; 738 of the witnesses appeared before the subcommittee dealing with the civil functions of the Department of the Army; 121 of the witnesses appeared before the subcommittee headed by the senior Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN]. The remaining 30 witnesses appeared before the subcommittee headed by the senior Senator from Alabama [Mr. HILL]. The hearings comprise four volumes, which contain 3,868 pages of testimony. Senators have a complete set of them on their desks. They constitute the basic information upon which the subcommittee based its recommendation to the full committee.

Mr. President, with respect to title I, before marking up the civil functions portion of this bill, we reviewed every project that was presented to the subcommittee, budgeted or unbudgeted. We ex-